

# MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

*Volume VIII*

1946

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
TORONTO, CANADA

NIHIL OBSTAT.  
GEORGIUS B. FLAHIFF C.S.B.  
Cens. Dep.

IMPRIMATUR.  
✠ JACOBUS C. CARDINALIS McGUIGAN  
Archiep. Torontin.

*Published Annually by*  
THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT,  
TORONTO 5, CANADA  
SUBSCRIPTION \$5.00 A YEAR.  
*Managing Editor:* ALEX. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

---

Reprinted in the Netherlands  
ACADEMISCHE PERS N.V. — AMSTERDAM

## CONTENTS

Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas Aquinas.

|   |                                  |
|---|----------------------------------|
| I. St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV                   |                                  |
| <i>Romana Ecclesia: Ceterum</i> .....                           | I. Th. Eschmann O.P. 1           |
| Egypte ou Grèce? .....  | Etienne Gilson 43                |
| Philologisches zur Frühscholastik.....                          | Artur Landgraf 53                |
| <i>Esse</i> and <i>Essentia</i> in the Metaphysics              |                                  |
| of Siger of Brabant.....  | Armand Maurer C.S.B. 68          |
| The Date of the Parisian Decree on the Elevation                |                                  |
| of the Host.....  | V. L. Kennedy C.S.B. 87          |
| Caxton's <i>Golden Legend</i> and De Vignai's                   |                                  |
| <i>Légende Dorée</i> .....                                      | Sister Mary Jeremy O.P. 97       |
| The <i>De Amore</i> of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation  |                                  |
| of 1277 .....   | A. J. Denomy C.S.B. 107          |
| Notes sur le Vocabulaire de l'Etre.....                         | Etienne Gilson 150               |
| A Note on St. Thomas, <i>Summa Theologica</i> , I, 44, 1-2..... | Anton C. Pegis 159               |
| <i>Esse</i> and <i>Existere</i> in St. Bonaventure.....         | George P. Klubertanz S.J. 169    |
| Froissart as Poet.....  | B. J. Whiting..189               |
| Cataldus Rádhav. A Study in the Early History of                |                                  |
| Diocesan Supremacy in Ireland.....                              | John Hennig 217                  |
| Tractatus Magistri Guillelmi Alvernensis                        |                                  |
| <i>De Bono et Malo</i> .....                                    | J. Reginald O'Donnell C.S.B. 245 |
| Mediaevalia:  |                                  |
| 1. Andreas Capellanus:  |                                  |
| Discovered or Re-Discovered.....                                | A. J. Denomy C.S.B. 300          |
| 2. Ambrose on the <i>Praecursor Angelicus</i> .....             | Johannes Quasten 301             |
| 3. How Judicare Came into the Creed.....                        | Francis Lee Utley 303            |
| 4. An Ingot in Foreign Exchange.....                            | Raphael Levy 310                 |
| 5. Old-English Riddle I: "Fire" .....                           | L. K. Shook C.S.B. 316           |

COPYRIGHTED 1944, BY  
THE PONTIFICIAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 QUEEN'S PARK CRESCENT, TORONTO



# Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas Aquinas

## I. St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV *Romana Ecclesia: Ceterum*

### I. TH. ESCHMANN O.P.

#### 1. THE PROBLEM

THE problem of Corporate Delict, or, as it is often called nowadays, Collective-Guilt, is a much discussed and timely question. Though not in all respects,<sup>1</sup> nevertheless in certain fundamental points this problem is an old and much embattled question both in philosophy and in law, and the jurists and the theologians of the thirteenth century were accustomed to call its basic notion *delictum universitatis* or, more generally, *peccatum multitudinis*. Otto von Gierke had every reason to say that the question whether such delict is possible and how it is to be handled juridically was "the most discussed question in mediaeval Corporative Law".<sup>2</sup> And it was implicit in the historical and doctrinal structure of the question that any discussion of it should raise the main issues of social philosophy, viz. the notion of society, of common or societal action and, above all, the analogy involved in speaking of a social organism.

In the following study it is my purpose to investigate this problem in the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas with special reference to the philosophy of community or society contained within it.

This problem has not been treated with sufficient attention in modern Thomistic literature. In so far, however, as it has been considered, the literature reveals even at a quick glance that the *locus classicus* in St. Thomas has been for students the theology of original sin. It is here that they have found the masterkey with which to unlock the mind of the Angelic Doctor regarding the *delictum universitatis*. The theological interpreters often do not hesitate to understand the notion of original sin as a collective guilt. On the other hand, the interpreters who are primarily interested in social philosophy are wont to see in collective guilt, and in every case of collective guilt, at least something like original sin—a consequence, surely, which will not fail to be considered as bold and surprising. In the *Revue Intellectuelle*,<sup>3</sup> Christianus recently spoke of

<sup>1</sup>One important difference between the modern and the mediaeval problem comes to the fore when the problem is stated on the "international" level and with regard to sovereign peoples. For, according to definition, such peoples have no judge set over them, and as long as the supposition of sovereignty lasts, in theory and in fact, every judge who will appear will be self-appointed and judging in *propria causa*. The grave objection will then have to be dealt with which St. Thomas expresses in the following words: *Nullus iuste punit aliquem, nisi sit eius iurisdictioni subiectus* (II-II, 65, 2). The mediaeval problem, on the contrary, arose on the supposition that there are competent judges outside the *universitas* and that there is finally one true and competent judge who is not a sovereign among sovereigns but is divinely appointed to be the head of the *universitas omnium*

*fidelium*, the *populus christianus*, and to judge in *causa communi*. That there is a common good for all humanity was not only theoretically acknowledged but moreover was, or tended to be, institutionally established. *Summus Pontifex*, Innocent III states, . . . *cuius interest communibus utilitatibus providere* (Decretals of Gregory IX 3, 49, 7: *ex concilio Lateranensi*). Cf. Conrad Germain (pseudon), 'Le problème de la responsabilité criminelle de tout un peuple', *Revue Dominicaine* LI, 1 (Montreal, 1945), 352 f.—In the following study our investigation will always proceed on the basis of the mediaeval problem.

<sup>2</sup>*Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. III: *Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Altertums und des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 1881), 402. Henceforth this work and volume shall be quoted under the siglum GR.

<sup>3</sup>XIII, 9; Oct. 1945, p. 3.

"the original sins of peoples", and what he meant by this was what others call collective guilt.

Some examples taken from recent works in theology and social philosophy will confirm and illustrate what has been said. They will also show how the problem is generally stated and solved by contemporary Thomists.

The famous and venerable Matthias Joseph Scheeben will be our first author. It will soon appear why this choice has seemed advisable. Scheeben wrote thus in his *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik* (1873/82). Adam's sin, the sin whereby original sin was caused to be, was a *Gesamthandlung*, i.e. an action posited for, and in a certain way by, the whole community. The first father of mankind, indeed, acted not as an individual but as the juridico-moral head of the Human City or, to be more precise, as the family head of all men who in their very being were radically and virtually present in him, just as a tree is radically and virtually present in the seed. Adam, therefore, represented this one moral person or one man (*Gesamtmensch*) who is humanity as a whole and whose members were to be each and every one of the first father's descendants. His deed was the transgression of the Lord's law which he was bound to fulfill by himself, yet not only for himself but also for all men. Hence it is clear that this sin belongs to each and every one of us because, and inasmuch as, the action of the head is the action of the whole body, and likewise because, and inasmuch as, the will of the head is the will of the whole body: in the action of the head the whole body finds itself morally included as one subject acting through one will.<sup>4</sup>

The English-speaking reader who has been made acquainted with the works of Otto von Gierke through F. W. Maitland,<sup>5</sup> Ernest Barker,<sup>6</sup> J. D. Lewis<sup>7</sup> and others, will no doubt recognize in this reference from Scheeben some, and even the fundamental, terms of the so-called Theory of Corporative Realism of which the author of *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (1873 ff.) has made himself the most prominent and powerful protagonist. "Our German Fellowship", wrote Maitland,<sup>8</sup> himself a Realist, summarizing Gierke, "is no fiction, no symbol, . . . no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a *Gesamtperson*, and its will is a *Gesamtwille*; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will." *Gesamtperson*, *Gesamtwille*, *Gesamthandlung* are also in Scheeben's theology the convenient means and terms of giving a rational exposition of the doctrine of original sin. These notions, no doubt acceptable to many a modern mind, will raise the veil considerably from an otherwise painfully hidden mystery. And while Scheeben pretends that these notions are a common patristic teaching,

<sup>4</sup>Der Charakter der Gesamthandlung in der Sünde wird von den Vätern und besonders von den Theologen technisch dadurch ausgedrückt, dass sie sagen, Adam habe eben als juristisch-moralisches Haupt, genauer als Stammhaupt des ganzen, noch wurzhaft in ihm verborgenen Körpers der Menschheit, d.h. des menschlichen Geschlechtes als einer moralischen Person oder eines Gesamtmenschen, dessen Glieder die einzelnen Nachkommen werden sollten, gehandelt, und diese Handlung als Uebertretung eines durch ihn und in ihm für alle zu erfüllenden, alle in ihm solidarisch verbindenden Gesetzes gesetzt. Die betreffende Handlung gehöre daher den übrigen Menschen mit an, weil und inwiefern die Handlung des Hauptes Handlung des ganzen

Körpers und sein Wille der Wille des ganzen Körpers sei, indem der ganze Körper im handelnden Haupte als ein durch den Willen solidarisch handelndes Subjekt moralisch miteingebunden sei. Loc. cit., Bk. IV, n. 282.

<sup>5</sup>*Political Theories of the Middle Age*, (Cambridge, 1913), a translation of GR § 11.

<sup>6</sup>*Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500-1800*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1934), a translation of parts of GR, vol. IV.

<sup>7</sup>*The Genossenschaft-Theory of Otto von Gierke* (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, 25, Madison, 1935).

<sup>8</sup>Op. cit., Translator's Introduction, p. XXVI.

nevertheless it is quite certain that at the most his sources are certain old commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g. the Salmantines,<sup>9</sup> Billuart<sup>10</sup> and others. The coincidence, however, in time and place, of the *Dogmatik* and the *Genossenschaftsrecht* is most worthy of notice, as is also the concordance in the important vocabulary of the matter. Of course, Scheeben's juridico-moral person and Gierke's physically real and substantial person are *toto caelo* apart.

Peter Tischleder, in his book *Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas und seiner Schule* (M.-Gladbach, 1923), was a great admirer of Gierke and not infrequently showed himself anxious both to bring out the fundamental accord existing between Gierke and St. Thomas and to clothe the latter's thought in the former's garments. Now the dominant idea in Gierke's social philosophy and in all his historical judgments is that social thinking is faced at the outset with this alternative: either society is a physical reality or it is a mental fiction. This is the question that all social thinking must meet and resolve before touching any other problem. In Gierke's and Tischleder's language, society will be either a physical, substantial and vital unity (*substanzielle Lebenseinheit*), i.e. an "organism", or else a pure creation of the mind, the product of an *artificium iuris*, a fictitious person, a ghost and a shadow. This means that to approach the philosophical problem of society consists precisely in assuming this antinomy and in thinking within its framework. No doubt, an experienced Thomist such as Tischleder did not fail to pour some Thomistic water into this all too generous Gierkean wine. For, evidently, substance is not exactly the right metaphysical location for society. Why not pull out another drawer of the Aristotelian table of predicaments? Is not society an accident, and therefore still a real physical entity? Is it not a relation, which in Thomism is generally held to be a physical entity, although not an *ens*, yet an *entis ens*? In this way, the Gierkean opposition, Physical Reality versus Mental Fiction, is maintained in its fundamental aspect, and it continues, even in recent Thomistic literature,<sup>11</sup> to be assumed as the capital issue of social philosophy.

It is Tischleder's contention that St. Thomas' thought can be measured on the Procrustes-bed of the Gierkean antimony. What is more, Gierke neglected to read St. Thomas attentively, since, had he done so, he would have found an ally where he suspected an enemy. For with his "organic conception" Aquinas had, according to Tischleder, laid the ghost of the Mental Fiction long before the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup> The notion of corporate delict, clearly seen and affirmed by Thomas Aquinas, is considered to be indicative of the deep accord between the two thinkers.

<sup>9</sup> *Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus*, tome VIII, *De Vitii et Peccatis* (Paris, 1877), 26 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Summa Sancti Thomae Hodiernis Academicorum Moribus Accommodata* (Ed. Lequette, Paris), vol. II, p. 504 ff.

<sup>11</sup> A striking example is G. M. Manser O.P., 'Der Staat', *Divus Thomas*, XXIV (Fribourg, 1946), 54 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Gierke beanstandet besonders, dass in der mittelalterlichen Staatslehre durchgängig "die Staatspersönlichkeit nur nach Art des auf rein privatrechtlichem Boden gebildeten Begriffs der juristischen Person aufgefasst worden sei; diese sei aber immer allgemeiner als eine reine Gedanken-schöpfung (*persona repraesentata*), eine durch ein *artificium iuris* begründete Fiktion betrachtet und bei aller sonstigen Ver-

schiedenheit der Auffassung jedenfalls in bloss äusserlicher und mechanischer Weise mit der realen Personengesamtheit verknüpft worden" (quoted from Gierke, *Althusius*, p. 136). Wie sehr aber gerade Thomas "den Begriff der juristischen Persönlichkeit [insofern sie jede willkürliche Vereinigung zu einem bestimmten Zwecke darstellt] durch die Verbindung mit dem Begriff des gesellschaftlichen Organismus vertieft und die dem letztern zugeschriebene substanzielle (*sic*) Lebenseinheit zugleich als Rechtssubjekt gesetzt und so das Schattenwesen der *persona ficta* durch den Begriff der realen Gesamtpersönlichkeit verdrängt hat" (*Althusius*, p. 136), das soll Thomas sofort selbst dartun . . . *Op. cit.*, p. 20 f. In a note Tischleder rejects the *substanzielle Lebenseinheit* as far as substantial unity is

On the basis of his organic thinking, St. Thomas reached the proper notion and clearly realized the existence of a corporate delict, that is to say, a delict which, though it is the work of the free men constituting the community, is nevertheless different from the private transgression of the individual, who is responsible only for himself. As soon as a man commits a delict as a member of, and in compliance with, the organic whole to which he belongs, this delict bears the mark of a public misdeed and consequently will be attributed to the whole and punished in the whole.<sup>13</sup>

But where does this doctrine appear in St. Thomas? The following passage from Tischleder will reveal the importance, in social philosophy, of that type of theology which we have met in M. J. Scheeben and which, let us repeat, is much older in its contents than the *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik*. In fact, Tischleder found it in St. Thomas himself.

In the article on the transmission of original sin (I-II, 81, 1), St. Thomas, having proved that all members of the state are, politically speaking, considered as one man, says: "The action of one member of the corporal body, of the hand, for instance, is voluntary, not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Therefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle . . . Just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man (for which reason it is called a human sin), so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person received his nature from his first parent (for which reason it is called the sin of nature)".<sup>14</sup>

But is it permissible to take an analogy, which is used in a certain context and for a certain purpose, as formal and explicit teaching? Would it not appear dangerous to lift a proposition from its proper and specific context and to make it the basis of another problem with other presuppositions and other difficulties? Here is Tischleder's answer:

To be sure, the immediate intention of this article is to show and to illustrate the way in which it is possible for Adam's sin to be also the sin of all his descendants who did not participate in his unlawful deed. Yet it is neither alien nor contrary to the very trend of St. Thomas' thinking as revealed in this problem to extend the doctrine and to apply it to the matter of corporate delict. No objection can therefore be raised against stating that St. Thomas acknowledges the existence and the nature of such a delict. Its notion accordingly is that of a misdeed of which the whole community is the acting subject, and this in such a way that it

---

concerned. But is it not dangerous to use this notion even in a loose, moral sense?

<sup>13</sup>Sogar zur klaren Auffassung des Körperschaftsdeliktes ist schon Thomas auf Grund dieser (i.e. the organic) Betrachtungsweise gekommen; zu der Feststellung, dass es ein wahres Vergehen der Gesamtheit gibt, welches, wenn auch gewiss das Werk der freien Menschen die sie bilden, dennoch verschieden ist von der privaten Verfehlung des für sich verantwortlichen Einzelindividuums. Sobald einer sich als Glied und auf Geheiss des organischen Ganzen, dem er angehört, verfehlt, trägt

sein Vergehen öffentlichen Charakter und wird demzufolge dem Ganzen zugeschrieben und am Ganzen geahndet. *Op. cit.* p. 23 f.

<sup>14</sup>Im unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Nachweis, dass in staatlicher Hinsicht die im Staat zusammengeschlossenen Menschen als ein Mensch angesehen werden, sagt Thomas etc.; follows the quotation which we reproduce from A. C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas* (New York), II, 666. The words "for which reason it is called the sin of nature" are omitted in T.'s translation.

bears the full responsibility for the act, even though only some individual members committed it; and, again, it will be just to take revenge upon the whole community for it, even though it be true that other members neither consented to the act nor took any part in it.<sup>15</sup>

Let us here observe that what Tischleder above called a doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, and a clear one at that, now turns out to be not an actual Thomistic teaching, but merely a potential one, i.e., a teaching of Tischleder himself which we have to suppose as being in agreement with some explicit Thomistic text. Whether or not such an agreement exists still seems to be an open question.

In an article presented as a commentary on Pius XII's Christmas Message of 1944,<sup>16</sup> P.-E. De Rooy O.P., a noted Thomist, also speaks of the problem of corporate delict in the context of concrete questions raised in our day. Like the old Cato, P. De Rooy pronounces and urges: *Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam*. For Carthage as Carthage, the Carthaginian people as a people and as a whole, is doubtless guilty of an immense crime, the crime of war, and, therefore, not only must Roman security be guaranteed in the future, but, what is more, and what indeed is infinitely different, the equilibrium of the spiritual world, measured by Roman impeccability and Roman virtue,<sup>17</sup> must be restored: Carthage as Carthage, the Carthaginian people as a people and as a whole, must suffer vindictive punishment at the hands of the Romans in order to atone for their crime.<sup>18</sup> Now there is nothing new or particularly interesting in this view and argument. But our interest is roused when we see that St. Thomas is drawn into the case.

Father De Rooy proposes three arguments. The first of these, which rests on the author's interpretation of a text from St. Thomas' *Commentary* on the *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>19</sup> reads as follows:

Society is no abstraction; it is not, as F. Bastiat has affirmed, "that airy fiction by means of which everybody tries to live at everybody else's expense." Society is a real dynamic human whole. This whole is as such

<sup>15</sup> Wenn es auch Thomas hier zunächst darauf ankommt, die Art und Weise aufzuzeigen, wie die Sünde Adams zugleich Sünde der an der Sündentat unbeteiligten Nachkommen sein kann, so liegt es doch durchaus in der Richtung seines Gedankenganges, die Anwendung auf das Körpervergehen zu machen, und zwar dergestalt, dass dieses Vergehen als vom Ganzen ausgehend trotz seiner Ausführung durch Einzelglieder doch dem Ganzen angerechnet und darum durch Bestrafung des Ganzen geahndet wird, selbst wenn einzelne Glieder des Ganzen mit dem Vergehen nicht einverstanden und auch an ihm nicht beteiligt gewesen sein sollten. *Loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> 'La parole de Pie XII', *Revue Dominicaine*, LI, 1 (Montreal, 1945), 198 ff.

<sup>17</sup> The Roman procedure against Capua as related by Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* XXVI, 16 makes useful reading in this matter and confirms Ben Akiba's wisdom in saying that there is never anything new under the sun.

<sup>18</sup> We insist here on De Rooy's words: "... tant à titre d'expiation pour son crime qu'à titre de garantie pour l'avenir" (*loc. cit.* p. 210). St. Thomas says: *De alienis peccatis non est contritio, and: De peccatis aliorum dolere debemus, non tamen oportet quod de eis conteramur* (4 *Sent.*, 17, II,

2 sol. 5). Father De Rooy does not seem to remember this teaching.—The theological error, an error about the nature of sin and, to be precise, consisting in neglecting the distinction between sorrow (*dolor*) which I ought to have for the sins of others (and, indeed, not only for my own people's sins), and, on the other hand, the contrition which I can have only for my own personal sins—this error, along with a number of other philosophical and especially practical mistakes, is very noticeable in H. A. Reinhold's many utterances about the problem: see especially *The Commonwealth* XLIV, 7, 158 ff. Satisfaction, in the proper and theological sense of the word (*satisfactio pro peccatis*) can be given for the sins of others, but can never be exacted by any court of this world. It is a thing which can only be done within the Mystical Body of Christ: *caritate mediante, per quam omnes unum sumus in Christo* (4 *Sent.*, 20, I, 2, sol. 3, ad 1).

<sup>19</sup> Habet . . . et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem. I, 1 (Ed. Pirotta, n. 5).

capable of having an action of its own: the general offensive is indeed the proper action of the army and not the action of one individual soldier. Since, therefore, this whole as such can act, it follows that as such it can also sin. Hence, as such it can be punished, and this punishment will fall upon all the members of the community individually. For, concretely speaking, the state is constituted by nothing else than its citizens in their political organisation.<sup>20</sup>

This fundamental argument in which it is possible to recognize both the Gierkean opposition of Reality and Fiction and the typically Gierkean way of proceeding,—this argument receives “confirmation” in the following text of St. Thomas. Our translation is made upon De Rooy’s own French version. On two occasions, however, it has seemed useful to remind the reader of the Latin original to be found in *De Malo* IV, 1 (an article, be it noted, devoted to the question of original sin). Here is De Rooy’s confirmatory argument:

In confirmation of the above doctrine St. Thomas says: “The individual man can be considered in two ways: in the first place, in so far as he is an individual, and, secondly, in so far as he is a part of a society; a *collegium*. And in either way an act can be attributed to him (*et utroque modo potest ad eum aliquis actus pertinere*). In the first way, there is the act which he does by himself and of his own choice; in the second way, the act which is posited by the whole society (*qui fit a toto collegio*) or by several of its members or by the prince according to the principle: that which the prince does, the city is considered to do . . . Such society is indeed thought to be like one single man” (*De Malo* IV, 1). On the foundation of this doctrine St. Thomas concludes: “When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken upon the whole or upon a great part of it” (II-II, 108, 1 ad 5). And Franciscus de Vitoria is of the same opinion: “It is permitted to punish the whole commonweal for the sin of the king . . . The commonweal is indeed bound to entrust the power to no one else than a person who exercises and uses power justly”.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> La société n’est pas une abstraction, “la grande fiction à travers laquelle tout le monde s’efforce à vivre aux dépens de tout le monde” comme Bastiat l’a affirmé. La société est un tout humain réel, dynamique. Ce tout est capable comme tel d’avoir une action propre comme l’offensive générale est l’action propre de l’armée et non pas d’un soldat isolé. Si donc comme tel il peut agir, il suit que comme tel il peut pécher et par conséquent comme tel il peut être puni, punition qui retombera sur les membres puisqu’au concret l’Etat n’est constitué que par les citoyens politiquement organisés. Loc. cit., p. 210.

<sup>21</sup> Voici comment S. Thomas confirme cette doctrine: “L’homme singulier, dit-il, peut être considéré de deux manières. D’abord en tant qu’il est une personne singulière; ensuite en tant qu’il fait partie d’une société (*collegii*). Et de chaque façon un acte peut lui être attribué. De la première façon l’acte qu’il fait par lui-même et de son propre arbitre . . . ; de la seconde façon l’acte qui est posé par toute la société ou par plusieurs de ses membres ou par le prince, selon le principe: ce que fait le prince, la cité est censée le faire. Telle société, en effet, est réputée être comme un seul homme” (*De Malo* IV, 1). D’où il conclut:

“Quand toute la multitude pèche, il faut la punir toute entière, ou une grande partie d’elle” (II-II, 108, 1, ad 5). De Vitoria est du même avis: “Toute la république peut être punie licitement pour le péché du roi . . . La république est tenue de ne pas confier ce pouvoir, sauf à celui qui l’exerce et l’emploie de façon juste . . .” (*De Potestate Civili*, n. 12).—The Aristotelian source of the principle mentioned in *De Malo* is *Eth.* IX, 8; 1168 b 30-32; cf. St. Thomas’ Commentary lect. 9, n. 1869.—The following Thomistic text might usefully be contrasted with Vitoria’s statement: *Dimittit autem Deus aliquos praefici propter subditorum peccata, secundum illud Iob lix, 30: Regnare facit hominem hypocritum propter peccata populi. Talis autem rector non dicitur esse secundum voluntatem Dei, sed secundum eius indignationem, secundum illud Oseea xiii, 2: Dabo tibi regem in furore meo, et auferam in indignatione mea* (*Expos. in I Cor.*, 1, lect. 1). While Vitoria’s thought is exclusively that of a philosopher tinted by an all-knowing and an all-powerful rationalism, St. Thomas’ attention is mainly directed toward the theological mysteries of human social life and the inscrutable wisdom of Providence. See below, p. 13 f.

*Carthaginem esse delendam*, therefore, is in its general content a sound and safe axiom of traditional moral and theological teaching, and old Cato is justifiable even with St. Thomas. But what about the innocent, the *pueri unius diei*, for whom the mediaeval lawyers<sup>22</sup> used to plead when the Carthaginian or similar cases were brought to their attention?

To be sure, such punishment will fatally hit innocent people. But this fatality ought not to stop justice from running its pitiless course. St. Thomas has indeed pondered the question whether an innocent human being should be punished, by temporal punishment, for the sin which not he but another has committed. His answer is in the affirmative, and of the three reasons which he adduces the third is this: "That emphasis be laid on the unity of human fellowship whereby one is bound to be solicitous for another lest he sin" (II-II, 108, 4 ad 1).<sup>23</sup>

Such then is the case of the corporate delict in some of the outstanding contemporary Thomists.

\* \* \*

An investigation into the various repercussions, in modern Thomistic literature, of that collectivist trend of contemporary thinking which builds society on a pretended suprapersonal collectivity rather than on persons, would be an interesting and indeed useful task. But such is not the intention of these studies in which St. Thomas' letter and doctrine are to be set forth and explained. Now, in the works of Aquinas there is one, and only one, small article directly and explicitly stating the problem of the punishment, or rather of one definite punishment, of a community as a whole; and in the development of this problem St. Thomas deals *ex professo* with the question of the delict of a community. This is a *quaestiuncula* of the *Scriptum* on Peter Lombard's Sentences. This important, and indeed most important, text does not seem to enjoy much popularity among those whom it should concern. The occasion of it was the Constitution of Innocent IV, commonly cited in the Middle Ages as *Romana Ecclesia*, and more especially a section of it to be found in the chapter *Ceterum*, a section prohibiting the excommunication of an *universitas*. If we want to speak Thomism with regard to our problem, it seems advisable carefully to read and examine the Little Question of the *Scriptum*.

In the first part of the present studies on the Thomistic notion of community, the part which is published in this volume, we have endeavoured to analyse this text and its manifold relations to the discussions, in St. Thomas' own time, of the theologians and jurists. Some other Thomistic texts, however, have also been taken into consideration, texts which, though not treating the exact problem of the *Scriptum*, are nevertheless related to it, in so far as they make use of the same principles and the same historical material.

When dealing with Innocent IV's decretal, St. Thomas, for definite reasons, knows of only one notion of the *delictum universitatis*: it is the delict of all its members, a misdeed actually committed by all in a truly *common action*. To the mind of Aquinas, the action performed by the actual contributions of all is

<sup>22</sup> See below pp. 26, 29.

<sup>23</sup> Le fait que cette manière d'agir frapperait fatalement des innocents, n'est pas un obstacle. A la question de savoir si un innocent peut être puni, d'une peine temporelle, pour le péché d'un autre, S. Thomas répond affirmativement et il donne trois raisons: la troisième est: "pour souligner l'unité de la société humaine en vertu de laquelle l'un doit être préoccupé qu'un

autre ne pèche."—If this means that the Romans are given the power justly to inflict on the Carthaginians punishment in the proper sense of the word (*pour l'expiation de leur crime*), i.e., punitive measures specifically different from merely political and material sanctions, I am afraid that Father De Rooy is grossly exceeding the limits of St. Thomas' text and authority. See below p. 15.



the *original* form of that *communiter agere* which is essentially required for there being a community. There are, however, certain and various *derived* forms of the common action. Their characteristic consists in that, instead of *all* the members, i.e., the whole community, only *a part*, no matter which it be, acts in such a way that it represents the whole. It is clear that on the supposition of such derivative forms of *communiter agere* a new problem arises with regard to *delictum universitatis* and its penal consequences. This problem might be stated thus: In the matter of delicts and their punishment, can the action of a part represent the whole? Can such a representation take place, and have effect, on the sole supposition, and on no other supposition, that the representing and the represented persons are one in that specific form of being one which is their social or political unity? And, finally, will this law of representation, if, and to the extent that it exists, have equal force in every court of justice, the divine as well as the human?

In a second part of these studies to be published on another occasion we hope with the relevant texts of St. Thomas to discuss this problem of representation and its roots and ramifications in Thomistic theology and social philosophy.

## 2. THE DECRETAL OF INNOCENT IV ROMANA ECCLESIA: CETERUM

A memorable date in the history of ecclesiastical Penal Law and, therefore, of European civilization is the 21st of April, 1246,<sup>24</sup> when Pope Innocent IV promulgated the Constitution *Romana Ecclesia* and, among many other dispositions, declared the excommunication of an *universitas* to be henceforth illegal. Thus one ecclesiastical punishment, the supreme one, was prohibited as a punitive measure to be meted out summarily. Although it had never been an accepted canonical practice,<sup>25</sup> some misuses of the ecclesiastical justice needed to be corrected. With Innocent's law a warning sign was erected against any and every summary punishment (the interdict, of course, excepted) and in this way the decretal *Ceterum* was destined to have far-reaching historical consequences.

What is an *universitas*? The mediaeval term means a social unit, in the broadest sense of the word. This unit the jurists require to be approved, at least tacitly, by the competent superior authority which, by granting to it the *privilegium universitatis*, makes it an *universitas*, juridically speaking.<sup>26</sup> This privilege consists in the right (*ius*) to have a common seal, a common treasury, to appoint a procurator or syndicus through whom to perform property transactions and to bring or defend lawsuits, the right moreover to make corporate resolutions with the majority of votes, and so on.<sup>27</sup> The *privilegium universitatis*,

<sup>24</sup> Potthast 12062; Denifle, *Chartularium* I, n. 152 f.

<sup>25</sup> This is mainly due to the canon *Si habes*; see below p. 20. The only "bodies" which were frequently excommunicated before Innocent's law were the collegiate chapters, town-councils and the like; see the remark of Bartholomew of Brescia below p. 26. As far, however, as secular justice is concerned, especially between the victor and the vanquished enemy, H. A. Smith is right in stating: "The punishment of communities in various ways was a familiar feature of mediaeval politics, and any one who declared it to be impossible would have been laughed at as an academic theorist who took no account of everyday facts"; *The Law of Associations* (Oxford,

1914), 152 f.

<sup>26</sup> Innocent IV, *Apparatus in Quinque Libros Decretalium*, gl. *Unum Corpus* in c. 14, X, 5, 31, (Ed. Venice, 1481), 240 r<sup>o</sup> ff.—St. Thomas mentions the problem of the necessity of approbation for the *universitas* in several places. His decision differs from that of the jurists in that he emphasizes the liberty of associations: [*privata societas*] . . . consensu duorum vel trium constituitur; sed [*societas publica*] . . . non potest constitui nisi ex superioris auctoritate: *Contra impugn. Dei cultum*, c. 3 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 29). *Omnis communitas aliqua lege ordinatur*: 4. *Sent.*, 27, I, 1, sol. 3. Cf. I-II, 105, 2.

<sup>27</sup> The rules and principles of the corporation law apply only to that *universitas* quae constituta est per superiores sic quod sit



be it noted at once, is in juristic texts not infrequently found to be mentally detached from its subject, viz. the social unit, and, taken in itself, i.e., as an abstract formality, also called *universitas*. In such way a group is said not only to be an *universitas*, but also to have *universitas*,<sup>28</sup> as in the famous Roman text<sup>29</sup> the *corpus* (we would translate corporateness) is something to have, to enjoy, to forego, and so on. But the more common use and, indeed, the only one which I have been able to discover in the mediaeval theologians is the above named concrete use. In this way the word is synonymous with *collegium*, *corpus*, *congregatio*, *collectio*, but also, especially in the writings of the theologians, with *communitas*, *societas*, *consociatio*, and sometimes even with *multitudo* (*collegium multitudinis*).<sup>30</sup> It comprises public and private, political and economic, ecclesiastical and laical, "necessary" and "voluntary" groups and associations. The following list chosen at random in juristic and theological writings will give an idea of the extremely vast and colorful range of this notion. *Universitates* thus are:

Respublica, regnum, gens, populus, civitas (congregatio, collegium, communitas civitatis, communitas politica); villa, vicus, burgum, castrum, castellum; familia (collegium familiae); societas professionis, negotiationis (v.g. cerdonum, pellipariorum, commilitantium etc.), universitas magistrorum et scoliarum, societas studii, societas vectigalium; collegium decurionum i.e. consiliariorum; Ecclesia universalis seu generalis (congregatio, collectio, societas omnium fidelium, societas populi christiani), singula ecclesia (collegium alicuius ecclesiae), capitulum (conventus) ecclesiae collegiatae, monasterium (collegium, congregatio monachorum, sanctimonialium, religiosorum); xenodochium (collegium miserabilium personarum), orphanotrophium, hospitium (collegium leprosorum) etc.<sup>31</sup>

universitas; nam si tot homines essent simul collecti quot sunt Romae et non haberent tacitum vel expressum consensum a superiore quod esset universitas, non possent sibi iudicem facere nec haberent alia iura et privilegia universitatis; Innocent IV, op. cit., gl. in c. 3, X, 1, 31; GR 289, n. 130. — Illi, quibus permittitur [habere corpus], possunt ordinare in causa communi syndicum vel actorem per quem res et negotia universitatis expediantur, et possunt habere arcam communem etc. Glossa Ord. in Corp. Iuris Civ., gl. Neque societatem to Lex 1, Dig., 3, 4.—See also Pierre Gillet, *La personnalité juridique en droit ecclésiastique* (Malines, 1927), 153.

<sup>28</sup> *Habere universitatem*. See for instance the text of Roffredus of Beneventum (d. A. D. 1250), *Quaestiones Sabbathinae*, quoted in GR 207, n. 57. Roffredus states the question: an castrum vel villa universitatem constituat; and he decides quod vicus potest universitatem habere. According to Hugolinus (GR loc. cit.) it is politically dangerous concedere villis habere communia et universitates. Hostiensis writes (*Summa*, De syndico, n. 1): hi quibus permissum est habere collegium seu corpus (cf. L. 1, Dig., 3, 4: quibus permissum est corpus habere collegii).

<sup>29</sup> Lex 1, pr., Dig., 3, 4 (Gaius 2, 11).

<sup>30</sup> For the jurists' vocabulary see the texts quoted in GR 193 ff., 247 ff. The theologians' language is in large part the same; cf. the following note. In St. Thomas' 4 Sent., 18, II, 3, 2 *communitas* is synonymous with *universitas*; in *Contra Imp. Dei cult.* III the

word *societas* is used with the exact meaning of *universitas* or *collegium*. The expression *collegium multitudinis* is found in *De Veritate* 7, 1.

<sup>31</sup> In part this collection is made from the texts quoted in GR §§ 7 and 8. Some Thomistic (but by no means exclusively Thomistic) terms have been added. Suffice it to point to the following texts: 4 Sent., 13, II, 1: prima congregatio quae est in hominibus est per viam cognitionis; *ibid.* congregatio corporis mystici; 4 Sent., 15, I, 5, 4 ad 3: communitas civitatis; *De veritate* 7, 1: collegium ecclesiae triumphantis; *In Isaiam* 33: mercatorum societas; *Contra impugnantes* 3 (this whole opusculum for whose composition St. Thomas manifestly made extensive juridical studies is a rich source of information on the topic, St. Thomas and the mediaeval jurists): societas ordinata ad studium, ad pugnandum, collegium alicuius familiae, collegium civitatis; *ibid.* 20 (ed. cit., p. 173): religiosorum collegium; *In Ioan.* 14, 1, 3: militans ecclesia, i.e. congregatio fidelium . . . triumphans ecclesia, i.e. sanctorum collectio in gloria Patris; II-II, 147, 3: societas populi christiani, etc.—An intensely mediaeval phrase, in many respects, is that of St. Bonaventure: In novo testamento videmus abbatissas, quibus committuntur collegia regenda; 4 Sent., 23, II, 1; Ed. Quaracchi IV, 649 b.—St. Augustine's use of the word *collegium* (e.g. C. Ep. Parmeniani III, 8: PL 43, 89, . . . qui ei non solum Ecclesiae unitate, sed etiam collegii consortio iungerentur) would hardly fit into the mediaeval scheme.

The decretal *Ceterum* in the Constitution *Romana Ecclesia* reads as follows:<sup>32</sup>

In universitatem vel collegium proferri excommunicationis sententiam penitus prohibemus, volentes animarum periculum vitare, quod exinde sequi posset, quum nonnumquam contingeret innoxios huiusmodi sententia irretiri; sed in illos duntaxat de collegio vel universitate, quos culpabiles esse constiterit, promulgetur.

The voluminous document of the Constitution *Romana* was promulgated by being sent *universitati magistrorum scholarium Parisiis commorantibus*.<sup>33</sup> In its introduction the instruction is given that these laws should be used *in iudicio et in scholis*.<sup>34</sup> Hence we see the jurists and theologians apply themselves at once to the matter of those wholesale excommunications, citing the law and explaining its foundations. To mention only the theologians,<sup>35</sup> Albert the Great, in the fourth book of his commentary on the Sentences, composed in 1249, seems to be the first Master to devote some remarks to the decretal. He does not, however, treat the question *ex professo*, but writes some notes on it in passing and, as it were, on the margin of another traditional problem of theology. St. Bonaventure manifestly depends on the German Master both in the content and the place of his observations on the "new" Constitution. St. Thomas, on the contrary, is the first to confer on this law and its problem the dignity of an independent question in theology and to assign to it a place of its own in a regularly constructed *quaestiuncula*. It is not widely known, but it can easily be verified that, from the very beginning of his literary career, Aquinas, often inspired by Albert, never neglected carefully to pursue, in his discussions of the traditional problems, every possibility which they offered to elucidate a point of interest for social or political doctrine. The important contribution which he made to this philosophy when dealing with Innocent's new decretal is due to a characteristic and persistent preoccupation of his mind.

### 3. THE TEXTS OF ST. THOMAS

In the *Scriptum super Sententiis* (4, d. 18, II, 3, q. 2) St. Thomas states the question whether *in universitatem sententia excommunicationis ferri possit*.

Beginning the exposition of this problem, Aquinas observes that in spite of everything such a sentence seems to be possible and just, for it might well happen that an *universitas*, (through misusing the means and ends which it has as *universitas*), unites in evil-doing (*contingit enim quod aliqua universitas sibi in malitia colligatur*). Now, if to this misdeed contumacy<sup>36</sup> is added, are not then all the conditions fulfilled which Canon Law requires for an excommunication to be pronounced? For, the law determines indeed that this punishment be imposed when one has gravely sinned and, moreover, opposes persistent disobedience to ecclesiastical judgment and correction. When, therefore, a whole community is convicted as guilty of such disobedience, why should it not suffer the whole severity of the canonical censure?

<sup>32</sup> Innocent IV's *Apparatus* (see below p. 29) shows that the author has already made this decretal a part of the *Decretales Gregorii IX*. In fact he comments on it under the heading: c. 64, X, 5, 39 (GR 280, n. 105); cf. CIC, ed. Lipsiensis II, *Decretalium Collectiones*, pp. LIII, LIV. Boniface VIII incorporated the decretal in his collection, c. 5, in VI<sup>o</sup>, 5, 11, whence the above text is transcribed.

<sup>33</sup> Potthast 12062; Denifle, *Chartularium I*, n. 152.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> For references see below pp. 36 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. 4. *Sent.*, 18, II, 1, 3: Excommunicatio infligi non debet etiam pro peccato mortali, nisi contumax fuerit, vel non veniendo ad iudicium, vel ante terminationem iudicii sine licentia recedendo, vel determinationi non parendo: tunc enim, postquam monitus fuerit, si obedire contempserit, contumax reputatur et excommunicari debet a iudice iam non habente quid contra ipsum faciat amplius.—On contumacy (*quae est maximum crimen et genus idolatriae*) cf. *Summa Raymundi*, Lib. III, tit. 33, § 22 (ed. Rome, 1603), p. 399. St. Raymond's text seems to be known to, and used by, St. Thomas.

Moreover, it will be observed that in Canon Law there is at any rate one censure, to wit the interdict, which is a recognized general punishment and, in fact, is often meted out to an *universitas*, e.g. a whole city. And, what is more, this punishment is in a certain way just as serious as the excommunication. For it concerns that which in excommunication is the gravest penalty, viz. the separation from the sacraments of the Church. Why should, therefore, a general excommunication be inadmissible?

The *Sed contra* invokes against this reasoning a theological authority and tradition, a biblical gloss, which even bears the potent name of St. Augustine. Indeed the *glossa Augustini* to Matth. xiii, 29— . . . *lest haply while ye gather up the tares, ye root up the wheat with them*—peremptorily declares that neither the prince nor a multitude are to be excommunicated: *princeps et multitudo non est excommunicanda*.

Excommunication (this is the decision of the *corpus articuli*) is only to be inflicted when one has committed a mortal sin. Now a sin consists in an act. Yet, in most cases, an act is not done by the whole community but by some persons (*actus autem non est communitatis, sed singularium personarum ut frequenter*). Hence these persons from among the community may be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And even if it be that sometimes an act pertain to a whole multitude—for instance: several men pull a ship which no one is able to pull—yet it is not probable that a community consent so entirely to evil that some people do not disagree. And since, as Holy Scripture teaches us, it is neither the way of God *who is the judge of all the earth to slay the righteous with the wicked*, therefore the Church on which it is incumbent to imitate the divine judgment has, very wisely indeed, enacted the statute that “a whole community be not excommunicated”, *lest, when gathering up the tares, the wheat be rooted out with them*.—A neat, clear, complete solution in which, as always with the great Aquinas, every single word is pondered and polished, and will prove to hit the point!

From this solution it is clear what answer is to be given to the first objection. (That all might become guilty in the aforesaid manner is, indeed, not impossible but improbable; and the statute of the Church is not a thesis of theoretical reason, but a measure of practical and evangelical wisdom: it does not affirm the absolute nonsense of such excommunications but denounces the danger of a spiritual judicial murder.)

It is wrong, moreover, to assume, as the second objection does, the equality and similarity of excommunication and interdict. For, the interdict, not entailing the complete separation from the community of the faithful, is not such a grave penalty as excommunication.<sup>37</sup> It might therefore be imposed without consideration of personal guilt, as happens when the whole kingdom is subjected to interdiction for the sins of the king.<sup>38</sup>

Two remarks regarding this text will have to be added at this point.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. 4. *Sent.*, loc. cit., art. 4, 3, ad 3: *Etiam aliquis sine culpa quandoque ab eu-charistia arcetur, sicut patet in suspensis vel interdictis, quia tales poenae quandoque alicui pro culpa alterius, qui in eis punitur, inferuntur.*

<sup>38</sup> *Videtur quod in aliquam universitatem sententia excommunicationis ferri possit. Contingit enim, quod aliqua universitas sibi in malitia colligatur. Sed pro malitia in qua aliquis contumax extiterit debet excommunicatio ferri. Ergo potest in aliquam universitatem ferri excommunicatio.*

Praeterea. Illud quod est gravissimum in excommunicatione est separatio a sacra-

mentis Ecclesiae. Sed aliquando tota civitas interdicitur a divinis. Ergo excommunicari aliqua universitas potest.

*Sed contra est glossa Augustini, Matth. xiii, quod princeps et multitudo non est excommunicanda.*

Ad . . . quaestionem. Dicendum quod excommunicari non debet aliquis nisi pro peccato mortali. Peccatum autem in actu consistit. Actus autem non est communitatis, sed singularium personarum ut frequenter. Et ideo singuli de communitate excommunicari possunt, non autem ipsa communitas. Et si etiam quandoque actus sit totius alicuius multitudinis, ut quando

First. It must be observed that in the phrase, *contingit enim quod aliqua universitas sibi in malitia colligatur*, the word *colligare* is a technical term implying that which is specific in an *universitas* or a *collegium*, i.e., its end and the proper means to achieve it, viz. the common action (*communiter agere*). *Collegium*, the glossator of the Civil Law defines,<sup>30</sup> *sic dictum, quia simul colligantur*. And St. Thomas says on the basis of the same "etymology" and definition:

4. *Sent.*, 40, I, 1: *secundum quamlibet communicationem denominantur aliqui quasi colligati ad invicem, sicut dicuntur concives qui habent politicam communicationem ad invicem, et commilitones qui conveniunt in militari negotio.*

Or again:

*Contra impugn.*, c. 7 (Ed. Mandonnet, p. 120): *Quando aliquis praelatus alicui plebi praeficitur, hoc modo ad invicem colligantur, quod subditi possunt a praelato spiritualia petere, et praelati a subditis temporalia.*

The misdeed, therefore, which is contemplated in the above text, is not just any unlawful action, but it is a common action specifically determined by the use, or more precisely the misuse, of the ends and means of the *universitas*. Hence the *delictum universitatis*—such seems to be the implication of the above phrase—is a common action whose specific moral character will be constituted by the misuse of the aims or the institutions of an *universitas*. Understood in such a way, St. Thomas' words imply a definition of that delict *ex parte obiecti*.

Our second observation regards the words: *actus autem non est communitatis, sed singular(i)um*<sup>31</sup> *personarum*. The difficulty of this phrase is, as often in Latin literature, the absence of the article. Is *singulae personae* to be translated "the single persons", "the individuals", or "single persons", i.e., "some individuals", "some persons"? If this latter translation is correct, then *communitas* means "all persons", and St. Thomas' reasoning appears to be built upon the opposition between whole and part. If, on the contrary, "the individuals" (which can also mean "all individuals") is the correct translation, *communitas* means something other than, something different from, "all individuals", and the reasoning rests upon an opposition between the whole and the whole, the same word taken in different meanings, as for instance: all individuals individually, all individuals collectively.—Now, of such a distinction between the whole and

multi navem trahunt quam nullus trahere potest, non tamen est probabile quod aliqua communitas ita tota ad malum consentiat, quin aliqui sint dissentientes. Et quia non est Dei qui iudicat omnem terram, ut condemnaret iustum cum impio, ut dicitur Gen. xviii (25), ideo Ecclesia, quae iudicium Dei imitari debet, satis provide statuit ut tota communitas non excommunicetur,—ne collectis zizanias simul eradicetur et triticum.

Ad primum ergo patet solutio ex dictis. Ad secundum. Dicendum quod suspensio non est tanta poena quanta excommunicatio, quia suspensi non fraudantur Ecclesiae suffragiis sicut excommunicati. Unde etiam aliquis sine peccato proprio suspenditur, sicut totum regnum supponitur interdicto pro peccatis regis. Et ideo non est simile de excommunicatione et suspensione.

<sup>30</sup> *Glossa Ordinaria*, in L. 1, Dig., 3, 4, s.v. *Collegium*.

<sup>31</sup> The writing *singularium* might be a mistake and should perhaps be *singularum*. For, *singularis persona* is, in St. Thomas, the individual qualified as acting for his own sake; it is opposed to *communis* or *publica persona*, while *singula persona* rather means one person in opposition to all persons. Cf. 2. *Sent.*, 11, 2, ad 4: *officia humana pertinentia ad singulares personas . . . officia quae ad multitudinem pertinent*; 4. *Sent.*, 12, III, 1, 4 ad 1: *sacerdos quasi persona publica* (St. Bonaventure, 4. *Sent.*, 25; Ed. Qu., p. 656: *clericus est persona communis*); *De verit.*, 29, 5 in 3: *persona singularis, . . . persona communis*; II-II, 33, 8 ad 4: *secundum quod praelatus est quaedam singularis persona*; *ibid.*, 53, 5: *singulares personae* [i.e.] *singulariter consideratae*. Yet to employ this qualified notion of *persona singularis* is manifestly not St. Thomas' intention in the present article.

the whole there is no trace in our text. In the immediately following lines St. Thomas also speaks of *tota aliqua multitudo* who cannot be said to agree with an evil deed without there being *aliqui dissidentes*, i.e., some persons disagreeing, a clear indication that the entire reasoning is constructed on the opposition between whole and part, between all and some. The evidence of the text itself, therefore, clearly points to the correctness of the translation given above. And this implies that, *ex parte subiecti*, the Thomistic definition of the *delictum universitatis* is that it is the delict of *all* the members of the community without exception—a definition which, in truth, is the all-decisive element in Aquinas' teaching at this point of the argument. The historical analysis which we are to undertake will confirm the evidence of the text.

In the Little Question of the *Scriptum* two distinct arguments are given in support of the thesis. The one is a philosophico-juridical reason centering around the notion and the existence of the delict of an *universitas*. The other is a theological reason whose elements and, as it were, rough draft are to be found in the *Sed contra* and in the last words of the body of the article: *ne collectis zizaniis simul eradicetur et triticum*. This theological reason consists indeed in a consideration drawn from that important biblical compendium of professional morals for judges—if we may say so—which is the Parable of the Sower. Now, the first and philosophical argument has no parallel in St. Thomas' other works and in this respect the *quaestiuncula* is a truly unique Thomistic text; the part of the *Tertia* where the problem of general excommunications would probably have been restated was left unfinished. But the second and theological argument is largely developed in the other writings, and it will be useful to be acquainted with these developments so as to have a complete survey of the Thomistic doctrine and to illuminate all its angles. No merely philosophical argument in a mediaeval theologian can indeed be fully appreciated if its vital theological context is not carefully taken into account.

The gloss on *Matt.* xii, 29, a capital authority for this biblical teaching, and adorned with the name of St. Augustine, is expressly quoted in the following places:

4. *Sent.*, 38, II, 4, q. 1, in 1<sup>a</sup> (cf. *Summa theol.*, II-II, 43, 7, ad 1);  
*Quodlibet* X, 7, 1, ad 1 (cf. 4. *Sent.*, 13, II, 3, ad 3; II-II, 11, 3, ad 3);  
*Summa theol.*, 108, 1, in 5<sup>a</sup>.

An implicit quotation of the same gloss is found in:

*Lectura in Matthaeum*, c. XIII (*ad vers.* 29).

And finally, instead of the gloss, the basic original text of St. Augustine<sup>41</sup> is used in:

*Catena Aurea, In Evangelium Matthaei*, c. XIII (*ad vers.* 29); cf. II-II, 108, 3 ad 1, *et alibi*;

*Summa theol.*, II-II, 10, 8, ad 1;

*Ibid.*, 43, 7, in 1<sup>a</sup>;

*Ibid.*, 64, 2 ad 1.

The basic problem in all these texts is this: What shall be the judge's attitude when he finds himself confronted with a crime committed by a multitude of men or by a potentate whom many people obey and willingly follow? The answer is a common rule of mediaeval jurisprudence, commonly formulated in the words of a decretal of Innocent III:<sup>42</sup> When a multitude of offenders is in

<sup>41</sup> See below p. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Text in c. 30, X, 5, 3; see below p. 32.  
 In St. Thomas the rule is referred to in 4 *Sent.*, 38, II, 4, q. 1 in 1<sup>a</sup>, and in II-II,

108, 1 ad 5; in St. Bonaventure, 4. *Sent.*, 19, *dub.* 6; *ed. cit.* IV, 513. The wording of the rule is a combination of *Dict. Gratiani* in C. 23, q. 4, c. 31 (*quando multitudo est in*

question the full rigour of justice is out of place (*cum multitudo est in causa, detrahendum est severitati*). In this case the letter of the law, to some extent, might have to be abandoned and its absolute claims abated, lest a greater good be endangered, or even ruined, than the good obtained by making all delinquents pay their penal debt to the absolutely last farthing. It is thus the indiscreet fanaticism of the *Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus* which the mediaeval rule sets out to criticize and to correct; and the theologians do not fail on the basis of the biblical parable to remind their readers that the last judgment belongs to God after history will have completed its course and that God alone can establish and secure ultimate and perfect justice: *non est hic ultimum retributionis tempus*.<sup>43</sup>

In the above-quoted places St. Thomas mentions this fundamental rule of human justice and compares it with other problems and principles of social or political life, for instance, the toleration of heretics, the question whether truth or discretion should be the supreme rule of the human judge, and so on. May we quote the following characteristic texts:

II-II, 43, 7:<sup>44</sup> It seems that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on account of scandal. For Augustine teaches that *punishment for sin should cease when the peril of schism is feared*. . . I answer that in the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of certain people threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.

II-II, 64, 2, ad 1: In the Parable Our Lord commanded the servants to forbear from uprooting the cockle [i.e. the wicked men] in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.

II-II, 108, 1 ad 5: When a whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them: either the whole multitude might then be punished (thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel, *Exod.* xiv, 22, and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed, *Gen.* xviii); or a part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf, *Exod.* xxxii, 27. Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude, *Num.* xxv, 4.

*causa*) and of D. 50, c. 25 (*detrahendum est aliquid severitati*: Augustinus, *Ep.* 185, *Ad Bonifatium*).

<sup>43</sup> *Summa theol.*, II-II, 68, 1.

<sup>44</sup> This and the following translations

have been taken from the *English Dominican Translation of the Summa*. Their rendering, however, of the II-II, 108, 1 ad 5 has been slightly changed.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to the others; else *the multitude should be spared and severity forgotten*. The same applies to the *prince whom the multitude follow*. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to a multitude; unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

From this teaching, so full of magnificent theological and political wisdom, it can easily be seen how this second group of texts is related to the *quaestiuncula* of the *Scriptum*. It completes and develops the latter's theological argument. While, however, the *Scriptum*, according to its proper problem, insisted on the separation of the innocent from the guilty, the present group deals in addition with the further and wider problem of punishing the guilty in case they are *multitudo* or *princeps*.

The text from II-II, 108 needs perhaps some explanation. Two suppositions are made, the one that a whole multitude sins, the other that a part of it sins. In the second supposition the reader will not fail to recognize the case which is assumed to be probable in the *Scriptum*. But what about the first supposition? Does not St. Thomas contradict himself by assuming, without remembering the restriction of the former work, that *tota multitudo peccat*? The answer to this is that in the *Summa* not a particular problem of exclusively human justice, but a universal problem of justice is considered, a problem including the question of divine justice. Hence all the examples given in the first section of our text are taken from Sacred Scripture and refer to the old and hard *theological* question of that divine justice which sometimes seems to inflict punishment without regard to personal guilt. Very emphatically, however, St. Thomas warns in the same Question of the *Summa* that the extermination of the children of Sodom is a mystery of God's justice not to be imitated by any human judge who by so doing would only prove himself a barbarous monster. Let us quote the text, although its detailed analysis belongs to the second part of these studies.

II-II, 108, 4 ad 2: As Augustine states, human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments, so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, although not without cause.<sup>45</sup>

The foregoing seem to be the Thomistic texts belonging to our problem. It will now be our task to enter upon the investigation of their sources. And the first source to be examined, because of its importance for the theological background of St. Thomas' thesis, will be the "gloss of Augustine" on *Matth.* xiii, 29.

<sup>45</sup> Because of this text I am afraid that Father De Rooy, *supra* note 21, entirely missed the point of St. Thomas' doctrine.

4. THE "GLOSS OF AUGUSTINE" ON MATTH. XIII, 29

The *glossa Augustini* is contained literally in the great encyclopaedia of mediaeval biblical knowledge, the so-called *Glossa Ordinaria*: *Multitudo non est excommunicanda nec princeps populi*.<sup>46</sup> The sentence is not itself textually from St. Augustine, but is a resumé, in a rather pointed formula, of a much longer Augustinian text. About the identity of this text there cannot be any doubt, as the quotations which we are to give below will show. In fact, the foundation, in St. Augustine's works, of the *glossa Augustini* is a large section of the third book of the *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*,<sup>47</sup> a fact which we would like to point out because of some misleading references in the editions of St. Thomas' works.<sup>48</sup> Aquinas himself knew this identity, at least after the extended patristic studies which he undertook for the so-called *Catena Aurea*, although previous to this it does seem that he wavered somewhat in identifying the original text underlying the gloss of Augustine. In the *Catena Aurea* he copied parts from the anti-donatist work, and in his later writings he sometimes used this original text where in the earlier parallel places the gloss was still employed.<sup>49</sup> To show the Augustinian foundation of the gloss it will be sufficient to quote the text as compiled by Aquinas. Another extract, only in part identical with that of St. Thomas, but not unfaithful to the intentions of the author, is found in the *Decretum* of Gratian,<sup>50</sup> a fact worthy of note because it shows that the Augustinian ideas were as widely known in the Middle Ages as that fundamental document of ecclesiastical legislation. In opposition to Gratian, however, St. Thomas was careful to select from the section of the *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani* passages interesting biblical exegesis and theology.

When any one of the number of Christians included in the Church is found in such sin as to incur an anathema, this is done, where danger of schism is not apprehended, with charity . . . , not for his rooting out, but for his correction. But if he confess not his sin, nor correct it by penitence, he will of his own choice go forth of the Church, and be separated from her communion; whence when the Lord commanded, *Suffer both to grow together till the harvest*, He added the reason, saying, *Lest when ye should gather out the tares ye root up the wheat also*. This sufficiently shews that when that fear has ceased, and when the safety of the crop is certain, that is when the crime and the criminal are known, and when the crime is acknowledged as so execrable as to have no defenders or not such as might cause any fear of a schism, then severity of discipline does not sleep, and its correction of sin is so much the more efficacious as the observance of love had been more careful . . . But when the same infection has spread to a large number at once, nothing remains to the good but sorrow and groans . . . Therefore let a man punish, with mercy, when he can do so; when he cannot, let him be patient and mourn with affection, until He from above shall correct and heal, and let him defer till harvest-time to root out the tares and winnow the chaff . . . But a (nameless) multitude of the unrighteous is to be struck at with a general reproof whenever there is opportunity of saying aught among the people; and above all when any scourge of the Lord from above gives opportunity, when they feel that they are scourged for their deserts; for then the calamity of the hearers opens

<sup>46</sup> PL 114, 132.

<sup>47</sup> Bk. III, ch. 2, §§ 13-17: PL 43, 92-95.

<sup>48</sup> See the Ottawa edition of the *Summa*, p. 1983<sup>a</sup> 20 (II-II, 108, 1), p. 88<sup>b</sup> 34 (*Suppl.* q. 23, 5).

<sup>49</sup> Proof of this is 4. *Sent.*, 38, II, 4, 1 in

1<sup>a</sup> where St. Thomas presents the *glossa Augustini* with the words of Innocent III's rule, *supra* n. 42.

<sup>50</sup> Cp. *Quodl.* X, 7, 1 ad 1 with II-II, 10, 8, ad 1.



their ears submissively to the words of their reprover, seeing the heart in affliction is ever more prone to the groans of confession than to the murmurs of resistance . . . And even when no tribulation lays upon them, should occasion serve, a word of reproof is usefully spent upon the multitude; for when separated they are wont to be fierce, when together they are wont to mourn.<sup>51</sup>

The outstanding feature of this important text lies in the fact that, manifestly though not quite expressly, St. Augustine, whose mind was so deeply impregnated with Roman civilization, rejects the punishment of a multitude without name on the truly Roman principle that only an offender with a name, only an individual, only Titius and Caius, can be judicially prosecuted. Yet in the early Middle Ages this feature remains unobserved. Nevertheless, comparing the gloss of Augustine with its original, it may be stated that the latter's ideas are, in general, almost as faithfully rendered as a short proposition will ever be able to render the complexity and the manifold shades of an Augustinian text. It is an ungrateful task to reduce such an abounding richness to the almost inevitable poverty of the proposition of a scholastic handbook. Yet the gloss has a certain pointedness about it which is well worth noticing.

The *glossa Augustini* has the approximate date of its composition stamped, as it were, upon it. In fact it points at once to the period of, or after, Gregory VII, i.e., to the political and juristic controversies aroused by the "unprecedented"<sup>52</sup> excommunication of Henry IV. It is undoubtedly, in some way or other, a literary echo of that event whose terrifying effect Bonizo<sup>53</sup> has so vividly described: *postquam de banno regis ad aures personuit vulgi, universus noster Romanus orbis contremuit*. As for the more precise date of the gloss, B. Smalley's excellent research<sup>54</sup> has made the first decades of the twelfth century a certainty. At least in its final form, the compilation of the commentary on the first gospel seems to have been made by either Anselm of Laon, or his brother Radulfus, whom Peter Comestor credited with the work, or both. Anselm died in 1117, Radulfus in 1132.

As early as the year 1076 Gregory VII disdainfully scorned some unnamed opponents who say: *regem non oportet excommunicari*.<sup>55</sup> The anti-Gregorians, as is well known, assembled a large collection of arguments against the excommunication of the German Emperor: they spoke of an uncanonical procedure, of a biased judgment, of personal spite, of tyranny, of the unheard-of novelty of the measure, and of many other things.<sup>56</sup> A criticism, however, which draws its force from St. Augustine's *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, seems to have been first proposed by the anti-Gregorian Bishop Wido of Ferrara. In his pamphlet *De scismate Hildebrandi*, written in 1086, Wido argues at length against the papal action and in so doing strongly emphasizes a long section of the Augustinian work containing the most important parts of the above-quoted text.<sup>57</sup> Taking into account the fact that in the time of Wido there probably existed a number of patristic anthologies and florilegia<sup>58</sup> there is no cogent reason to suppose that the contentious bishop personally discovered in the works of St. Augustine, the text which he so cleverly brings to bear upon the

<sup>51</sup> Text in *Catena Aurea*, Ed. Turin, 1925, p. 234 f. The translation, except for slight changes, is taken from *Catena Aurea*, vol. I, 2; 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1864), p. 498 f.

<sup>52</sup> Wenrich of Trier says with regard to this excommunication: *novum est . . . et omnibus retro saeculis inauditum*; *Epistola*, MGH, *Libelli de Lite* I, 289.

<sup>53</sup> *Liber ad Amicum* VIII: *op. cit.* I, 609.

<sup>54</sup> In *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1935), 235-262; 8 (1936), 24-60; 9 (1937), 365-400. See especially vol. 8, p. 48.

<sup>55</sup> *Registrum* IV, 2: Letter to Herman of Metz; Jaffé 5000 (3749); PL 148, 434.

<sup>56</sup> C. Mirbt, *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII* (Leipzig, 1894), 135 f.

<sup>57</sup> MGH, *Libelli de Lite* I, 561.

<sup>58</sup> Mirbt, *op. cit.*, 169.

Gregorian problem. At any rate in the contemporary canonical compilations this text does not appear.<sup>50</sup>

This sort of criticism, based on St. Augustine, of a reforming action did not, however, remain limited to the anti-Gregorians, nor is it even typical of their polemics. It was indeed no less determined a supporter of the papacy as Ivo of Chartres who only some eight years after Wido's pamphlet made the Augustinian quotation his own. A reform of such vigour and relentlessness as that of Gregory is easily exposed to the danger of exaggeration, especially if it is carried out by men of lesser caliber; then it may be fitting to advise moderation. In the celebrated prologue, which is prefixed to Ivo's *Decretum* and whose topic is prudence and moderation in ecclesiastical justice, we now find the passage of the anti-donatist work in a new, and this time its proper, setting.<sup>51</sup> Later the Bishop of Chartres had occasion to employ this passage even for the sake of defending the attitude of a Pope. When Paschal II in spite of the Roman events of the year 1111 (the Pope had been imprisoned by Henry V and forced to certain concessions in the question of investiture) did not pronounce the excommunication, Ivo, in the face of overzealous ecclesiastics vehemently criticizing this abstention, justified it on the authority of the third book of *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*.<sup>52</sup>

It seems to be mainly due to the great Chartrain that the text of St. Augustine became widely circulated in the ecclesiastical writings of the first decades of the twelfth century. Let us mention Placidus of Nonantula, *De Honore Ecclesiae*,<sup>53</sup> written in 1111, and Alger of Liège's book *De Misericordia et Iustitia*,<sup>54</sup> written before 1121, a treatise whose title at once characterizes the author as a sympathizer of Ivo's moderation and wisdom. In the year 1119 Geoffroy of Vendôme sums up the Augustinian text in a short dictum which it would not be amiss to compare with the categorical formula of the biblical Gloss:

Bonus et discretus Augustinus in epistola ad Parmenianum (*sic*) dicit vix aut numquam excommunicandum eum esse qui in malo opere obstinam multitudinem habet secum.<sup>55</sup>

In this or in a similar form the rule may be found in not a few theologians, for example Gerhoh of Reichersberg,<sup>56</sup> Peter Cantor<sup>57</sup> in the twelfth century,

<sup>50</sup> *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, Ed. Lips. secunda, Richter-Friedberg, vol. I, p. 914, n. 534.

<sup>51</sup> PL 161, 52 D f.

<sup>52</sup> *Epistola ad Ioscerannum: Lib. de Lite II*, 651.

<sup>53</sup> LXXV: *Lib. de Lite II*, 600.

<sup>54</sup> PL 180, 859 ff; cf. *Pars I*, c. 15 (864); c. 43 (873); c. 79 (891) etc.

<sup>55</sup> *Libellus IV: Lib. de Lite II*, 690.

<sup>56</sup> *Opusculum de Edificio Dei: Libelli de Lite III*, 182; *Opusculum ad Cardinales: ibid.* 403. Of special interest in view of St. Thomas' reasoning is Gerhoh's letter (*Ep.* 25: PL 193, 606 f.) complaining about a general excommunication inflicted by the bishop on the whole city of Ratisbon: He vigorously insists that a discreet judgment be pronounced, quo non totus populus involvatur, sed innocens a nocente, iustus ab iniusto iuste discernatur, et erga ipsos quoque nocentes tanto misericordius agatur, quanto evidenter apparet eos, qui ecclesiam dehonorerunt manus violentos imnitendo in virum falsarium, pauperes fuisse . . . Poterat fieri competens iudicium quod

non involveret totum illius civitatis populum, nisi forte populus ipse voluisset criminosos contra iustitiam defendere . . . Non est autem credibile omnes cives Ratisbonenses ita desipere, ut se manifeste opponant iustitiae. Unde consulendum est domino episcopo, ne involvat iustum cum impio.

<sup>57</sup> *Summa de Sacramentis et Animae Consiliis: Ms. Troyes, Bibl. de la Ville 276*, fol. 76 v<sup>a</sup>: Si quis frater nominatur etc. (I Cor. v, 11). Auctoritas est Apostoli. Si quis: importat caritatem et praeterea quod sit inter plures connumerabilis. Per hoc ergo notat in multitudinem non esse ferendam sententiam. Nec etiam in principem qui est supra.

*Ibid.*, fol. 78 v<sup>b</sup>: (an interesting use of Gratian's dictum in c. 32, C. 23, q. 4: Can a preacher admit an excommunicated person to hear his sermon without himself incurring excommunication since in allowing this he "communicates" with that person?) Sed nonne Augustinus, cum esset manichaeus, praedicationi beati Ambrosii interfuit, et ita

and, at the beginning of the thirteenth, in Robert Courson.<sup>67</sup> These are theologians from whose mind nothing was farther than the anti-papal sign under which the principle had begun its history. The rule has in fact completely lost its sting and has become an integral part of the canons. Because of their historical importance let us add the words by which Gratian introduces the canon containing the Augustinian text:<sup>68</sup>

Non est ferenda sententia, quando multitudo est in causa, vel quando ille peccat, qui sociam habet multitudinem; unde Augustinus in lib. II (*sic*) contra Parmenianum . . .

Then the text itself follows with the inscription:

Quod a multitudine peccatur, vel ab eo qui multitudinem habet sociam, ab ecclesia non punitur, sed defietur.

It was this tradition which St. Thomas, never neglecting any point of the teaching of the past, no matter how small, had in mind when using the gloss of Augustine. But what exactly is the idea and content of this tradition? It will be noted that there is not yet any question of a technical problem of the excommunication of an *universitas*, although the statement of the biblical glossator with its over-emphasized and perhaps not very skillful expression would suggest that there is one. The implicit allusion to such a problem in St. Augustine's passage is not exploited. In so far as our authors speak of the *multitudo* they do not mean a community in the technical sense but a loose, indefinite crowd who willingly follow the brilliant name, and yield to the power of a potentate: it is the *socia multitudo*, to use St. Augustine's own word<sup>69</sup> ever recurring in mediaeval literature; it is, we would say today, *public opinion*. In the context, moreover, of our quotation no question of the strict justice of the excommunication of a multitude is generally<sup>70</sup> stated or treated; rather these authors consider the political and, in the light of the parable, evangelical wisdom of such a measure. The strict right and justice of the excommunication of the prince and in general of all who deserve punishment, no matter how many they be, is not doubted; and even the most decided anti-Gregorians hardly questioned the fundamental papal right to excommunicate a king. The debate always turns around the question of its expediency, it is a discussion

tandem conversus est? Forte occultus erat, vel forte multitudo erat in causa.

*Ibid.*, fol. 80 r<sup>a</sup>: Dicit: detrahendum est aliquid severitati propter sociam multitudinem. Doctrinae autem tales conditionaliter sunt intelligendae, sicut et illa: *non neophytum, ne forte propter superbiū elatus incidat in tentationem diaboli* (I Tim. iii, 6). *Idem*, *Summa Abel*: Ms. Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville 234, fol. 4 v (cf. fol. 51 r): Anathematizatio sive excommunicatio sive eradicatio: Damna, ut si episcopus excommunicet regem vel principem vel collectionem hominum, scilicet si multitudinem est in culpa: sine magno consilio et magna discretione adhibita, si debeat fieri.

<sup>67</sup> *Summa de Sacramentis*: Ms. Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville 247, fol. 25 r<sup>b</sup>-v<sup>b</sup>: Nunc non est sententiandum in illum qui posset esse occasio scismatis, sicut nec in terrenum principem qui secum traheret sociam multitudinem. Et ad idem facit illa auctoritas evangelii: *Nolite eradicare zizania, ne simul eradicetis et triticum*. Ibi dicitur quod hoc omittendum est, ubi princeps est zizanium et secum posset trahere sociam

multitudinem.—*Sed contra*. Apostolus neminem excepit. Ergo nec talis est excipiendus, si subest iusta causa. Quod patet per factum Nicolai Papae qui excommunicavit regem Lotharium propter superinductam Gualdradam (Jaffé 2829).—*Solutio* . . . De principe qui excommunicatus est et trahit secum sociam multitudinem, dicimus quod circa ipsum quandoque potest differre sententiam, sed non debet parcere ei, praecipue ubi notatus est aut confessus aut in iure convictus, sicut nec pepercit Nicolaus Lothario, imo eum excommunicavit; et Trevirensis et Coloniensis episcopus, quia prohibuerunt concilium, deposuit (Jaffé 2834).—Indeed, Robert Courson is a contemporary of Innocent III!

<sup>68</sup> C. 23, q. 4, c. 32.

<sup>69</sup> C. Ep. Parm. loc. cit., 14: Neque enim potest esse salubris a multis correctio, nisi cum ille corripitur qui non habet sociam multitudinem.

<sup>70</sup> Gerhoh's letter on the events in Ratisbon A.D. 1140 (*supra*, n. 65) is an exception.

on policy rather than on judicial honesty. St. Thomas, as we have seen, again and again brought his attention to the same aspect of the problem.

The technical, juridico-philosophical discussion of punishing an *universitas* has another context and another origin. It is due, on the one hand, to another Augustinian document, a text incorporated into ecclesiastical legislation as the so-called canon *Si habes*, and, on the other hand, to Roman Law. Both sources have left visible traces in St. Thomas' Little Question. And so we will now have to consider these sources, and in the first place the canon *Si habes* and its influence in mediaeval literature.

##### 5. THE CANON "SI HABES" AND THE EXCOMMUNICATION OF AN UNIVERSITAS

This canon of Gratian's *Decretum* is a venerable and celebrated document, traceable, in the Compilations, as far back as the ninth century.<sup>71</sup> It contains an extensive passage of St. Augustine's letter to Bishop Auxilius.<sup>72</sup> May we ask the reader again to consider some of the immortal words of the great Bishop of Hippo. The following text is indeed capital reading with regard to our problem; later mediaeval jurists are right in quoting Innocent's decretal together with the canon *Si habes* which is its true foundation.<sup>73</sup>

Bishop Auxilius, a young colleague of St. Augustine's, confirming the old truth of the new broom that sweeps clean, had, with the solemnity of ecclesiastical procedure, anathematized Classicianus, a man of rank, and all his household, and had done so on a petty and insufficient ground. Hearing of this from Classicianus himself, St. Augustine frankly confesses that "the thoughts of his mind are agitated like the waves of a stormy sea." He addresses to Auxilius a polite but firm rebuke:<sup>74</sup>

If you have (*Si habes*) thoroughly examined your judgment in this matter, and have proved it by irrefragable reasoning or Scripture testimonies, you will have the kindness to teach me also the grounds on which it is just that a son should be anathematized for the sin of his father, or a wife for the sin of her husband, or a servant for the sin of his master, or how it is just that even the child as yet unborn should lie under an anathema, and be debarred, even though death were imminent, from the deliverance provided in the laver of regeneration, if he happen to be born in a family at the time when the whole household is under the ban of excommunication. For this is not one of those judgments merely affecting the body, in which, as we read in Scripture, some despisers of God were slain with all their households, though these had not been sharers in their impiety. In those cases, indeed, as a warning to the survivors, death was inflicted on *bodies* which, as mortal, were destined at some time to die; but a spiritual judgment, founded on what is written, "*That which ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven*" (*Matth.* xvi, 19), is binding on *souls*, concerning

<sup>71</sup> C. 24, q. 3, c. 1. See ed. Richter-Friedberg, p. 388, note 19.

<sup>72</sup> Ep. 250; PL 33, 1066.

<sup>73</sup> So for instance *Glossa Ordinaria* in c. 30, X, 5, 3. William Durantis, however, has already forgotten all about the canon *Si habes*; see *Speculum Iudiciale*, IV, 4, *De sententia* exc., n. 9: . . . [non] debet proferre sententiam excommunicationis in collegium vel universitatem, ut *Extra*, eod., Romana, § finali (i.e. the decretal *Ceterum*). Et est ratio, quia universitas non habet animam, quae specialiter per excommunicationem

ligatur . . . Alia vero ratio ibi redditur, § finali.—The Speculator (and before him Hostiensis) provide the transition to the nominalist interpretation of Innocent's decretal, and it is very characteristic that under the heading *alia ratio* he adjudicates the second place to what is in truth the first and even the only reason. Cf. *infra* n. 144.

<sup>74</sup> The translation is taken from *The Works of Aurelius Augustine*, ed. by M. Dods, vol. XIII, 2 (Edinburgh, 1875), 455 f.

which it is said, "*As the soul of the father is mine, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die*" (Ezech. xviii, 14). It may be that you have heard that other priests of great reputation have in some cases included the household of a transgressor in the anathema pronounced on him; but these could, perchance, if they were required, give a good reason for so doing. For my own part, although I have been most grievously troubled by the cruel excesses with which some men have vexed the Church, I have never ventured to do as you have done, for this reason that if any one were to challenge me to justify such an act, I could give no satisfactory reply. But if, perchance, the Lord has revealed to you that it may be justly done, I by no means despise your youth and your inexperience, as having been but recently elevated to high office in the Church. Behold, though far advanced in life, I am ready to learn from one who is but young; and notwithstanding the number of years for which I have been a bishop, I am ready to learn from one who has not yet been a twelvemonth in the same office, if he undertakes to teach me how we can justify our conduct, either before men or before God, if we inflict a spiritual punishment on innocent souls because of an another person's crime, in which they are not involved in the same way as they are involved in the original sin of Adam, in whom "*all have sinned*" (Rom. v, 12). For although the son of Classicianus derived through his father, from our first parent, guilt which behoved to be washed away by the sacred waters of baptism, who hesitates for a moment to say that he is in no way responsible for any sin which his father may have committed, since he was born, without his participation? What shall I say of his wife? What of so many souls in the entire household?—of which if even one, in consequence of the severity which included the whole household in the excommunication, should perish through departing from the body without baptism, the loss thus occasioned would be an incomparably greater calamity than the bodily death of an innumerable multitude, even though they were innocent men, dragged from the courts of the sanctuary and murdered. If, therefore, you are able to give a good reason for this, I trust that you will in your reply communicate it to me, that I also may be able to do the same; but if you cannot, what right have you to do, under the promptings of inconsiderate excitement, an act for which, if you were asked to give a satisfactory reason, you could find none?—What I have said hitherto applies to the case even on the supposition that our son Classicianus has done something which might appear to demand most righteously at your hands the punishment of excommunication.

St. Thomas, not the least of whose gifts was that he knew how to read a text and put his finger on the really important point, both in regard to doctrine and to history—St. Thomas never quoted this document without indicating the words of Ezechiel xviii, 14 to be its formal statement: *As the soul of the father is mine, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die.*<sup>76</sup> They are indeed the true center of St. Augustine's teaching. They touch on what is the core of Christian social philosophy. St. Augustine has also expressed this idea of the person, and the *Christian* person, falling, before God, on his own deserts and on nothing else, in another document which is likewise included in the *Decretum*:<sup>77</sup> If a man lives a good life in Holy Church, the law

<sup>76</sup> *Lectura in Ioannem*, c. IX, 1, 2; I-II, 81, 2 ad 1; *ibid.*, 87, 8.

<sup>77</sup> Si quis a catholica ecclesia fuerit separatus, quantumlibet laudabiliter se vivere existimet, hoc solo scelere, quod a Chris-

tianitate disiunctus est, non habebit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum. Quisquis autem in hac sancta ecclesia bene vixerit, nihil ei praeiudicant aliena peccata; quia in ea unusquisque proprium onus portabit,

of solidarity in evil, valid in pagan society, for him is nullified. No sin of others will cause him prejudice. For in this Church the law established by the Apostle (Gal. vi, 5) is in force: *Each one shall bear his own burden and person: causam suam et personam suam*. In mediaeval jurisprudence as well as in philosophy it is this idea of the Christian personality which finally commands the solution of the problem of the *delictum universitatis* and its punishment. No doubt the law of 1246 directly depends on the canon *Si habes*. No doubt either St. Thomas in the *Quaestiuncula* goes back to this foundation and develops it and re-establishes it, as we shall see later, in the face of a different solution which had been tried out by other thinkers.

But let us not anticipate. In the juristic literature before 1246 which we are considering here,<sup>77</sup> the canon *Si habes* exercises its influence in two directions.

First, it brings on, and authorizes, the formulation of the principle: *Universitas non est excommunicanda*, and here the term *universitas* has its specific and technical meaning. To be sure, St. Augustine did not speak of an *universitas* but of a family, a household (*domus, familia*). Yet very generally mediaeval thinkers, in accord with their patriarchal and feudal conceptions, had no difficulty or hesitation to subsume all and every social unit under the notion of family.<sup>78</sup> In this way it comes about that the canon is very often summarized in the above-quoted formula. Johannes Teutonicus in the Gloss which he composed before 1215, invokes the *Si habes* when affirming: *Civitas non est excommunicanda*.<sup>79</sup> On the ground, thus, of the Augustinian canon a common opinion is established long before the decretal of Innocent IV, holding, at least in general, i.e., except in special cases, the excommunication of an *universitas* in the technical sense of the word to be illegal.

Secondly, the canon teaches on what reason this rule should be based. For, insisting on personal merits and deserts it urges to separate the innocent from the guilty and thus to consider the problem of punishing an *universitas* under this aspect that such a sentence may involve a miscarriage of justice. Even those jurists who, like Bartholomew of Brescia, somehow hesitate to acknowledge the unlimited force of the above rule, are in complete and sincere agreement with it when, and in so far as, in an *universitas* there are *infantes et similes personae*, i.e., persons about whose innocence there can be no doubt.<sup>80</sup>

Nevertheless, in the discussions of the jurists before 1246 the canon *Si habes* is not yet recognized in all its force: its argument, in the minds of the lawyers, is somehow weakened by the gravity of certain objections which come to them

sicut Apostolus ait. Ergo communio malorum non maculat aliquem participatione sacramentorum, sed consensio factorum. Nam si in malis factis non eis quisque consentiat, portat malus causam suam et personam suam (Ed. Romana), nec preiudicat alteri, quem in consensione mali operis non habet socium criminis.—Cf. c. 129, *De consecr.* Dist. 4. The expression: *causam suam et personam suam*, although not accepted by Richter-Friedberg in the edition of the *Decretum*, is nevertheless St. Augustine's; Ep. 141, 5; CSEL 34, II, 3, p. 239.

<sup>77</sup> Our account of the doctrines of the mediaeval jurists is in large part based on the texts quoted in Gierke's extensive notes, GR §§ 7 and 8. Up to this date no other documentation is ordinarily available; the manuscripts and the old and rare editions have not been at our disposal, except in the case of Innocent's *Apparatus* and, of course, the *Glossa Ordinaria* on both Laws. In acknowledging our indebtedness to, and our admiration for, Gierke's work, we must

however observe that our interpretation entirely differs from his.—It would be an urgent task to edit or re-edit the vast amount of those juristic glosses and commentaries. No clear knowledge of mediaeval social and political thought is indeed possible without them.

<sup>78</sup> As late as the XIVth century Bartolus of Sassoferrata objects against Innocent: quaedam sunt delicta propter quae filius punitur propter patrem; and he concludes: In istis cessant rationes Innocentii, ubi posunt puniri parvuli propter maiores et descendentes propter civitates; Commentary on L. 16, § 10, *Dig.*, 48, 19; GR 408 f.—As for St. Thomas there is, it seems to us, a long way between 2 *Sent.*, 33, I, 2 ad 5 and the omission in II-II, 108, 4 ad 1 (Ed. Ottawa, p. 1986<sup>n</sup>, 47-49). We are to come back to this point in the second part of these studies.

<sup>79</sup> Text quoted *infra* p. 26.

<sup>80</sup> Text quoted *infra* p. 26.

from other facts and sources of information. And in speaking thus of the "discussions of the jurists", let us not forget to add that certain grain of salt which tempers an all-too sweeping assertion. For the problem is only dawning upon the lawyers' mind and as yet they are devoting to it only scanty and passing remarks. Their method, moreover, prevents them from penetrating to the bottom of the matter. They do not write treatises but glosses, and instead of thinking out a principle they combine and harmonize legal decisions.

The first and for a canonist the most serious difficulty in the problem is the recognized and legal practice of the general interdict. For, this interdict is a "spiritual punishment", meted out, sometimes, without regard to personal guilt and responsibility. Now, did not St. Augustine motivate the injustice of "excommunicating an *universitas*" by recurring precisely to the danger of summary *spiritual punishment*? How then does this accord with the interdict? It is clear beyond any doubt that, to use a very significant phrase of the Decretist in the *Glossa Ordinaria*, *non potest quis peccare per alium*.<sup>81</sup> But it is much less clear, if it is clear at all, whether or not, at least in certain cases, *unus pro alio puniri possit*, the first and immediate canonical difficulty in the way of this being the interdict. Hence it is no surprise to find either, on the one hand, pinned to the rule of the canon *Si habes*, the characteristic restriction: *nisi aliud caveatur*—a restriction by which from olden times the jurist is wont to shun the labour of synthesis and penetration: [*Poenā spirituali excommunicationis non punitur unus pro alio*] *nisi, ut quidam dicunt, enormitas delicti aliud suadeat*;<sup>82</sup> or, on the other hand, the remark that the interdict belongs to those spiritual penalties with regard to which the Augustinian principle of personal responsibility suffers exception: *Poenā [spirituali] interdicti bene unus punitur pro alio*.<sup>83</sup> Innocent IV, therefore, calls the interdict a "special punishment" without, unfortunately, feeling any urge to investigate either this general, and of course analogical, notion of "punishment", or the special and specific character of the "punishment" of the interdict.<sup>84</sup>

Still another set of difficulties arise in the mind of the jurists when they consider "corporal" punishment and ask the question whether or not such penalties, specifically belonging to the secular courts, can be meted out without regard to personal guilt. At this point not only juristic but also theological objections play their part to render more difficult a consistent solution of the problem. For, theologically speaking, the task as seen by our mediaeval scholars, is now to reconcile the God of *Ezechiel* xviii, 14 with that *jealous God* of *Exodus* xx, 5 who *visits the iniquity of the father upon the children, upon the third and the fourth generation*.<sup>85</sup> There is thus at this point, in theology itself, a clash between two fundamental conceptions of social and juridical thinking, the one being a personalist, the other—let us coin the word—a communalist conception; and, to be sure, when theology is involved or the theological aspect of a problem taken in view, not only the very last but also the very most difficult word is to be spoken. To the lawyer, as St. Bonaventure once stated,<sup>86</sup> belongs the *Quia*, not the *Propter Quid*, of legal problems. One can,

<sup>81</sup> *Glossa Ordinaria* in c. 8, C. 1, q. 4.

<sup>82</sup> *Glossa Ordinaria* in dict. Gratiani, *initio* C. 24, q. 3, s. v. *Quod autem*.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Apparatus*, gl. *Consiliarios*; text quoted *infra* p. 31, line 95. It will be noted that even St. Thomas does not go into the problem of the interdict as "punishment". He simply remarks, in the *Quaestiuicula*, ad 2, that it is *non tanta poena* as excommunication. I do not know of any place in other and later works where Aquinas would throw more light on this obscure problem.

In II-II, 108, 4 it is supposed that, in speaking of *poena sensus* and *poena damni*, i.e., criminal and civil penalty, one uses the same word in different meanings. But the application of this to the matter of the interdict is not made in St. Thomas' *littera*.

<sup>85</sup> On the importance, in mediaeval political thinking, of these two texts of Scripture see R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. V (Edinburgh and London, 1923), 444, 452.

<sup>86</sup> 4. *Sent.*, 18, P. II, q. 3; ed. Quaracchi IV, 488<sup>b</sup>.

therefore, hardly expect the jurists to disentangle such a knot, although to the praise of mediaeval jurisprudence it must be said that at least one of them, a truly great canonist, Innocent IV, did give the solution, a solution which *in nuce* is exactly the same as that of a truly great theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>87</sup>—But all this is another story the details of which we will have to recount in the second part of these studies where we are to discuss the possibility and extension of representation in the matter of penal law.

The most important fact, at this point, in the mediaeval history of the problem of the *delictum universitatis* is that the canon *Si habes* and its emphatic separation between the innocent and the guilty met with mediaeval Romanist jurisprudence. In this meeting the fundamental notion of society underlying all these discussions was slowly emerging, and it was St. Thomas' merit to have brought it to the fore and clearly shown how it bears on the problem.

#### 6. ULPIAN'S QUESTION IN DIGEST, "DE DOLO MALO", AND MEDIAEVAL JURISPRUDENCE

Ulpian, *loc. cit.*,<sup>88</sup> records the lawyers' doubt whether a suit may be brought against *municipes* on the ground of fraud or deceit:

An in *municipes* de dolo malo detur actio dubitatur.

His decision is this:

Et puto ex suo quidem dolo non posse dari: quid enim *municipes* dolo facere possunt? Sed si quid ad eos pervenit ex dolo eorum, qui res eorum administrant, puto dandam. De dolo autem decurionum in ipsos decuriones dabitur de dolo actio. Item si quid ex dolo procuratoris ad dominum pervenit, datur in dominum de dolo actio in quantum ad eum pervenit: nam procurator ex dolo suo procul dubio tenetur. In hac actione designari oportet, cuius dolo factum sit, quamvis in metu non sit necesse.

Obviously *municipes* are not just fraudulent individuals who also happen to live in, and be citizens of, a town. *Municipes* are the citizens as such, all the citizens, each and every one of them, and, in this sense, the whole town, the town itself. The object, therefore, of Ulpian's difficulty is whether an *actio doli* will lie against a town. The jurist makes it clear that he abhors that juristic vacuum which is an anonymous crowd, for, as he states, it is characteristic of the *actio doli* that the offender be designated by his name. Moreover he cannot think of any way in which all citizens, each and every one, might become guilty of *dolus malus*. Therefore, he supposes that such an action will not lie. Two cases, however, are beyond doubt. The first is, when officials of the town have committed a fraud by which the town has profited. Ulpian considers this case to be analogous to the situation of a *dominus* who has gained by the wrongdoing of his *procurator*. Hence he would admit an action against a town, not for *dolus malus* but for unjust enrichment. The second case is that of fraudulent *decuriones*. No objection can be raised against prosecuting, on account of *dolus malus*, the members of the municipal senate, for they obviously can be enumerated and named.

On the basis of this decision the mediaeval legists, pressing Ulpian's point slightly, ask the question whether an *universitas* "can" commit a delict: *an*

<sup>87</sup> Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, gl. *Consiliarios*, text quoted *infra* p. 32, lines 114-118. St. Thomas, II-II, 108, 4. The problem of both these texts is due to the dictum Gratiani on c. 11, C. 1, q. 4. St. Thomas' article is

the rare example of a treatise in the *Summa* which would fit most exactly into a commentary on the *Corpus Iuris Canonici*.

<sup>88</sup> L. 15, § 1-3, *Dig.*, 4, 3.



*universitas possit delinquere*. The following answer is very commonly given and held to be the correct explanation of the Roman lawyer's question: *quid enim municipes dolo facere possunt?* In principle such a delict is possible. In fact, it does happen in a small number of cases; considering the ordinary run of events, however, it is rarely met with.

Why indeed should a *delictum universitatis*, i.e., a misdeed of all its members, be absolutely impossible? Is it not at least thinkable, that in a given unlawful act the essential condition be fulfilled which philosophy and jurisprudence require of a common act (*actus unicus et communis*,<sup>89</sup> *communiter agere*<sup>90</sup>), viz. that it be a joint action to which each and every one contributes in his capacity as member of the *universitas*, and which is performed through using the legally relevant forms of common acting, i.e., as the jurists put it: *concilio habito, et campana sonata vel alias eis* (i.e. the members) *convocatis*?<sup>91</sup> And, this being so, why should it be said that such a delict cannot happen at all? As St. Thomas states, and as the legists long before him declare and repeat, though not in these exact words: *contingit quod aliqua universitas sibi in malitia colligatur*. Hence in the lawyers' glosses frequent and rather emphatic account is taken of the case that *tota universitas* or *tota ecclesia delinquit*,<sup>92</sup> and the various manners in which this common delict, the universal participation in an unlawful act, may be brought about, are carefully recorded.<sup>93</sup>

This delict, although a definitely possible fact, is however a rare thing. It does not happen frequently because, as the Bolognese legist Azo puts it, men are naturally inclined to disagree with one another.<sup>94</sup> To be sure, Ulpian's text implies rather a tacit negative answer to his question. But, the legists suggest, why not make a slight addition to it so as to leave room for a positive answer also; and is not an authority sometimes like that waxen nose referred to by Alan of Lille<sup>95</sup> which needs to be set straight that it may point again in the right direction? *Quod lex dicit: quid enim [municipes dolo facere possunt?], supple: de facili*.<sup>96</sup> Even a certain philological essay, found in Gratian, about rhetorical questions is referred to at this point by the legists: *Haec interrogatio (scil. quid enim etc.) raritatem, non impossibilitatem notat, sicut ibi: Si sacerdos peccaverit, quis orabit pro eo?*<sup>97</sup> Account is also taken, in these discussions, of the proposition of Paulus in the title *De acquirenda vel amittenda possessione*:

<sup>89</sup> See GR 313, n. 204 and 206.

<sup>90</sup> St. Thomas, *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, chapt. 3; see below, n. 102. The jurists themselves speak of *communiter* or *collegialiter* (*capitulariter*) *agere, consentire* etc.: GR 313; 267, n. 65 (Laurentius Hispanus).

<sup>91</sup> *Gl. Ordin.* in L. 7, § 1, *Dig.*, 3, 4, s.v. *Non debetur*: GR 222, n. 107. The opposite of this form of acting is that every one acts *suo motu* (*ibid.*).

<sup>92</sup> . . . nisi forte universitas tota deliquerit: Damasus Boëmus; GR 343, n. 314.— . . . cum tota ecclesia deliquit: Goffredus of Trani; GR *ibid.*—*Omnium delictum: Ordin.* in L. 10, *Cod.*, 1, 2, s.v. *Corrigimus*; GR 235, 159.

<sup>93</sup> Innocent IV, gloss *Consiliarios*, *infra* p. 31, lines 91-96. In this gloss, however, the words, *vel tantae partis, quod invitis aliis maleficium fecerint*, refer exclusively to the interdict.

<sup>94</sup> GR 234, n. 154: propter naturalem hominis ad dissentiendum facilitatem. Very appropriately St. Thomas rather insists on the fact that men disagree with regard to evil and sin: non . . . est probabile quod aliqua communitas ita tota ad malum con-

sentiat, quin aliqui sint dissentientes (*Scriptum, Quaestiuncula*). This is the reason why, as St. Thomas states elsewhere: In multitudine malorum non omnes omnibus socialiter concordant, sed quidam quibusdam (*Expos. in Iob* XLI, 1). Azo's statement is only partially true. If it were completely true, how then would society be natural? Interesting, in this context, is also St. Albert's remark: *peccata non habent unum principium nec unam formam* . . . Sed opera bona habent et formam communem et principium commune, propter quae omnes boni sunt unum corpus caritate connexum, sed non mali (4. *Sent.*, 45, 1; ed. Borgnet 30, 608). This very clearly shows what a mediaeval theologian thought of Christian society, and what is his notion of Christian social philosophy.

<sup>95</sup> *De Fide Catholica* I, 30; PL 210, 333.

<sup>96</sup> *Gl. Ordin.* on L. 9, § 1, *Dig.*, 4, 2, s.v. *Collegium*; GR 234, n. 154. The same idea is expressed by Pillius, Azo, Hugolinus; GR 218, n. 97.

<sup>97</sup> *Gl. Ordin.* on L. 15, § 1, *Dig.*, 4, 3, s.v. *Facere possunt*. The tacit reference is to *Dict. Grat.* in c. 59, *De penit.* D. 1.

*Universi consentire non possunt*,<sup>98</sup> and this sentence, it is submitted, should be understood with the same distinction. Lastly from Roman Law itself a text is often quoted which for the mediaeval students presupposes that a *delictum universitatis* has been committed: *Sive singularis sit persona quae metum intulit, sive populus vel curia vel corpus, huic edicto (scil. the edict Quod metus causa) locus erit.*<sup>99</sup>

In this way, among the legists and their canonist disciples of the first half of the thirteenth century, a definite and common opinion is established about the existence of a delict of an *universitas*. The application of this teaching to the matter of excommunication may best be seen in a gloss of the *Ordinaria* on the *Decretum*.<sup>100</sup> This gloss is a short note composed of two parts which were written at different times and by different authors.

The name of Johannes Teutonicus is affixed to the following observation:

Universitas non potest dolum committere, ut ff *De dolo malo*, *Sed si ex dolo*. Sic nec dicitur aliquid possidere: ff *De acquirenda possessione*, L. 1, § ult. Nec civitas potest excommunicari, ut [C.] XXIV, q. 3: *Si habes . . . Ergo universitas non potest de crimine conveniri. Quod verum est . . . Johannes.*

To this reasoning and conclusion Bartholomew of Brescia, the revisor and editor of the *Ordinaria* writing shortly before 1246, opposes what he might have thought to be the last word in civilian jurisprudence:

Ego credo quod universitas, nisi sint infantes et similes personae, accusari potest, quia dolum committere potest. Nec obstat lex illa ff *De dolo*, *Sed si ex dolo*, quia quod ibi dicitur: non potest committere dolum, supple: de facili. Et videmus quod saepe capitulum accusatur et excommunicatur concilium universitatis.

The conclusion may not unduly be drawn from this that the jurists, although in possession of that very appropriate distinction between the absolute possibility and the relative impossibility of a *delictum universitatis*, nevertheless did not know how to use it; and a remark of St. Albert comes to our mind: . . . [*decretistae*] *nesciunt unam obiectionem solvere quam faciunt*,<sup>101</sup> a remark which is indeed a little malicious and not too serious. As a matter of fact however, with regard to our problem it was left to St. Thomas Aquinas, in the Little Question of the *Scriptum*, to show the right use of that distinction. No later mediaeval jurist, to my knowledge, has taken account of this Thomistic teaching, not to speak of appreciating the assistance offered by a theologian.

But let us be careful not to undervalue or even misjudge the jurists' efforts. They are indeed *philosophically* relevant. When St. Thomas wrote down his well-known definition of society: '*Societas nihil aliud esse [videtur] quam adunatio hominum ad unum aliquid communiter agendum*',<sup>102</sup> he did no more, in truth, (nor indeed less,) than synthesize and give clear expression to the various elements of juristic teaching found in the glosses and commentaries, so that the roots of this Thomistic definition may be said to spread out into the vast earth of civilian and canonist doctrine. Let it be noted, however, that no mediaeval jurist ever synthesized his own doctrine in the way in which St. Thomas achieved this. When touching upon the matter of defining *collegium* or *corpus* the

<sup>98</sup> L. 1, § 22, *Dig.*, 41, 2. See below the text of Joh. Teutonicus. Moreover *Gl. Ordin.* on L. 15 § 1, *Dig.*, 4, 3, s.v. *Facere possunt*; *GR* 218, n. 98.

<sup>99</sup> L. 9, § 1, *Dig.*, 4, 2.

<sup>100</sup> Note on c. 58, C. 12, q. 2, s.v. *Accusandi*.  
<sup>101</sup> 4 *Sent.*, 27, 21; ed. Borgnet 30, 182<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> *Contra Impugnantes* . . . , chapt. 3; ed. Mandonnet IV, 25.

lawyers struggle with the Stoic reminiscences of Pomponius in Roman Law,<sup>103</sup> and they do not give the impression that they knew too well what to do with them.

The juristic discussions about the existence of a common delict seem to contain, although in an undeveloped state, the following philosophical doctrine of the very nature of common action and community. On the part of its object and specification (these terms are of course not used by the jurists) the common action is an *actus unicus*, i.e., an act specifically unified by its aim and object, called *causa universitatis*.<sup>104</sup> If the *singuli* act *ut universi*,<sup>105</sup> i.e. toward the, or an, object of common character and universal relevance, and in the forms of *collegialiter agere*, the act is a common action. If, however, the *singuli* act *ut singuli*, i.e., each and every one for his own sake and on his own motive the act is a singular action, and it will not become a common action even if it should happen that, in fact, several individuals act in like manner. On the part of its subject and exercise, on the other hand, the common action (*actus communis*), in principle and originally, are the acts of each and every individual who is part of the community and acts in view of the aforementioned *causa universitatis*. When a whole community acts in this way, i.e., each and every one contributing his share to the common action, the jurists say that the *universitas* is acting *per se (totam)*.<sup>106</sup> That thus the original form of common action is held to be the actual co-operation under legally qualified conditions, of each and every one of the community's members, this is indeed a principle of far-reaching importance in social and political thinking. To be sure, by emphasizing this *original* form of common acting, the problem of this acting is by no means exhausted or definitely settled. For, other and *derived* forms must be considered, forms in which the *universitas* acts *per se (partem)* or even, as the jurists hold, *per alium*. But in the present part of our studies it is this notion of the original form of common action which is important; the derived forms will be taken into account in our second part.

To illustrate the immediate consequences, in penal law, of this notion of common action and common delict, may we quote the Glossator of the Digest.<sup>107</sup> When treating of the ban of an *universitas* which as in ecclesiastical excommunication was to be pronounced on the ground of contumacy, the author insists: *Ut ergo universitas sit contumax, citetur in capitulo vel arengo*. Indeed, no criminal sentence can in justice be pronounced against an *universitas* without previous individual conviction of all its members. It is at this point that the civilian doctrine meets with the canon *Si habes* and its emphatic separation between the guilty and the innocent individuals. The legists furnish the *Si habes* with its juristic foundation, and, to a certain extent, they also open the way to its philosophical verification.

A fundamental mistake seems to underlie Gierke's interpretation of these and similar texts of mediaeval jurisprudence. To the author of the *Genossenschaftsrecht* it is an unshakeable tenet that in reducing the common action to individual acting the mediaeval writers showed their radical and crude indi-

<sup>103</sup> L. 30, pr., Dig., 41, 3; tertium (sc. genus corporum), quod ex distantibus constat, ut corpora plura non (non del. Bernays) soluta, sed uni nomini subiecta, veluti populus, legio, grex.—For mediaeval explanations of this definition cf. the texts in GR 193; 247/8.

<sup>104</sup> Causa ecclesiae vel universitatis: Damasus Boëmus, GR 300. Likewise Innocent IV, *Apparatus*, gl. *Culpabiles*, infra p. 29, lines 13 ff.

<sup>105</sup> Municipēs, scilicet omnes generaliter:

Gl. *Ordin.* on L. 15, § 1, Dig., 4, 3. *Negotium*, quando tangit multos ut singulos . . . Innocent IV, GR 342, n. 308. *Singulorum* . . . consensus, puta unus, duorum, trium vel etiam multorum, dummodo non faciant universitatem civitatis, castri, burgi vel villae, vel collegii alicuius ecclesiae, vel gratia professionis vel negotiationis . . . Innocent IV, GR 304, n. 175.

<sup>106</sup> GR 219 f.

<sup>107</sup> Gl. *Ordin.* on L. 199 (160), Dig., 50, 17.

vidualism. For, on the basis of this reduction, are they not forced to admit that the community is nothing else than the sum, the mere sum of the individuals? And does not thinking in the matter of social philosophy only begin after the notion of that sum is definitely relinquished and abandoned?—To refute this criticism it will be sufficient to observe that no mediaeval jurist actually mentioned that sum of the individuals, nor did any theologian. They all, however, insist on two facts: first, that the individual, and only the individual, acts, i.e., produces that physical reality which is a human act and which is to be qualified morally; and, second, that originally the community is nothing else than all its individuals acting not *ut singuli* but *ut universi*. Now why should this 'all the individuals' of necessity mean their arithmetical addition? Why should it not, on the contrary, involve something quite different, viz. their teleological unity, the unity of *order* built around a common cause for which all individuals, each and every one, are supposed to be acting? Certain juristic texts seem to be moving, as it were, towards this capital notion of order, although their doctrine is far from being consistent and unambiguous. At any rate, the principle that only the individual can act, in the full sense of the word (whether or not the act of one individual may stand for that of another, is quite a different story), this principle is no indication of an individualistic tendency, unless it be decreed, and accepted, that whoever ignores or denies that mysterious and unthinkable *substanzielle Lebenseinheit* is, by the same token, an individualist. But neither has the fact of individualism anything to do with, nor will its notion ever become clear in the light of, such metaphysics. Individualism is a matter of moral behaviour and, consequently, of moral science. It posits, not individuals and nothing else, but, individuals acting exclusively for their own advantage and thereby frustrating the common cause and utility. No mediaeval jurist or theologian ever thought of philosophically constructing society with such individuals.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the foregoing chapters we have endeavoured to investigate the sources of St. Thomas' Little Question as they are either expressly cited or implicitly referred to. To the former category belong the gloss of Augustine and the statute of Innocent IV, which, in its turn, is based upon the canon *Si habes*. In the category of implicit references we should like to place the two remarks whose origin in mediaeval Roman jurisprudence it is difficult not to notice: First, the remark by which, at the very beginning of his discussion, Aquinas takes up the problem: *Contingit . . . quod aliqua universitas sibi in malitia colligatur*; and, second, the remark containing one of the principles which command the solution: *Actus autem non est communitatis, sed singularum personarum ut frequenter*. That St. Thomas did not quote the legists is a principle with him. To mediaeval theologians these scholars are, indeed, like the family's black sheep whose names are rather not mentioned. In a later *Opusculum*<sup>108</sup> Aquinas states: *Inconsonum et derisibile videtur quod sacrae doctrinae professores iuristarum glossulas in auctoritatem inducant vel de eis disceptent*. This rule, it seems, is justified by certain incidental conditions of the time—and, anyway, "the jurists do not know how to solve one single objection". Nevertheless, in fact, St. Thomas was too great and generous a mind to spurn any bit or shred of truth which was offered to him, no matter what its source.

<sup>108</sup> *Contra Pestiferam Doctrinam Retrahentium Homines a Religionis Ingressu*, chapt. 13; ed. Mandonnet IV, 308. The remark refers in particular to Bernardus in

*suo Apparatu*, Huguccio, Raymundus et Goffinus (? Goffredus) in *suis Summis*; *ibid.* 300. As for Raymund of Pennafort cf. *supra* n. 36.

There is, however, more to the text of the *Scriptum* than all these sources. To anyone familiar with both St. Thomas' and St. Albert's commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences there can be no doubt that Aquinas in writing his text had constantly before his eyes the *notulae* of his teacher. The question, therefore, must be asked how, in the problem of general excommunications, the Thomistic doctrine is related to St. Albert. Now it is a fact that St. Thomas, on the one hand, makes use of St. Albert's text, and yet, on the other hand, observes silence with regard to a point which in the German Master's reasoning is the very gist of the matter. This silence, it seems to us, is significant. In the following two chapters, therefore, we propose both to establish, in detail, the fact of this silence and to examine its significance.

Albert's reasoning is much like, and surely in some way or other dependent on, the reasoning of Innocent IV in his *Apparatus in Quinque Libros Decretalium*. Hence it will be our first task to be acquainted with the Pope's argument.

## 7. A NEW ARGUMENTATION IN INNOCENT IV'S APPARATUS

The *Apparatus in Quinque Libros Decretalium*, a scholarly work of the great canonist which was finished shortly after the Council of Lyons,<sup>109</sup> is difficult of access.<sup>110</sup> Let us therefore first of all reproduce in full the texts relating to the problem of general excommunication. To facilitate the reading we have taken the many allegations out of the text and put them in our notes; an asterisk will mark the place where the author is quoting his sources; these latter, we have indicated according to modern usage.

*The gloss In universitatem*<sup>111</sup> (c. 64, X, 5, 39 = c. 5, In VI<sup>a</sup>, 5, 11 in fine). (This and the following gloss constitute Innocent's scholarly commentary on the above-quoted decretal.)

- Ex hac enim [excommunicatione] sequitur absurditas, quod puer unius 5. diei incidit in hanc excommunicationem et ille qui absens est. Sed iuste sic fertur sententia: Excommunico omnes illos de hac universitate, qui fuerunt rebelles modo mandato.—Sententia autem interdicti iuste fertur in universitatem, quae fertur pro delicto alterius.\*<sup>112</sup>

*The gloss Culpabiles (ibidem).*

10. Dicunt quidam quod etiam in iustos (istos) culpabiles non fertur sententia excommunicationis, nisi primo moneantur et contra eos causa cognita procedatur: quia alia est causa capituli vel universitatis quam sit causa canonicorum.\*<sup>113</sup> Causa enim universitatis potest esse, quia non comparet in iudicio, vel quia non recipiunt aliquem in canonicum, et huiusmodi. 15. Causa autem personarum culpabilium de collegio non est hoc, quia ipsi non specialiter vocantur; imo si comparerent, non admitterentur ad respondendum pro capitulo sine mandato.—Item. Ipsi non possent nec deberent aliquem recipere in canonicum sine capitulo.—Alii dicunt, et forte melius, quod auctoritate huius decretalis sine alia monitione et causae cognitione

<sup>109</sup> F. v. Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des kan. Rechts II* (Stuttgart, 1877), 93.

<sup>110</sup> We used the edition of Venice 1481 (Library of Congress).

<sup>111</sup> *Ed. cit.*, fol. 258 r<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>112</sup> c. 19, C. 16, Q. 7; c. 11, X, 4, 1.

<sup>113</sup> c. 11, C. 2, Q. 1; c. 48, X, 5, 39; *dict.*, §

Qui manumittitur, in c. 58, C. 12, Q. 2 (= L. 10, § 4, *Dig.*, 2, 4: Qui manumittitur a corpore aliquo vel collegio vel civitate, singulos in ius vocabit: nam non est illorum libertus, sed rei publicae honorem habere debet.) This allegation is conventional whenever a mediaeval jurist points to the distinction between *universitas* and *singuli*.

20. nominatim possunt excommunicare illos quos culpabiles norunt. Sed si non esset eis notum, non deberet sententiam (sententia) excommunicationis in quemcumque ferri, nisi praemissa monitione.\*<sup>114</sup>

Sed quaeritur, an appellatio capituli quod habet causam possit canonicis, ut de cetero contra eos non valeat ferre sententiam.

25. Respondeo. Si delegatus erat iudex, non videtur quod de cetero possit in aliquem de capitulo sententiam ferre, etiam si ante appellationem culpabilis extitisset: quia in eum poterat iuste excommunicationis sententia ferri: quia sublato principali tollitur accessorium.\*<sup>115</sup> *Item.* Quia per iustam appellationem desinit esse iudex et in principali et in accessoriis.—Si autem  
30. esset ordinarius et ab eo esset in aliquo negotio appellatum a capitulo, cum illud negotium per appellationem sit ad superius auditorium delatum, ulterius occasione istius negotii non poterit in aliquem de canonicis sententiam excommunicationis proferre.\*<sup>116</sup>—Sed quid, si ordinarius vel delegatus in aliquem de capitulo post appellationem legitimam tulerit  
35. sententiam excommunicationis de facto: numquid capitulum potest petere sententiam contra hunc canonicum latam pronuntiari nullam? *Respondeo:* si eius interest, vel quia de mandato capituli fecit canonicum (canonicus) quare in eum est sententia excommunicationis lata, vel quia diffamatur capitulum quia suus canonicus sic denuntiatur excommunicatus, vel ex  
40. alia iusta causa: quod bene potest implorare officium iudicis, ut sententia nuntietur nulla.\*<sup>117</sup> Sed si vellet capitulum sententiam excommunicationis in suum canonicum latam occasione capituli dicere iniustam, hoc dicunt quidam non posse fieri, quia absolutio non debet dari nisi petenti. Et hoc quidem dictum est de canonicis excommunicatis pro capitulo. Hoc idem  
45. dicendum est de rectoribus civitatum excommunicatis pro civitatibus.

Ex isto loco satis apparet quod, si litterae impetrentur contra aliquod capitulum quod cogantur ad alicuius receptionem, tamen delegatus compellet singulos canonicos ad receptionem ipsius, licet litterae tamen contra capitulum et non contra singulos canonicos sint impetratae. Et hoc est ea

50. ratione, quia, quando mandat quod capitulum aliquid faciat, intelligendum est, quod canonici et alia membra capituli illud faciant: \*<sup>118</sup> quia capitulum, quod est nomen intellectuale et res incorporalis, nihil facere potest nisi per membra sua. Idem videtur quod, si mandetur delegato, quod cogat universitatem facere solutionem debiti vel venditionem vel permutationem  
55. vel quidquid aliud simile, cogenda sunt membra eius illi facto praestare consensum expressum. Et sic de omnibus aliis quae consistunt in facto quae per universitatem fieri non possunt. De extraneo autem, an posset impedire universitatem adimplere quod debet, notavi supra.\*<sup>119</sup>

Contra praedicta videtur [C.] 12, [Q.] 2, [Dict. Gratiani post c. 58 = L.

60. 10, § 4, Dig., 2, 4] *Qui manumittitur*.<sup>120</sup>

Solutio. Levis est, quia universitas bene potest habere libellum et agere et conveniri per procuratorem suum. Sed consensum alicuius (? alicui) facto praestare pro aliquo suo membro non potest, cum consensus [sit] corporis, nec corpus habeat. Sed in praedictis casibus videtur quod, si

65. alicui commissa est causa universitatis alicuius, quod per delegatum, ubi expediret, cogenda essent membra universitatis praestare consensum in faciendo procuratorem vel alia consimilia.

\*<sup>114</sup> c. 1, C. 2, Q. 1; (Nos in quemquam sententiam ferre non possumus, nisi aut convictum aut sponte confessum; Augustinus); *ibid.* c. 11.  
\*<sup>115</sup> c. 3, X, 1, 2.

\*<sup>116</sup> c. 9, C. 3, Q. 6; melius in c. 5, X,

1, 30.

\*<sup>117</sup> argumentum L. 1, Dig., 2, 12.

\*<sup>118</sup> c. 22, X, 3, 5.

\*<sup>119</sup> in c. 11, X, 1, 29.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. *supra* n. \*113.

*The gloss Gravem*<sup>121</sup> (c. 53, X, 5, 39).

- (In Pisa the podestà and his officials and councillors have drawn up  
70. statutes detrimental to ecclesiastical liberty. The Bishop of Siena is therefore instructed by Pope Honorius III to promulgate the excommunication against these men should they persist in maintaining and enforcing these statutes. A and B and some other citizens of Pisa are liable to excommunication. As for the others it will be noted that)  
75. hi non erant excommunicati, quia nec fecerant, nec fieri mandaverant, nec in mora erant delendi [scil. statuta de capitularibus], vel officium dimittendi.  
(Only the individual offenders should be punished. Here is where the gloss *Consiliarios* belonging to the same text and case sets in.)

80. *The gloss Consiliarios (ibidem).*

Istae speciales personae excommunicantur pro proprio delicto.

Universitas autem non potest excommunicari: quia impossibile est quod universitas delinquat: quia universitas, sicut est capitulum, populus, gens et [huiusmodi:] haec nomina sunt iuris et non personarum. Ideo non cadit

85. in eam excommunicatio.

Item. In universitate sunt et pueri unius diei.

Item. Eadem est universitas quae est tempore delicti et quae futuro tempore, quo nullo modo delinquant. Esset autem multum iniquum quod huiusmodi, qui nullo modo delinquant, excommunicantur.\*<sup>122</sup>

90. Item. Universitas nihil potest facere dolo.\*<sup>123</sup>

Fatemur tamen quod, si rectores alicuius universitatis vel alii aliquod maleficium faciunt de mandato universitatis totius, vel tantae partis, quod invitatis aliis maleficium fecerint, vel etiam sine mandato fecerint, sed postea universitas quod suo nomine erat factum, ratum habet: quod universitas

95. punietur speciali poena suspensionis et interdicti,\*<sup>124</sup> et etiam temporali, puta pecuniaria.\*<sup>125</sup>

Item. Poena capitali vel mortis vel relegationis non punietur universitas, si contra eam agatur criminaliter *Lege Cornelia de Sicariis*,<sup>126</sup> vel *Lege Iulia de Vi Publica*,<sup>127</sup> vel quacumque alia; sed poena capitis mutabitur in pecuniariam.\*<sup>128</sup> Quidam tamen dicunt, et forte non male, quod, etsi possit contra universitatem agi civiliter *Vi Bonorum Raptorum*,<sup>129</sup> et *Lege Aquilia*,<sup>130</sup> et *Iniuriarum*,<sup>131</sup> et aliis huiusmodi quibus irrogatur poena pecuniaria, non tamen potest contra eam agi criminaliter.

105. Sententia autem contra universitatem mandabitur executioni in bonis universitatis, si habet alia (aliqua) communia. Et si nihil habet commune, privabitur privilegio universitatis, ut ulterius non sit universitas. Et sic patietur capitis diminutionem.\*<sup>132</sup>

Item. Dicunt quidam quod fiet collecta pro solvendis huiusmodi poenis per libram et solidum; et ab ista collecta erunt immunes illi qui contra-

<sup>121</sup> Ed. cit., fol. 256 v<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>122</sup> c. 1 (*Si habes*), C. 24, Q. 3; *Constitutio Romana Ecclesia*, c. *Ceterum*, § fin.

<sup>123</sup> L. 15, § 1, Dig., 4, 3 (Ulpian's question).

<sup>124</sup> cc. 33 et 8, C. 17, Q. 3; c. 11, X, 4, 1.

<sup>125</sup> L. 9, § 1, Dig., 4, 2 (*Quod metus causa*); L. 4, Dig., 43, 16; c. 2, C. 23, Q. 2 (St. Augustine on the question of just war: iusta bella solent definiri, quae ulciscuntur iniurias: sic gens vel civitas petenda est, quae vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per

iniurias ablatum est.—This is said, of course, on the supposition of the Roman Empire.)

<sup>126</sup> Cod. 9, 16.

<sup>127</sup> Dig., 48, 6.

<sup>128</sup> L. 13, § 7, Dig., 3, 2.

<sup>129</sup> Inst. 4, 2.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. 3.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. 4.

<sup>132</sup> L. 21, Dig., 7, 4 (*Si ususfructus civitati legetur et aratrum in ea inducatur, civitas esse desinit, ut passa est Carthago, ideoque quasi morte desinit habere ususfructum.*)

110. dixerunt maleficio, pueri, et alii qui omnino sunt sine culpa. Alii tamen dicunt nullum ab hoc eximi.

Item. Pro peccato unus punitur alius infamia.\*<sup>103</sup>

Item. Servitute.\*<sup>104</sup>

- Item. Videtur quod etiam in corpore puniatur quis pro alio: [*dict. in* 115. c. 11, C. 1, Q. 4]. Sed quod ibi dicitur, verum est quod a Deo corporaliter punitur unus pro alio, qui novit abscondita, praesentia et futura. Et ideo ex iusta causa punitur unus pro alio, ne eum in vitio imitetur.\*<sup>105</sup> Homo autem hoc non potest.

Item. Poena aeterna numquam punitur unus pro alio.\*<sup>106</sup>

120. *The gloss Abbatibus*<sup>107</sup> (c. 30, X, 5, 3).

(The Archbishop of Canterbury propounded to Pope Innocent III the question whether, a multitude of culprits and cases being involved, it was advisable to give play to the full rigour of canonical discipline with regard to the crime of simony, specifically consisting in exaction and payment of

125. a fixed price for the reception, into monasteries and chapters, of monks and canons. The Pope, who in this document also quotes the rule: *quia multitudo reperitur in causa, severitati [est] aliquid detrahendum*, gives the following instruction: when in a regular judicial procedure conviction of the individual misdoers, both the givers and the takers of simoniacal 130. retribution, is obtained, no relaxation of the prescribed disciplinary rigour is advisable. When, however, for such regular criminal procedure has to be substituted the "inquisition", then special and milder penalties are advised. They, again, are to be meted out to the guilty individuals, i.e., especially *abbatibus* . . . , *abbatissis, prioribus, praelatis quibuslibet et* 135. *officialibus*. At this point Innocent IV takes occasion to remark:)

Ideo hi praecipue puniuntur, quia eorum consilio et auctoritate omnia fiunt.\*<sup>108</sup> et quia [episcopi etc.] in culpa sunt, si hoc [scil. punitionem] negligent.\*<sup>109</sup>

Sed videtur quod collegium possit accusari et de eo inquire.\*<sup>110</sup>

140. [Sed contra] . . . Universitas per procuratorem debet se defendere; et in causa criminali non constituitur procurator.\*<sup>111</sup>

[Solutio.] Nos dicimus quod universitas non potest accusari vel puniri, sed delinquentes tantum. Civiliter autem conveniri et pecuniariter puniri potest ex delicto rectorum.\*<sup>112</sup> Praeterea potest inquire inquiri super statu

145. universitatis, sed nec tunc puniuntur nisi delinquentes.\*<sup>113</sup>

(Immediately following this text Innocent moreover remarks on the word *Officialibus*:)

[hi puniuntur] quia ista faciunt vel sciunt et tolerant.

The most striking feature of these glosses is that, although in large part the author's reasoning travels along the roads of the decretal and of tradition, yet in more than one place he tries out a new and different path. On the basis of the canon *Si habes* the decretal had warned against a miscarriage of justice with regard to the innocent individuals and, thereby, given to understand that the *delictum universitatis* is a misdeed of individuals or persons who misuse

\*<sup>103</sup> *Dict. in c. 11, C. 6, Q. 1.*

<sup>104</sup> c. 3, C. 15, Q. 8.

\*<sup>105</sup> *Dict. in can. cit.*, § 12.

\*<sup>106</sup> c. 8, C. 1, Q. 4.

<sup>107</sup> *Ed. cit.*, fol. 228 v<sup>b</sup> f.

\*<sup>108</sup> c. 7, C. 10, Q. 2; L. 21, *Cod.*, 7, 62 (?);

c. 47, C. 2, Q. 7.

\*<sup>109</sup> c. 47, C. 2, Q. 7.

\*<sup>110</sup> *Dict. Grat. Qui manumittitur* (*supra*

n. \*113); c. 19, X, 5, 3; L. 9, § 1, *Dig.*, 4, 2 (*Quod metus causa*); *arg. c. 11, C. 7, Q. 1*; c. 1, C. 24, Q. 3 (*Si habes*); L. 15 § 22, *Dig.*, 41, 2 (*De acquir. vel amitt. possessione*; cf. *supra* n. 98).

\*<sup>111</sup> L. 1, *Dig.*, 3, 4; c. 2, C. 5, Q. 3.

\*<sup>112</sup> "ut in contrariis (*supra* n. \*140) et"

c. 19, X, 5, 3.

\*<sup>113</sup> c. 30, X, 5, 3; c. 26, X, 5, 1.



the common cause and the common institutions. In part of these glosses, however, the problem appears to be shifted from the delinquent persons to an *universitas* which not only can no longer be conceived as an actually offending subject but which, moreover, is as sharply as possible distinguished from the persons constituting the whole. This *universitas*, as Innocent explains in the gloss *Consiliarios* (lines 82-85), is a *nomen iuris*, not a *nomen personarum*. Hence with regard to it the author is able to affirm that a delict is absolutely impossible and that, consequently, this same *universitas* clearly cannot be the object of a sentence of excommunication. This is the novelty of Innocent's commentary on his own law. And since in this case the legislator and the scholar were the same man, it is not surprising that in later jurisprudence the decretal was more or less completely superseded by the *Apparatus*: are not scholars often wont to read commentaries instead of the texts? As early as 1272 William Durantis, the Speculator, commenting on the decretal *Ceterum*, finds that this law is based on two reasons. For him the first of these is not that of the decretal, but that of the *Apparatus* which absorbs his interest. Only in the second place does he mention that of the decretal, and about this he has not a single word to say.<sup>141</sup> *Habent sua fata libelli*.

The later history of the Innocentian novelty is, however, especially interesting because of fourteenth century legal science. The jurists of this period, if ever they had any philosophic preoccupation, were nominalists, almost without exception. One can imagine how eagerly their minds grasped, like trout at a fly, at Innocent's *nomen iuris*. Out of this truly innocent "name" they soon made the harmful "mere name" of nominalism and, in accordance with the philosophy of the *Via Nova*, they opposed to this "pure fiction", this "nothing but a *flatus vocis*", the real thing, i.e., the individuals of the community, one by one and taken, precisely, in their singleness.<sup>142</sup> That Innocent had not contrasted *nomen iuris* with *res* but with *nomen personarum*, and that he therefore had clearly shown himself immune from any nominalist preoccupation, this naturally does not bother a great man. This Fiction, moreover, was frankly recognized to be a falsehood substituted for the truth, and this substitution was declared to be justified by the authority of either the jurists themselves<sup>143</sup> or the prince,<sup>144</sup> so

<sup>141</sup> See above, n. 73. Durantis' explanation of the text of the gloss *Consiliarios* depends more on Hostiensis than on Innocent. Hostiensis' commentary on the decretal *Ceterum* reads as follows: Dicas ergo quod, quantumcumque universitas vel collegium excommunicetur, numquam universitas est excommunicata, nec excommunicari potest: quia cum hac sententia ligetur anima solummodo creaturae rationalis . . . patet quod universitas, quae nec animam habet nec baptizata est, excommunicari non potest. Sicut enim res universitatis non sunt singulorum, nec e contrario . . . sic nec animae singulorum sunt universitas . . . Nam universitas unum corpus est . . . et monstruosum esset quod unum corpus universitatis haberet plures animas. Sed si animae singulorum considerarentur, tot haberet corpus universitatis animas quot sunt singuli; nisi videantur animam ponere, quam falso fingit Averroes, quae secundum ipsum hominibus communis est: quod esset haereticum dicere et insanum.—The text is quoted, without reference, by P. Gillet, *op. cit.*, p. 166; it seems to be taken from Hostiensis' *Lectura in Decretales Innocentii IV*. Its interest in view of Dante's social Averroism is manifest.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. GR 362 ff.—Bartolus of Sassoferrato,

*Dig. Novum*, commentary on L. 16, § 10, *Dig.*, 48, 19: . . . an universitas sit aliud quam homines universitatis? Quidam dicunt quod non . . . Et hoc tenent omnes philosophi et canonistae, qui tenent quod totum non differt realiter a suis partibus. Veritas est quod, siquidem loquamur realiter, vere et proprie, ipsi dicunt verum. Nam nihil aliud est universitas scholarium quam scholares. Sed secundum fictionem iuris ipsi non dicunt verum. Nam universitas repraesentat unam personam, quae est aliud a scholaribus seu ab hominibus universitatis . . . Et sic aliud est universitas quam personae quae faciunt universitatem: secundum fictionem iuris.—Cinus (Guittoneo Sinibaldi, d. A.D. 1336): Licet populus sint plures, pro uno tamen reputatur (GR, 364, n. 38).—Albericus de Rosciate (d. 1354): collegium, licet constituatur ex pluribus, est tamen unum per repraesentationem (GR, loc. cit.)

<sup>143</sup> Bartolus, loc. cit.: Proprie [universitas] non potest delinquere, quia proprie non est persona . . . Tamen hoc est fictum positum pro vero, sicut ponimus nos iuristae.

<sup>144</sup> Lucas de Penna (contemporary of Bartolus): The 59th of the 67 privileges of a prince is: solus princeps fingit quod in rei veritate non est (GR 371, n. 62).

that eventually the Fiction became if not a genuine at least a potent thing.<sup>148</sup>

By the doubtful method of reading history backwards, Gierke adopts this fourteenth century nominalist interpretation of Innocent IV. The teaching of his glosses, we are told, is that the *universitas*, as such, is "an incorporeal, conceptual being", "an intellectual thing", "a mere juristic concept not at all identical with the notion of the persons in their social collection", "an abstraction without any real content",<sup>149</sup> and so on. By reason of his own metaphysical "Realism" in social philosophy Gierke naturally rejects the Fiction. Nevertheless he urges us to admire Innocent IV's "stroke of genius in re-discovering, as it were, in Roman Law the idea of the purely conceptual and fictitious existence (sic) of the Juristic Person, an idea implicit but not fully expressed in the Roman texts. To this idea the Pope gave emphatic and clear expression, backed up by his high authority, and so became the father of that dogma which is still today (1881) almost universally accepted".<sup>150</sup>—In criticism of this interpretation it may be observed that Gierke is unable to show one single text in which Innocent employs the word fiction in connection with this doctrine.<sup>151</sup> This alone, it seems to us, is sufficient to destroy the historical theory that he was the father of Fictionism.

But what was Innocent's teaching? With regard to the problem of general excommunications—and be it carefully noted: with regard to this problem alone—his basic affirmation is: *impossibile est quod universitas delinquat* (line 82). This affirmation is founded upon the following declarations concerning the notion of *universitas* as the author wants it to be understood in the relevant passages:

- (a) *universitas* is a *nomen iuris et non personarum* (line 84);
- (b) *universitas* is a *nomen intellectuale* (line 52);
- (c) *universitas* is a *res incorporalis* (line 52).

To these determinations another one may be added, found elsewhere in the *Apparatus*, namely

- (d) *universitas* is a *societas intellectualis et iuris*.<sup>152</sup>

Only the notion of *res incorporalis* is given a definite, though curious, explana-

<sup>148</sup> Oldradus de Ponte (d. A.D. 1335): In a consistory Boniface VIII stated, quod universitas sive collegium non habet veram personam, quia nomina sunt iuris; et quantum ad rei veritatem, quum animam non habeant, delinquere non possunt nec puniri. Against this statement Oldradus observes: Licet non habeant veram personam, tamen habent personam fictam fictione iuris . . . Et sic eadem fictione animam habent, et delinquere possunt et puniri (GR 364).

<sup>149</sup> In solchen Zusammenhang (i.e., discussing the delict of an *universitas*) nun stellte zuerst Innozenz IV den Satz auf, dass die Korporation als solche ein unlebliches Begriffswesen sei. Als blosser Rechtsbegriff, der sich mit dem Begriff der verbundenen Personen nicht decke, könne sie nicht exkommuniziert werden; als unlebliches Wesen sei sie willensunfähig; als rein intellektuelles und unkörperliches Ding könne sie nicht selbst, sondern nur durch ihre Glieder handeln; GR 281.

<sup>150</sup> Da war es Innozenz, der mit genialem Griff den im römischen Recht tatsächlich waltenden, doch nur halb ausgesprochenen Gedanken des rein begrifflichen und fiktiven Daseins der juristischen Person gewissermassen neu entdeckte, ihn in schärfster Formulierung vor aller Augen stellte und so

zum Vater des heute noch herrschenden Dogmas wurde; GR 279 f.—Gierke's interpretation is widely accepted; see Maitland's introduction to the translation, *op. cit.*, p. XIX; Paul Vinogradoff, *Collected Papers* II (Oxford, 1928), 336; Hans J. Wolff, *Juristische Person und Staatsperson* (Berlin, 1933), 3, n. 3.—P. W. Duff, however, to whom Innocent's teaching suggests "the combination of confused theory with practical common-sense rules characteristic of English judges, rather than the clear-cut logic (?) of German professors," declares himself unable to find any Fictionism in this doctrine: *Personality in Roman Private Law* (Cambridge, 1938), 222 f.

<sup>151</sup> Gierke, although without much enthusiasm, quotes from the *Apparatus* (ed. Frankfurt, 1570) the following text: . . . cum collegium in causa universitatis fingatur una persona (GR 279, n. 102). The edition of 1481 reads *fungatur* instead of *fingatur* (fol. 126 r<sup>a</sup>). *Fungatur* [ut] seems to be the better reading since it corresponds more exactly to the usual Roman vocabulary; cf. L. 22, *Dig.*, 46, 1: *haereditas persona vice fungitur, sicut municipium et decuria et societas*.

<sup>152</sup> Gl. *Unum corpus* in c. 14, X, 5, 31: *ed. cit.*, vol. 240 v<sup>h</sup>.

tion: *universitas*, it is said, has no body (*corpus*) and, therefore,—*cum consensus sit corporis*—it cannot of itself act, i.e., produce the physical reality of an act, for instance, consent. It can do so only through its members. Obviously these terms and notions have their origin in Roman Law. But, obviously too, the disciple of Azo, Balduini and Accursius, is at this point using Roman language in contradiction to the Roman meaning which is both manifest and known to him. For, according to the Roman sources, *consensus* is *animae*, not *corporis*,<sup>153</sup> and that *universitas corpus habet*<sup>154</sup> is so elementary a Roman supposition that its negation by Innocent cannot leave any doubt about the author's intentions: for a moment he deliberately abandons the language of jurisprudence and speaks that of metaphysics. We suggest that this is the true "stroke of genius" in Innocent's argument. To have felt the necessity of a metaphysical reduction of the problem and bravely to have confronted this difficult task, this is indeed a fact which makes the *Apparatus* a most memorable work and a date in the history of social philosophy, no matter how clumsy and inexperienced this essay was bound to be, no matter how stuttering its metaphysical language was.

Two ideas seem to labour in Innocent's mind. The first is that *universitas*, having no body, is nobody, no individual, neither Titius nor Gaius. The second is that *universitas* is both an abstraction (*nomen intellectuale*) and a right or privilege (*nomen iuris*).

The greatest difficulty in interpreting Innocent's text lies in these latter words (*nomen intellectuale*, *nomen iuris*) in which two entirely different determinations seem to be combined and mixed together. For, the abstraction is a work of speculative reason, while the right is a work of practical reason. It seems that *nomen intellectuale* refers to the fact that the *corpus*, which an *universitas* is, can, as abstract corporateness, be detached from the concrete whole and, in some way, opposed to it. This is probably what is meant by *nomen intellectuale*, and be it noted again that no evidence in the text allows us to assume that this abstraction is held to be a fiction. Fiction and abstraction are two thoroughly different things: the one is not based on truth, the other is; *abstrahentium non est mendacium*.

On the other hand, *nomen iuris*, it seems, should be translated and understood, not "a name coined by jurisprudence" (this is the common opinion of later jurists), but "the name of a right or privilege". For, as we pointed out above, this use of the word *universitas* implying not that which a group is but that which it has, is quite frequent in mediaeval juristic literature. Obviously corporateness as a right is different from corporateness as an abstraction. Yet both are and may be called an *ens rationis*. Only the abstraction is an *ens rationis speculativae*, whereas the right is an *ens rationis practicae*. Hence metaphysics and ethics are mixed together in the Innocentian combination *societas intellectualis et iuris*.

But be this as it may, the important point of Innocent's argument is clear: it is that notion of *universitas* in which the whole, as such, appears to be something apart from the individuals who are its component parts. Now such an *universitas* evidently will not be affected by anything which can happen only in the realm of individuals. Hence the conclusion: *impossibile est quod universitas delinquat*. It will not be amiss to point to the rather strong emphasis which, in the light of this analysis, falls on the old and solid truth that only individuals can act and, more especially, that only individuals can commit a delict and become guilty (cf. line 143).

But in this very fact the fault of Innocent's reasoning comes to the fore. To be sure, this fault is not to have made a wrong statement. Rather it is to have

<sup>153</sup> L. 1, § 22, *Dig.*, 41, 2.

<sup>154</sup> L. 1, pr., *Dig.*, 1, 8 = Gaius 2, 11.

made a right statement in the wrong place. The characteristically Innocentian statements in these glosses are right as far as they go. Only they do not go far; and, indeed, considered in their context, they lead nowhere. If a man sets out to prove that two is twice one, what will be the use of starting the argumentation by declaring that two is not twice three? Correct as this affirmation is, in itself, it cannot serve as a premiss of the argument which is contemplated. Now is not this exactly the way in which Innocent proceeds? The aim of this reasoning is indeed to bring out a conclusion whose predicate is to be an action supposing an existent human being, i.e. an individual. But at the start he goes off into the realm of abstract essences and of rights. That such things cannot act or sin is true but it is not conducive to the proposed end. Hence Innocent's argument turns out to be what in technical language would be called *ignoratio elenchi*. The problem which was to be dealt with was a concrete moral and juristic problem: In what ways can the legal status and the legal institutions of a Body Corporate be misused? And is it reasonable to assume that all members of such Bodies might become guilty on this count? In those passages of the glosses in which later jurisprudence has found the characteristic Innocentian contribution to this discussion, this problem is not faced.

It is, however, confronted, and very definitely so, in many other passages of these glosses.<sup>155</sup> And, moreover, as is most clearly shown in the celebrated gloss *Consiliarios*,<sup>156</sup> the author is quick to drop his inconclusive abstract theory and to deal with the problem in the same manner in which the decretal and tradition had dealt with it. Do not the words *Fatemur autem* (line 91) which in the same gloss introduce the remark on the interdict sound as an admission of the fruitlessness of the essay on general excommunication?

The attentive reader will not have failed to notice that the foregoing review of Innocent's glosses was made in virtue and under the light of St. Thomas' Little Question. But before turning again to Aquinas let us inquire into the doctrine of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure.

### 8. ST. ALBERT AND ST. BONAVENTURE

When he writes his commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences in the year 1249, St. Albert takes occasion to devote a few interesting remarks to the problem of general excommunications.<sup>157</sup> As we pointed out above, there is not yet in these *notulae*<sup>158</sup> a well-rounded treatment of the problem in the manner of a self-sufficient question or article. Rather the question is brought up incidentally, i.e., within the context of a traditional problem in the theology of the power of the Keys. When treating of ecclesiastical jurisdiction theologians had long since stated the question<sup>159</sup> which we shall present in St. Albert's words thus:

<sup>155</sup> Cf. lines 4 ff., 37 ff., 75-77, 109 f., 142 f., 148.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. lines 87-89 where, however, the two modes of reasoning are curiously interwoven.

<sup>157</sup> 4 *Sent.*, 19, 6; ed. Borgnet 29, 807 f. The date of this fourth book of his commentary is given by St. Albert himself *ibid.*, 35, 7 ad 3; ed. *cit.*, 30, 354. In 1249 young Thomas was St. Albert's pupil in Cologne.

<sup>158</sup> St. Albert's own word designating the IVth bk. of the commentary: 4 *Sent.*, 26, 1; ed. *cit.*, 30, 98.

<sup>159</sup> Peter Cantor in the twelfth century states the same question. We reproduce his text on account of its interest for the history of corporation theory in mediaeval theo-

logians: *Ms. Troyes 276, fol. 80 r<sup>a</sup>. Quaestio de facto pertinens ad hos claves proponitur, scil. utrum sede metropolitae vacante debeant subditi de parochiis et episcopi suffraganei subiacere praeceptis sedis illius. Ad quod facit rescriptum Alexandri III dictum cuidam suffraganeo Senonensis sedis. Qui cum nollet obedire sedi vacanti increpatus est ab eodem Alexandro dicente: etiam si sedes illa te suspendisset, nos quoque pro suspensio te haberemus. Similiter abbas sancti Remigii, cum nollet obedire sedi Remensi vacanti, graviter increpatus est a Summo Pontifice. Item. Ipsa est quasi materfamilias quae succedit in ius patrisfamilias, ipsa scil. cum filiis suis. Item. Quia iuratur per obedientiam non tantum praelatis, sed etiam*

Quaeritur utrum congregatio habeat claves ita, quod nullus de congregatione; et hoc praecipue quaeritur propter illum usum clavis, qui est excommunicare et absolvere.

This question St. Albert resolves in the following thesis:

Respondeo. Dicendum quod multitudo congregationis alicuius, quae reducitur ad unum, potest habere spiritualement potestatem iurisdictionis excommunicandi et absolventi ita, quod nullus de multitudine illa.

May we at once open a parenthesis and quote St. Thomas' decision in the same matter:<sup>100</sup> it will indeed prove useful for the exact understanding and appreciation of St. Albert's solution:

Sicut in politicis quandoque iudex habet potestatem totam, sicut rex in regno, quandoque autem multi in diversis officiis constituti, vel etiam ex aequo, ut patet in VIII *Ethicorum*,<sup>101</sup> ita etiam spiritualis iurisdicatio potest haberi ab uno solo, sicut ab episcopo, et a pluribus simul, sicut a capitulo. Et sic habent clavem iurisdictionis, non autem clavem ordinis, omnes simul (*italics ours*).

Thus at the exact point where St. Albert chooses a negative formula, viz. *ita, quod nullus* (nobody in particular), St. Thomas opts for a positive expression: *plures simul, omnes simul* (all together).

Now it is in connection with this discussion that the Cologne Master recalls the "new" Constitution of 1246. The decretal *Ceterum* serves him to elaborate, in dialectical antithesis to his decision, the following argument *in contrarium*:

Sicut dicit nova Constitutio, multitudo non potest tota excommunicari ita, quod nullus; sed singuli de multitudine possunt excommunicari, et tunc multitudo erit excommunicata. Ergo nec excommunicare potest ita, quod nullus.

What the addition *ita, quod nullus* means comes to the fore a few lines further on where Albert in fact reveals its source, viz. Roman Law. In one of the arguments in favour of the thesis he says indeed:

Unus est servus multitudinis alicuius ita, quod nullus secundum se. Ergo sic potest esse in spiritualibus. Ergo habet multitudo potestatem coercendi per excommunicationem sibi rebelles.

Thus in the background of this *ita, quod nullus* there clearly appears the Roman Law concerning corporate (municipal) ownership.<sup>102</sup> Implicitly, indeed, Albert

ecclesiis . . . *Ibid.*, fol. 80 r<sup>b</sup>: Auctoritas sedis residet penes capitulum sede vacante, ut videtur voluisse Alexander . . . *Item*. Auctoritas sedis residere videtur penes universitatem, non penes singulos. *Item*. Iudicare potest. Excommunicare potest. Ordinare? Non, quia universaliter ordinare non potest . . . *Ibid.*, fol. 80 v<sup>a</sup>: Ceterum circa decani potestatem quaeritur, si universitas dicat decano: excommunicare istum, et decanus nolit, dicatque universitas subdecano vel alii: nos tibi damus auctoritatem sententiandi in eum, si ille sententiaverit et decanus solverit, cui erat parendum? Quid si ipsa in singulis sententiaverit et decanus solverit, cui parti potius standum erit? Quid si dixerit ipsa universitas decano: nos subtrahimus tibi auctoritatem et sententiandi nolumus te organum nostrum? . . .

<sup>100</sup> 4 *Sent.*, 19, I, 1, sol. 3 ad 3.

<sup>101</sup> St. Thomas takes this quotation from St. Albert *loc. cit.* The reference is to *Eth.* VIII, 10: 1160<sup>a</sup> 31-36 where Aristotle speaks of monarchy, aristocracy etc. In aristocracy Albert finds that there is: potestas plurium simul secundum virtutem imperantium ita, quod nullius.

<sup>102</sup> L. 6 § 1, *Dig.*, 1, 8: Universitatis sunt non singulorum veluti quae in civitatibus sunt theatra et stadia et similia et si qua alia sunt communia civitatum. Ideoque nec servus civitatis singulorum pro parte intelligitur, sed universitatis.—L. 1, § 7, *Dig.*, 48, 18: Nec enim plurium servus videtur, sed corporis.—L. 1, pr., *Dig.*, 1, 8 = Gaius 2. 11: quae publicae (scil. res) sunt, nullius in bonis esse creduntur.—*Ibid.*, L. 2, pr: Quaedam naturali iure communia sunt omnium,

refers here to the various fragments—to be sure, all vague and obscure in point of theory<sup>100</sup>—of the Roman lawyers in which the idea of common ownership by the members of a municipality is, or seems to be, contrasted with that of corporate ownership residing, as it were, in the legal body itself as distinguished from the collection of its members. Hence the sequence of analogies used by St. Albert and the steps of his reasoning may be described thus:

- (a) In Roman Law the fact of corporate ownership is acknowledged. It implies that an *universitas*, for instance a town, can have proprietary rights and duties which are not the rights and duties of its individual members *qua* individuals (*nullius secundum se*);
- (b) this idea concerning the ownership of material things may be extended to the "ownership" of spiritual power, i.e., jurisdiction, coercion, and so on;
- (c) but the same idea cannot apply in the matter of penal liability: a *multitudo* cannot be, *tota*, the "owner" or subject of that penal duty which is the foundation of a sentence of excommunication. This to St. Albert is the content of the decretal *Ceterum*.

This analysis strongly suggests that Albert's acquaintance with the law of 1246 was made not through the text itself but through a commentary resembling, and perhaps being, that of Innocent's *Apparatus*. At any rate whether or not the original of the decretal was known to him, is an open question. The fundamental presuppositions and the essential structure of the reasoning seem to be the same in both the canonist and the theologian. *Universitas*, to them, is not so much *omnes simul*, i.e. all the members in their specific order; rather it is, or tends to be, something apart from the persons: and the formal content of the law is seen in that a general excommunication would seem to be imposed on this impersonal something. The same kind of abstract, speculative thinking which we found in Innocent exercises its charm upon St. Albert as well. Is it not characteristic that, in the above-quoted argument *in contrarium*, he does not repeat the word *tota* (referring to *multitudo*) in the conclusion, after having laid some stress on it in the premiss? In fact, the movement of his reasoning aims at the conclusion that, even if *multitudo*, i.e. each and every one of the community, were punished, yet *multitudo tota*, i.e. the community itself, the order built upon a common cause, would not be affected thereby. *Multitudo tota* is in truth nothing other than the *causa universitatis*, the common good, taken as the formal and formative principle of a social or political order of men to which it gives rise and the essential structure of which it provides. In the last analysis, therefore, Albert's statement of the problem comes to raise the same curious question which we also met in Innocent, viz. whether the very idea of *universitas*, and the order founded on this idea, are capable of sin and liable to punishment. This question, one would say, is hardly worth asking. For, obviously, this idea cannot be said to sin or to be, in any way whatever, the object of judicial authority and sentence; it can only be approved or disapproved by the competent, legislative or administrative, authority. Nor is the order, formed by this idea, a malefactor in any conceivable way. This idea and this order can only be the specifying circumstance and determination of mis-doing which, in its turn, is performed by individuals, i.e. physical persons. It is quite an interesting and important feature in St. Albert as well as in Innocent, that a metaphysical basis of a legal ordinance is so eagerly sought for. Yet in the light and on the authority of St. Thomas' Little Question, it seems safe to say that the true metaphysical lever which would pry loose the solution of the problem is not found by either doctor.

quaedam universitatis, quaedam nullius, *op. cit.*, p. 65 ff.  
pleraque singulorum.—See P. W. Duff, <sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

The affinity of Albert's thinking in this matter with Innocent's scholarly theory comes out still more clearly in what follows. For the theologian almost verbally repeats the canonist's basic statement: *impossibile est quod universitas delinquat*. Albert says indeed: *Sicut dicit nova Constitutio, peccata multitudinis nulla sunt omnino*. And a few lines further he explains: *Rationabilissime est constitutum quod multitudo non possit excommunicari, quia non peccat multitudo*. This, indeed, couched in slightly different words, is exactly the teaching of that part of Innocent's glosses which we have analysed above.

With Albert the words *rationabilissime est constitutum* have their specific meaning in conformity with the metaphysics the first traces of which we discovered in the above arguments. In fact, the German Master now sets forth in support of the law a *naturalis ratio* in which the character of his interpretation comes out very clearly indeed. This "natural" argument reads as follows:

Et alia ratio est naturalis (i.e. *besides the fact of the law there is also a metaphysical reason for not excommunicating a community*): quia multitudo bene causat potentiam activam in excellentia, sed numquam defectum et impotentiam sive passionem. Exemplum autem huius est, quod multitudo potest trahere navem<sup>104</sup> et trahit, et nullus per se de multitudine; non tamen multitudo *trahit*, nisi quilibet *trahat* (*italics ours*), nec multitudo mentitur, nisi quilibet mentiatur: quia abundantia virtutis in coagendo bene generatur in multitudine, sed non defectus in patiando. Et ideo non sequitur: si potest excommunicare, quod etiam possit excommunicari; vel: si non potest excommunicari, quod non possit excommunicare.

Let us at once quote the parallel text of St. Bonaventure<sup>105</sup> whose treatment of the question in all essential points agrees with that of St. Albert:

Ad illud quod quaeritur . . . : quare congregatio sive multitudo potest excommunicare ita, quod nullus, et non excommunicari, dicendum, quod peccata multitudinis nulla sunt, sed iurisdictio multitudinis nonnulla est. Et si tu quaeras: unde est hoc? dicendum, quod multitudo bene facit augmentum potentiae in excellentia—unde multitudo potest trahere navem ita, quod nullus trahit navem per se—sed multitudo, in quantum huiusmodi, non facit defectum nec impotentiam virium: unde multitudo non *trahitur*, quin quilibet de multitudine *trahatur* (*italics ours*). Sic tota multitudo excommunicat ita, quod nullus; non sic excommunicatur: ad minus secundum nova Iura, ut iuristae dicunt.

We suggest that in St. Albert's text the words which we italicized, *trahit*, *trahat*, are a false reading and must be replaced by the words *trahitur*, *trahatur* as found in St. Bonaventure. At any rate only the passive voice makes sense. It will also be noted that in thus reproducing St. Albert's version of the matter and his *naturalis ratio* the Franciscan doctor does not seem to feel much at ease. He wishes to stress the novelty of this legislation and, what is more, he suspects Albert's, and his own, development to be based rather on the teaching of the jurists than on the text of the law. In this he is perfectly right. St. Thomas went one step further: he looked up the text itself. When, therefore, he writes *Ecclesia statuit*, how could we miss the emphasis and the concrete meaning of these words? They do imply just a shade of insistence on the

<sup>104</sup> This example is at the same time a corruption and a philosophical adaptation of the Roman *collegium naviculariorum* (qui annonae urbis serviunt: L. 6, § 3, Dig., 50, 6), i.e., the association of ship-

owners, often mentioned in Roman texts relevant to the doctrine of corporations, e.g. L. 1, § 1, Dig., 3, 4; L. 18, Cod. Theodos., 13, 5.

<sup>105</sup> 4 Sent., 18, II, 3: ed. Quaracchi IV, 489.

simple and golden rule of heuristics: a text is always to be preferred to commentaries.

But what about this *naturalis ratio*? With due reverence to both the Dominican and the Franciscan Master, and on the authority of St. Thomas, let us again observe that their reasoning can hardly be said to be to the point. For, the problem of the *delictum universitatis* is not what the cause and the institutions of an *universitas* are and mean in themselves, but what is actually done with them, and by whom this is done. And again, with regard to this point, St. Thomas' words, *Satis provide Ecclesia statuit*, seem to be full of concrete signification. They contain a hint to, and a correction of, St. Albert's *rationabilissime est constitutum*, just as the whole of St. Thomas' reasoning is a tacit correction of St. Albert's *naturalis ratio*.

### 9. ST. THOMAS' DOCTRINE

The *Quaestiuncula* of the *Scriptum* is not the product of a scholar whose mind was far removed from the concrete conditions of his time and dealing only with the intrinsic necessities of his problems. Rather it is an answer to questions which were being asked, it is a contribution to contemporary discussions. Each and every word is intended not only to settle the problem but also to terminate an existing controversy and to correct its mistakes. In fact, St. Thomas wrote the best *glossula* to Innocent IV's decretal. No other commentary can compare with the Little Question in its theological profundity, its philosophical conclusiveness, the completeness of its historical information and, last not least, the accuracy of its specifically juristic judgment.

Let us summarize in a few conclusions the Thomistic doctrine as it stands in the light of the foregoing analysis.

(a) Realizing that a law had been enacted in regard to general excommunications St. Thomas' first care is to inspect its text. Small and trivial as this fact may appear, yet it stands out too clearly not to be noticed. The previous discussions had shown, and the later history of the problem was amply to confirm, the true importance of this first step in the process of arriving at a solution. A learned theory had indeed overshadowed this text and veiled its significance. The very roots of the law in tradition were in danger of being lost to sight. St. Thomas restored this law to its original place in a long and venerable tradition whose main witness was the canon *Si habes*, a document belonging to St. Augustine.

(b) St. Thomas recognizes and, from the beginning to the end, refuses to be drawn aside from the true object of the question. This object is to ascertain a matter of fact. The problem of the *delictum universitatis* is whether all the members of a community, each and every one, may be assumed to be the offenders in a crime in which the legal status of *universitas* is misused for the sake of bringing about contumacy: for, contumacy is the fact causing a sentence of excommunication to be passed in justice by the competent judge. St. Thomas' illustrious predecessors had allowed themselves to be drawn to a point of view where this object of the question must needs vanish from their eyes. Not what *universitas* is in itself, but what is actually done with it, and by whom this is done, that is the question.

(c) This factual problem finds its solution with the distinction, established in mediaeval Romanist jurisprudence, between, on the one hand, the absolute and rather abstract possibility, and, on the other, the relative impossibility, i.e., the moral improbability, of a *delictum universitatis*. This Romanist tenet furnishes St. Thomas' reasoning with its decisive turn.

(d) This solution, however, needs to be elaborated by that *reductio ad artem* in which the mediaeval theologians recognized their specific task and prerogative.



St. Thomas sets his teaching upon two bases: the one philosophical, the other theological. The definition of action and, again, the definition of common action are the philosophical pillars supporting the whole structure. Actions are performed only by persons—and none other than a person can answer, and be made to answer, for an action—and common action, in principle, is the action of all persons, members of the community, each and every one acting in view of the common cause. These are the fundamental assumptions of the Little Question, viz. that action, sin and guilt are personal facts and, therefore, can be attributed only to society in so far as it is an order and unit of men *de facto*, not in so far as it is such *de iure*. Withdrawal from this *societas facti* (to use an Augustinian notion<sup>166</sup>) is possible and is indeed effected by dissent. No judge may pass a sentence on the mere count of *societas iuris*, for every judicial sentence essentially supposes individual facts and the individual conviction thereof.

(e) In point of theology St. Thomas calls attention to the rules of administering justice as revealed in Sacred Scripture. God's judgments are measured by the fact of personal responsibility and guilt in those upon whom they are passed. But, moreover, a strong warning against the unconditional *Fiat iustitia* is recorded by Aquinas from the pages of traditional theology, a theology based upon the rule of the Parable of the Sower and summarized in the gloss of Augustine. It is by no means true, in every case, that justice must be done.<sup>167</sup> The final spiritual equilibrium in human affairs must be left to divine judgment and providence. No judge of this world dare assume this rôle and presumptuously usurp the part of God who alone is the master of history.

(f) The Little Question leaves no room for *körperschaftliches Verschulden*. The radical mistake of this notion is that, in some way or other, it supposes a community to be, *simpliciter et per se*, one subject of action. Whether this supposition rests upon the dogma of social Realism or upon that of Fictionism is in the last analysis as irrelevant as is the distinction between metaphysical Realism and Nominalism: for, both systems prove to be moving on the same (Platonic) ground and within the same orbit of thinking.<sup>168</sup> When St. Thomas says, *actus est communitatis* (or, as in other places, *actus fit a toto collegio, totum habet operationem propriam*)<sup>169</sup> this in no way implies a subjective and physical oneness of the common action ("the whole as such can act and, consequently, as such it can also sin"). The intentionally vague formulation chosen by Aquinas should once and for all caution us against such an interpretation. Metaphysically speaking the common action is not due to one efficient cause, *simpliciter et per se*, but to a plurality of causes<sup>170</sup> bound together in a moral union and

<sup>166</sup> Quomodo, inquit Parmenianus, incorruptus poteris permanere, qui corruptis sociaris? Ita plane, sociatur, id est si mali aliquid cum eis committat aut committentibus favet. Si autem neutrum facit, nullo modo sociatur; C. 23, Q. 4, c. 6 (ex Augustino, C. Ep. Parmeniani); cf. *ibid.*, c. 8: . . . communicatur quippe, quando facto eius (scil. mali) consortium voluntatis vel approbationis adiungitur.

<sup>167</sup> Just as it is not true, in every case, that *deposita sunt reddenda*: I-II, 94, 4.

<sup>168</sup> See A. C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity", *Essays in Thomism* (New York, 1942), 172.

<sup>169</sup> *Supra* notes 19 and 21.

<sup>170</sup> 3 *Sent.*, 18, 1, ad 5: Actionis unitas non solum dependet ex termino, sed etiam ex multis aliis causis. Et ideo non oportet quod si sit idem actum quod sit eadem actio.

Contingit autem quod idem actum ex diversis actionibus causatur multipliciter. Uno modo, quando unum agens non est sufficiens ad complendum effectum, sed multi simul: sicut multi simul trahunt navem quam nullus per se trahere posset. Et tunc omnes illi sunt quasi unus agens non simpliciter, sed congregationis unitate; et similiter actione eorum non est una simpliciter, sed quasi una congregata ex multis. 4 *Sent.*, 22, II, 2, sol. 1: Quando aliquis effectus procedit a multis causis simul congregatis, tunc nulla earum est causa per se, sed omnes sunt una causa, sicut patet in trahentibus navem. 4 *Sent.*, 27, II, 2, ad 6: Trahentes navem agunt per modum unius causae: et ideo, quod deest uni, potest suppleri de altera. *Contra Gentiles* 4, 7: Idem autem non potest esse operatum eodem modo a duobus agentibus nisi vel dissimiliter, sicut idem

order which is no physical being at all but a moral being, i.e. a thing constituted by practical reason.<sup>171</sup> "Only with regard to a whole which is something physically one, one physical being, can the action of the part be said to be the action of the whole; and he who speaks otherwise, speaks pointlessly":

In solo toto quod est aliquid unum et ens, actio partis est actio totius; et si quis aliter loquitur, improprie loquitur.<sup>172</sup>

The Little Question of the *Scriptum* forbids the assumption, in Thomistic thinking, of collective guilt. To show how St. Thomas in all his other writings respected this limitation will be the object of our investigation on a future occasion.

---

fit a principali agente et instrumento, vel si similiter, oportet quod convenient in una virtute. Quae quidem virtus quandoque congregatur ex diversis virtutibus in diversis agentibus inventis, sicut patet in multis trahentibus navem: omnes enim similiter trahunt, et quia virtus cuiuslibet imperfecta est et insufficiens ad istum effectum, ex diversis virtutibus congregatur una virtus omnium, quae sufficit ad trahendum navem. In *Metaph.* 5, 3 (Ed. Cathala, n. 793): Est autem alius modus, quo causae possunt dici compositae, secundum quod plures causae concurrunt ad unius rei constitutionem: sicut plures homines ad trahendum navem,

vel plures lapides, ut sint materia domus. Sed . . . nullum illorum est causa, sed pars causae.

<sup>171</sup>Of the *civitas* which is the "perfect community" (I-II, 90, 3) St. Thomas states explicitly: est . . . principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt (*Exp. in Politica*, prol.) Hence it will especially be observed that society is no predicamental relation. It is an *ens rationis*, but neither *rationis ratiocinantis* (fiction), nor *rationis speculativae ratiocinatae* (abstraction). Cf. *Exp. in Eth.*, prol.

<sup>172</sup>*Opusculum De Unitate Intellectus*: ed. Mandonnet I, p. 53.

## Egypte ou Grèce?

ETIENNE GILSON

L'ARTICLE des *Confessions* VII, 9, 15 ne présente à première vue aucune difficulté particulière. Il suffit de le lire vite pour le trouver clair, mais dès qu'on tente de préciser la suite des idées et le sens exact des formules, tout devient obscur et peut-être même doit-on renoncer à l'éclaircir.

Augustin vient de dire, et continue de dire en ce passage, ce qu'il a trouvé et ce qu'il n'a pas trouvé dans les livres des "platoniciens". La conclusion de VII, 9, 14 marque un infléchissement dans la marche du développement. Empruntant les paroles de saint Paul, *Rom.* i, 21-23, il pose une thèse qui constitue la conclusion de l'article 14 et le début de l'article 15. En fait, le développement que les éditions scindent en deux articles forme en réalité un bloc dont la continuité est assurée par celle de cette citation. Voici d'ailleurs comment se présente le texte, les italiques représentant tout ce qui est emprunté à l'*Epître aux Romains*:

etsi cognoscunt *Deum* [*Rom.* i, 21: Quia cum cognovissent *Deum*], *non sicut Deum glorificant* [*Rom.* i, 21: glorificaverunt] *aut gratias agunt* [*Rom.* i, 21: egerunt], sed evanescunt [*Rom.* i, 21: evanuerunt] *in cogitationibus suis et obscuratur* [*Rom.* i, 21: obscuratum est] *insipiens cor eorum; dicentes* [*Rom.* i, 22: *add. enim*] *se esse sapientes stulti fiunt* [*Rom.* i, 22: facti sunt]. Et ideo legebam ibi etiam inmutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae<sup>1</sup> in idola et varia simulacra, *in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium*, videlicet Aegyptium cibum, quo Esau perdidit primogenita sua . . .

On voit à quel moment et comment s'introduit ici cette première mention de l'Egypte. Elle peut d'abord sembler arbitraire, mais elle était en fait prévisible pour un lecteur accoutumé à la démarche d'Augustin. Le texte de *Rom.* i, 21-23 évoque en effet souvent dans son esprit l'image de l'Egypte. Il y a chez lui des développements qui sortent presque infailliblement, plus ou moins complets, et avec des variantes, mais toujours reconnaissables, lorsque paraît le thème scripturaire auquel ils sont liés. Or *Rom.* i, 23 est un de ces thèmes, il appelle l'Egypte, et voici pourquoi.

Les Calendes de Janvier étaient toujours un moment inquiétant pour l'évêque d'Hippone, parce qu'il s'y produisait comme un réveil d'antiques superstitions païennes.<sup>2</sup> C'est pourquoi, dans un sermon prononcé à cette date, Augustin prend comme premier thème ce même texte de saint Paul. L'ayant conduit jusqu'au *Dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt*, il reporte sur leur orgueil la responsabilité de leur folie. Les païens se sont arrogés ce que Dieu leur avait donné; au lieu de remercier Dieu humblement et de se purifier par la contemplation du don qu'il leur avait fait, ils ont cru, dans leur orgueil, pouvoir se purifier eux-mêmes. Usant de leur orgueil, le Malin leur a promis cette purification de l'âme qu'ils cherchaient et les a fait adhérer au culte des démons. De là, précisément, tous les rites que célèbrent les païens et dont ils attendent la purification de leurs âmes. Et voyez à présent ce qu'ils ont reçu en récompense: "*Pour n'avoir pas honoré Dieu comme Dieu doit être honoré, mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis*. Ce sont là les idoles, et, d'abord, celles des Grecs et de toutes les

<sup>1</sup> La Vulgate donne ici: Et mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei. *Rom.* i, 23.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Sermo* 196, 4, 4; PL 38, 1020-1021.

autres nations, qui sont faites à l'image de l'homme. Mais il n'est pas d'idolatrie plus grande ni plus superstitieuse que celle des Egyptiens, car l'Egypte a inondé le monde de simulacres tels que ceux dont va parler l'Apôtre. C'est pourquoi, après avoir dit *In similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis*, il a ajouté: *et volucrum, et quadrupedum et serpentium*. Et en effet, mes Frères, n'avez-vous pas vu, dans d'autres temples, une statue à tête de chien ou de taureau et d'autres images d'animaux dépourvus de raison? Ce sont là les idoles des Egyptiens. Aussi, unissant les deux espèces d'idoles, l'Apôtre dit: *In similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium*".<sup>3</sup>

Rien de plus clair. L'idolatrie se présente comme une décadence en deux étapes: celle des Grecs et autres peuples qui rendent un culte à des idoles de forme humaine; celle des Egyptiens qui rendent un culte à des images d'animaux. Il suffit donc de mentionner cette deuxième forme d'idolatrie, qui est la plus basse, pour mentionner simplement l'Egypte. C'est là, si l'on peut dire, sa triste spécialité.

Un autre texte d'Augustin confirme cette interprétation. Ecrivant contre l'idolatrie, il reproduit une fois de plus tout le passage de *Rom.* i, 21-23 que nous venons de citer. Puis il ajoute: "On sait que telles furent les idoles des Egyptiens, où l'on dit, qu'a régné une idolatrie plus variée et beaucoup plus ignominieuse qu'ailleurs".<sup>4</sup> Ce texte, qui précède d'ailleurs immédiatement un paragraphe consacré à l'*in illo vivimus* des *Actes* xvii, 28, sur lequel nous aurons à revenir, établirait à lui seul que l'Egypte est, dans la pensée d'Augustin, la terre d'élection de la zoolatrie dénoncée par saint Paul.

S'il en est bien ainsi, l'Egypte dont parle Augustin lorsqu'il commente *Rom.* i, 23, est nécessairement le pays réel dont parlent les géographes. C'est là, en effet, sur cette terre bien déterminée, qu'a proliféré le culte des animaux sacrés ou de leurs images, d'où il s'est ensuite répandu dans le reste du monde.

Malheureusement pour le lecteur des *Confessions*, les choses se compliquent aussitôt, car Augustin y ajoute tout d'un trait à la citation de saint Paul: "... *et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium, videlicet Aegyptium cibum quo Esau perdidit primogenita sua*". Ainsi, l'Egypte réelle se confond immédiatement dans notre texte avec une Egypte allégorique, celle qui a fourni le plat de lentilles pour lequel Esau perdit son droit d'aînesse. Allégorique, disons-nous, car la "nourriture égyptienne" convoitée par Esau ne peut que signifier le culte rendu aux animaux par les Egyptiens. Ce qui se passe ici est assez curieux, mais non pas du tout unique ni même rare dans les raisonnements scripturaires: le texte de saint Paul évoque l'Egypte réelle, qui n'est pas nommée, mais à la place de qui Augustin nomme une Egypte allégorique, celle d'où venait la nourriture pour laquelle Esau perdit son droit d'aînesse, comme le peuple juif perdit le sien pour avoir convoité la basse zoolatrie des Egyptiens.<sup>5</sup>

Nous n'avons d'ailleurs perdu l'Egypte réelle que pour la retrouver aussitôt, puisque la même phrase continue: "c'est-à-dire la nourriture d'Egypte pour laquelle Esau perdit son droit d'aînesse, puisque ton peuple premier-né rendit

<sup>3</sup> *Sermo* 197, 1; PL 38, 1022.

<sup>4</sup> *De unico baptismo contra Petilianum* IV, 5; PL 43, 597: Talia quippe novimus fuisse simulacra Aegyptiorum, ubi et instituta esse multiplicior multoque ignominiosior idolatria perhibetur.

<sup>5</sup> P. de Labriolle (*Confessions*, t. I, p. 160, note 3) renvoie ici, après les Mauristes, à *Enarr.* in Ps. 46, 6: Ce fut sa convoitise d'un mets d'Egypte qui fit perdre à Esau son droit d'aînesse. Ainsi en fut-il du peuple juif dont il est dit: "Leurs cœurs

se tournaient vers l'Egypte". Le peuple aussi, à sa façon, en convoitant les lentilles, et c'est ainsi qu'il perdit sa primauté. PL 36, 527. Egalement cité par P. Henry, *Plotin et Occident* (Louvain, 1934), p. 102, note 5, qui conclut: La similitude avec le texte des *Confessions* est frappante. Oui, et il est non moins frappant que, dans les deux oeuvres, ce premier développement en appelle un deuxième, celui qui porte sur le texte des *Actes* xvii, 28.

honneur, non à toi, mais à une tête de quadrupède, retournant de cœur en Egypte (*Act. vii, 39*) et abaissant ton image, son âme, devant l'image d'un veau qui mange son foin (*Ps. cv, 20*). L'Egypte où le peuple juif revient de cœur en adorant le veau d'or, c'est une fois de plus l'Egypte réelle, terre d'élection de la forme d'idolâtrie la plus ignominieuse que le monde ait connue.

Ce qui suit devient tout-à-fait surprenant: "*Inveni haec ibi et non manducavi*". P. de Labriolle traduit: "Voilà ce que j'ai trouvé dans ces écrits, mais je n'ai pas goûté de cette nourriture". Rien de plus correct, *ibi* ne pouvant désigner ici rien d'autre que ce que désignait déjà l'*ideo legebam ibi* par quoi commence l'article 15. Seulement, il faut voir à quoi ce double *ibi* nous oblige. Venant après l'*Item legi ibi* de l'article 14, il nous renvoie aux *quosdam Platoniorum libros* de l'article 13, ce qui nous invite à entendre que, dans ces écrits de platoniciens ou, tout au moins, dans un d'entre eux, Augustin avait lu quelque justification du culte des idoles, sous la forme particulièrement ignoble que ce culte avait revêtu en Egypte. On se demande aussitôt quel "platonicien" peut avoir recommandé un culte analogue à celui du veau d'or, et il n'est pas facile de répondre à cette question. Qu'on y trouve réponse ou non, la question est suscitée dans le texte, on ne saurait donc l'éviter.

Différons-en pourtant l'examen, afin de ne pas rompre le mouvement du texte: "Il t'a plu en effet, Seigneur, d'éloigner de Jacob l'opprobre de son infériorité, et d'assujétir l'aîné au plus jeune, et tu as appelé les nations à ton héritage". Allusion manifeste à *Rom. ix, 13*: *Quia major serviet minori, sicut scriptum est: Jacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui*. Ainsi, en citant saint Paul qui, à son tour, cite l'Écriture, Augustin nous renvoie de nouveau à l'histoire d'Esau (*Gen. xxv, 23-24*), dont le plat de lentilles nous ramènera en Egypte.

Voici comment s'opère ce mouvement. Rébecca, mère d'Esau et de Jacob, est, par là même, la mère de deux peuples à venir: le peuple qui naîtra de l'aîné: Esau, sera soumis au peuple qui naîtra du plus jeune: Jacob (*Gen. xxv, 23; Rom. ix, 10; Conf. VII, 9, 15*). Cette substitution d'un peuple appelé à l'héritage qui revenait de droit à son aîné, symbolise la substitution des nations, appelées par Dieu à l'héritage qui revenait de droit au *populus primogenitus*. Ce peuple, que nous venons de voir s'abaisser devant une idole d'Egypte, est justement le descendant d'Esau, l'aîné qui a vendu son droit pour un plat d'*Aegyptium cibum*. L'allégorie nous lie donc de ce double lien: l'Esau qui vend ses droits pour un aliment égyptien, c'est le peuple premier-né qui vend ses droits pour une idole d'Egypte. Sur quoi Augustin poursuit: "Et moi aussi je venais à toi des nations, et je me suis intéressé à l'or, que tu as voulu que ton peuple emportât d'Egypte, parce qu'il était à toi, en quelque lieu qu'il fût". Encore l'Egypte, mais à la fois réelle et allégorique cette fois, puisqu'il s'agit de celle dont Dieu a délivré le peuple juif en lui ordonnant d'en emporter tout l'or et toutes les dépouilles possibles (*Exod. iii, 22*), c'est-à-dire, allégoriquement, du paganisme, dont les Chrétiens ont le devoir de prendre tout ce qu'il a de bon, parce que tout ce qu'il a de bon est à Dieu. Ainsi, en prenant aux "platoniciens" ce qu'ils avaient de bon, Augustin n'a fait qu'exercer un droit et même un devoir de reprise: il a restitué à Dieu ce qui venait de Dieu.

Ici se place, sans articulation aucune mais par simple juxtaposition, une incidente dont l'interprétation divise les historiens. La voici, suivie de la conclusion de cet article:

Et dixisti Atheniensibus per Apostolum tuum, quod in te *vivimus, movemur et vivimus et sumus* (*Act. xvii, 28*), sicut et quidam secundum eos dixerunt, et utique inde erant illi libri. Et non adtendi in idola Aegyptiorum, quibus de auro tuo ministrabant, qui transmutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam creatori (*Rom. i, 25*).

La fin du texte ne présente aucune difficulté. On la comprendrait d'ailleurs presque mieux encore sans l'incidente qui la précède. Rien ne serait alors plus clair, comme chacun peut en faire l'épreuve: je me suis intéressé à l'or des Egyptiens, mais je n'ai prêté aucune attention à leurs idoles, etc. Comment expliquer la présence de cet *Et dixisti Atheniensibus* . . . qui, s'il ne rompt pas l'unité du développement, en trouble certainement le cours?

L'explication la plus simple, et celle qui nous semble la plus satisfaisante, est d'y voir un exemple allégué en confirmation de ce qui précède immédiatement. On interpréterait alors la phrase en ce sens: l'or t'appartient, où qu'il se trouve; ainsi, c'est toi qui as dit aux Athéniens, par ton Apôtre, qu'en toi nous avons la vie, le mouvement et l'être; certains d'entre eux l'ont dit aussi, et, en fait, c'est de là que venaient les livres où je l'ai repris à mon tour. La formule *quidam secundum eos* est une curiosité grammaticale, mais l'origine en a été fort bien éclaircie<sup>6</sup> et, de toute manière, le sens en est certain. On peut la traduire, avec de Labriolle, par "certains de leurs écrivains", ou, plus simplement, par "certains des leurs"; il s'agit, en tout cas, d'auteurs qui écrivent la langue d'Athènes, d'auteurs grecs. La remarque suivante s'explique alors naturellement: *et utique inde erant illi libri*, c'est-à-dire, et, en fait, c'est de là que venaient ces livres, les livres où j'ai retrouvé à mon tour cette doctrine étaient des livres grecs. Pour que l'interprétation soit acceptable, il faut pourtant que cette doctrine se rencontre en effet chez un des platoniciens qu'a pu lire Augustin. Or on l'y trouve, à peu près littéralement, dans un traité de Plotin: *Enn.* I, 6, 7, c'est-à-dire précisément dans ce traité *Du Beau* dont il est certain qu'Augustin l'a connu et utilisé: "jusqu'à ce que, ayant abandonné, dans cette montée, tout ce qui était étranger à Dieu, on voie seul à seul dans son isolement, sa simplicité et sa pureté, l'être dont tout dépend, vers qui tout regarde, par qui est l'être, la vie et la pensée; car il est cause de la vie, de l'intelligence et de l'être".<sup>7</sup> Si l'on accepte la substitution de la "pensée" au "mouvement", Augustin a donc lu deux fois dans une même phrase l'*in eo vivimus* de saint Paul: *καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ ἔστι καὶ ζῆ καὶ νοεῖ ζῶνς γὰρ αἰτίον καὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι*. Qui affirmera d'ailleurs avec certitude qu'en prenant ce bien où il le trouvait, Augustin ne l'a pas effectivement repris?

Même si l'on admet l'ensemble de cette interprétation, plusieurs difficultés de détail attendent encore qu'on les écarte.

La première tient à la structure même de notre texte. Ayant rappelé la parole de l'Apôtre Paul, Augustin ajoute *sicut et quidam secundum eos dixerunt*. Or il est manifeste, et on l'a fait remarquer depuis longtemps déjà, que le texte original des Actes se trouve ici gravement altéré. Dans les Actes, xvii, 28, saint Paul dit en effet: *In ipso enim vivimus et movemur et sumus. Sicut et quidam vestrorum poetarum dixerunt: Ipsius enim et genus sumus*. Le *sicut et quidam* des Actes porte sur l'*Ipsius enim* qui suit; le *sicut et quidam* des *Confessions* porte au contraire sur l'*In ipso enim vivimus* qui précède, ce qui donne un sens assez différent. Ce fait peut tenir simplement à ce qu'Augustin suivait un texte où manquait déjà l'*Ipsius enim et genus sumus* qui doit suivre. Il n'est pas non plus impossible qu'Augustin ait consciemment modifié le texte des Actes pour servir sa propre exégèse. On l'a ingénieusement soutenu<sup>8</sup> et chacun sait qu'en histoire le vraisemblable n'est pas toujours le vrai. Quoi qu'il en soit,

<sup>6</sup> F. Chatillon, 'Quidam secundum eos', *Revue du moyen âge latin* I (1945), pp. 287-293.

<sup>7</sup> P. Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident*, pp. 111-116.

<sup>8</sup> *Enn.* I, 6, 7; trad. E. Bréhier, I, p. 103.

P. Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 97, note 1, propose un autre excellent rapprochement avec *Enn.* VI, 9, 9, II, 7-11, qui a le mérite de rappeler

de plus près le *non longe* d'Actes xvii, 27. Sur la question du rapport possible de Plotin à saint Paul, voir les travaux de Picavet et de H. F. Müller mentionnés dans la même note, et F. Chatillon, *art. cit.*, pp. 301-302.

<sup>9</sup> F. Chatillon, 'Quidam secundum eos', pp. 294-303.

cette altération du texte des *Actes* s'offre à nous comme un fait. C'est à elle que nous devons le texte des *Confessions* qu'il s'agit pour nous d'éclaircir. Acceptons-la donc telle qu'elle est.

La deuxième difficulté concerne le rapport de l'*Et dixisti Atheniensibus* au *sicut et quidam* qui le suit. Augustin veut-il dire simplement comme nous l'avons interprété: "tu as dit aux Athéniens . . . et certains d'entre eux l'ont dit aussi?" Ou ne faudrait-il pas l'entendre en ce sens légèrement plus fort: "tu as dit aux Athéniens . . . et certains d'entre eux l'ont dit à leur tour?" En d'autres termes, Augustin n'aurait-il pas été le premier à ouvrir la controverse "saint Plotin", en suggérant discrètement que Plotin n'avait rien fait d'autre ici qu'utiliser saint Paul? Je ne le pense pas. L'hypothèse est séduisante, car elle donnerait au texte une cohésion parfaite: l'or est à Dieu; en voici la preuve: Dieu parle par la voix de saint Paul; Plotin s'empare de ce qu'a dit saint Paul; l'or qu'on trouve ici chez Plotin appartient donc directement à Dieu. En revanche, et toute séduisante qu'elle soit, l'hypothèse force un peu le texte. En juxtaposant deux faits: "Dieu dit aux Athéniens" et "certains d'entre eux disent aussi", Augustin ne dit rien qui invite à penser que lui-même ait vu dans le premier la cause du second. Mais il y a plus. Dans un autre texte, où se rencontre la même citation des *Actes*, Augustin présente les idolâtres qu'il condamne, comme des hommes qui sont arrivés à connaître le Créateur à partir de la création (*per creaturam*). Ce qu'il leur reproche, précisément, là et ailleurs, c'est, après avoir été capables de découvrir le vrai Dieu, de s'être crus sages, d'avoir perdu la raison et d'être enfin tombés dans l'idolâtrie. Sur quoi il ajoute, comme pour lever toute doute sur sa pensée véritable: "Que les sages du paganisme aient découvert le Créateur, c'est ce qu'a manifestement fait voir le même Apôtre dans son discours aux Athéniens. Car après leur avoir dit: *in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus*, il ajoute: *sicut et quidam secundum vos dixerunt*<sup>10</sup> Augustin affirme bien ici que les Grecs sont, de leur côté, arrivés à connaître le Créateur, et, bien que cela même ne se soit pas fait sans Dieu, cela ne s'est du moins pas fait par une révélation spéciale de Dieu usant à cette fin de la prédication de son Apôtre. Rien, dans le texte des *Confessions*, n'invitant à supposer que Augustin y ait voulu dire plus, l'interprétation la plus simple reste donc la plus sage: Dieu vous a dit qu'en lui nous avons l'être, le mouvement et la vie, et certains d'entre vous l'ont dit aussi.

La troisième difficulté tient au sens qu'il convient de donner à *inde*. Nous l'avons rapporté, comme on l'avait toujours fait d'ailleurs, aux Grecs dont parle ce passage, mais on a récemment proposé de le rapporter à l'Égypte, dont il est en effet question dans tout le reste du développement.<sup>11</sup> Pour choisir entre ces deux interprétations, rappelons d'abord ce que peut recommander la première.

Si l'on rapporte *inde* aux auteurs païens de langue grecque, on ne voit pas ce que le texte ainsi pourrait avoir de mystérieux. La deuxième phrase elle-même semble claire, et même si on la coupe en deux, en mettant un point après *dixerunt*, le sens général n'en semble pas affecté. *Et dixisti Atheniensibus . . . , sicut et quidam secundum eos dixerunt. Et utique inde erant illi libri*: il s'agit des Athéniens; *eos* ne peut se rapporter qu'à *Atheniensibus*; à son tour, *inde* ne peut se rapporter qu'à l'origine grecque de ces livres. D'ailleurs, que signifie *illi libri*, et de quels livres s'agit-il? La phrase en question conclut un développement continu, qui commence à VII, 9, 12, et dont la première phrase contient les paroles bien connues: *procurasti mihi per quemdam hominem*

<sup>10</sup> *Expositio quorundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, Prop. 3; PL 35, 2063.

<sup>11</sup> P. Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident*, pp. 96-103. Dans le même sens, F. Chatillon, 'Regio

dissimilitudinis', *Mélanges P. de Chard* (Lyons, 1945), pp. 89-91, et 'Quidam secundum eos', pp. 303-304.

*immanissimo tyfo turgidum quosdam Platoniorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam versos*. Ces livres sont bien des livres d'origine grecque (*inde erant*). Exactement, c'étaient des traductions latines de livres platoniciens écrits en grec.

C'est d'ailleurs de quoi tout le monde semble tomber d'accord: "dans cette incise, le sens de *libri* est fort clair. Il s'agit évidemment des ouvrages néoplatoniciens qu'Augustin se justifie d'avoir lus. Ce sont, d'après les conclusions d'une enquête minutieuse, des ouvrages de Plotin".<sup>12</sup> Pourtant, le même historien pense que, dans la phrase *et utique inde erant illi libri*, l'adverbe *inde* ne renvoie pas à la Grèce, mais à l'Égypte. Cette "curieuse petite phrase" lui semble s'expliquer parfaitement "si l'on se rappelle que *Plotin est originaire d'Égypte*".<sup>13</sup> Que faut-il penser de cette deuxième interprétation?

Notons d'abord que son auteur ne la tient pas pour démontrable à la rigueur et ne la propose que "sous toutes réserves". On peut donc ne pas accepter cette hypothèse sans le contredire lui-même. Voyons pourtant quelles raisons il invoque en sa faveur.

1.° Premier argument: "*Inde* ne peut désigner que l'Égypte. Toute la question est de savoir si Augustin continue de parler au sens figuré, ou s'il passe ici, comme nous le pensons, du sens figuré au sens propre. L'incise signifie donc de deux choses l'une: ou bien que les *libri*, par leur origine, leur contenu, ou la patrie de leur auteur, sont vraiment des ouvrages "égyptiens", ou bien qu'ils sont des ouvrages "païens". Mais ceci est si évident et pour Augustin et pour ses lecteurs, qu'on ne s'explique pas qu'Augustin ait cru devoir le signaler à cet endroit. Tout le contexte suggère l'assimilation des *platoniorum libri* aux "dépouilles d'Égypte". Bref, si l'Égypte, rappelée par l'adverbe *inde*, ne représente que le monde païen, toute l'incise *et utique inde erant illi libri*, apparaît superflue, même peu intelligente. C'est un premier argument".<sup>14</sup>

Si l'on commence par poser qu' "*inde* ne peut désigner que l'Égypte", le problème est en effet tranché, sinon résolu. Rien ne prouve pourtant qu'*inde* ne désigne pas autre chose. *Inde* n'est pas nécessairement adverbe de lieu, il peut n'être qu'un adverbe d'origine, et il ne serait d'ailleurs pas autre chose si, comme on admet que cela est au moins possible, il désignait des ouvrages "païens". Il peut donc désigner aussi bien des livres "grecs". Que dit en effet Augustin? *Et dixisti Atheniensibus*: Dieu a dit aux Athéniens, par la bouche de saint Paul, que *in eo vivimus et movemur et sumus*; certains *secundum eos*, c'est-à-dire, certains des leurs, ou d'entre eux, ou de leurs écrivains, ont dit la même chose; et, de fait, c'est de là que provenaient ces livres. Pour que tout s'éclaire, s'il y a ici quelque chose d'obscur, il suffit d'admettre que *secundum eos*, formule assez vague pour autoriser ce sens, désigne, non les Athéniens d'Athènes, mais ceux qui, suivant leur usage, écrivent en langue grecque. Il n'est donc pas nécessaire qu'*inde* désigne l'Égypte. Pour que l'incise en question ne soit ni superflue, ni peu intelligente, il suffit d'admettre qu'*inde* désigne des ouvrages païens de langue grecque. Voilà pour le premier argument.

2.° "Le second est peut-être plus convaincant, tout en étant moins aisément communicable: il se confond avec l'intuition d'où jaillit le sens vrai de ce passage. Si Augustin n'entend pas souligner que les *libri* étaient réellement, de quelque manière que ce soit, originaires d'Égypte, l'adverbe *inde* perd absolument tout son sens. Cet *utique* nous avertit pour ainsi dire qu'Augustin fait un jeu de mots, qu'il passe du sens figuré au sens propre".<sup>15</sup>

Ici, tout l'argument repose sur une intuition qui, engendrant le sens vrai du passage, y trouverait pourtant sa propre confirmation. Pour autant qu'il se

<sup>12</sup> P. Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>13</sup> P. Henry, *ibid.* Sur l'impossibilité de démontrer à la rigueur cette hypothèse, cf.

*op. cit.*, p. 98, note 1.

<sup>14</sup> P. Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>15</sup> P. Henry, *ibid.*



formule concrètement, cet argument s'appuie sur le sens d'*utique*. On peut en effet hésiter entre plusieurs traductions, mais comme on hésiterait entre plusieurs mots si l'on écrivait seulement en français: et "d'ailleurs", et "en tout cas", et "précisément", ou encore, ainsi qu'on nous le propose à bon droit,<sup>16</sup> "et de fait ces livres venaient de là-bas". Acceptons cette dernière traduction. En quoi nous avertit-elle "qu'Augustin fait un jeu de mots, qu'il passe du sens figuré au sens propre"? *Utique* signifie bien plutôt, dans l'usage latin, que l'on continue de parler dans le même sens. Il y a là, nous dit-on, une sorte de syllogisme. Majeure: Dieu a promis aux Hébreux d'emporter avec eux les dépouilles des Egyptiens; mineure: or les livres que j'ai lus venaient bien d'Egypte. Sans doute, mais il s'agit justement de savoir si *inde* désigne l'Egypte, et le fait qu'on puisse construire un syllogisme, au cas où tel serait son sens, ne prouve pas que ce soit en effet le sien. Dieu a parlé aux Athéniens, certains écrivains grecs ont dit de leur côté la même chose et, de fait, c'est chez eux qu'Augustin a retrouvé ces paroles à son tour. *Utique* peut ne pas désigner l'Egypte sans perdre absolument tout son sens.

Reprenons donc le texte d'ensemble, en acceptant les fragments de traduction que l'on nous en propose, et laissons à chacun le soin de trancher la question: "Moi aussi j'étais venu à toi des nations. Et je me suis tourné vers l'or que tu as voulu que ton peuple enlevât d'Egypte, parce que, où qu'il soit, il était tien. Tu as dit aux Athéniens, par ton Apôtre, qu'en toi nous avons la vie, le mouvement et l'être, comme l'ont dit aussi certains d'entre eux, et, de fait, c'est de là que venaient ces livres. Je ne me suis pas tourné vers les idoles des Egyptiens, auxquelles offraient de ton or ceux qui ont changé la vérité de Dieu en mensonge et servi la créature plutôt que le Créateur". Bref, tout se passe comme si l'Egypte était bien à la fois l'Egypte réelle où fleurissait l'idolâtrie et l'Egypte allégorique des exégètes qui inclut le paganisme des écrivains de langue grecque auxquels renvoie l'*inde* en question. Augustin y a retrouvé de l'or, et il s'en est emparé. Il y a trouvé aussi de l'idolâtrie mais il l'a laissée sur place, et c'est après cette admonition venue de la philosophie grecque, qu'il a pu se détacher enfin du sensible et rentrer véritablement en soi.

Reste finalement à résoudre ce problème que nous avons provisoirement ajourné: chez quels "platoniciens" Augustin a-t-il rencontré ce polythéisme "égyptien" qu'il condamne ici en termes si sévères? Rapporter *inde* aux néoplatoniciens qu'il a lus ne fait que rendre le problème plus pressant et, semble-t-il, sa solution plus difficile. En effet, c'est là, exactement là, c'est-à-dire dans ces livres mêmes, qu'il a lu ce qui se rapporte au culte des animaux tel qu'on le pratiquait en Egypte, c'est-à-dire ce qui se rapporte à la forme d'idolâtrie la plus basse que le monde ait connue: *et ideo legebam ibi . . . Inveni haec ibi*, ces formules ne permettent aucune hésitation. *Ibi*, c'est "dans ces livres" platoniciens. Or nous savons par la *Cité de Dieu* VIII, 12, quels étaient pour Augustin les "platoniciens" authentiques. Le fait qu'Augustin les ait nommés plus tard, dans la *Cité de Dieu*, ne prouve pas qu'il les ait déjà tous connus au temps de sa conversion, mais ceux qu'il avait déjà lus à ce moment se retrouvent sans doute dans la liste qu'en donne la *Cité de Dieu*. C'est là, en tout cas, notre seule chance de les retrouver. Or cette liste est brève.<sup>17</sup> Elle contient trois *Graeci*, ainsi nommés parce que c'étaient des auteurs

<sup>16</sup> P. Henry, op. cit., p. 97. Si "de fait" rend parfaitement *utique*, "là-bas" force légèrement *inde* qui signifie simplement "de là". Seulement, "là-bas" va dans le sens de la thèse que le texte est censé justifier. Traduire "de là", c'est fait retomber l'origine sur les Athéniens dont il vient d'être question, ce que notre historien désire

éviter. En traduisant par "là-bas", il recule au contraire cette origine, par delà les Athéniens tout proches, jusqu'aux Egyptiens de la phrase précédente. Ce qu'il fallait obtenir.

<sup>17</sup> En voici la fin: *Ut cum . . . recentiores tamen philosophi nobilissimi, quibus Plato sectandus placuit, noluerint se dici Peri-*

grecs, quels que furent d'ailleurs leurs pays d'origine: Plotin, Iamblique, Porphyre; et elle leur ajoute un écrivain dans les deux langues: Apulée. Eliminons Apulée, dont aucune idée ne se retrouve dans ce qu'Augustin dit avoir lu dans les livres en question. Eliminons aussi Iamblique, qu'Augustin n'a cité nulle part ailleurs. Restent, comme Grecs éligibles, Plotin d'Égypte et Porphyre de Tyr. Nous savons, par ce même texte de la *Cité de Dieu*, qu'Augustin les tient, et Platon lui-même, pour polythéistes, mais il y a loin de là à les tenir pour idolâtres, et plus loin encore à leur attribuer la forme d'idolâtrie chère aux Égyptiens, le culte des animaux.<sup>18</sup> Comment sortir de cette difficulté?

Il existe bien un Égyptien, connu d'Augustin, et partisan de l'idolâtrie, c'est le mythique Hermès Trismégiste, dont Augustin connaissait au moins l'*Asclepius* et qu'il a combattu dans la *Cité de Dieu*. Seulement, pour lui, cet Hermès était précisément un "Égyptien", non un "Grec",<sup>19</sup> et il ne l'a pas compté au nombre des "platoniciens" auxquels s'adresse sa critique. Il ne reste donc vraiment que Plotin et Porphyre comme sources possibles de ce culte idolâtrique voué à des images d'hommes, d'oiseaux, de quadrupèdes ou de serpents.

On a essayé d'en charger Plotin. L'essayer pour la thèse prise en toute sa force, serait une gageure, et d'autant plus intenable qu'elle contredirait directement le sens général du texte. S'il reste vrai que Plotin, comme Platon, ait été polythéiste, il serait étrange qu'Augustin lui attribuât la forme d'idolâtrie la plus basse, dans un texte où tout le contexte loue Plotin de l'avoir libéré du matérialisme en lui révélant la pure spiritualité de Dieu. Pour soutenir que l'accusation vise Plotin, il faut l'atténuer à souhait, c'est-à-dire la réduire à celle de quelque compromission avec le paganisme des mystères, qui lui-même n'était pas pur de toute idolâtrie. On l'a fait avec talent,<sup>20</sup> mais sans résoudre pour autant le problème posé dans toute sa force. S'il y a quelque part une apologie du culte des idoles égyptiennes, ce n'est pas chez Plotin qu'on peut la trouver.

Il faut donc que ce soit chez Porphyre, mais sous quelle forme? Augustin a beaucoup parlé de Porphyre<sup>21</sup> et, suivant en cela sa politique constante et consciencieuse envers les "platoniciens",<sup>22</sup> il l'a fait sans jamais hésiter ni à le louer

pateticos, aut Academicos, sed Platonicos. Ex quibus sunt valde nobilitati Graeci, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius: in utraque autem lingua, id est et graeca et latina, Apuleius Afer exstitit Platonicus nobilis. Sed hi omnes, et ceteri ejusmodi, et ipse Plato, diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putaverunt. *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 12; PL 41, 237. Cette dernière phrase vise le culte de latrie rendu par Platon aux anges, qu'il traite comme des dieux. *De Civitate Dei* X, 3; PL 41, 280-281.

<sup>18</sup> Pour Platon: . . . , quomodo ausus est Plato, etiamsi non diis, quos ab omni humana contagione semovit . . . *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 14; PL 41, 239.

<sup>19</sup> Ille autem Aegyptius alios deos esse dicit a summo deo factos, alios ab hominibus. *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 23, 1; PL 41, 247. Plus loin: Hujus Aegyptii verba, sicut in nostram linguam interpretata sunt, ponam. *Ibid.* Suivent des citations empruntées à l'*Asclepius*, notamment la fameuse défense du culte des statues: statuos, o Asclepi, videsne quatenus tu ipse didicas.

<sup>20</sup> J. Nørregaard, *Augustinus Bekehrung* (Tübingen, 1923), pp. 106-107. Dans le même sens, P. Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident*, pp. 101-102. Tous deux argumentent contre la thèse antérieurement soutenue par Fr. Wörter,

*Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seiner Taufe* (Paderborn, 1892), pp. 44 ff. N'ayant pu prendre connaissance de ce dernier travail, nous ne savons si notre propre solution coïncide ou non avec la sienne, mais nous sommes entièrement d'accord avec lui pour la chercher dans la direction de Porphyre.

<sup>21</sup> Porphyre est qualifié par Augustin de *nobilissimus philosophus paganorum*, *De Civitate Dei* XXII, 3; PL 41, 574. Il a corrigé Platon sur un point d'importance, (*op. cit.*, X, 30; *ibid.*, 310-311). Transjuge du Christianisme d'ailleurs, et, bien entendu, polythéiste comme les "platoniciens" le sont tous (*op. cit.*, XIX, 23, 1; *ibid.*, 651). Ni dans ces passages, pourtant, ni dans aucun autre que je connaisse, Porphyre n'est formellement inculpé d'idolâtrie zoolatrique.

<sup>22</sup> Par exemple, *Sermo* 197, 1; PL 38, 1022, où Augustin établit comment, à partir de la sagesse même qu'ils avaient acquise, les païens en sont arrivés, par orgueil, à cette folie qu'est la zoolatrie des Égyptiens. Peut-être encore plus net, le développement, déjà cité ici, du *De unico baptismo contra Petilianum* IV; PL 43, 597-598, véritable et parfaite commentaire doctrinal (nous ne disons pas historique) de notre texte des *Confessions*. Les païens ont institué le culte

chaleureusement de ce que ce sage avait dit de vrai, ni à le blâmer vertement pour avoir sombré de la sagesse dans la folie que dénonce l'Apôtre. Or on ne voit pas qu'Augustin ait personnellement tenu Porphyre pour un idolâtre à la mode d'Egypte et il serait sans doute assez difficile de prouver qu'il l'ait été. On ne pourrait le faire sans forcer les textes. Il est vrai, et sa *Lettre à Anebo* le prouve, que Porphyre était extrêmement curieux de théurgie, mais ne rappelait-il pas, dans ce texte même, que "les dieux sont des êtres purement intelligibles, que les démons sont des êtres spirituels qui participent de la pensée, que des êtres purement intelligibles ne sauraient être séduits par des choses sensibles ni se mêler à elles, et que les supplications qu'on leur offre sont entièrement incompatibles avec cette pureté de la substance intelligible". L'homme qui pensait ainsi ne peut avoir recommandé le culte du chacal Anubis.

Nous ne pensons pas non plus qu'il l'ait fait, ni qu'Augustin l'en accuse, et c'est pourtant bien *ibi*, dans une de ses œuvres, qu'il a vu "la gloire incorruptible de Dieu changée en idoles et en images diverses", et non seulement en images d'hommes, mais d'oiseaux et de quadrupèdes. Le traité de Porphyre: *De abstinencia ab esu animalium* rapporte en effet tout au long, pour les besoins de la thèse particulière qu'y soutient son auteur, des détails précis sur le genre d'idolâtrie qui prospérait en Egypte. Les Egyptiens, dit-il, ont traité les animaux comme des dieux, "soit qu'ils les aient réellement tenus pour des dieux, soit qu'ils aient, de propos délibéré, donné à leurs dieux des têtes de bestiaux, d'oiseaux ou d'autres animaux pour avertir qu'il fallait s'abstenir d'en manger aussi bien que de manger de la chair humaine, soit pour quelque raison plus secrète. De même aussi les Grecs ont donné à la statue de Jupiter des cornes de bélier et à celle de Bacchus des cornes de taureau; Pan fut composé d'homme et de boue etc."<sup>23</sup> Voilà bien la zoolâtrie égyptienne envahissant le monde et corrompant la Grèce! Sans doute, Porphyre ne l'approuve pas, mais il en parle, il l'excuse, et non seulement il ne tarit pas sur les images d'animaux aussi sympathiques que le Scarabée sacré par exemple,<sup>24</sup> mais la condamnation discrète qu'il porte contre ces cultes est exactement celle qu'il fallait pour justifier l'attaque d'Augustin: "Ils raisonnent semblablement au sujet du bélier, du crocodile, du vautour, de l'ibis et de tous les autres animaux. si bien que, par sagesse et par excès de théosophie, il en sont arrivés au culte des animaux".<sup>25</sup>

Que l'on pèse ces derniers mots: c'est la thèse même d'Augustin, qui n'est à son tour que celle de l'Apôtre: *dicentes se esse sapientes stulti fiunt*. Ces gens en sont tombés au culte des idoles animales, *in similitudinem imaginis . . . volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium*. Et qui le dit? Porphyre, dans ce même texte dont Augustin peut avoir écrit en toute vérité: *Et ideo legebam ibi etiam immutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae in idola et varia simulacra . . . videlicet Aegyptium cibum, . . . Haec ibi inveni, . . . Et non adtendi in idola Aegyptiorum . . .*, toutes affirmations qui sont littéralement exactes, dont aucune ne nous oblige à charger Porphyre, ni moins encore Plotin, de cette

des idoles, dont le plus bas est celui des Egyptiens. Ainsi, ils ont connu Dieu, mais ne l'ont pas glorifié comme Dieu. Ils ont connu Dieu, puisque l'Apôtre les en loue dans *Actes xvii*, 28. En ajoutant *sicut quidam secundum vos dixerunt*, il affirme que *l'in eo vivimus* est de cette vérité que les impies détiennent dans l'iniquité de leur idolâtrie même: "Or cette vérité que, comme nous voyons, il trouve chez des sacrilèges impies, l'Apôtre ne la détruit pas, mais les confirme, et la prend à témoin pour instruire

leur ignorance". Bref, il invoque la vérité contre sa propre corruption dans le cœur des païens.

<sup>23</sup> Porphyre, éd. R. Hercher (Paris, Didot, 1858), III, 16, pp. 56-57.

<sup>24</sup> Porphyre, éd. cit., IV, 9; pp. 74-75. Cf. 10; p. 75.

<sup>25</sup> Porphyre, éd. cit., IV, 9; p. 75. Noter, dans le *De antro Nympharum*, 10, une citation textuelle de la parole du "Prophète": *Et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas* (*Gen.* i, 2); dans Porphyre, éd. cit., p. 90.

1 zoolatrie qu'Augustin dénonce, et qui signifient pourtant très précisément ce qu'elles disent: toute cette idolatrie insane se trouve bien dans l'un des livres platoniciens qu'Augustin a lus avant sa conversion finale au Christianisme; elle s'y trouve présentée comme une dégradation de sagesse païenne authentique; Augustin s'est détourné de cette dégradation et n'a gardé que cette sagesse. Il ne lui restait plus dès lors qu'à rentrer en lui-même, sous la conduite de Dieu.

# Philologisches zur Frühscholastik

ARTUR LANDGRAF

## I. EDITIO

EI Gelegenheit der Behandlung des Zeugnisses des Praepositinus für eine erste und zweite Edition der *Sentenzen* des Lombarden<sup>1</sup> ergab sich die Frage, ob der Ausdruck *editio* für jene Zeit des 12. Jahrhunderts in unserm heutigen Sinn genommen werden muss. Nachdem die Sache selber sich für die *Sentenzen* des Lombarden eindeutig dahin entscheiden liess,<sup>2</sup> dass bei dem Vervielfältigungsprozess in jener Zeit, wo langsam von der Hand geschrieben eine Kopie nach der andern entstand und der Autor so die Gelegenheit hatte, seine neuen Erkenntnisse ohne Schwierigkeit in den späteren Kopien unterzubringen, auch dem Lombarden eine gleiche Möglichkeit geboten war, von der er auch tatsächlich Gebrauch gemacht hat, indem er Zusätze und Änderungen an seinen *Sentenzen* vornahm, blieb so nur eine Frage der Terminologie als ungelöster Rest. Ich bin dann auch dem Wort *editio* und *edere* in der Literatur der Frühscholastik und Vorscholastik nachgegangen und habe es öfter, als ich *a priori* gedacht hätte, feststellen können. In der Zwischenzeit hat H. Emonds für das Altertum die gleiche Aufgabe unternommen und herausgearbeitet, inwieweit man damals von einer Mehrauflage des gleichen Werkes sprechen kann.<sup>3</sup>

Er ist zu dem Ergebnis gekommen: "Die auf handschriftlicher Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung beruhende antike Buchtechnik und Buchedition zwingt uns, den Begriff der zweiten Auflage für das literarische Altertum zu erweitern. Es braucht mit ihr nicht notwendig eine vollständige Neuausgabe im modernen buchtechnischen Sinn verbunden zu sein. Vielmehr kann jede nachträgliche Änderung eines antiken Werkes, die sich auf den Verfasser zurückführen lässt und in den mittelalterlichen Handschriftenvarianten auf uns gekommen oder durch literarische Nachrichten bezeugt ist, den Anspruch erheben, als zweite Auflage des Werkes angesprochen und bewertet zu werden. Es besteht daher zu Recht, wenn wir eingangs unserer Arbeit sagten, dass es sich bei einer Untersuchung über das zweite Auflage-Problem in der Antike im wesentlichen nur um die antike Entsprechung des modernen Begriffes handelt. Die Erscheinung, die wir heute als zweite Auflage bezeichnen, oder die wenigstens unsern Begriff der zweiten entspricht, nannte die Antike *διασκευή*<sup>4</sup>.

Ich bringe nun vor allem die Texte, die mir begegnet sind:

Haimo (1) Zu 1 Kor. v. 8: "Itaque epulemur". Alia editio habet: Itaque festivitatem celebremus.<sup>5</sup> (2) Zu Koloss. ii, 18: Sed quia nihil erat, quod dicebant, subiunxit apostolus: "Quae non vidit", subaudis docens, "ambulans frustra inflatus sensu carnis suae", id est de suo errore et mendacio ambulans inflatus. Ex hoc enim, quod videbantur aliquid scire, superbiebat

<sup>1</sup> *Summe* (Toulouse, Bibliothèque communale, Cod. lat. 159, fol. 142): In qua sententia visus est fuisse summus magister P[etrus] Lombardus. In prima namque sententiarum editione dixit: Similitudo est indifferens essentia; et in secunda quasi corrigens dixit: similitudo est indifferencia, quasi dicat: Pater et Filius dicuntur similes, quia non sunt indifferentes.

<sup>2</sup> A. Landgraf, 'Notes de critique textuelle sur les sentences de Pierre Lombard,'

*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, II (1930) 89-96.

<sup>3</sup> H. Emonds, *Zweite Auflage im Altertum* (Kulturgeschichtliche Studien zur Uebersetzung der antiken Literatur, Klassisch-Philologische Studien herausgegeben von Ernst Bickel und Hans Heiler, Heft 14, Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig, 1941).

<sup>4</sup> A.a.O., 122.

<sup>5</sup> PL 117, 537C.

in mente praeferens humilitatem in vultu. Vel, sicut alia editio habet: quae non vidit inculcans, id est replicans frustra.<sup>6</sup>

Hervaeus von Bourg-Dieu. (3) *Isaiaskommentar*, zu Is. vi, 4: In eo autem, quod nova editio habet: "Et commota sunt superliminaria cardinum a voce clamantis", sic illam admonitionem intelligimus.<sup>7</sup>

Ps. Haimo. (4) *Psalmenkommentar*, zu Ps. 1: Sciendum est autem, quod non eo ordine David psalmos composuit, quo hic sunt ordinati. Cum enim in uxore Uriae peccasset, "Miserere mei Deus" fecit; post haec vero pro persecutione Absalon "Domine, quid multiplicati sunt" edidit.<sup>8</sup>

Petrus Abaelardus. (5) *Expositio in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, lib. 2, c. 5: Boetius autem lib. III editionis secundae in Perihermenias, quid sit liberum arbitrium diligenter aperiens ait: Nos enim liberum arbitrium ponimus nullo extrinsecus cogente in id, quod pro nobis faciendum vel non faciendum iudicantibus perpendentibusque videatur . . .<sup>9</sup>

Petrus Lombardus. *Psalmenkommentar*. (6) Zu Ps. xxxiv, 7: Quoniam gratis, quia eis non nocui, "absconderunt" Judaei, ut putabant, cum eorum tamen corda cognoscerem, "mihi" Christo "interitum laquei sui", id est consilia et insidias, quibus me occiderent; sed tamen fuit eis in interitum laqueus suus, et non mihi. Ille enim laqueus non morientis, sed peccantis erit interitus. Unde alia editio habet: "absconderunt" mihi muscipulam corruptionis suae, et "exprobraverunt", id est accusaverunt "animam meam".<sup>10</sup> (7) Zu Ps. xlv: Unde in Levitico caput turturis iubetur retorqueri ad ascellas. Nostra editio habet ad pennulas.<sup>11</sup> (8) Zu Ps. cxlvii, 1: Eadem est Sion et Jerusalem. Jerusalem enim interpretatur "visio pacis", Sion "speculatio"; vel contemplatio et visio pacis est: contemplatio Christi, qui est pax nostra. Vel secundum aliam editionem "collauda", o Jerusalem, Dominum, non simpliciter, dico, lauda, sed collauda, quia ex multis constas.<sup>12</sup> (9) *Sententiae*, lib. 1, dist. 31, c. 2, n. 270:<sup>13</sup> Ecce habes, qualiter verba Hilarii praemissa accipienda sint, licet tantae sint profunditatis, ut etiam adhibita expositione vix aliquatenus ea intelligere valeat humanus sensus, cum et ipsa eorum explanatio, quam hic Augustinus edidit, plurimum in se habeat difficultatis et ambiguitatis.

Petrus Comestor. (10) *Historia scholastica in Actus Apostolorum*, c. 6: [Zum Text: Act. i, 12: Tunc reversi sunt Hierosolymam a monte, qui vocatur Oliveti] Vetus editio habet a monte trium luminum. Sic autem dictus est mons Oliveti, quia de nocte ex parte occidentis illuminabatur igne templi.<sup>14</sup> *Evangelien-glosse*. (11) Zu Joh. i: Nota, quod secundum editionem nostram non invenies hoc expresse in aliquo prophetarum, scilicet: Nazareus vocabitur, sed quod aliam editionem invenies, ut in littera nostra dicitur: flos de radice eius ascendet.<sup>15</sup> (12) Zu Joh. viii, 25: Vide, quia quidam libri habent quandam glosam, que revera non est necessaria quantum ad nostram editionem, quia quantum ad latinam editionem planum est, quod ait: ego sum principium. Sed greca editio, in qua scriptum est hoc euuangelium, quia Johannes scripsit in Asia minori, cogit dicere:

<sup>6</sup> PL 117, 757.

<sup>7</sup> PL 181, 91B.

<sup>8</sup> PL 116, 196.

<sup>9</sup> PL 178, 867A.

<sup>10</sup> PL 191, 349.

<sup>11</sup> PL 191, 455A.

<sup>12</sup> PL 191, 1279.

<sup>13</sup> Hrsg. *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum* I. (Quaracchi, 1916), 193.

<sup>14</sup> PL 198, 1648.

<sup>15</sup> Is. xi, 1. Cod. Paris. Nat., lat. 15269, fol. 5v.

principium esse accusativi casus et veritatem feminini generis, quasi dicat: credite me esse veritatem et ita quantum ad grecam editionem necessaria est glossa.<sup>16</sup> (13) Zu *Luc.* xiii, 32: "Tertia die consummor". Dominus in quid ambigue locutus est et huic capitulo exponendo ad litteram nemo expositorum apposuit manum. Si tamen vobis sedet expositio, quam edidi in expositione evangelice historie, satis potestis tenere, quasi dicat Dominus: Herodes deliberavit de morte mea, sed inanis est deliberatio, quoniam non est in manu eius mors mea . . .<sup>17</sup> (14) Zu *Marc.* i: "apud vos manet et in vobis erit". Forte in actibus apostolorum vel in Johanne secundum aliam editionem hoc legitur.<sup>18</sup>

Die Sentenzenglosse des *Cod. lat.* 1206 der Bibliothek von Troyes. (15) Zu 1, dist. 11, n. 165:<sup>19</sup> "Spiritus, qui a Patre". *Joh.* xv in fine. Quod in missa [fol. 18] cantatur, hoc symbolum in concilio Niceno editum est, sed consequenter in concilio Constantinopolitano institutum est in missa decantari.<sup>20</sup>

Petrus Cantor. *Isaiaskommentar.* (16) Zu *Is.* v., 2: sed "electam" in omnibus gentibus. Alia editio habet: vineam Soreth, quod est genus vitis optime et uberrimis perpetuis fructibus nota.<sup>21</sup> (17) Zu *Is.* xxxvi, 16: Continebat vel audiebat ab aliquo Ezechiam sic persuadere populo: facite mecum benedictionem, id est pactum, ut bene sit vobis, vel benedicite et laudate me. Vel secundum aliam editionem: facite, quod vobis utile est, ut scilicet me recipiatis et pax vobis maneat.<sup>22</sup> (18) *Prologserklärung zu Ezechiel:* "sacerdos" etc. Post commendat editionem LXX, quia consonat hebraice veritati ibi. Sed vulgata etc. Et nota, quod tempore Jeronimi dicebatur editio LXX vulgata, nunc autem nostra Je[ronimi], que est inventa in Jericho. Post exprimit admirationem suam. Numquam videbatur ei, quod illa editio ita miraculose facta sit, ut vult Augustinus. Nam si hoc est, mirum videtur ei, quod in quibusdam consonat hebraice veritati, in aliis dissonat.<sup>23</sup> (19) Zu *Esdras:* Iuxta autem editionem vulgatam, id est Theodotionis, hoc cum premissa visione unum reputatur.<sup>24</sup>

Petrus von Poitiers. (20) *Distinctiones Psalterii:* "LXX interpretatur". Secundum Augustinum isti LXX interpretores in singulis cellulis singulas fecerunt editiones, quas tandem coram Tholomeo Philadelpho propalantes nec uno iota dicordes inventi sunt.<sup>25</sup>

Bekanntlich hat bei uns Heutigen Edition den Sinn einer in einer bestimmten Anzahl von Exemplaren zugleich geschehenden Veröffentlichung. Geschieht die Veröffentlichung zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt noch einmal, ohne dass am Äusseren oder am Inhalt des Werkes eine Veränderung vorgenommen würde, dann ist damit schon eine andere Edition gegeben. Wir kennen unveränderte und veränderte, verbesserte, erweiterte Editionen desselben Werkes.

Diesen Sinn hat das Wort *editio* in der Vor- und Frühscholastik nicht. Der damalige Sinn scheint sich eher mit dem zu decken, was wir als ein der Öffentlichkeit zugängliches—also schriftlich fixiertes—Werk bezeichnen möchten. Nach Nr. 15 würde eine Verschiedenheit der Edition des wörtlich gleichen Werkes schon durch die blosse Verschiedenheit der Verfasser bedingt sein. Im allgemeinen aber wäre eine *alia editio* schon bei jedem textlichen auf den Verfasser zurückgehenden Unterschied gegeben. Nach Nr. 4 rückt die Bedeutung

<sup>16</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 15269, fol. 14<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 15269, fol. 55<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 15269, fol. 120.

<sup>19</sup> *Ed. cit.*, 78.

<sup>20</sup> Fol. 17<sup>v</sup> f.

<sup>21</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 178, fol. 56.

<sup>22</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 178, fol. 82.

<sup>23</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 178, fol. 135.

<sup>24</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 178, fol. 180.

<sup>25</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 14423, fol. 26.

des *edere* ganz in die Nähe des *facere* eines Geisteswerkes. Doch dürfte sich *edere* nach Nr. 9, 13 und 15 im wesentlichen ungefähr mit dem decken, was wir heute als mitteilen, lateinisch *tradere* bezeichnen möchten. Dies ist übrigens ein Sinn, der genau dem entspricht, was die *Sentenzen*glosse des *Cod. Bamberg.*, *Patr.* 128 betreff der *Sentenzen* des Petrus Lombardus an der wohl für den Bericht des Praepositinus über eine *secunda editio* der *Sentenzen* des Lombarden massgebenden Stelle mit den Worten sagt:

Magister, qui in prima traditione sententiarum tradidit, quia cum dicitur: persone tres sunt similes, sensus est: unus sunt essentie, et predicatur ibi essentia divina. Sed postea hoc correxit et quod secundo traditum est, est tutius dictum, utrumque tamen catholice.<sup>29</sup>

## II. FACULTAS

Bei Gelegenheit der Beschreibung der zweiten *Sentenzen*glosse des *Cod. VII C 14* der Biblioteca Nazionale von Neapel<sup>27</sup> bin ich auf den Ausdruck *facultas* im Sinn eines Wissenszweiges oder vielleicht sogar der heutigen Facultät (theologische, philosophische Fakultät) unseres Universitätsbetriebes gestossen. Ich hatte damals nicht die Möglichkeit, dem Vorkommen dieses Ausdruckes im genannten Sinn weiter nachzugehen und musste mich mit dem in einer Mitteilung der genannten Glosse begründeten Hinweis begnügen, dass der Gebrauch des Wortes auf Hugo von St. Viktor zurückgeführt werde. Ausserdem konnte ich noch berichten, dass der Ausdruck im gleichen Sinn bei Stephan Langton und in der Langton nahe stehenden *Quästionensammlung* des *Cod. Erlangen, lat. 353* auftritt. In der Zwischenzeit konnte ich nun Nachforschungen nach dem Wort *facultas* in der fröhscholastischen Literatur anstellen. Die Ergebnisse sind die folgenden:

D. du Cange<sup>28</sup> gibt die Auskunft: *Facultas, Collegium doctorum eiusdem artis in scholis mediæ aevi: Gallis Faculté*. Vide Savin, *Historia Jur. Roman.* tom. 3, cap. 21 § 85, Not. B. Bei F. C. von Savigny, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter* III<sup>2</sup> (Heidelberg, 1834), 233, Anm. b, liest man: "Der Name des Collegii kommt wenigstens schon 1312 vor (§ 81 g.): desgleichen 1314 im Diplom des Cinus (§ 80 f.). Der Name *facultas* dagegen für ein solches Collegium von Lehrern desselben Faches ist ziemlich neu: schon im Mittelalter und namentlich im zwölften und dreizehnten Jahrhundert heisst *facultas* sehr häufig ein einzelnes wissenschaftliches Fach, und daher ist die Benennung auf die Gesamtheit der Lehrer des Faches übertragen worden. Vergl. Heumann, *Praef. ad Conring. antiqu. acad.*, p. XIV, welcher dafür Stellen gesammelt hat. Andere Stellen finden sich noch bei Sarty, P. 2, p. 223, N. 9, *Statuta univ. Montispezz*, (Anhang VI.o) C. 10, 18, Egrefeuille, *Hist. eccles. de Montpellier*, pp. 340, 342, 343, 355. Pet. de Vineis, *Epist.* III, 11, Bini, pp. 195, 198, 199." H. Conring, *De Antiquitatibus academicis dissertationes*, Supplementum LXXVI<sup>29</sup> berichtet die Worte des Briefes Innozenz' IV oder VI an die Pariser Universität des Wortlautes:

Statuimus, quod nullus in universitatem vestram magistrorum et scolarium aut rectorem aut procuratores vestros cuiuscumque aut quarumcumque facultatum etc. audeat sententiam promulgare.

<sup>27</sup> *Cod. Bamberg.*, *Patr.* 128, fol. 34. Man vgl. A. Landgraf, 'Notes de critique textuelle sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* II (1930), 92.

<sup>28</sup> A. Landgraf, 'The first Sentence Com-

mentary of Early Scholasticism', *The New Scholasticism* XIII (1939), 128 f.

<sup>29</sup> *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis* III (Paris, 1844), 184.

<sup>30</sup> (Helmestadii, 1674), 373.



Natürlich ist das Material in der Zwischenzeit nicht zuletzt durch die Veröffentlichung des Chartulariums der Pariser Universität gewaltig vermehrt worden. Hier ist aber nicht meine Absicht an Hand von Diplomen oder sonstigen Archivalien dem Bedeutungswandel des Wortes *facultas* nachzugehen, sondern ich möchte lediglich aufspüren, wo und wie es in den theologischen Werken der Frühscholastik gebraucht wurde.

Die zweite Sentenzenglosse des *Cod. VII C 14* der Biblioteca Nazionale von Neapel beruft sich für den Gebrauch des Wortes *facultas* auf Hugo von St. Viktor, da sie sagt: *Ut enim ait magister Hugo de Sancto Victore, hec est divinitas theologie, quod significata aliarum facultatum hic sunt significantia.* Ich konnte diese Stelle aber nicht wörtlich bei Hugo feststellen.<sup>30</sup>

Dagegen begegnete mir der Ausdruck *facultas* zum erstenmal und da gleich relativ häufig im Werk des Gilbert de la Porrée und zwar im Sinn von Wissenszweig und bedeutet darüber hinaus auch schon die Vertreter eines wissenschaftlichen Faches. Zwei Zitate mögen genügen:

*Commentaria in librum Boetii de Trinitate:* Hic commemandum est, quod cum facultates secundum genera rerum, de quibus in ipsis agitur, diversae sint, id est naturalis, mathematica, theologica, civilis, rationalis: una tamen est, scilicet naturalis, quae in humanae locutionis usu promptior est et in transferendorum sermonum proportionibus prior.<sup>31</sup> *Commentaria in librum de duobus naturis et una persona Christi:* Natura enim multiplex nomen est, adeo quod non solum multimodis, verum etiam multis significationibus de rebus diversorum in diversis facultatibus etiam generum dicitur. Nam et philosophi et ethici et theologi usu plurimo ponunt hoc nomen.<sup>32</sup>

In der Gilbertschule ist denn auch der Ausdruck ziemlich heimisch geworden.

So steht er in dem streng porretanischen mit dem des *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat. 686* im wesentlichen identischen Paulinenkommentar des *Cod. C. 57* der Biblioteca Vallicelliana in Rom in der Erklärung zu *Rom. xi, 33*: „Sapientie et scientie“. Diverse sunt facultates, inter quas naturalis comoditate verborum est pre ceteris dicio, sola habens verba rebus, de quibus loquitur, acomodata. Sed quanto hec pre ceteris verborum habundat copia, tanto theologica pre ceteris premitur inopia. Ubi enim deficit intelligentia, necesse est deficere et verba . . .<sup>33</sup> Am unteren Rand von Blatt 35 des *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat. 686* kann man zum gleichen Römerbriefkommentar die Glosse lesen: Attende, quod in ceteris facultatibus numquam de subiectis aliqua predicantur nominibus mathematicis. Numquam enim de albo dicitur, quod sit albedo, nec de homine, quod sit humanitas. In sola vero theologica mathematico nomine de persona predicatur essentia, ut non solum dicatur: Deus est essens vel potens, sed etiam: est essentia, potentia ceteraque similia. Der zweite ebenfalls den Gilbertschen Paulinenkommentar erklärende Hebräerkommentar des gleichen *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat. 686* schreibt auf Blatt 71: Nota, quod, cum sit quadruplex facultas, theologia pre ceteris preeminet rerum excellentia; sed quanto est rebus fecundior, tanto est

<sup>30</sup> Mit ihr dürfte vielmehr bloss der Sinn der Stelle aus der *Summa de sacramentis*, lib. 1, p. 1, c. 5 wiedergegeben sein, die lautet: Unde apparet, quantum divina scriptura ceteris omnibus scripturis non solum in materia sua, sed etiam in modo tractandi subtilitate et profunditate praecellat; cum in ceteris quidem scripturis solae voces significare inveniantur, in hoc autem non solum voces, sed etiam res significativae

sint. (Rouen 1648), 486 f.

<sup>31</sup> PL 64, 1281. Man vgl. auch PL 64, 1255.

<sup>32</sup> PL 64, 1359. Man vgl. auch PL 64, 1404C; ferner *Commentaria in librum de praedicatione trium personarum* (PL 64, 1303D) und *Commentaria in librum, quomodo substantiae bonae sunt* (PL 64, 1316D, 1327A, 1328D).

<sup>33</sup> Fol. 159.

vocabulis humilior. Pre ceteris enim maiori nominum premittitur inopia, quippe circa eam frustratur humana intelligentia. Ea enim, quae sunt in voce, sequuntur ea, quae sunt in anima. Unde, cum deficit humana intelligentia nec habetur rerum cognitio, pariter deficit vocabulorum impositio. Ideoque, si velimus loqui de theologicis, oportet nos uti verbis transumptis, ut sic descendat theologia, ut ascendat nostra intelligentia.

Innerhalb der Gilbertschule findet sich der Gebrauch des Ausdrucks *facultas* im Sinn von Wissenszweig dann noch bei Alanus von Lille<sup>34</sup> und in der anonymen Summe des Cod. Bamberg., *Patr.* 136,<sup>35</sup> sowie in der anonymen Summe des Cod. lat. 109 der Stiftsbibliothek von Zwettl.<sup>36</sup>

In der gleichen Bedeutung begegnen wir ihm sodann in der *Summa de sacramentis et anime consiliis* des Petrus Cantor,<sup>37</sup> in der Summe des Robert Courson,<sup>38</sup> in den Sentenzen des Petrus von Poitiers,<sup>39</sup> in der Summe des Praepositinus,<sup>40</sup> im Paulinenkommentar des Stephan Langton,<sup>41</sup> in der zweiten zu

<sup>34</sup> *Theologicae Regulae*, Reg. CXV (PL 210, 681): Pertractatis regulis, quae theologiae veritatis specialiter sunt accommodatae, agendum est de iis, quae ad naturalem pertinent facultatem, considerandumque maxime, quae ita accommodantur naturali facultati, quod non evagantur a theologia. Quae vero utrique facultati sunt communes, naturalis physicae maxime haec est. Reg. CXVI. . . . Haec regula quidem utrique facultati communis est: Ut enim testatur Hilarius: Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi. Hoc quidem liquet esse verum in naturali facultate. Quod enim Petrus dicitur esse homo, ab humani-[682] tate; quod albus ad albedinem; quod iustus a iustitia; quod etiam pratum ridere dicitur, a causa est: ideo enim dicitur ridere, quia causam risus habet penes se. Similiter in theologicis omne dictum a causa est. Quod enim dicitur iustus, a causa est, quia efficit iustum et sic de aliis. Reg. CXVII. . . . Haec regula accommodata est naturali facultati. In naturali autem facultate verum est, quod aliud album, aliud albedo; aliud homo, aliud humanitas. In theologicis vero non aliud Deus, aliud divinitas. . . . Reg. CXVIII. . . . Haec regula communis est duabus facultatibus, naturali et theologiae. . . . Reg. CXIX. . . . Haec regula communis est utrique facultati. . . . Reg. CXX. . . . [683]. . . . Haec regula tam convenit naturalibus quam divinis. . . . Reg. CXXI. . . . Causa dicendi per se est, quae nullius dicitur comparatione, ut in naturalibus homo albus. In divinis, ut Deus iustus.

<sup>35</sup> Fol. 54<sup>v</sup>: Item in naturali facultate docetur, quod pars prior est suo toto. Fol. 57: In grammatica etiam facultate tertia persona evacuatur a prima et cedit in proprietatem illius, ut iam ibi non dicatur persone [terti]e, sed prime.

<sup>36</sup> Fol. 12: In quo quidem notandum, quod cum his rationibus naturalia dividantur, si qua tamen in ceteris facultatibus vocabula, ut in mathematica, logica, ethica. . . . Fol. 35 f.: Susceptio etenim apud facultates diversas diversas habet positionis causas. Dicitur namque medicus suscipere. . . . Dicitur orator suscipere. . . . Dicitur largus vel misericors suscipere. . . . Dicitur sapiens atque perfectus suscipere. . . . Dicitur denique forma suscipere materiam.

<sup>37</sup> Rein, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. lat. 61, fol.

196<sup>v</sup>: Habemus et in hac facultate accommodatum exemplum. Petrus enim multa opera imperfectionis fecit, antequam haberet caritatem perfectam. . . .

<sup>38</sup> Brügge, Cod. lat. 247, fol. 101: Ad cuius evidenciam sciendum est, quod hoc nomen sacramentum tripliciter accipitur in hac facultate. Quandoque enim dicitur sacre rei signum, quandoque dicitur sacrum secretum, quandoque dicitur sacramentum quodcumque veteris testamenti sacrificium vel oblatio. . . .

<sup>39</sup> Lib. 5, c. 11 (PL 211, 1244): Ideo dicendum, quod hoc pronome hoc nihil est demonstratum, donec completa sit verborum prolatio, quae sit de forma sacramenti. Quod verissimum videtur secundum grammaticorum vel dialecticorum facultates, quibus aliter multas quaestiones, quae videntur cadere in fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter non facile est solvere.

<sup>40</sup> Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. lat. 353, fol. 24: Quod secundo obicitur: sunt duo homicidia etc., dicimus, quod homicidium accipitur equivoce de voluntate et opere. Et dialecticus non reciperet et diceret de voluntate, quod est homicidium et non est homicidium, scilicet quia in hac facultate hoc vocabulum equivoce acceptum pluraliter accipitur. Cod. Vat., lat. 1174, fol. 37 und Cod. Vat. Ottob., lat. 601, fol. 75<sup>v</sup>: Potest tamen dici, quod hoc verbum prohibet tribus modis accipitur in hac facultate: laxa, id est illicite. . . .

<sup>41</sup> Zu Rom. vii (Salzburg, Bibliothek des Erzstiftes St. Peter, Cod. a. X 19, Seite 27): Temporis modus et infinitivus, ut dicitur in alia facultate, conjuncta habent tempora, quia eadem vox est ibi presentis temporis et preteriti imperfecti. Zu Rom. viii (a.a.O., Seite 34): Sed scire vel agnoscere ponitur saepe in hac facultate pro sentire experimento. Zu Rom. viii (a.a.O., Seite 36): Sed in alia facultate dicitur, quod aliquid scitur in universali, quod nescitur in particulari. Zu Rom. xiii (a.a.O., Seite 51). Zu Rom. xv (a.a.O., Seite 57): Laus enim sive exhortatio non solum in aliis facultatibus, sed etiam in theologia. Zu 1 Kor. 1 (a.a.O., Seite 59). Zu 1 Kor. vi (a.a.O., Seite 68). Zu 2 Kor. x (a.a.O., Seite 105). Zu Gal. iii (a.a.O., Seite 121). Zu Hebr. ii (a.a.O., Seite 204 und 205). Ferner eine Marginalglosse am

Langtons Bereich gehörigen *Quästionensammlung* des *Cod. lat. 353* der Universitätsbibliothek von Erlangen<sup>42</sup> und in der zweiten *Sentenzen-glosse* des *Cod. VII C 14* der Biblioteca Nazionale von Neapel.<sup>43</sup>

### III. DIE ZITIERWEISE DER FRÜHSCHOLASTIK

Für die Datierung von Werken ist es wichtig zu wissen, welche Autoren benützt worden sind. Sobald die Chronologie der Werke derselben feststeht, lässt sich dann daraus, dass dieses oder jenes zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt entstandene Opus von dem augenblicklich interessierenden benützt ist, der *terminus post quem* feststellen. Offen bleibt dann noch die Frage nach dem *terminus ante quem*. Hier muss man sich gegebenenfalls mit dem Hinweis begnügen, dass noch eine Lehre gehalten ist, die zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt wegen einer bereits erfolgten Entscheidung des kirchlichen Lehramtes nicht mehr gehalten werden dürfte. Doch bleibt hier immer noch eine offene Zeitspanne, da, wie die Erfahrung lehrt, solche Entscheidungen nicht immer in Schulen, die abseits von den grossen Studienzentren lagen, sehr rasch bekannt wurden, oder auch da die Echtheit solcher Entscheidungen längere Zeit umstritten blieb.<sup>44</sup>

Man möchte nun *a priori* den Versuch für aussichtsreich halten, aus der Art, wie die verschiedenen zeitgenössischen Autoren zitiert werden, festzustellen, ob sie zur Zeit des Zitates noch am Leben waren, oder nicht.<sup>45</sup>

Ich habe aber die mir zugängliche fröhscholastische Literatur daraufhin durchgesehen, wie die Autoren zitiert werden, und musste leider feststellen, dass sich daraus für unsern Zweck keine ohne weiteres zuverlässige Handhabe gewinnen lässt. Die Untersuchung erbrachte folgende Einzelheiten oder Ergebnisse: Wir machen die Feststellung, dass in den frühesten Sentenzen-sammlungen der Autorenverweis sich nicht stilistisch mit den Sentenzen verbunden findet, sondern derselben lediglich in einer Form vorangesetzt findet, wie wir sie noch im *Sic et Non* des Abaelard<sup>46</sup> z.B. in der Weise finden: *Hieronymus super Isaiam*, lib. V: *Non crudelis est, qui crudelem iugulat*.<sup>47</sup> Oder in der Sentenzensammlung des *Cod. British Museum, Royal 11 B XIV*: *Queris, si elemosina iusto homini potius quam nequam sit danda. Jeronimus super Math[eu]m*, libro III: *Quamdiu fecistis uni ex his minimis fratribus meis, michi fecistis*.<sup>48</sup> Oder auch in den Sentenzenwerken aus der Schule Anselms von Laon,<sup>49</sup> oder in der Sentenzensammlung des *Cod. lat. 18* der Bibliothek von

Rand der Seite 43 des *Cod. a X 19* der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Peter in Salzburg: *Quod ubicumque in hac facultate invenitur plebs Dei, fere semper pro sanctis sumitur.*

<sup>42</sup>Fol. 79<sup>v</sup>: *Et sicut solet dici in alia facultate, quod duo nomina sunt una pars orationis et duo dola sunt unum vitium, ita due persone sunt unum principium.* Fol. 101: *Sunt enim in hac facultate tres modi supponendi . . .*

<sup>43</sup>Fol. 71<sup>r</sup>. Fol. 72<sup>r</sup>. Fol. 73 verschiedentlich. Fol. 74: *Similiter hac locutione qui est misit me multum a remotis innuitur unitas essentie et non significatur ibi, quia hoc nomen masculinum qui est personale, vel melius, ut habetur in alia facultate, hoc nomen qui iunctum cum verbo presentis temporis valet participium illius verbi, id est oratio constans ex hoc nomine et verbo circumloquitur participium illius verbi.* Fol. 76. Fol. 76<sup>v</sup>: *Item, quicquid intelligo, intelligere me scio* in habitu, hoc est quod in alia facultate sic dicitur: quicquid scio,

scire me scio. Fol. 77<sup>r</sup>. Fol. 78<sup>r</sup>: *Unum lumen*. Et etiam illi duo insimul, scilicet unum lumen, ut et singulus id est utraque, sicut in alia facultate dicitur singulum incomplexorum. Fol. 79<sup>v</sup> verschiedentlich. Fol. 81. Fol. 83. Fol. 84.

<sup>44</sup>Man vgl. A. Landgraf, 'Die Ansicht der Fröhscholastik von der Zugehörigkeit des Baptizo te zur Taufform', *Scholastik XVII* (1942), 412-427, 531-555.

<sup>45</sup>Einen Versuch solcher Beweisführung vgl. man bei B. Smalley, 'Master Ivo of Chartres', *The English Historical Review L* (1935), 685.

<sup>46</sup>PL 178, 1339-1610.

<sup>47</sup>PL 178, 1607.

<sup>48</sup>Fol. 105.

<sup>49</sup>So schon der Beginn der Sammlung: *Augustinus. Semel immolatus est Christus* (H. Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie

Vitry le François.<sup>50</sup> Eine Übung, der man zum Teil auch in Werken begegnen kann, die nicht eigentlich Sentenzensammlungen sind, wie in Abaelards *Expositio in epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*,<sup>51</sup> in des Hugo von St. Viktor *Summa de sacramentis christianae fidei*,<sup>52</sup> im Paulinenkommentar des Gilbert de la Porrée,<sup>53</sup> in der *Summa Sententiarum*,<sup>54</sup> in den *Sentenzen* des Petrus Lombardus,<sup>55</sup> in der *Summe* des Udo<sup>56</sup> oder in der Fritzlarer *Sentenzenabbreviation*.<sup>57</sup> Teilweise treten diese Verweise auch bloss als Randvermerke auf. So z.B. schon im *Cod. Bamberg. Bibl. 127*, der den Paulinenkommentar des Sedulius Scotus enthält, und im *Cod. lat. 427* der Leipziger Universitätsbibliothek mit dem Paulinenkommentar des Gilbert de la Porrée, ganz abzusehen von den Handschriften des Paulinenkommentars des Petrus Lombardus.

Man findet aber schon in den *Sententie divine pagine* und in den *Sententie Anselmi* die Autorenverweise stilistisch mit den betreffenden Sentenzen verbunden. Und zwar wird hier zumeist im Präsens und nur ausnahmsweise und zwar dann vor allem, wo es sich nicht um ein blosses Verweisen, sondern um einen historischen Bericht handelt, in der Vergangenheit gesprochen.

Man vgl. in den *Sententie divine pagine*: quam dat Augustinus<sup>58</sup>—ut dicit Augustinus<sup>59</sup>—quod Augustinus affirmat . . .—Augustinus vero dicit.<sup>60</sup> Aber dann auch: Quod heresis Origenis asserebat<sup>61</sup>—quidam tamen dicunt . . . et his consensit episcopus in "cur Deus homo".<sup>62</sup> Item queritur, quando cepit habere vim baptismus. Quidam dicunt: ante passionem, quando Dominus dixit ad Nicodemum . . . quando dixit discipulis . . . Previdens enim Johannes, quod homines abhorrerent baptismum Christi, ideo premisit suum.<sup>63</sup> Dicit Augustinus: Non audeo inde precipitare sententiam. Nos tamen credimus, quia baptismus sit, et si Augustinus inde dubitavit, bene fecit.<sup>64</sup>

Man kann aber auch in einer historischen Schilderung lesen: *Sed in libro retractationum profitetur se male dixisse aperte ostendens, quod nullus sine gratia baptismi salvari possit*.<sup>65</sup> In den *Sententie Anselmi*, wo die Lage ähnlich

und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band 33, Heft 1-2, Münster i.W., 1936, 281); ferner in der Sammlung *Deus hominem fecit perfectum*: Ex libro Boetii contra Nestorium. Querendum est, quomodo (H. Weisweiler, a.a.O., 296), in der Bearbeitung *Dubitatur a quibusdam*: Origenes. O homo . . . Origenes. David. Quis similis (H. Weisweiler, a.a.O., 322), Origenes. Deus cum beneficiis . . . (Ebenda, 325), Origenes: Christus sanguine suo . . . (Ebenda, 340); im *Ehetraktat Decretum Dei fuit*: Unde Augustinus: Benedictio . . . Unde Augustinus: Utriusque . . . Unde Augustinus: Poterant . . . Unde Augustinus: Deus (a.a.O., 362).

<sup>50</sup> Z.B. Fol. 27v: Cassiodorus psalmo XXXVIII: Faciamus hominem ad . . . Ambrosius ad Col.: Secundum imaginem eius . . . Augustinus in XII libro de Trinitate cap. VII: Credo mulierem . . . Diese gleiche Sentenzensammlung findet sich auch im *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat. 16528* und im *Cod. Laud. Misc. 514* (11. Jahrh.) der Bibliotheca Bodleiana in Oxford.

<sup>51</sup> Z.B. Lib. 1, c. 1 (PL 178, 789 f.): Augustinus, *Retractionum* lib. 1: Epistolae . . . Oder Lib. 2, c. 4 (PL 178, 844): Gregorius in *Moral. lib. IV*: "Quod valet . . ."

<sup>52</sup> Z.B. Lib. 2, p. 1, c. 4; (Rouen, 1648), 587: Augustinus adversus impietatem Arrii: Patres novum nomen . . . Idem in libro contra Maximinum: Nulla sit . . . Idem libro de Trinitate: Si solus Filius intelligit.

<sup>53</sup> Zu *Rom. ix* (Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, *Cod. lat. 427*, fol. 19v): Ambrosius: Ysaac significat Christum et Jacob credentes de utroque populo iudeorum et gentium . . . Zu *1 Kor. vii* (fol. 39): Augustinus: Miror: Si viro adultera dimissa licet aliam ducere . . .

<sup>54</sup> Tract. I, c. 2; (Rouen, 1648), 418: Gregorius homilia tertia: Apparentia non habent . . . Item in dialogo: Cum Paulus . . . Unde Augustinus: Quia sibi vult . . . Idem Augustinus in libro *quaestionum evangeliorum*: Est etiam . . . Prosper ex dictis Augustini: Tres sunt . . .

<sup>55</sup> Z.B. Lib. 1, dist. 15, c. 2, n. 146; (Quaracchi, 1916), 108: Unde Augustinus in libro *XV De Trinitate*: Si in donis . . . Item in eodem: Joannes . . .

<sup>56</sup> *Summe* (Cod. Bamberg, *Patr. 136*, fol. 47v und 53).

<sup>57</sup> Z.B. Fol. 8v, 13 usw.

<sup>58</sup> F. Bliemetzrieder, *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band 18, Heft 2-3, Münster i.W., 1919), 4.

<sup>59</sup> Ebenda, 6.

<sup>60</sup> Ebenda, 12.

<sup>61</sup> Ebenda, 16.

<sup>62</sup> Ebenda, 32.

<sup>63</sup> Ebenda, 43.

<sup>64</sup> Ebenda 45 f.

<sup>65</sup> Ebenda, 46.

ist,<sup>66</sup> kann man in historischen Schilderungen auch bloss das Präsens<sup>67</sup> oder Gegenwart und Vergangenheit vermischt finden.<sup>68</sup> Ähnliche Feststellungen machen wir auch sonst, wie z.B. in der zu Anselms Bereich gehörigen Sentenzenbearbeitung *Dubitatur a quibusdam*,<sup>69</sup> in den *Sententie Parisienses*<sup>70</sup> und auch in den *Sentenzen* des Petrus Lombardus.<sup>71</sup>

Bisher hat es sich nur um Zitate von Autoren gehandelt, die, wenn wir von Anselm von Canterbury absehen wollen, in einer weit zurückliegenden Zeit geschrieben haben und jedenfalls nicht als zeitgenössisch angesprochen werden können. Wie ist es nun aber bei Zitaten aus Lehrern, des zwölften Jahrhunderts in Werken des 12. Jahrhunderts?

Udo, dessen *Summe* O. Lottin<sup>72</sup> in die Zeit nach 1160, also nach dem Tod des Lombarden verlegt, zitiert Petrus Lombardus im Präsens.<sup>73</sup> Die *Sentenzenabbreviatio* des *Cod. lat. 65* der Bibliothèque Nationale von Luxemburg tut nicht anders. Man lese nur:

M[agister] P[etrus] ita determinat,<sup>74</sup> oder: Per hoc nomen caritas sive dilectio m[agister] P[etrus] unum tantum, id est Spiritum Sanctum intelligit<sup>75</sup>—Magister Petrus dicit<sup>76</sup>—sicut magister Petrus dicit<sup>77</sup>—magister Petrus dicit plane.<sup>78</sup>

Wir finden sodann in der anonymen, Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts entstandenen *Summe* des *Cod. Bamberg*, *Patr. 136* das Zitat: *Sed ait magnus ille Gillebertus*,<sup>79</sup> womit—es handelt sich um ein Werk aus der Schule desselben—nur der 1154 verstorbene Gilbert de la Porrée gemeint sein kann. Wenn dann hier auch für den Manducator das *ait* gebraucht wird,<sup>80</sup> ist es nicht gestattet, daraus schon zu schliessen, dass es sich bei ihm um einen noch Lebenden handelte.

<sup>66</sup>Für das Praeteritum in historischen Schilderungen vgl. man F. Bliemetzrieder, *a.a.O.*, 61, 83, 92, 100, 102, 106, 111, 129, 140.

<sup>67</sup>F. Bliemetzrieder *a.a.O.*, 61: et potuit esse, ut Augustinus dicit, sed non asserit, quod . . . *Ebenda*, 63: Quam divisionem facit Augustinus in enchiridion, ubi dicit . . .

<sup>68</sup>F. Bliemetzrieder, *a.a.O.*, 90 f.: Dicit enim propheta: Ecce virgo concipiet . . . Quid ergo? Mentitus est propheta loquens in Spiritu Sancto? Absit. Quomodo igitur verum dixerit, intueri debemus . . . Propheta ergo, cum dicit: Ninive subvertetur, subversionem futuram non confirmavit, sed aliquas solitas causas rerum requirere, ut futura esset, prenuntiabat. *Ebenda*, 139: Sed opponitur, quod dicit Augustinus illos Christi et ecclesie non habere sacramentum . . . Sed hoc sacramentum [non habere] hos, qui carnaliter non conveniunt Augustinus [dixit], coniugium esse non negavit.

<sup>69</sup>H. Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in deutschen Bibliotheken*, 353: Illudque, quod Augustinus dicit: Nulli sacramento facienda est iniuria, ad solum baptisma determinant referri. Episcopus etiam taraanensis hoc sacramentum volebat ad solam unionem ecclesie pertinere . . . hoc sacramentum confici asserere. *Ebenda*, 375: De tollendo etiam proverbio ab Israel Jeronimus dicit: Hominibus gratie . . . Et de nova lege statuenda Augustinus pluralem numerum posuit: In iniquitatibus . . .

<sup>70</sup>A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Fasc. 14, Louvain, 1934). Vergangenhheit: Seite 5: Sicut dicit Macrobius,

summus philosophus, de Platone, quod ipse nescivit, quid Deus esset, sic dicens: "Deus, quid sit . . . Man vgl. auch Seite 7, 8, 18, 25, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 50, 52.

<sup>71</sup>Vergangenhheit findet sich z.B. 1. dist. 9, c. 3, n. 93; (Quaracchi, 1916), 68: Sed hoc non dixit Hieronymus ideo, quod . . . Vergangenhheit und Gegenwart liest man 1. dist. 13, c. 4, n. 118; (Quaracchi, 1916), 89: . . . dicimus, quod Hieronymus aliter acceperit nomen ingeni et aliter Augustinus. Accepit enim Augustinus ingenuum . . . Hieronymus vero ingenuum dicit non genitum . . . Quod autem Hieronymus ita acceperit, ostenditur ex verbis suis, quibus in eodem tractatu utitur faciens talem divisionem. 1. dist. 14, c. 2, n. 121; (Quaracchi, 1916), 91: Et hoc dicunt Bedam sensisse in superioribus verbis, quibus dicit . . .

<sup>72</sup>Le premier commentaire connu des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XI (1939), 64–71.

<sup>73</sup>*Cod. Bamberg*, *Patr. 126*, fol. 14: Dicit enim magister Petrus Lombardus. Fol. 44v: Occasione horum verborum et multarum aliarum auctoritatum magister Petrus scribit in sententiis dicens . . . *Ebenda*: Similiter etiam potest intelligi, quod scribit magister Petrus in sententiis, scilicet . . .

<sup>74</sup>Fol. 9.

<sup>75</sup>Fol. 21v.

<sup>76</sup>Fol. 173.

<sup>77</sup>Fol. 185v.

<sup>78</sup>Fol. 187.

<sup>79</sup>Fol. 3.

<sup>80</sup>Fol. 27: Ideo consultius ait manducator . . . Fol. 53: Ait tamen manducator.

Bei Praepositinus wieder lesen wir: *Magister dicit in sententiis*,<sup>81</sup> wo der bereits verstorbene Lombarde gemeint ist, oder auch ausdrücklich: *Propter predicta dicit magister Petrus Lombardus*.<sup>82</sup> *Ad hoc dicit magister Petrus*.<sup>83</sup> *Ad hoc dicit magister*.<sup>84</sup> *Ad hoc magister sapienter respondet*.<sup>85</sup> *Ad hoc respondet magister in Sententiis*.<sup>86</sup> *Ad hoc respondet magister Petrus*.<sup>87</sup> *Magister dicit in sententiis*.<sup>88</sup> *Magister in sententiis solvit dupliciter*.<sup>89</sup> Ferner schreibt Praepositinus: *secundum quod dicit magister Hugo*,<sup>90</sup> was auf Hugo von St. Viktor geht. Aber man findet bei ihm auch: *Hanc viam tenuit magister Petrus, sed nullus de suis coequalibus secutus est eum*.<sup>91</sup> Lediglich der Zusatz gibt uns das Recht anzunehmen, dass der magister Petrus bereits der Vergangenheit angehört, nicht aber das bloss Praeteritum, in dem allein von ihm auch an anderen Stellen gesprochen wird, wie: *Magister Petrus Lombardus duos status constituit in primo homine*.<sup>92</sup> *Propter hoc dixit magister primo libro*.<sup>93</sup> *Sed magister predicto loco tertiam significationem non recepit*.<sup>94</sup> Gleiches ist auch hinsichtlich des *Dixit enim magister Gilebertus*<sup>95</sup> zu sagen. Ich wage darum nicht ohne weiteres aus dem Umstand, dass Praepositinus den Magister Gerardus Puella<sup>96</sup> oder den Robertus de Monte<sup>97</sup> in der Vergangenheit zitiert, den Tod derselben im Zeitpunkt des Zitates anzunehmen. Immerhin zitiert eine grosse Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür, da an der Stelle, wo von dem noch lebenden Gerhard von Douai die Rede ist,<sup>98</sup> das Präsens gebraucht wird. Denn es ist durchaus möglich, dass er für die schon klassisch gewordenen Lehrer Vergangenheit und Präsens, für die gewöhnlichen aber, die der Vergangenheit angehören die Vergangenheit, und für die noch lebenden die Gegenwart gebraucht.

Für die Zitierweise des Petrus von Capua sind die folgenden Stellen von Bedeutung:

- (1) *Quod concedebat magister P. Abbaldardus . . . Magister Anselmus et illi antiqui dixerunt . . . Magister Petrus Remensis et fere omnes moderni dicunt*.<sup>99</sup>
- (2) *Abba[lardus] dicebat*.<sup>100</sup>
- (3) *Quidam dicunt, ut magister Odo*.<sup>101</sup>
- (4) *Quidam tamen utentes hoc nomine essentia personaliter concesserunt essentiam generare essentiam*. Daneben am Rand: *ut Yvo Carnotensis*.<sup>102</sup>
- (5) *quia Alcuinus dicit*.<sup>103</sup>
- (6) *Manducator dicebat*.<sup>104</sup>
- (7) *et hoc dicebat, ut fertur, Abaialardus*.<sup>105</sup>
- (8) *Manducator dicebat*.<sup>106</sup>
- (9) *Manducator exponebat*.<sup>107</sup>
- (10) *Vel sicut exponebat Manducator*.<sup>108</sup>
- (11) *Manducator dicebat*.<sup>109</sup>
- (12) *Hec autem solutio potest haberi ex quadam divisione, quam faciebat Manducator super hac questione*.<sup>110</sup>
- (13) *Manducator dicebat*.<sup>111</sup>
- (14) *Set Alexandri intentio videtur fuisse, ut nullus negaret eum esse aliquod*

<sup>81</sup> Cod. Erlangen, lat. 353, fol. 54.

<sup>82</sup> Ebenda, fol. 14.

<sup>83</sup> Ebenda, fol. 14<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>85</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>86</sup> Ebenda, fol. 35<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> Ebenda, fol. 50<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>88</sup> Ebenda, fol. 36<sup>v</sup> und 51<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> Ebenda, fol. 56.

<sup>90</sup> Ebenda, fol. 22<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>91</sup> Ebenda, fol. 14<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>92</sup> Ebenda, fol. 18<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>93</sup> Ebenda, fol. 35<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>94</sup> Ebenda, fol. 35<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>95</sup> Ebenda, fol. 18<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>96</sup> Cod. Erlangen., lat. 353, fol. 3: *Propter has obiectiones dixit magister G. puella*. Cod. Toulouse, lat. 159, fol. 143<sup>v</sup>: *Propter has obiectiones dixit magister Geraldus Lapucell*.

<sup>97</sup> Cod. Toulouse, lat. 159, fol. 159: *et in hac opinione fuit magister Rotbertus de*

Monte.

<sup>98</sup> Cod. Erlangen., lat. 353, fol. 3<sup>v</sup>: *Sunt alii, qui dicunt . . . Dazu findet sich am Rand der Vermerk: Allia] responsio G. de Doai episcopi] Katalauneel*.

<sup>99</sup> Summe (Clm 14508, fol. 6).

<sup>100</sup> Ebenda, fol. 28<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> Ebenda, fol. 12<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> Ebenda, fol. 2<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>103</sup> Ebenda, fol. 7<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>104</sup> Cod. Vat., lat. 4304, fol. 21<sup>v</sup>; Cod. Vat., lat. 4296, fol. 22.

<sup>105</sup> Cod. Vat., lat. 4304, fol. 27; Cod. Vat., lat. 4296, fol. 27.

<sup>106</sup> Clm. 14508, fol. 31.

<sup>107</sup> Cod. Vat., lat. 4304, fol. 36<sup>v</sup>; Cod. Vat., lat. 4296, fol. 35<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>108</sup> Cod. Vat., lat. 4304, fol. 40.

<sup>109</sup> Clm 14508, fol. 40.

<sup>110</sup> Clm 14508, fol. 44.

<sup>111</sup> Clm 14508, fol. 45<sup>v</sup>.

compositum secundum quod homo.<sup>112</sup> (15) quia Alexander sub anathemate prohibuit.<sup>113</sup> (16) Manducator concedebat.<sup>114</sup> (17) Videtur autem manducator velle, ubi agit de oblatione puerpere in istoriis.<sup>115</sup> (18) Quidam dicunt, ut manducator.<sup>116</sup> (19) Manducator dicebat.<sup>117</sup> (20) Manducator concedebat.<sup>118</sup> (21) ut dicebat Manducator.<sup>119</sup> (22) Set Augustinus plane asserit.<sup>120</sup>

Hier sehen wir für den Manducator ständig die Vergangenheit gebraucht ausser in zwei Fällen, die auch bei einem Verstorbenen nicht gut anders als im Präsens behandelt werden könnten,<sup>121</sup> und darum dürfen wir schliessen, dass mit dem Praeteritum auch sein Ausscheiden aus dem Leben bezeichnet werden soll, für ihn ebenso wie für Abaelard. Daran hindert nicht, dass für Alcuin und Augustinus z.B. das Präsens gebraucht wird, da es sich in ihnen um Autoren handelt, die für den blossen Zitiergebrauch schon zeitlos geworden waren. Leider aber ist es uns bei dem Zitat, das den Petrus Remensis, d.i. den Petrus Cantor nennt, nicht möglich, aus dem Präsens *dicunt* darauf zu schliessen, dass er zur Zeit der Abfassung wenigstens dieses Teiles der *Summe* noch unter den Lebenden weilte; denn er wird hier in einem Atem mit allen *moderni* in der Form genannt: *Magister Petrus Remensis et fere omnes moderni dicunt*.<sup>122</sup>

Die Zitate bei Petrus Cantor:

*Summe*: (1) In hoc tamen articulo questionis notanda est opinio quorundam sicut magistri Odonis, qui dicebat verbum illud: voluntas pro facto reputatur, scilicet in via, sane debere intelligi.<sup>123</sup> (2) Hoc sentiebat magister Ivo charnothensis.<sup>124</sup> (3) Magister Robertus de Camera dicebat, quod si aliquis confitetur sacerdoti . . .<sup>125</sup> (4) Tamen nota, quod dicit Manducator: Declinare a malo semper vitat penam.<sup>126</sup> *Paulinenkommentar*: (5) Zu. *Phil.*: ut quod Anselmus in Gallia dixit esse matrimonium, Gratianus negabat in Lacia.<sup>127</sup> (6) Zu 1 *Tim.*: Ergo remissio peccatorum precedit infusionem gratie, ut aiebat magister G[ilbertus].<sup>128</sup> (7) *Kommentar zu Actus Apostolorum*: Quod de illis credendum, ut ait magister P[etrus] in III<sup>to</sup> sententiarum, qui fidem Trinitatis.<sup>129</sup> (8) *Psalmenkommentar*: dicit m[agister] P[etrus] Lombardus.<sup>130</sup> (9) *Psalmenkommentar*: Unde magister Anselmus sic hunc locum exponit.<sup>131</sup> (10) *Jobkommentar*: Magister Gilbertus Deum dicebat non esse bonitatem vel iustitiam vel divinitatem et huiusmodi omnia.<sup>132</sup> (14) *Kommentar zu Habakuk*: tamen mag[ister] R[adulphus], qui has glosas continuavit, dicit eum esse translatum . . .<sup>133</sup>

Hier finden wir das Präsens gebraucht für Petrus Lombardus, Gilbert de la Porrée, Anselm und Radulph, die sicher zur Zeit der Abfassung längst tot waren. Immerhin aber wäre der Erwägung wert, ob ihre Autorität nicht schon zeitlos geworden war. In diesem Fall würde dann das Imperfekt für Odo, Ivo von Chartres und Robert de Camera bedeuten, dass sie zur Zeit der Abfassung der betreffenden Stelle bereits tot waren, während das Präsens für Petrus Manducator ihn noch als lebend bezeichnen könnte.

Die zum Bereich des Odo von Ourscamp gehörige *Quästionensammlung* des *Cod. lat. 964* der Bibliothek von Troyes:

<sup>112</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 48<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>113</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 48<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>114</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 52<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>115</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 55<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>116</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 59<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>117</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 60.  
<sup>118</sup> *Cod. Vat. lat.* 4304, fol. 65<sup>v</sup>; *Cod. Vat.*, lat. 4296, fol. 69.  
<sup>119</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 61<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>120</sup> *Clm* 14508, fol. 15.  
<sup>121</sup> Nr 17 und 18.  
<sup>122</sup> Nr 1.

<sup>123</sup> Rein, Stiftsbibliothek, *Cod. lat.* 61, fol. 192.  
<sup>124</sup> *Ebenda*, fol. 193.  
<sup>125</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 9593, fol. 85<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>126</sup> *Cod. Paris. Nat., lat.* 9593, fol. 190<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>127</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 209.  
<sup>128</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 217.  
<sup>129</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 252.  
<sup>130</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 22<sup>v</sup>.  
<sup>131</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 108.  
<sup>132</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 23.  
<sup>133</sup> *Cod. Paris. Mazarin, lat.* 176, fol. 219.

(1) Fol. 99: Et magister etiam scripsit in sententiis. (2) Fol. 107: Et hanc, inquit, sententiam non improbat magister in sententiis. Nos tamen, qui audivimus eum, scimus, quia erat in contraria sententia. (3) Fol. 113: De eo autem, quod querebatur, an vidue maritus posset ad sacros ordines promoveri, distinguit Rolandus, an fuerit vidua virgo an corrupta. (4) Fol. 114: Super hoc, inquit, audiui magistrum hesitantem et in eadem ambiguitate volo esse. Secundo queritur, utrum a perfecta caritate possit aliquis descendere ad imperfectam non amissa prorsus caritate. Et super hoc, inquit, similiter dubitabat, pronior tamen erat in hanc partem . . . (5) Fol. 118<sup>v</sup>: Dominus etiam papa Alexander in hac sententia fuit . . . [fol. 119] . . . De hoc autem, quod sequitur, si peccet dando decimas, dicit Rolandus, quod non peccat. (6) Fol. 119<sup>v</sup>: Rolandus dicit . . . (7) Fol. 134<sup>v</sup>: M[agister] Sy[mon] itaque dixit omnem penam malam, et ita passionem Christi, cum esset pena, mala[m] esse concedit, nec meruisse nobis per passionem, sed per obedientiam in passione. (8) Fol. 135: Solutio: Dilectio est in Deo. Rubertus Call. dulcedinem dicit esse misericordie Dei. Sed magister Ugo, cui magis assentimus, dispositionem Dei. (9) Fol. 142: Sed magister, inquit, recipiebat istam . . . Quod queritur, utrum Christus, in quantum est homo aliquid, magister, inquit, non semper negabat, immo quandoque concedebat extraneis (10) Fol. 144: Magister erat in hac trita, ut absolute diceret paritatem caritatis facere paritatem meriti . . . (11) Fol. 146<sup>v</sup>: Queritur, utrum a perfecta caritate posset esse descensus ad imperfectam. Et magistrum, inquit, audiui super hoc hesitantem. Pronior tamen erat in alteram partem. (12) Fol. 147: Sed cum videatur esse illa auctoritas ad infirmationem huius partis, iuxta considerationem, inquit, magistri, potius erat ad eius confirmationem. Aiebat enim . . . (13) Fol. 150: Et non audiui super hoc magistrum in certitudine dogmatizantem . . . (14) Fol. 152: Et magister, inquit, concedebat . . . (15) Fol. 154<sup>v</sup>: Et magister in sententiis duo membra posuit, tertium subticuit, forte quia ambiguum erat . . . Et illum tertium articulum subticuit magister . . .

Es handelt sich hier zumeist um Zitate, die sich auf den mündlichen Unterricht des Magisters beziehen. Erwähnenswert sind Nr 1 und Nr 15, da mit Bezug auf die Sentenzen des Magisters, in Nr 1 das Präsens, in Nr 15 das Praeteritum gebraucht wird.

Die Zitate bei Stephan Langton:

*Paulinenkommentar* im *Cod. a X 19* der Bibliothek des Erzstiftes St. Peter in Salzburg: (1) Seite 3: Cantor Parisiensis, sicut dicunt, qui eum audierunt, dicebat, quod Christus est filius Dei adoptivus. (2) Seite 5: Ex hoc quidem videtur, quod naturaliter prior sit peccatorum remissio quam prime gratie infusio, sicut dicit magister Gillebertus Porretanus. (3) Seite 9: Magister Gilbertus sic continuat multum bene: Propterea tradidit eos Deus in passionem ignominie. (4) Seite 10: Lombardus ponit talem litteram in glosa . . . (5) Seite 13: . . . quia verba sunt magistri, qui fuit in hac opinione . . . (6) Seite 16: Sed ex hoc videtur, quod remissio peccatorum naturaliter precederet gratiam, sicut dicit magister Gilbertus . . . (7) Seite 21: . . . quod remissio peccatorum naturaliter precedat gratie infusionem, sicut dicit magister Gilbertus . . . (8) Seite 25: Nota, quod magister Gilbertus sic distinguebat . . . (9) Seite 30: Sed magister Prepositinus dicit . . . (10) Seite 39: et etiam, ut dicit magister P[etrus] Corboliensis . . . (11) Seite 41: . . . quod bene concedit Corboliensis, modo Senonensis. (12) Seite 49: sicut dicebat magister Stephanus cancellarius . . . (13) Seite 70: Quid est, quod dicit Alexander in decretali . . . (14) Seite 74: Gilbertus in media glosatura sic exponit . . . (15) Seite 81: Comestor dicebat, quod, quando



totum dictum est, totum factum est, nec aliud volebat ibi determinare. (16) Seite 82: Hoc solvebat Corboliensis. (17) Seite 93: Corboliensis exponit istud . . . (18) Seite 111: Quod concedimus, licet non ita dicat Lombardus . . . (19) Seite 122: Quod non concedebat Lombardus, sicut in sententiis habes. (20) Seite 123: Quod concedimus, quicquid dixerit Lombardus. Alexander enim III manifeste dicit, quod Christus . . . (21) Seite 137: Haimo est recitator huius opinionis Jeronimi. (22) Seite 138: Ita dicit Aimo solvens contrarietatem, que videtur esse . . . (23) Seite 151: . . . quia, ut ait Bernardus . . . (24) Seite 159: Quod tamen Prepositinus non dixit. Immo dixit . . . (25) Seite 175: Istud dicit Aymo . . . (26) Seite 178: Quidam magnus, cui adhibenda est fides, dicit se audivisse a magno et pio Cantore Parisiensi, quod ipse Cantor legerat in scriptis Jeronimi . . . Et hoc idem dicebat prefatus Cantor in scriptis Jeronimi. (27) Seite 186: Certe non, quia, ut dicit magister in sententiis . . . (28) Seite 195: Hanc questionem noluit solve Alexander papa . . . (29) Seite 205: Corboliensis dicebat etiam . . . (30) Seite 217: Hoc concedit m[agister] P[etrus] Picta[viensis]. (31) Seite 218: Quod concedebat magister P[etrus] Cor[boliensis]. (32) Seite 218: Propter tales auctoritates dicit Lombardus . . . (33) Seite 221: Sic exponebat Senonensis, scilicet magister P[etrus] de Corb[olio]. (34) Seite 223: Et hoc vult Alcuinus dicens in glosa.

Die *Quästionem* des Cod. Vat., lat. 4297: (35) Fol. 23<sup>v</sup>: Unde, si diceretur, sicut dicit Exboliensis [statt Corboliensis], quod motus diversarum virtutum sint simul . . . (36) Fol. 41<sup>r</sup>: Dicebat enim manducator, quod quando totum dictum est, totum factum est, nec aliud ibi dicere volebat. Sed eius sequaces dixerunt . . .

Langton starb 1228, Petrus von Corbeil 1222. Es wäre also an und für sich möglich, dass Langton noch an seinem *Paulinenkommentar* arbeitete oder feilte zu einer Zeit, da Petrus schon tot war und so der Vergangenheit angehörte, und dass Langton an diesen Stellen seine Corboliensiszitate im Praeteritum gegeben hätte (Nr 16, 23, 29, 31, 33). Aber wir müssen zugleich darauf hinweisen, dass umgekehrt der schon längst verstorbene Gilbert de la Porrée im Praeteritum (Nr 2 und 8), aber auch im Praesens (Nr 3, 6, 7, 14) zitiert wird. Auch Praepositinus erscheint einmal in der Gegenwart (Nr 9) und einmal in der Vergangenheit (Nr 24). Es ist also durchaus ratsam aus dem Tempus der Zitate bei Langton keine Schlüsse zu ziehen. Lediglich die Umstände, die in einem solchen Zitat erwähnt werden, können hier Aufschlüsse geben, wie z.B. in Nr 36 oder Nr 1 und Nr 26, die durchaus nahe legen, dass der Manducator und auch der Cantor nicht mehr am Leben waren.

Zitate aus der *Summa aurea* des Wilhelm von Auxerre (Paris, 1500):

(1) Propter hoc vel potest dici, sicut dicit magister Gilbertus, quod Deus potest facere, quod ista numquam fuerit corrupta, quia quantum in se est, non se habet aliter ad res quam se haberet ab eterno.<sup>134</sup> (2) Magister Prepositinus dicebat, quod . . .<sup>135</sup> (3) Magister Symon Tornacensis dicebat . . .<sup>136</sup> (4) Aliorum est opinio, quam principaliter asserit archiepiscopus Senonensis et sequaces eius . . .<sup>137</sup> (5) . . . sicut dicit Prepositinus . . .<sup>138</sup> (6) Unde dicebat Prepositinus . . . Prepositinus autem dicebat . . .<sup>139</sup> (7) Sicut dicebat Prepositinus sic dicens . . .<sup>140</sup> (8) Unde dicimus, sicut dixit Prepositinus . . .<sup>141</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Fol. 25<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>135</sup> Fol. 18.

<sup>136</sup> Fol. 181<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>137</sup> Fol. 113.

<sup>138</sup> Fol. 303.

<sup>139</sup> Fol. 303.

<sup>140</sup> Fol. 216<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>141</sup> Fol. 91.

Wir haben hier für Praepositinus mit einer Ausnahme durchgehend das Praeteritum, doch macht es gerade diese eine Ausnahme (Nr 5) unmöglich, aus dem Praeteritum allein schon Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Wenn auch Simon von Tournai ebenfalls im Praeteritum erscheint, so wird doch Gilbert (Nr 1) und ebenfalls dem schon 1222 verstorbenen Petrus Senonensis (Nr 4) das Praesens zuerkannt. Aus der Häufigkeit des Praeteritums für Praepositinus darf man nicht schon schliessen, dass er einer vergangenen Periode angehört. Denn wir müssen feststellen, dass der von Wilhelm von Auxerre abhängige Hugo a S. Charo in seinem *Sentenzenkommentar* den Praepositinus fast durchwegs im Praesens zitiert:

(1) Item narrat Praepositinus . . .<sup>142</sup> (2) Ad hoc dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>143</sup> (3) Tamen dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>144</sup> (4) Unde dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>145</sup> (5) . . . ut dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>146</sup> (6) . . . sicut dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>147</sup> (7) Praepositinus dicit, quod . . .<sup>148</sup> (8) Quidam dicunt ut Praepositinus . . .<sup>149</sup> (9) Ita dicit Praepositinus . . .<sup>150</sup> (10) Et dicit quidam, quod sic, ut Praepositinus . . .<sup>151</sup> (11) Ad tertium dicit Praepositinus . . . Ad quartum solvit Praepositinus . . . Tamen Praepositinus dicit . . .<sup>152</sup> (12) Praepositinus dicit . . . Ita dicit Praepositinus . . . Dicit ergo Praepositinus.<sup>153</sup>

Aber auch hier eine Ausnahme. Auf fol. 101 des *Cod. lat.* 573 der Leipziger Universitätsbibliothek liest man zu 2 dist. 24: *Huius opinionis fuit Prepo[sitin]us*. Vielleicht war zur Zeit des Wilhelm von Auxerre und des Hugo a S. Charo die Autorität des Praepositinus schon so erkannt, dass er gewissermassen in die Zeitlosigkeit eingegangen war und man eben darum ihn sowohl im Praesens als auch im Praeteritum zitierte. Aber es ist nicht weniger wahrscheinlich, dass man dem Tempus des Zitates reflex überhaupt keinerlei Bedeutung beilegte. Immerhin ist aber noch bemerkenswert, dass der Corbuliensis jedesmal im Praeteritum genannt wird: *Corbuliensis dicebat . . .*<sup>154</sup> *Ad secundum dicimus, sicut dominus Senonensis . . . Unde dicebat . . .*<sup>155</sup> *Dicebat magister P[etrus] Corbuliensis*.<sup>156</sup>

Als Resultat unserer Untersuchung müssen wir jedenfalls buchen, dass das blossе Tempus des Zitates allein im allgemeinen für die Zugehörigkeit eines Autors zur noch lebenden oder zur bereits dahingegangenen Generation nichts beweist. Wir müssen darum auf dieses Hilfsmittel für die Datierung eines Werkes verzichten, solange es nicht durch weitere Anhaltspunkte unterstützt wird. Lediglich eine Summe kleinerer Beobachtung, wie z.B. auch die Art der Schriftzitate oder insbesondere irgend ein Beisatz zum Namen des zitierten Gelehrten vermag im Glücksfall zu genaueren Datierungsmöglichkeiten führen. So wissen wir z.B. dass der mit *Omne quod est, aut ita est, quod semper est nec esse cepit* beginnende Torso eines Trinitätsstrakates im *Cod. lat.* 109 (fol. 121<sup>v</sup>-123<sup>v</sup>) der Stiftsbibliothek von Zwettl nach dem Tod Gilberts de la Porrée, d. i. nach 1154, geschrieben wurde, weil man darin auf Blatt 123<sup>v</sup> lesen kann: *Nec immerito dixit bone memorie magister Giselbertus Por[retanus] loquendo de hypostasi . . .* Ähnliche Anhaltspunkte liefert auch die zweite Quästionen-

<sup>142</sup> Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, *Cod. lat.* 573, fol. 229<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>143</sup> Ebenda, fol. 229.

<sup>144</sup> *Cod. Vat. lat.* 1098, fol. 196<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>145</sup> Ebenda, fol. 197.

<sup>146</sup> Ebenda, fol. 198.

<sup>147</sup> Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, *Cod. lat.* 573, fol. 196<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>148</sup> Ebenda, fol. 248<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>149</sup> Ebenda, fol. 79.

<sup>150</sup> Ebenda, fol. 79.

<sup>151</sup> *Cod. Vat., lat.* 1098, fol. 79.

<sup>152</sup> Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, *Cod. lat.* 573, fol. 121.

<sup>153</sup> *Cod. Vat., lat.* 1098, fol. 168.

<sup>154</sup> Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, *Cod. lat.* 573 fol. 153.

<sup>155</sup> *Cod. Vat., lat.* 1098, fol. 118<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>156</sup> *Cod. Vat., lat.* 1098, fol. 103<sup>v</sup>.

sammlung des Cod. Erlangen. lat. 353 an die Hand, in der erst eingehende Forschung Werke aus der Feder des Stephan Langton und des Robert Courson<sup>157</sup> identifizieren konnte. Auf fol. 75 steht hier geschrieben: *Diximus cum Cantore Parisiensi bone memorie*. Die hier in Betracht kommende Frage ist also nach 1197, dem Todesjahr des Petrus Cantor, entstanden. In dieser wie in der nächsten Frage wird denn auch sonst der Cantor im Praeteritum zitiert.<sup>158</sup> Praepositinus erscheint in der eben erwähnten ersten Frage auf Blatt 75<sup>159</sup> im Praesens, in einer weiteren Frage auf Blatt 83 aber heisst es von ihm: *Dicebat Praepositinus pie memorie contrarium*. Diese zweite Frage ist also nicht vor dem Jahr 1210, dem Todesjahr des Praepositinus,<sup>160</sup> entstanden. Schliesslich liest man noch von Gerhard von Brüssel in einer Quästion auf Blatt 95<sup>v</sup>: *Alii dicebant, ut Magister Gerardus de Brusella felicitis memorie . . .*, was ihn aus der Liste der Lebenden streicht.

<sup>157</sup> A. Landgraf, 'Werke aus der engeren Schule des Petrus Cantor', *Gregorianum* XXI (1940), 36-44.

<sup>158</sup> Fol. 75<sup>v</sup>: In hac opinione fuit Cantor Parisiensis. In hiis ita iudicavit Cantor esse distinguendum. Ebenso in einer Frage auf Blatt 100<sup>v</sup>: Quod concedebat Cantor Parisiensis. Dicebat enim, quod . . .

<sup>159</sup> Ita intelligit Praepositinus auctoritatem Ambrosii.

<sup>160</sup> Man vgl. G. Lacombe, *Praepositini Cellarii Parisiensis (1206-1210) Opera omnia* I, *La vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin*, (Bibliothèque Thomiste XI, Le Saulchoir, 1927), 40.

# *Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant*

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

## I. INTRODUCTION

IN the last half-century, studies in the philosophy of the Middle Ages have brought to light many interesting personalities, the distinctiveness of whose thought was hitherto scarcely suspected. Among these personalities Siger of Brabant holds an important place.<sup>1</sup> Master in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris from about 1266 to 1277, he lived in an intellectual world recently set in turmoil by the introduction of newly-discovered works of Aristotle and his Arabian commentators. Along with his great contemporaries, St. Albert and St. Thomas, he faced the philosophical problems of his age with a vigorous intelligence and an admirable sincerity, although it was in Averroes above all that he sought his inspiration in solving them. He played an important role in the intellectual drama of his day. Hence to see that drama in its entirety, it is necessary to take into account this outstanding Latin Averroist of the thirteenth century.

A new impetus was given to the study of Siger's philosophy in 1924, when Msgr. Martin Grabmann announced the discovery of several of his lost works in the Munich manuscript (*Clm.* 9559).<sup>2</sup> It is true that there has not been unanimous agreement among historians that all of these works are certainly Siger's.<sup>3</sup> One of them, however, the *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, is undoubtedly his, since, unlike the others, it is explicitly ascribed to him in the manuscript. Father Van Steenberghen has recently announced that this work will be published by Dom A. Graiff. Another manuscript of Siger's metaphysical questions, whose text is more concise than that of the Munich manuscript, has been found by M. J. J. Duin in Paris, *Nat. Lat. Ms.* 16.297. This manuscript will be published by M. Duin.<sup>4</sup>

A detailed analysis of the *Questions on the Metaphysics* will aid greatly in understanding Siger's philosophy. We propose here to study one of the questions, the central problem of the distinction of essence and existence. The text of the Munich manuscript of this question has already been described and published by Msgr. Grabmann.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately the text as he published it contains a number of misreadings of the manuscript. For this reason, as well as for the convenience of the reader in following this study, it was thought advisable to publish the text in a corrected form. This transcription has been made from a microfilm copy of the manuscript. Several marginal notes are illegible on the film, and these I have taken from Grabmann's text. The texts of the Munich and Paris manuscripts are printed on the same page, the Paris beneath the Munich and in italics. All references are to the Munich manuscript unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>1</sup> For the life, works and doctrine of Siger, cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Les oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant* (Bruxelles, 1938). Cf. also, by the same author, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* (Les Philosophes Belges, XII and XIII, Louvain, 1931 and 1942).

<sup>2</sup> M. Grabmann, *Neu aufgefundene "Quaestiones" Sigers von Brabant zu den Werken*

*des Aristoteles* (Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle, I. Rome, 1924, pp. 103-147).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *Dante et la Philosophie* (Paris, 1939), pp. 317 ff. Cf. also E. Gilson's review of F. Van Steenberghen's *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites II* in *Bulletin Thomiste* VI (1940-1942), 15 ff.

<sup>4</sup> F. Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, II, p. 511.

<sup>5</sup> M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-138.

## II. TEXT

Munich, *Clm.* 9559.

(fol. 95')<sup>1</sup> Sicut declarat Philosophus 4 *Metaphysicorum*,<sup>2</sup> scientia quaedam, quae philosophia seu sapientia dicitur, speculatur ens secundum quod est ens, et principia et causas et consequentia entis inquantum ens. Ideo cum de ipsa sit intentio, primo quaeramus circa ipsum ens: Utrum ens vel esse in rebus causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum, vel sit aliquid additum essentiae illorum? Secundo: Utrum ens inquantum ens causam habeat, ut Sortes inquantum est ens causetur ab aliquo?

De primo arguitur quod non:

[I].<sup>3</sup> Esse se habet ad illud quod est sicut vivere ad illud quod vivit. Sed vivere non pertinet ad essentiam illius quod vivit, sed est aliqua dispositio ei competens. Ergo esse non pertinet ad essentiam illius quod est, sed est dispositio accidentalis. Maior patet, quia vivere viventibus est esse. Minor patet quia secundo *De Anima*<sup>4</sup> dicit Aristoteles quod vivere est movere secundum locum, et appetere, et sentire, et intelligere, quae omnes sunt dispositiones accidentales. Quare, etc.

[II]. Iterum. Actus non pertinet ad essentiam rei; sed esse est actus rei. Quare, etc.

[III]. Item. Illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet esse, et non est ipsum per dispositionem additam essentiae, sicut homo albus se habet ad hominem non sicut dispositio essentialis, ipsum est ex seipso et non indiget alio. Sed nec causatum est tale. Quare esse non pertinet ad essentiam eius cuius est. Quare, etc.

[IV]. Item. Auctoritate Avicennae, secundo tractatu et secundo capitulo et tertio:<sup>5</sup> Res imponitur a quidditate in communi; et intentio rei et entis imaginantur ab hominibus duae intentiones. Ergo ratio essendi est alterius rationis quam ratio rei.

[V]. Item. Ex verbis eius ibidem<sup>6</sup> potest sumi quod eorum quae significant eandem essentiam sunt nomina synonyma, et quidditas unius non certificatur per essentiam alterius. Sed certificatio quidditatis rei est per esse secundum Avicennam.<sup>7</sup> Cum quaeritur quid est res, dicitur quod res est id quod est, et sic certificatur unum per alterum. Unde qui dicunt quod res sit res, et quod tamen non sit, non sunt de universitate eorum quae intelligunt. Et non solum habetur hoc ex Avicenna, sed etiam ab Aristotele in principio 4 *Metaphysicorum*.<sup>8</sup> Dicit enim quod quaedam sunt entia quia substantiae, quaedam quia qualitates, et sic de aliis, et quaedam quia privationes. Quare non ens est non ens, ut dicit ipse in littera.<sup>9</sup> Quamvis enim res quae sunt in singularibus possunt non esse, tamen cum dico quod res non sit res, et tamen quod non habeat esse neque extra animam, neque in anima, falsum est.

[VI]. Item. Auctoritate Boetii:<sup>10</sup> In omni quod est citra primum differt quod est et esse. Si differunt quod est et esse, unum est accidens alteri necessario.

[VII]. Item. Omne quod est citra primum compositum est;<sup>11</sup> differt enim unumquodque a primo in simplicitate. Sed quaedam sunt citra primum quae

<sup>1</sup>The title of the work of which this Question is a part is given in the table of contents in the Munich manuscript 9559, fol. 152<sup>v</sup>: Quaestiones super primum, secundum, tertium, quartum, et partim super quantum *Metaphysicorum* a Magistro Sogero. In the inferior margin of fol. 95<sup>v</sup> the title of the Question is given: Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, *Meta.* IV, 1, 1003a21, 22.

<sup>3</sup>The objections and the answers to them are not numbered in the manuscript.

<sup>4</sup>*De Anima* II, 2, 413a23, 24.

<sup>5</sup>I have not found the texts in these places. Cf., however, Avicenna, *Metaphysics* (ed. Venice, 1508), I, 6, 72va, II, 18-21 and 23-30. All references to Avicenna are to this edition.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 30-54.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>*Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b7-10.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*De Hebdomadibus*, PL 64, 1311BC; *De Trinitate* 2; PL 64, 1250C.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Boethius, *Ibid.*

non composita sunt, quemadmodum essentiae ex materia et forma. Ergo est compositio ex essentia et esse; et ita in his esse non pertinet ad essentiam.

[VIII]. Item. Si sic, esset nugatio dicere: Res ens [est],<sup>13</sup> vel: Ens homo [est],<sup>13</sup> quod non dicitur.

[IX]. Item. Omnia entia sunt per participationem primi entis, ita quod nihil est ens per se aliud a primo. Ergo cum in his quae sunt entia per participationem, differt esse participatum et natura participans; quare differt esse ab essentia.

[X]. Item. Esse secundum quod esse non potest esse diversum. Si igitur debeat diversificari, oportet quod sit ex aliquo sibi addito. Sed esse per se subsistens non habet aliquod sibi additum per quod diversificetur. Ergo esse per se subsistens est unum tantum; et si hoc, tunc oportet quod in omnibus aliis sit aliquid unitum ipsi esse, aut non esset solum unum esse per se subsistens; ita quod differt natura esse participans et esse.

Contra, Averroes 5 *Metaphysicorum*<sup>14</sup> dicit sic: Dictio 'homo est', uno modo est problema de genere, alio modo de accidente. Secundum quod praedicatur esse diminutum vel esse in effectum, sic est problema de accidente. Sed sic dictio 'homo est', secundum quod praedicatur esse non diminutum, sed qualitatum vel quantitatum, sic problema de genere. Sed in problemate tali est praedicatio essentialis.

Item. 4 *Metaphysicorum*:<sup>15</sup> Idem est homo et ens homo, et non significat aliquid diversum apud dictionum repetitionem 'homo', et 'est homo'.

Item.<sup>16</sup> Substantia cuiuslibet non secundum accidens est [aliquid]<sup>16a</sup> ens, si hoc cum esse imponitur ab actu essendi. Ergo esse non praedicat aliquid quod non pertinet ad essentiam rei.

Item. Averroes in eodem loco:<sup>17</sup> Si res est non per suam essentiam, sed per dispositionem additam essentiae, iterum illa dispositio est addita essentiae. Et si dicas quod illa dispositio est per suam essentiam, standum fuit in primo, si non procedendum est in infinitum.

Solutio. Diversae sunt opiniones circa hoc. Aliqui dicunt quod res est per dispositionem additam essentiae suae, ita quod secundum ipsos res et ens non sunt eiusdem intentionis, ita quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae. Haec est opinio Alberti Commentatoris.<sup>18</sup> Ratio sua est ista *Libro de Causis*,<sup>19</sup> quia res habet esse ex suo primo principio. Ipsum autem primum est illud quod ex seipso est, et illud quod ex seipso est habens esse, et est illud quod est ex se;

\* \* \* \* \*

Paris B.N., lat. 16. 297.

(Fol. 93<sup>v</sup>) Quidam dicunt quod res est per dispositionem additam suae essentiae, non per essentiam suam. Et secundum hos, res et ens significant diversas intentiones, et non sunt nomina synonyma, nam res certificatur per esse. Et horum ratio est quia res habet esse, et unumquodque causatum ex primo principio habet esse; essentia autem rei est ex se. Unde illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet esse est ex seipso; in causatis autem non est tale. Ergo ista diversa sunt. Sed cum universaliter quicquid est in re sit effectus primi principii, non potest distinguere inter essentiam rei et esse per hoc quod unum sit effectus primi principii et non aliud. Non est autem inconveniens quod in causatis esse

<sup>13</sup> Scribe has written what appears to be a c or t with superscript t.

<sup>14</sup> In V *Meta.* 1, t. 14 (Aristotelis *Metaphysicorum libri XIV cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis VIII*, Venetiis apud Juntas, 1574, 117F). All references to Averroes are to this edition.

<sup>15</sup> Arist., *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b26-30. Cf. Averroes, In IV *Meta.* 2, t. 3, 66M.

<sup>16</sup> Arist., *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b33. Cf. Aver-

roes, In IV *Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67H.

<sup>16a</sup> Ms. aliquid. Cf. Text, p. 72.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. note 16.

<sup>18</sup> Ms. has in margin: *Opinio Alberti* (Grabmann). Cf. St. Albert, *De Causis et Processu Universitatis* I, 1, 8, *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890-1899) X, p. 377.

<sup>19</sup> Ch. 18, ed. Steele (in *Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi* XII, Oxonii. 1935), p. 175.

quare res distinguitur ab esse. Sed contra: Quicquid est universaliter in re est effectus primi principii, et nihil est eorum quae pertinent ad rem in re ipsa, neque essentialiter neque accidentaliter, quin reducat in primum principium. Ergo haec distinctio nulla est, scilicet,<sup>20</sup> inter essentiam rei et esse, per hoc quod unum sit effectus primi principii et aliud non.

Alia ratio illorum fuit talis.<sup>21</sup> Illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet esse, vel est ex seipso, non indiget alio. Si igitur aliquid in causatis esse habeat de sui essentia, non indiget alio. Dicendum, quod hic est aequivocatio ex eo quod ex importat circumstantiam causae, et causa multipliciter dicitur, ut habetur 5 *Metaphysicorum*,<sup>22</sup> et Avicenna deceptus fuit per aequivocationem de ly ex. Cum enim dicitur res est ex seipsa, potest ex denominare circumstantiam causae [formalis]<sup>23</sup> vel efficientis. Tunc dico quod ista simul stant: 'Homo est homo per se', secundum quod ly per dicit circumstantiam causae formalis; et tamen, 'Homo per aliud est homo', secundum quod per denominat circumstantiam causae efficientis; et sic est hic deceptio. Unde in *Libro Posteriorum*<sup>24</sup> primo modo dicendi per se illud est tale quod est tale per suam formam. Unde potest aliquid causatum esse per se formaliter, et tamen causam efficientem habet aliam.

Alia opinio est eadem in ratione. Quidam<sup>25</sup> dicunt sic quia inducunt Avicennam<sup>26</sup> ponere quod ratio entis et rei sunt diversae intentiones. Et hoc non ponit, ut videtur, Aristoteles, sed contradicit.<sup>27</sup>

Ponunt autem quidam<sup>28</sup> modo medio quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae rei, non pertinens ad essentiam rei; nec ponunt quod sit accidens, sed est aliquid additum, quasi per essentiam constitutum, sive<sup>29</sup> ex principiis essentiae.

Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum tamen ponendi non intelligo, quia esse quod pertinet ad rem aut est pars essentiae rei, ut materia vel forma, aut res ipsa composita ex his, aut accidens. Sed si sit accidens, tunc erit additum essentiae rei, quod est contra dictam opinionem proximam. Sed dicere quod esse sit aliquid additum essentiae rei, ita quod non sit res ipsa neque pars essentiae, ut materia vel forma, et dicere quod non sit accidens, est ponere quartam naturam in entibus. Item dicitur sic, quod esse est aliquid additum, nec est res ipsa, nec principium rei, sed est aliquid constitutum per principia essentiae. Sed constitutum per principia essentiae est ipsa res. Quare non erit additum nisi tu dicas mihi quod sit constitutum effective, sicut accidentia; et tunc erit accidens. Hoc enim dicimus accidens, quod advenit alicui quod habet formam, vel quod advenit essentiae rei.

\* \* \* \* \*

*pertineat ad essentiam; et sic causatum sit ex se secundum quod ex importat circumstantiam causae formalis, non efficientis. Dicere quod esse non est essentia rei, sed aliquid constitutum per essentiae principia, est idem affirmare et negare, cum constitutum per essentiae principia nihil aliud sit quam ipsa res ex illa constituta. Ponere etiam quod esse sit aliquid additum essentiae et non essentia rei, cum universaliter omne pertinens ad rem aut est pars essentiae, ut materia et forma, aut essentia, aut accidens essentiae; hoc est ponere quartam naturam in entibus.*

<sup>20</sup> scilicet . . . non, in margin (Grabmann).

<sup>21</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.* I, 8, 74ra, ll. 42-46; I, 7, 73rb, ll. 37-42.

<sup>22</sup> Arist., *Meta.* V, 2, 1013a24 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Ms. materialis.

<sup>24</sup> Arist., *Posterior Analytics* I, 4, 73a34-37.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate* 2, (*Opera Omnia*, Paris, 1674, II, p. 2b).

<sup>26</sup> *Meta.* I, 6, 72va, ll. 18-21.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b26-34.

<sup>28</sup> Ms. has in margin: *Opinio Thomae* (Grabmann). Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Meta.*, lectio 2, Cathala ed. No. 558.

<sup>29</sup> sive . . . essentiae, in margin (Grabmann).

Primo<sup>30</sup> pono quod in causatis ipsum esse pertinet ad essentiam causatorum, et non est aliquid additum essentiae causatorum; ita quod res et ens non significant duas intentiones. Ad hoc, intelligendum quod tria sunt genera nominum quae convertuntur in suppositis, tamen diversimode. Quaedam sunt nomina quae significant eandem essentiam et eodem modo, sicut nomina synonyma, ut Marcus Tullius. Isto modo ens et res nec significant, nec convertuntur, quia tunc unum non certificaret reliquum. Secundo, quando unum significat essentiam, aliud autem non significat essentiam, sed additum essentiae; convertuntur tamen in suppositis, quia se extendunt ad aequalitatem suppositorum, ut homo et risibile, quorum intellectus formales diversi sunt. Tertium est genus nominum in quo quidem sunt quae ad aequalia se extendunt, significantia eandem essentiam, ita quod essentia (95v) quae primo apprehenditur eadem est, modo tamen diverso apud animam, unum per modum actus, aliud per modum habitus, sicut currere et cursus, et animatum et vivere. Modo dico quod res et ens significant eandem essentiam; non tamen sunt nomina synonyma, nec significant duas intentiones, sicut homo et risibile, sed significant eandem intentionem, unum tamen ut est per modum actus, ut hoc quod dico ens, aliud per modum habitus, ut res. Unde duo deceperunt Avicennam, sicut invenitur a Commentatore 4 *Metaphysicorum*.<sup>31</sup> Non enim distinxit inter nomina quae significant intentiones diversas, et inter nomina quae significant eandem essentiam, modis tamen diversis; et ideo credidit quod esse significat aliquid additum essentiae. Unde ad modum significandi diversum credidit diversam essentiam consequi.

Item Commentator 4 *Metaphysicorum*.<sup>32</sup> Quaedam sunt dispositiones quae significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei, ut album et nigrum; quaedam sunt essentiales dispositiones quae pertinent ad essentiam. Sed illud quod significat dispositionem alicuius essentialem, quia non significat modo eodem, nec dixit Aristoteles hic<sup>33</sup> expresse quod significat alio modo, hoc decepit ipsum Avicennam. Dispositionem enim accidentalem non distinxit a dispositione accidentali.<sup>34a</sup> Unde in 4<sup>34b</sup> [*Metaphysicorum*]:<sup>34</sup> Substantia cuiuslibet rei est aliquod ens non secundum accidens. Si esse est dispositio addita, procedetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Standum est ergo in primo. Sed duo sunt

\* \* \* \* \*

*Unde dicendum quod etiam in causatis ipsum causatum est per suam essentiam, non per dispositionem additam essentiae, ita quod res et ens eandem intentionem important.*

*Nominum enim quae convertuntur in suppositis, quaedam significant eandem essentiam eodem modo, ut synonyma; aliorum, unum significat essentiam, aliud dispositionem additam, non tamen contrahentem, ut homo et risibile. Quaedam significant eandem essentiam quae primo occurrit intellectui, sed diversimode, ut cursus et currere. Res autem et ens significant eandem essentiam, non ut synonyma, scilicet, eodem modo, sed diversimode, unum significat illam per modum actus, aliud per modum habitus. Unde Avicenna deceptus fuit in eo quod non distinxit inter nomina quae significant diversas intentiones et quae significant eandem diversimode. Unde ad diversum modum significandi credidit essentiam diversam consequi. Dispositionem etiam accidentalem non distinxit Avicenna ab accidentali.*

<sup>30</sup> Ms. has in margin: *Opinio propria* (Grabmann).

<sup>31</sup> In IV *Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67BC.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b23-35.

<sup>34a</sup> Cf. *infra*, Analysis, note 27.

<sup>34b</sup> Arist., *ibid.* Cf. also Averroes, In IV *Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67H.

<sup>34</sup> Ms. om.



advertenda. Verum est quod Boetius et alii magistri dixerunt, quod res est illud quod est ex seipsa, esse autem habet ex primo principio; et in solo primo principio posuerunt multi est esse pertinens ad essentiam. Illud aliquid veritatis habet, quia esse significat essentiam per modum actus maximi. Sed convenit substantiae rei habere naturam et modum actus secundum quod effectus primi principii. Ideo potest dicere quod esse est ex primo principio magis proprie, et de aliis minus proprie. Item esse videtur actum primum significare. Sed nulla est natura in rebus quin ad naturam potentiae accedat ex aliquo primo. Ideo ad essentiam primi magis pertinet esse.

[I]. Ad primam rationem concedo maiorem. Ad minorem dico quod vivere uno modo est esse viventibus, secundum quod vivere dicitur esse primum; alio modo est operatio viventium, ut moveri secundum locum, augeri, etc. De vivere primo modo debet intelligi, sicut de esse, quod vivere sit de essentia viventium.

[II]. Ad aliud dicendum quod est actus potentiae et est actus compositi, et licet actus non pertineat ad potentiam rei, vel ad essentiam potentiae, est tamen alius actus sicut actus compositi; et ille pertinet ad essentiam compositi. Aliter autem sic: Cum dicitur actus non pertinet ad essentiam potentiae, dico quod licet actus non pertinet ad essentiam potentiae quando aliter distinguitur realiter, dicendo quod hoc est actus, illud autem potentia; tamen illud quod habet modum actus bene potest pertinere ad illud quod habet modum potentiae, et tunc non distincta sunt; et tunc non est maior vera.

[III]. Ad illud aliud: Cuius essentiam, etc., solutum est in corpore quaestionis<sup>35</sup>

[IV]. Ad illud Avicennae, dicendum est quod Avicenna erravit credendo esse et res significare essentias diversas, quia significant modo diverso.

[V]. Ad aliud eorum: Quae sunt synonyma, etc., non dico quod sunt nomina synonyma, immo indubitanter non sunt synonyma. Et ratio huius est quia si sic. unum non certificaret reliquum. Item nomine entis non oportet significare aliquid additum essentiae, quia eadem res, secundum quod uno nomine significatur, potest certificare seipsam secundum quod alio modo significatur; unde quamvis significet eandam intentionem, tamen illud quod primo comprehenditur ab intellectu est ens, nec potest aliquid illud manifestare.

[VI]. Ad illud Boetii, dicendum quod differt quod est et esse, sed non

\* \* \* \* \*

Quia tamen a magnis dicitur quod res est id quod est ex seipsa, et esse habet a primo principio, intelligendum quomodo hoc habet veritatem; esse enim significat substantiam rei per modum actus. Unde dicitur actus entis. Nunc autem convenit enti actus secundum quod effectus primi principii. Solum autem in primo principio esse dicitur pertinere ad essentiam, quia essentia primi actus purus est. In causatis autem nulla essentia ita actus est quin ad naturam potentialem accedat.

Cum ergo dicitur quod vivere viventibus est esse, verum est secundum quod accipitur pro ipso esse primo, non secundum quod pro esse secundo, ut est sentire, moveri, et huiusmodi.

Cum etiam dicitur quod esse est actus entis, actus autem est aliquid additum ei quod est in potentia rei cuius est actus, verum est quod actus. Et est actus compositi et est actus potentiae; et licet non pertineat ad essentiam potentiae, bene tamen pertinet ad essentiam compositi. Vel dicendum quod quando aliqua sic distinguuntur quod unum est potentia, aliud actus, unum ad essentiam alterius non potest pertinere; illud tamen quod habet modum actus potest pertinere ad id quod habet modum habitus.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 71.

differunt ita quod hoc sit additum essentiae illius, sed differunt in modo significandi.

[VII]. Ad aliud: Omne per se subsistens citra primum compositum est. Ista et ultima ratio movit fratrem Thomam.<sup>36</sup> Dicendum quod haec ratio duplicem habet solutionem; primum tamen modum non assero. Cum dicitur omne citra primum debet recedere a simplicitate primi, etc., nescio ubi sumpta sit haec propositio. Bene tamen invenio quod quae sunt citra primum recedunt ab ipso et multiplicantur per hoc quod accedunt ad potentiam. Et causa huius est cum nullum aliorum sit ita actus purus sicut primum; hoc tamen non concedendum quod habeant diversas essentias. Item recedunt a primo per participare, quia quaedam participant de ente magis et minus, quia quanto magis accedunt ad primum, tanto plus participant de ente, sicut species numeri per comparisonem ad unitatem, quia una magis perfecta, alia minus; nec inveniuntur, nec possunt inveniri, duae species numeri quae sint aequaliter se habentes ad principium numeri, quod est mensura numerorum, ut unitas.<sup>37</sup> Nec etiam in continuis inveniuntur duo quae aequaliter se habeant ad suam mensuram, ita similiter in substantiis. Cum primum sit mensura omnium entium in rebus, non potest esse quod aliqua duo aequae perfecte appropinquent ipsi primo, et quod habeant diversam naturam. Unde Aristoteles:<sup>38</sup> In speciebus numeri semper una species magis perfecta, alia minus. Item. Esto quod maior sit vera: Unumquodque recedit a simplicitate primi, etc.; et quaedam sunt quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma. Ergo sunt composita ex essentia et esse. Fallacia consequentis est. Possunt enim recedere alio modo, ut per intelligere, quia omne aliud a primo intelligit per speciem, quae est aliud ab ipso.

[VIII]. Ad aliud: Cum dicitur nugatio est: 'Res ens est', Commentator solvit;<sup>39</sup> nam eadem essentia dicitur frequenter, nec tamen inutiliter. Aliquid enim vel ratio aliqua alia constituitur in audiente quando dicitur: 'Res ens', quam quando dicitur: 'Res per se'; non tamen sic cum dicitur Marcus Tullius.

[X].<sup>40</sup> Ad aliud: Non potest esse per se subsistens nisi unum tantum. Si negavero tibi illud, quomodo probares? Dico quod esse simpliciter actu non est nisi unius tantum, scilicet Dei; esse tamen extendit se, accipiendo esse non pro actualissimo; sed secundum quod sumitur in aliis potest esse in alio sine alio recipiente esse. Ad propositum: Esse unum est; oportet ergo, quod si diversificetur, quod hoc sit per aliud, [aut]<sup>41</sup> per illa in quae recipitur, aut per differentias; non per differentias cum non sit genus. Dico quod si esse esset omnino univoce dictum, bene probares. Sed esse ipsum multipliciter dicitur, et plures habet rationes. Nonne tunc potest multiplicari ex ratione essendi quae plures est, et non per aliquid cui additum est? Item. Ratio essendi non potest esse ratio addita, quia omnis ratio est essendi ratio, ita quod ratio entis praedicatur de omnibus rationibus essendi univoce.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Licet autem omne ens causatum recedat a simplicitate primi, non oportet tamen quod sit ibi compositio realis esse et essentiae, quia recedunt omnia a primo, recedendo ab actualitate primi et per accessum ad primam. Unde per recessum a prima diversificantur species entium et per participare plus vel minus unitatem primam, quae cum sit mensura entis in rebus, non potest esse quod aliqua duo aequaliter se habeant ad suam mensuram, et quod sicut species numeri diversificantur per participationem plus vel minus unitatis quae est numeri principium.*

<sup>36</sup> *Summa Theologiae* I, 50, 2 ad 3m;  
*Summa Contra Gentiles* II, 52.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Arist., *Meta.* V, 15, 1021a13.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Meta.* VII, 3, 1043b34 and 37-39.

<sup>39</sup> In IV *Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67C.

<sup>40</sup> Reply to ninth objection is lacking.

<sup>41</sup> *Ms.* ut.

### III. ANALYSIS OF TEXT

The Question we are to analyze has the structure which was currently used by the great scholastics and made classic by St. Thomas in his *Summa Theologiae*. First the statement of the problem is given: Whether being or existence (*ens vel esse*) in caused things belongs to their essence, or is something added to their essence? Ten arguments are then given to prove that existence (*esse*) does not belong to their essence, but is something added to it. Then, on the authority of Aristotle and Averroes, four arguments are given *sed contra*. Following this, Siger gives his own solution to the problem. Finally, he answers the objections.

Siger begins his solution to the problem by presenting two opinions contrary to his own. They try to prove that existence (*esse*) is something added to the essence of a caused being. After presenting each one, he gives his refutation of it. He then gives his own solution to the problem.

The first opinion given is, he says,<sup>1</sup> that of Albert the Commentator, based on the argument of the *Liber de Causis*, that a thing has existence (*esse*) from its first principle.<sup>2</sup> According to Siger, Albert's opinion is that a thing exists through a disposition added to its essence. Consequently the concept of thing (*res*) and being (*ens*) are not the same. Existence (*esse*) is thus something added to the essence.

In his *De Causis et Processu Universitatis*, St. Albert argues as follows:<sup>3</sup> Everything which exists by reason of another thing has existence different from that which it is. For that an animal is an animal, or that a man is a man, it does not have from something else, since it is equally this whether it actually exists or does not actually exist. But that it actually exists, it does not have from itself, but rather from the first existence from which all existence which is in act flows. Consequently that which is has its existence and its essence (*illud quod est*) from different sources; and so existence in this way happens to it (*accidit ei*) because it comes to it from something else.

It is not difficult to recognize the Avicennian inspiration of this position. Avicenna had already made the distinction, in everything lower than the first principle, between what it is, its *possibile esse*, which it has with respect to itself, and its existence, which it has from another.<sup>4</sup>

Siger's refutation of this position bears precisely on this distinction between existence and essence. He says<sup>5</sup> that universally whatever is in a thing is the effect of the first principle, and there is nothing which belongs to the thing, whether essentially or accidentally, which is not derived from the first principle. It is useless, therefore, to try to distinguish the essence of a thing and its existence on the ground that the one is the effect of the first principle and the other is not.

Siger then gives a second argument of those who maintain this position. It

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Text, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> . . . ens primum dat causatis suis omnibus ens. *Liber de Causis* 18, ed. Steele, p. 175.

<sup>3</sup> Omne enim quod ex alio est, aliud habet esse, et hoc quod est: quod enim animal sit animal, vel homo sit homo, quod est pro certo, non habet ex alio: hoc enim aequaliter est, hoc existente et non existente secundum actum. Quod autem esse habeat in effectu, ex se non est sibi, sed potius ex primo esse, ex quo fluit omne esse quod est in effectu. Hoc ergo quod est, ab alio habet esse, et illud quod est, et sic esse hoc modo accidit ei. *De Causis et Processu Universitatis* I, 1, 8, ed. Borgnet, X, p. 377. St.

Albert makes it clear that he is writing here only as a commentator on Aristotle (falsely attributing the *Liber de Causis* to Aristotle), and is not giving his own doctrine. *Op. cit.* II, 5, 24, p. 619.

<sup>4</sup> Quod enim respectu sui ipsius habet aliud est ab eo quod habet ab alio a se, et ex his duobus acquiritur ei esse id quod est, et ideo nihil est quod omnino sit exspoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu sui ipsius nisi necesse esse. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I, 8, 74<sup>a</sup>, ll. 50-54. Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina* (Paris, 1937), p. 140 and note 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

runs as follows:<sup>9</sup> That to whose essence existence belongs, or which exists of itself (*ex seipso*) has no need of anything else. Consequently if any caused thing has existence from its essence, it does not depend on anything else.

Now Avicenna had pointed out this characteristic property of possible being: It necessarily needs another to make it exist in act. For whatever is possible being with respect to itself, is always possible being, but there may perhaps happen to it (*fortassis accidit ei*) necessary being through another than itself.<sup>7</sup>

To this Avicennian position Siger replies<sup>8</sup> by pointing out that it rests on an equivocal use of the word "cause". The expressions "from" and "through" (*ex, per*) always indicate a cause, but one must distinguish, as Aristotle does,<sup>9</sup> between the different kinds of cause. There is a formal and an efficient cause. When it is said, then, that a thing is from or through itself, or from or through something else, the "from" or "through" may mean formally or efficiently. Thus man is man through himself (*per se*) if you mean by "through" a formal cause. But a man is also a man through something else (*per aliud*) if you mean by "through" an efficient cause. Consequently there is nothing contradictory in saying that something caused is through itself (*per se*) formally, and is through something else (*per aliud*) efficiently. If this is true, the Avicennian-Albertine position is destroyed. For to say that a thing is what it is through itself and exists actually through another, does not point to a real distinction between what the thing is (its essence) and its actual existence. Rather it points to a distinction between two casualities which converge in the thing: the formal cause by reason of which the thing is what it is through its own nature, and the efficient cause by reason of which the thing is through something other than itself.

Siger then goes on to say that there is another opinion of the same nature as the preceding.<sup>10</sup> Some hold on the authority of Avicenna that the *ratio* of being and thing (*entis et rei*) are distinct concepts.<sup>11</sup> But, Siger says, Aristotle does not say this, as it seems, but in fact contradicts it.<sup>12</sup> Siger does not say whose opinion he is referring to here. Possibly he has in mind the position of William of Auvergne who distinguished two concepts or *intentiones* of *esse*: one of the *essentia rei*, the other of that which is said by the verb *est*, which is outside the nature of each thing except in the case of God of whom it is predicated essentially.<sup>13</sup>

Now that Siger has stated and refuted the Avicennian position regarding essence and existence, he turns to the second, which he says is mid-way between the Avicennian position and his own. Some hold, he says,<sup>14</sup> in an intermediate way, that existence is something added to the essence of a thing, not belonging to the essence of the thing, and yet not an accidental disposition of it; but it is something added, constituted, as it were, by the essence or by the principles of the essence.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

<sup>7</sup> Eius autem quod est possibile esse iam manifesta est ex hoc proprietas, scilicet, quia ipsum necessario eget alio quod faciat illud esse in effectum; quicquid enim est possibile esse respectu sui semper est possibile esse, sed fortassis accidit ei necessario esse per aliud a se. Avicenna, *Meta.*, I, 8, 74ra, ll. 42-46. Cf. also *Meta.* I, 7, 73rb, ll. 37-42.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

<sup>9</sup> Arist., *Meta.* V, 2, 1013a24, ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

<sup>11</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.* I, 6, 72va, ll. 18-21: Dico ergo quod intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur in animabus duae intentiones.

Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *Op. cit.*, p. 136, note 4: *Imaginantur*, traduit à tort le latin pour *mulasawarant*, qui indique une opération intellectuelle et non pas imaginative.

<sup>12</sup> Arist., *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b26-34.

<sup>13</sup> . . . esse duas habet intentiones, et una earum est residuum a circumvestitione et varietate accidentium, et hoc est proprie quod nominatur essentia, sive substantia . . . Secunda autem intentio huius quod est esse, est illud quod dicitur per hoc verbum est de unoquoque, et est praeter uniuscujusque rationem. William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate* 2, (Paris, 1674), p. 2b.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

As a marginal note in the Munich manuscript indicates, Siger is referring here to the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. The latter says in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*:

Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquid superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae.<sup>15</sup>

St. Thomas often speaks of proper accidents as caused by the principles of the subject. For example: . . . *sicut risibile est per se accedens hominis, quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis subiecti*.<sup>16</sup> Now existence is not an accident for St. Thomas; yet in a way it is caused by the form.<sup>17</sup> The *quasi* with which he qualifies the expression *constituitur per principia essentiae*, is clearly meant to warn the reader that the way in which the existence of a thing is constituted by the principles of the essence is different from that in which an accident is caused. For St. Thomas, existence is in fact outside the order of essence, and it is said to be constituted by its principles in the sense that it is the act of the essence.<sup>18</sup> Siger interprets St. Thomas' doctrine in a wholly naïve manner and from the point of view of an essentialist metaphysics.

Siger says<sup>19</sup> that although this position is true, namely, that existence is not an accident, but is something constituted by the principles of the essence, he does not understand the way in which it is stated. For the existence which belongs to the thing is either a part of the essence of the thing, as matter or form, or it is an accident. If it is an accident, it will be added to the essence of the thing. But this is contrary to the above position. On the other hand, if you say existence is something added to the essence of the thing, so that it is not the thing itself, nor a part of the essence, as matter and form, and then if you add that it is not an accident, you are bound to posit some fourth nature among beings: *quartam naturam in entibus*.

The point of Siger's argument is that among beings there is found simply essence with its component principles, matter and form, and in addition, accidents. If existence is not an accident, nor the essence itself, nor matter nor form, there is no known kind of nature to which it belongs.

Likewise, Siger continues,<sup>20</sup> this opinion maintains that existence is something added to the essence. It is not the thing itself, nor a principle of the thing, as matter or form. Rather it is something constituted by the principles of the essence. Siger argues that it is the thing itself (*res ipsa*) which is constituted by the principles of the essence. On this ground, existence is nothing but the essence itself. Of course, existence may be said to be effectively added to the essence as an accident. But this is neither acceptable to St. Thomas nor to Siger.

Now that Siger has refuted these two positions regarding the relation between existence and essence, he passes on to a statement and defense of his own. I hold, he says,<sup>21</sup> that in things which have been caused, existence itself (*ipsum esse*) belongs to their essence, and is not something added to them. Consequently the words thing (*res*) and being (*ens*) do not signify two concepts (*intentiones*).

To explain his position more clearly, he distinguishes between three kinds of names which can be interchangeably predicated of a suppositum, although in different ways:

<sup>15</sup> St. Thomas, *In IV Meta.* lectio 2, Cathala ed. No. 558.

<sup>16</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 3, 6 c.

<sup>17</sup> St. Thomas, *De Substantiis Separatis* 6, (*Opuscula Omnia*, ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1927, I, p. 97).

<sup>18</sup> *Summa Theologiae* I, 3, 4 c. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5th ed. Paris, 1944), p. 58, note 1.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Text, p. 71.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, p. 60 (104); Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Text, p. 72.

(1) Two names signify the same essence in the same way. These are synonyms, e.g. Marcus and Tullius.

(2) One name signifies the essence; the other does not signify the essence, but something added to the essence, e.g. man and capable of laughter. In this case the formal concepts (*intellectus formales*) are different.

(3) Two names signify the same essence, but this same essence is apprehended in a different way by the mind. One name signifies the essence as apprehended after the manner of an act (*per modum actus*). The other signifies the essence apprehended after the manner of a habit (*per modum habitus*), e.g. to live (*vivere*) and animated (*animatum*).

Now the words "thing" (*res*) and "being" (*ens*) signify the same essence. But they are not two synonyms, like Marcus and Tully; nor do they signify two different concepts, like man and capable of laughter.<sup>22</sup> They signify the same essence and the same concept, one, however, as it is *per modum actus* (being, *ens*), the other *per modum habitus* (thing, *res*). We can conclude, therefore, that for Siger being is not a different concept from thing. They are two names signifying the same concept although in different ways, being signifying in a dynamic way what thing signifies in a static way.

Siger then says<sup>23</sup> that according to Averroes there were two things which led Avicenna into error. Avicenna did not distinguish between names which signify different concepts and names which signify the same concept but in different ways. Consequently he thought that existence (*esse*) signifies something added to the essence. So he thought that a different essence followed upon a different mode of signification.

If we look at Averroes' *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, we see that he criticizes Avicenna precisely on this point.<sup>24</sup> He says that Avicenna was greatly mistaken in that he thought that one (*unum*) and being (*ens*) signify dispositions added to the essence of the thing. Avicenna reasoned to his position by saying that if one and being signify the same thing, to say that being is one would be to no purpose. It would be like saying that one is one or being is being. Averroes objects that this only follows if it is maintained that when we say of anything that it is being or one, these words signify the same concept and signify it in the same way. In point of fact, they signify the same concept or essence, but they signify it in different ways; and they do not signify different dispositions added to the essence. Avicenna's mistake was not to see the difference between significations which signify the same essence in different ways without signifying concepts added to it, and significations which signify in the same essence dispositions added to it, that is to say, different from it in act.<sup>25</sup>

From these texts of Siger and Averroes we can conclude that their criticism

<sup>22</sup> It is difficult to understand why the different mode of apprehension does not give rise to different concepts. Siger criticizes Avicenna's position: *ens et res dicant diversas rationes secundum Avicennam*. (M. Grabmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 130.) Yet he himself says: *Aliquid enim vel ratio aliqua alia constituitur in audiente, quando dicitur res ens quam quando dicitur res per se. Non tamen sic cum dicitur Marcus Tullius*. Cf. Text, p. 74.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Text, p. 72.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the very useful discussion on this point in A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1931), p. 142 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei

. . . Et iste homo ratiocinatur ad suam opinionem, dicendo quod si unum et ens significant idem, tunc dicere ens est unum esset nugatio, quasi dicere unum est unum, aut ens est ens. Et hoc non sequeretur, nisi diceremus, quod dicere de aliquo quod est ens et unum, quod significant eandem intentionem et eodem modo. Nos autem diximus, quod significant eandem essentiam, sed modis diversis, non dispositiones diversas essentiae additas; et secundum hoc non est differentia apud istud hominem inter significationes quae significant eandem naturam modis diversis, absque eo quod significant intentiones additas illi, et inter significationes quae significant in eadem essentia dispositiones additas illi, scilicet, diversas ab ea in actu. Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67BCD.

of Avicenna was the following: Avicenna was right in saying that being and one are not synonyms of thing. But he was wrong in thinking that because they are not synonyms, they signify distinct concepts, different from the concept of thing and added to it. Averroes, and Siger after him, distinguish a third group of names which are neither synonyms nor signify different concepts. They signify one concept and one essence, although conceived in different ways. Now the names "being" and "one" belong to this class of names. They do not, as Avicenna says, belong to the class of names which signify different concepts and different essences. As Averroes and Siger interpret Avicenna's position, he holds that being signifies something added to essence, so that there are two distinct concepts of them. And these distinct concepts of being and the essence to which it is added in turn signify different essences.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Averroes and Siger maintain that being and essence signify one and the same concept, which in turn signifies one and the same essence although in different ways.

Siger then proceeds to give the second reason why Avicenna fell into error. There are, he says, following Averroes, some dispositions which are accidental and added to the essence of a thing, like white and black; and there are essential dispositions which belong to the essence. Avicenna was deceived precisely because he failed to understand this distinction.<sup>27</sup> This led him to consider existence an accidental disposition added to the essence of a thing, not an essential disposition.

It will be well at this point to consider Avicenna's doctrine of existence to see why Averroes and Siger are so critical of it.

In his *Metaphysics* Avicenna makes the distinction between concomitant and non-concomitant accidents:

... accidentia aut sunt inseparabiliter concomitantia naturam, et tunc non differt in eis multitudo quae est sub specie; aut sunt accessibilia non concomitantia naturam quorum accessio fit propter hoc quod pendent ex materia.<sup>28</sup>

Now existence is a concomitant which happens to a thing:

Ergo essentia eius est ipsi per se. Ipsum vero esse cum alio a se est quiddam quod accidit ei vel aliquid quod comitatur naturam suam sicut haec animalitas et humanitas.<sup>29</sup>

Existence is neither a genus nor a species: *esse nec est genus nec species*.<sup>30</sup> It is thus not an intrinsic constitutive of the essence of the thing. It is a concomitant which follows from the very nature of that thing:

... dicemus ergo quod naturae hominis ex hoc quod est homo accidit ut habeat esse, quamvis ex hoc quod habet esse non habet esse homo.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Text, p. 72. "L'exposé d'Averroès traite comme équivalentes les expressions *intentio-essentia*; *intentio diversa*, *dispositio addita*, *res addita*, *accidens*; . . ." J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris, 1938), p. 222, note 3.

<sup>27</sup> Siger's argument seems to rest on his supposing Avicenna did not distinguish between accidental and essential dispositions. Yet both manuscripts read: Avicenna did not distinguish between an accidental disposition and an accidental disposition. (Cf. Text, p. 72.)

<sup>28</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.* 5, 2, 87<sup>ra</sup>, ll. 19-21.

<sup>29</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.* 5, 1, 87<sup>ra</sup>, ll. 21-24. Cf.

A.-M. Goichon, *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>30</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.* 5, 1, 87<sup>ra</sup>, l. 27.

<sup>31</sup> Avicenna, *Meta.*, 5, 2, 87<sup>ra</sup>, ll. 10-11. Cf. *Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium*, I, 1, 3, 2, ed. Carame (Rome, 1926), p. 28. Sed unius natura est de accidentibus quae inseparabiliter rebus inhaerent. Unum enim nullius rei quidditatis constitutum est. Sed quidditas est quod quid est, ut puta homo vel equus, aut intellectus, aut anima. Postea hoc aliquid connotatur per hoc, quod scilicet, est unum et existens. Goichon, (*op. cit.*, p. 90), prefers the Latin *sequitur* to *accidere* in the text of the *Metaphysics* 5, 2, 87v which we have quoted in the body of this essay. She says: "Nous n'avons pas rencontré une seule fois le sens d'*accidere* chez Ibn Sina."

Now there are two kinds of concomitants which accompany the thing without being constitutive characters of it. Some belong to the thing by itself, as inequality belongs to three. Some belong to it extrinsically, as existence belongs to the world.<sup>32</sup>

Existence is consequently a concomitant belonging extrinsically to the essence. It does not enter into the essence as one of its essential constitutives; but neither is it an accident of the non-concomitant type, by which a thing is sometimes described and sometimes not.<sup>33</sup>

If this is true, existence for Avicenna is not an essential characteristic of the existing thing. In the strict sense, the essential characters are the genus, species and difference. In a broad sense, the property of the species can also be called essential, e.g. capable of laughter in man.<sup>34</sup> But existence is not genus, species or difference; nor is it a property of the species. Rather it is one of the common concomitants which belong to a whole species and besides this belong to other things.<sup>35</sup>

Averroes' criticism of Avicenna bears precisely on this non-essential relation of existence to the essence.<sup>36</sup> For Averroes unity and existence imply different dispositions of the essence:

. . . est necesse ut unum et ens significant eandem naturam, non duas naturas diversas: quia eadem natura intelligitur cum dicimus unus homo, aut homo est, idest ens, aut iste homo; quia istae dictiones iterantur, licet importent dispositiones diversas.<sup>37</sup>

But these dispositions are not added to the essence:

. . . significant eandem naturam modis diversis, absque eo quod significant intentiones additas illi.<sup>38</sup>

Consequently,

. . . substantia cuiusque rei est una essentialiter, non per rem additam illi. Quoniam, si res esset unum per aliquam rem additam suae naturae, sicut credit Avicenna, tunc nihil esset unum per se, et per suam substantiam, sed per rem additam suae substantiae. Et illa res quae est una, si dicitur quod est una per intentionem additam suae essentiae, quaeretur etiam de illa re, per quam fit una, et per quid fit una; si igitur fit una per intentionem additam illi, revertitur quaestio, et procedetur in infinitum.<sup>39</sup>

Averroes does not here explicitly use this argument to prove the non-accidental character of existence or being. He does, however, use it in the *Destructio Destructionum*.<sup>40</sup>

In the light of the above texts Averroes' position is clear; but even if it were not, he himself leaves us in no doubt as to his intention of really identifying being, unity and substance.

<sup>32</sup> " . . . Les concomitants qui accompagnent la chose sans être pour elle des (caractères) constitutifs, appartiennent à la chose soit par elle-même, comme l'imparité appartient à trois, soit extrinsèquement, comme l'existence appartient au monde". Avicenna, *Mantiq*, 18. Translated by A.-M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.

<sup>33</sup> "Le caractère accidentel est celui par lequel la chose est parfois décrite, pourvu qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire que la chose soit toujours décrite par cela. Avicenna, *Mantiq*, 14. Trans. by A.-M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless both Averroes and Siger interpret Avicenna's doctrine of the accidentality of existence without remarking his precise distinction between existence and a non-concomitant accident. But they rightly see that for him the essence of composite beings does not include their existence. Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121 and pp. 136-145.

<sup>37</sup> Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 66M.

<sup>38</sup> Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67D.

<sup>39</sup> Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67G.

<sup>40</sup> Averroes, *Des. Destructionum*, Disp. 5, (ed. Juntas) IX, 78A.



... et ideo dicimus quod substantia cuiuslibet unius, per quam est unum, est suum esse, per quod est ens.<sup>41</sup>

Let us now go back to Siger's text.<sup>42</sup> On the authority of Averroes he first makes the distinction between accidental and essential dispositions.<sup>43</sup> He says there are some dispositions which signify dispositions added to the essence of a thing, like white and black. There are other dispositions which are essential, belonging to the essence. Now, he continues, Avicenna was deceived because what signifies an essential disposition of a thing does not signify it in the same way, nor did Aristotle expressly say that it signifies it in a different way. Siger seems to mean that essential dispositions signify the thing to which they belong in different ways, even though they are really identical with each other and with the essence to which they belong. This is in agreement with his previous statement that being and unity signify the same concept and the same essence, although in different ways. But this diverse signification of essential dispositions is precisely what deceived Avicenna. He thought that because being and unity signify diverse dispositions, they must be *accidental* dispositions added to the thing. He did not see that they are *essential* dispositions, signifying the same essence, but in different ways.

Siger then concludes:

Substantia cuiuslibet rei est aliquod ens non secundum accidens. Si esse est dispositio addita, procedetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Standum est ergo in primo.<sup>44</sup>

The meaning of this text is clear in the light of Averroes' doctrine. A substance exists essentially, not through an accident added to it. If it were an added accidental disposition, the cause of the existence of that added disposition would again have to be sought, etc. We should consequently agree that in the first instance the substance exists and is a being in virtue of itself, and not in virtue of an added disposition.

This conclusion will be reinforced and further clarified if we turn to the first argument in the *Sed contra*,<sup>45</sup> which Siger gives on the authority of Averroes.

The text of Averroes to which Siger here refers, and which we will analyze shortly, directs us to Aristotle's *Topics* for an understanding of the argument. In the first book of the *Topics* Aristotle raises the discussion of 'problems':

Γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων· περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματα ἐστὶν . . . Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα καὶ ἡ πρότασις τῷ τρόπῳ. Οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ῥηθέντος, ἄρα γε τὸ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν ὀρισμός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου; καὶ ἄρα γε τὸ ζῶον γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; πρότασις γίνεται. Ἐὰν δὲ, πότερον τὸ ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν ὀρισμός ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ἢ οὐ; καὶ πότερον τὸ ζῶον γένος ἐστίν; πρόβλημα γίνεται.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67H.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Text, p. 72.

<sup>43</sup> Siger seems to be referring to Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, t. 3, 67B: . . . dixit enim quod dispositionum quaedam sunt intentionales, et quaedam animales, sive essentialia; et dixit quod unum et ens reducuntur ad essentiam dispositam per illa, et non sunt dispositiones additae essentiae, sicut est dispositio in albo et nigro et uno. Averroes, however, seems to refer this distinction to Avicenna. I have not been able to find this distinction in Avicenna.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Text, p. 72.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Text, p. 70.

<sup>46</sup> For arguments start with 'propositions', while the subjects on which reasonings take place are 'problems'. . . . The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, 'An animal that walks on two feet' is the definition of man, is it not? or 'Animal' is the genus of man, is it not?' the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an animal that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' (or 'Is "animal" his genus or no?') the result is a problem. Arist., *Topics* I, 4, 101b15-34 (Ross translation).

Πᾶσα δὲ πρότασις καὶ πᾶν πρόβλημα ἢ γένος ἢ ἴδιον ἢ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ . . . <sup>47</sup>

As an example of a generic problem Aristotle gives: "What is the object before you?" In the case of a man, it is appropriate to answer, "He is an animal". What is mentioned in reply is a predicate in the category of essence, indicating the genus of the thing, for,

Γένος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλείονων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον.<sup>48</sup>

An accident, on the other hand, is neither a definition, nor a property, nor a genus.

Συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἐστὶν . . . δὲ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁποῦν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.<sup>49</sup>

Problems are consequently generic or accidental according as the answers to them are in terms of genus or accident. And as a genus is predicated in the category of essence, it will state the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, whereas the accident will not.

The proposition before Siger is: "Man is". Is the being predicated of man predicated of him as a genus, that is, essentially, or accidentally? Siger's reply follows Aristotle's rule in the *Topics*:

\*Ἐτι ἐὰν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, κείμενον δὲ ἢ ὡς ὑπάρχει ἢ ὡς οἷχ ὑπάρχει, θάτερον δεικνύει τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων, ἐὰν μὴ ἀμφω ἐνδέχεται. Χρηστότεον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν λαμβανόντων' . . . <sup>50</sup>

Siger wishes us to see a two-fold meaning in the being which can be predicated of man, and therein lies the solution to the problem. If we say, "Man is", the being predicated is either *esse diminutum vel esse in effectu*, or it is *esse qualitatum vel quantitatum*. In the former case, being is predicated accidentally; in the latter, it is predicated generically or essentially.

These two meanings of being are made clear if we refer to the fifth book of Averroes' *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. There he says:

Sed debes scire universaliter quod hoc nomen ens, quod significat essentiam rei, est aliud ab ente quod significat verum; . . . <sup>51</sup>

This is the distinction between the being which signifies composition in the intellect, and the being which signifies essence which is outside the intellect:

Et intendebat (sc. Aristoteles) distinguere inter hoc nomen ens, quod significat copulationem in intellectu, et quod significat essentiam, quae est extra intellectum.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident. *Arist., op. cit.*, 101b17.

<sup>48</sup> A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. *Arist., op. cit.*, 102a32.

<sup>49</sup> An 'accident' is . . . something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. *Arist., op.*

*cit.*, 102b4-8.

<sup>50</sup> . . . if a term be used in several senses, and it has been laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S, you should show your case of one of its several senses, if you cannot show it of both. This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is undetected. *Arist., op. cit.*, II, 3, 110a23-27.

<sup>51</sup> Averroes, *In V Meta.* 7, t. 14, 117F.

<sup>52</sup> Averroes, *loc. cit.*, 117G.

Now, Averroes continues, he who understands being as that which is common to the ten predicaments, says it is placed among the generic problems, while he who understands being as that which is understood of the true, says it is placed among the problems of accident.<sup>53</sup>

For Averroes, then, if one predicates being in the sense of being outside the mind, one predicates it as a genus; whereas if one predicates it as being within the mind, it is predicated accidentally. And in his commentary on the sixth book of the *Metaphysics* he calls this being within the mind *ens diminutum*, in contrast to being outside the mind, which is *ens perfectum*.<sup>54</sup>

In the text of Siger which we are studying, it is said "Man is" is either a generic or accidental predication. It is an accidental predication if by the being predicated is meant *esse diminutum vel in effectu*.<sup>55</sup> But if the being predicated of man is not this being of the mind, but being outside the mind, as found in the ten predicaments, such as quality or quantity, then the predication is a generic one.

The problem Siger originally set is: *Utrum ens vel esse in rebus causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum vel sit aliquid additum essentiae illorum*. In this problem the being or existence is clearly being or existence outside the mind. But he has shown that being or existence in this sense is always predicated essentially, because predicated generically. Therefore it always belongs to the essence of the thing and is not added to it accidentally.

If there is still any doubt that Siger considered being or existence a genus and therefore part of the essence of that of which it is predicated, we have only to turn to his celebrated work: *Quaestio Utrum Haec Sit Vera: Homo Est Animal Nullo Homine Existente*.<sup>56</sup> Here he tells us that it is of the *ratio* of human nature that it be being purely and simply, not for a determined time, like Socrates or Plato. And so he who says, "Man is non-being", understands of him the opposite of what is of his *ratio*, as if he were to say, "Man is dead". So he who claims that man is not or is not-being claims the opposite of his *genus*.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Sed debes scire universaliter quod hoc nomen ens, quod significat essentiam rei, est aliud ab ente quod significat verum; et ideo expositores diversantur in quaesito simplici, scilicet, dicere verum aliquid est in secundo Topicorum, utrum collocetur in quaestionibus accidentis aut generis. Qui enim intelligit de ente illud quod est commune decem praedicamentis, dicit quod collocatur in quaestionibus generis; et qui intellexit de ente illud quod intelligitur de vero, dicit quod collocatur in quaestionibus accidentis. Averroes, loc. cit., 117F.

<sup>54</sup> Ens enim quod est per accidens, non habet causam terminatam; et quod est veridicans non habet etiam causam nisi animam; et ideo utrumque numeratur in genere entis diminuti; et ideo perscrutandum est de ente perfecta quod est ens extra animam. Averroes, *In VI Meta.* 2, t. 2, 152I.

<sup>55</sup> The expression in *effectu* presents a difficulty. It is an Avicennian term, signifying actual being in distinction to possible being. (Cf. A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina*, Paris, 1938, n. 754, p. 422.) It does not seem that Siger would use the expression with its Avicennian meaning in this argument which is taken from Averroes. In his commentary on the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*, however, Averroes again distinguishes between generic being and being which signifies truth in the mind. This being in the mind

is here described as an act: Et etiam (Avicenna) fuit deceptus, quia ignoravit differentiam inter hoc nomen ens, quod significat genus, et quod significat verum. Quod enim significat verum, est actus, et quod significat genus, significat unumquodque decem praedicamentorum multipliciter. In *X Meta.* 4, t. 8, 257F-257G. Perhaps Siger uses the expression *esse in effectu* in this Averroistic sense of *actus*.

<sup>56</sup> *Sigeri de Brabantia: Quaestio Utrum Haec Sit Vera: Homo est Animal Nullo Homine Existente*, edited by P. Mandonnet in *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, II<sup>me</sup> Partie, II (2<sup>e</sup>, Louvain, 1908), p. 65 ff.

<sup>57</sup> De ratione humanae naturae est quod ipsa sit ens simpliciter, non pro determinato tempore, sicut Socrates vel Plato. Ergo qui hominem ponit esse non ens, accipit de homine oppositum illius quod est de sua ratione, sicut qui poneret hominem mortuum, ita quod quaestio quaerentis, utrum haec sit vera: homo est animal nullo homine existente, similis est quaestioni quaerenti: utrum homo sit animal, homine non existente substantia, vel non existente animalis . . . qui petit hominem non esse, vel non esse ens, quaerit oppositum generis seu generalis . . . Qui petit hominem non esse, implicet duo opposita, sicut qui petit hominem non esse hominem. Siger of Brabant, *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

There still remains the possibility that man can remain in his essential being and not in his actual being. No, Siger says, for to the essential being of man belongs the actuality of being: *nam ad esse essenziale hominis pertinet actualitas essendi*. But the actuality of being does not alone belong to it, because to the essence of man belong both potency and act. The essential being and actual being of anything differ in this, that actual being is said to pertain to the actuality of its essence, but the being of the essence means the whole which pertains to its entity, whether potency or act, indicated by the definition. And if actuality belongs to the being of the essence of man, and to the thing defined, if the actual being is destroyed, the essential cannot remain, since the essential implies that in itself: *cum essenziale illud in se implicet*.<sup>58</sup>

It is no more possible, therefore, for man not to be a being than it is for a man not to be an animal or a man, for it is equally of his essence. And if one tries to distinguish between actual and essential being, and say that actual being does not belong to his essence, and therefore man can be essentially without being actually a man, Siger denies any real distinction between essential and actual being. Essential being implies actual being; the being of the essence is the whole to which both potency and act belong.

Siger has tried to show that it is futile to try to prove a distinction between being and essence from the fact that a thing is what it is by reason of itself, and that it is by reason of the first principle. He has also tried to show that it is not true that only in the first principle or God does existence belong to essence. In fact, existence always belongs to essence in creatures as well as in God. It is never an accident added to the essence. He now goes on to show that these positions which he has refuted are in a way true, and he shows how they are to be interpreted in the light of his own doctrine.<sup>59</sup>

Existence signifies essence in the manner of the greatest act: *esse significat essentiam per modum actus maximi*. We have already seen that being or existence signifies essence *per modum actus*. Since the first principle is most actual, it is existence by superior right. Existence more properly signifies the first act: *actum primum*. Consequently existence is the effect of the first principle by superior right. It is only in a less proper sense that existence is from other things. Accordingly, substances caused by the first principle have both their nature and their mode of act or existence as effects of the first principle. But as effects of the first principle they will fall short of the maximum of act of that first principle. Therefore, they will always have potency from the first principle as well as act, and their potency will be the exact measure of their falling short of the actuality of the first principle. Beyond the first, substances recede from it and are multiplied, not because there is found in them diverse essences, but because they come nearer to potency. And so, as the Paris manuscript tells us, there is no need that there be in creatures a real composition of essence and existence (*compositio realis esse et essentiae*).<sup>60</sup>

They likewise fall short of the first through participation, because some participate in being more and others less; for the more they approach the first, the more they participate in being, as the species of number in relation to

<sup>58</sup> . . . non potest remanere homo in esse essentiali quin remaneat in esse actuali, nam ad esse essenziale hominis pertinet actualitas essendi, etsi non hoc solum, quia ad essentiam hominis pertinet potentia et actus. Differunt enim esse essenziale et esse actuale alicuius in hoc quod dicitur esse actuale, illud quod pertinet ad actualitatem essentiae eius; esse autem essentiae dicit

totum quod pertinet ad entitatem eius, sive potentia, sive actus, indicatum per definitionem. Quod si ad esse essentiae hominis et ad definitum pertinet actualitas, destructo actuali non remanet essenziale, cum essenziale illud in se implicet. Siger of Brabant, *op. cit.* p. 66.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Text, p. 73.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Text, p. 74.

unity. Brother Thomas, Siger says,<sup>61</sup> referring to St. Thomas Aquinas, argues that everything *per se* subsisting beyond the first being is a composite; and since there are some things not composed of matter and form, they must be composed of essence and existence. But, Siger says, the conclusion does not follow. They can fall short of the first being in another way, e.g. through their manner of knowing. For everything which is different from the first being knows through a likeness which is different from itself.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

After the analysis of our author's text, a few conclusions can be drawn with regard to his position on the relation of essence to existence, and the general direction of his metaphysical thought.

Siger's substantial agreement with Averroes is clear. Like the great Commentator on Aristotle, he will have no part in a doctrine which sees existence as something added to the essence of a thing after the manner of an accident.<sup>62</sup> Averroes had attacked Avicenna for making this mistake. For the same reason Siger attacks the thirteenth century follower of Avicenna, the St. Albert who commented on the *Liber de Causis*.

From the point of view of logic, the problem which these philosophers faced is: How is being predicated of a thing? Avicenna and St. Albert both deny it is predicated as a genus.<sup>63</sup> Averroes and Siger both affirm that in a way it is. It is interesting to notice that this difference seems to arise from a difficulty in the metaphysics itself of Aristotle. The Stagirite had at once denied that being is a genus, and affirmed that in a way it is a common notion.<sup>64</sup> Faced with this difficulty, Averroes distinguished between two kinds of genera. The first kind is a genus which is predicated univocally; the second is a genus which is said *per prius et posterius*. Examples of this latter kind of genus are: *ens*, *res*, *esse*, *substantia*. Now, Averroes goes on to say, Avicenna said the word "being" signifies a common consequent of the substances of things; for he thought that since it is impossible that it be a genus said univocally or equivocally, it must signify a common consequent, but does not answer to the question, "What is a thing?"<sup>65</sup> As Averroes sees it, therefore, being belongs to the essence of things and is predicated of them as a genus, although it is predicated of them unequally, *per prius et posterius*. For Siger too, being belongs to the essence of things and is not added to them. And the hierarchy of beings is measured precisely by the degree of being they have with reference to the first principle which is *actus primus*. Being, then, in the sense of being outside the mind, is always predicated essentially. Only in the case of the being the mind gives things in the act of judgment is there accidental predication of being; for it is accidental to anything whether something be affirmed about it in the mind.

It is difficult to find any distinction in Siger's text between being (*ens*) and

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Text, p. 74.

<sup>62</sup> It is of interest to notice that in the anonymous *Commentary on the Physics* in the Munich Ms. 9559, recently published by P. Delhaye and attributed by him to Siger of Brabant, the doctrine of essence and existence is Avicennian, explicitly taken from Algazel. (Cf. *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la physique d'Aristote*, ed. P. Delhaye in *Les Philosophes Belges* XV, Louvain, 1941, pp. 195-196). The problem of the authenticity of the anonymous works in the Munich Ms. is a difficult one, and I make no pretence to be able to enter into

it. Those who hold, however, that the *Physics* belongs to Siger must face the problem of reconciling its doctrine of essence and existence (which is Avicennian) with that of the *Metaphysics* (which is Averroistic).

<sup>63</sup> For Avicenna, cf. note 30; for St. Albert, cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, 1, 19, ad 2m, ed. Borgnet, XXXI, p. 130.

<sup>64</sup> Aristotle, *Meta.* III, 3, 998b22; Bk. IV, 2, 1003b15.

<sup>65</sup> Averroes, *Destructio Destructionum*, Disp. 7, (ed. Juntas) IX, 93H-I.

existence (*esse*). He sometimes uses the two words synonymously: *ens vel esse*.<sup>66</sup> Again: *hominem non esse, vel non esse ens*.<sup>67</sup> He says that the name *ens* with *esse* is imposed from the act of being.<sup>68</sup> *Ens*, however, is not a synonym of *res*, but neither are these two different concepts. The words *ens* and *res* signify the same concept (*intentio*) and the same essence. The difference between them lies in the different way in which the mind apprehends the essence; now after the manner of an act, now after the manner of a habit. But Siger makes it clear that this different mode of apprehension does not give rise to different formal concepts. *Res* and *ens* are two words signifying one concept and one essence, although the mode of signification is different.

Being, then, in Siger's view, is fundamentally essence; existence is an essential disposition of essence, really identical with it. Although he criticizes Avicenna for saying that existence is an accidental disposition of essence, he is at one with him in thinking that what is most central in reality is essence. In his treatment of the Thomistic doctrine of existence, he shows himself bewildered by an *esse* which is neither matter nor form, nor the essence constituted by them, nor an accident. It must then, he says, be some fourth unknown nature. He does not even consider the possibility of its being outside the order of essence, the actuality of all acts and consequently the perfection of all perfections.<sup>69</sup>

Siger's real identification of essence and existence obliges him to save the distinction between God and His effects in some other way than by seeing in the latter a real composition of essence and existence. The distinction between God and creatures is not one between something in which existence is identical with essence, and some things in which the two are really distinct. They are in fact really identical in both God and creatures. The distinction between them lies in the measure of act which they contain. God is *maximus actus, actus purus*. Creatures have from that first act their essence and their mode of act, which are cast, so to speak, in one block, without any real distinction between them. But because they are not the first being, they are not *maximus actus*; they fall short of its actuality and approach potentiality. And the degree to which they do this is the exact measure of their declination from the first being. In this way Siger thinks he has saved the distinction of creatures and God, and at the same time the real identification of existence and essence in both.

On the basis of the texts we have studied, this appears to be Siger's solution to the problem of essence and existence. In reaching that solution he showed himself alive to the complex influences which were working upon the philosophical thought of his day, as well as to the different directions that thought was taking under their impact. In the texts we have met Aristotle, Boethius, the *Liber de Causis*, Avicenna and Averroes. Among his contemporaries he witnessed to a movement of thought inspired by Avicenna. He was aware of the independent direction which St. Thomas was taking, although the import of the Angelic Doctor's existentialism was lost to him. As to the elements which combine to form his own solution to the problem, they are no doubt complex; but it appears that he was guided principally by Aristotle as commented upon and interpreted by Averroes.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Text, p. 69.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 57.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Text, p. 70.

<sup>69</sup> St. Thomas, *De Potentia* 7, 2, ad 9m (*Quaestiones Disputatae*, ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1925, II, p. 254).

# The Date of the Parisian Decree on the Elevation of the Host

V. L. KENNEDY C.S.B.

IT has been generally accepted by liturgical scholars that the introduction of the major elevation into the Mass was due to the initiative of Odo of Sully, bishop of Paris from 1196 to 1208.<sup>1</sup> Among the synodal decrees assigned to this bishop by Mansi,<sup>2</sup> there is a statute which prescribes that the priest shall be careful not to raise the host aloft until he has said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*; then and then only is he to elevate it so that it may be seen by all.<sup>3</sup> These statutes of Bishop Odo fall into two parts. The first is entitled: *Prohibitiones et praecepta observanda ab omnibus sacerdotibus*; it contains rules for holding a synod and six<sup>4</sup> chapters of regulations on the sacraments. The second part has the title: *Hic incipiunt communia praecepta synodalia* and contains sixty articles on almost every phase of the priestly ministry; the twenty-eighth article of this section prescribes the elevation of the host.

Within the last ten years, some doubts have been cast on Odo's authorship of all these statutes.<sup>5</sup> Internal evidence makes it clear that the decrees are not all of the same date. The thirty-fifth of the *communia praecepta* commands priests 'under penalty of a large fine to observe the statutes that are written in their booklets'; it goes on to state that 'although three years have elapsed since they have had these booklets, some are so negligent that they do not yet have an ivory pyx, nor a tabernacle where the Body of the Lord may be reserved with due honor, nor a font with a key, nor do they keep the chrism and oil in a cabinet'.<sup>6</sup> The regulations here mentioned are all contained in the decrees on the sacraments in the first part of Odo's statutes.<sup>7</sup> Allowing some

<sup>1</sup>To mention but a few, cf. E. Martène, *De antiquis ecclesiae ritibus* I (Rotomagi, 1700), p. 407; Claude de Vert, *Explication simple, littéraire et historique des cérémonies de l'église* III (Paris, 1713), pp. 261-264; H. Thurston, 'Lifting the Host', *The Tablet*, (1907), 603 ff; also Art. 'Elevation', *Cath. Encl.* V, 380-381; A. Fortescue, *The Mass* (London, 1912), pp. 338-342; P. Batiffol, *Leçons sur la messe* (Paris, 1927), pp. xviii-xix, 261-264; E. Dumoutet, *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), pp. 37 ff; P. Browe, *Die Verehrung der Eucharistie im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1933), pp. 28 ff; V. L. Kennedy, 'The Moment of Consecration and the Elevation of the Host', *Mediaeval Studies*, VI (1944), 121-150.

<sup>2</sup>J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* XXII, 675 ff. These statutes are also found in: *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisiensis* (Paris, 1674), pp. 3-22; *Statuta Ecclesiae Parisiensis* (Paris, 1777); PL 212, 58-67 etc., etc.

<sup>3</sup>PL 212, 65; c. 28: Praecipitur presbyteris ut cum in canone missae inceperint: *Qui pridie, tenentes hostiam, ne elevent eam statim nimis alte, ita quod possit ab omnibus videri a populo, sed quasi ante pectus detineant, donec dixerint: Hoc est corpus meum; tunc elevent eam ut possit ab omnibus videri.*

<sup>4</sup>There are no decrees on the sacrament

of Holy Orders, no doubt because synodal decrees are for priests only.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. J. Heydenreich, 'Zu den Trierer Synodalstatuten des 13. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, XXV (1936), 480: 'Ihrerseits stellen diese Pariser Statuten kein einheitliches Werk dar, sondern sie sind das Ergebnis mehrfacher synodaler Tätigkeit'. See also: C. R. Cheney, *English Synodalia of the Thirteenth Century* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 55-56.

<sup>6</sup>PL 212, 66; c. 35: Item praecipitur sacerdotibus strictissime et sub poena magnae emendae, ut custodiant praecepta synodalia quae scripta sunt in libellis suis. Quidam enim, licet jam elapsi sint tres anni ex quo praedictos libellos habuerint, ita sunt negligentes, quod nondum habent pixidem eburneam, nec tabernaculum ubi reservetur cum honore corpus Domini, nec fontes sub clave, nec chrisma vel oleum in aliqua capsula.

<sup>7</sup>PL 212, 59; Cap. III, 3: Fontes sub sera clausi custodiantur propter sortilegia. Chrisma similiter et sacrum oleum sub clave servetur. PL 212, 60; Cap. V, 5: sed semper sacerdos cum magna reverentia et maturitate deferat (corpus Domini) in pixide eburnea bene clausa. Cap. V, 7: In pulchriori parte altaris cum summa diligentia et honestate sub clave sacrosanctum corpus Domini custodiatur.

time for copying and distributing these synodal booklets, we may assume that this particular decree is from four to five years later than the original group of statutes. In all probability, the *communia praecepta* are the work of a number of synods over a period of years.<sup>8</sup> To see that such an hypothesis is reasonable, we have only to examine the rules for holding a synod given in chapters one and two of Mansi's edition:

Cap. II. De eodem. 1. Finito sermone licentiabit episcopus laicos et scholares et alios clericos qui non debebunt synodo interesse. Hoc facto legantur praecepta synodi.

2. His expletis dicantur capitula quae addenda sunt et in fine districtae praecipitur ut servantur sacerdotibus. Deinde sequuntur preces pro necessitate locorum et personarum.<sup>9</sup>

If we understand this correctly, it means that the statutes of the previous synod or synods are first to be read; then the new regulations drawn up by the synod in session are to be proclaimed; the priests of the diocese are warned to obey these and then prayers follow for various intentions. From the wording of these two decrees, it is apparent that they do not belong to the draft of the original synod; and in fact the three manuscripts which we use for this study (Paris B.N. Lat. 14,443, Arsenal 386 and 769A) all begin with article 3 of Mansi's chapter II: *Districtae praecipitur sacerdotibus ut ieiuni intrent synodum*.<sup>10</sup> In Arsenal 769A and in the printed text found in the *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisiensis* these regulations come at the end of the statutes.

Granting that the original group of statutes do belong to the time of Bishop Odo, the problem remains of dating the subsequent additions by other synods. These might all come within the period of his episcopate or it might be that that some of them are of later date. We may assume as a *terminus ante quem* the year 1215 since there appears to be no trace in these statutes of the legislation of the Fourth Council of the Lateran,<sup>11</sup> and Peter of Poitiers, canon of St. Victor's, quotes from the *communia praecepta* in his penitential written shortly after 1215.<sup>12</sup> A complete study of the manuscript tradition may settle this problem, but since that is not possible at the present time, our aim here is merely to point out, from the available evidence, certain indications that seem to show that some of these *communia praecepta*—including the decree on the elevation—are probably later than 1208 the year in which Bishop Odo died. These indications are based, in the first place, on an examination of the three manuscripts mentioned above, and secondly on other evidence from contemporary writers.

<sup>8</sup> The opinion of Dr. Heydenreich, cf. note 5 above.

<sup>9</sup> Mansi XXII, 675; PL 212, 58: *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisiensis*, p. 22—at the end of the statutes.

<sup>10</sup> See the detailed description of these manuscripts given later on in this article.

<sup>11</sup> Cheney, *English Synodalia*, p. 56. Heydenreich seems to think that there is a close relationship between these statutes and those of the Fourth Lateran (*op. cit.*, p. 480), but he hesitates to give a judgment on the priority of one or the other. In the examples he gives (note 6, p. 480), he refers to Lateran III; this is obviously a mistake since, for example, Lateran III has no canons 50-51. The corresponding canons of Lateran IV do deal with some of the same subject-matter as the Synod of Paris, but there is practically no verbal similarity between the decrees. The best proof of the

dependence of any council or synod on the Fourth Lateran is the presence of the canon: *Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis*—prescribing annual confession and communion, and there is no trace of this in any of the statutes assigned to Bishop Odo.

<sup>12</sup> A. Teetaert, 'Le Liber Poenitentialis de Pierre de Poitiers', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie u. Theologie des Mittelalters*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935), 323: Tit. 38: *Sicut laudabiliter fit in episcopatu parisiensi omnes plebani presbyteri debent habere synodalia instituta redacta in scriptis* . . . For another instance cf. *infra* p. 95. For the correct date of the penitential of Peter of Poitiers, cf. C. R. Cheney, 'La date de composition du "Liber Poenitentialis" attribué à Pierre de Poitiers', *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, IX (1937), 401-404.



## I. THE THREE MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscript 386 of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal came from the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris.<sup>13</sup> It is written in an early thirteenth century hand and contains a number of theological and canonical texts; among these (fol. 183-225) we find the Penitential of Robert of Flamborough, canon-penitentiary of St. Victor's.<sup>14</sup> This treatise was written after 1208,—Robert states therein that he used in certain cases faculties which he had received from the bishops of Paris, Odo and Peter (1208-1219).<sup>15</sup> From fol. 225<sup>v</sup> to 230<sup>v</sup> there is a series of decrees and regulations on matters of church discipline; we note in particular the decrees or constitutions promulgated by Gualo, the apostolic legate to France 1208-1209.<sup>16</sup> The statutes of Bishop Odo begin on fol. 230<sup>v</sup> with the decree: *Districte precipitur sacerdotibus ut ieiuni intrent sinodum*. Although they are divided into paragraphs, the statutes had originally neither title nor rubrics; a modern hand has written at the top of fol. 230<sup>v</sup>: *Statuta synodalia Odonis episcopi parisiensis*. The first paragraph contains the general decrees as found in Mansi c. II, 3-7; then follow the decrees on baptism—Mansi c. III; confirmation—Mansi c. IV; eucharist—Mansi c. V; confession—Mansi c. VI, omitting nos. 4 and 10; matrimony—Mansi c. VII with some difference in no. 2: extreme unction—Mansi c. VIII, 1-3. The final paragraph in this manuscript begins with no. 4 of Mansi's c. VIII and continues on to article 17 of the *communia praecepta* inclusive; then come three decrees on the relations of Christians with Jews, three on confession, and four on the celebration of Mass. None of these last ten is found in Mansi. This manuscript, written certainly after the death of Bishop Odo, does not contain nos. 18 to 60 of the *communia praecepta*; consequently it does not have the decree on the elevation of the host (no. 28).

Manuscript 769 of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, also from the Abbey of St. Victor, is a volume containing six separate manuscripts;<sup>17</sup> we are concerned here only with the first two parts A and B which are written by the same hand,—probably within the first third of the thirteenth century. Part A contains the sermons of Maurice de Sully (fol. 3-42);<sup>18</sup> the statutes of Bishop Odo (fol. 42<sup>v</sup>-46<sup>v</sup>); an unidentified penitential (fol. 46<sup>v</sup>-55<sup>v</sup>),<sup>19</sup> and some extracts from Bede and other fathers (fol. 56-57<sup>v</sup>). Part B contains, among other matters, the Penitential of Robert of Flamborough (fol. 84<sup>v</sup>-109<sup>v</sup>);<sup>20</sup> the constitutions of Gualo (fol. 113<sup>v</sup>);<sup>21</sup> the statutes of the Council of Paris held around June 1213 under the presidency of Cardinal Robert Courson (fol. 115-119<sup>v</sup>).<sup>22</sup> From internal

<sup>13</sup> H. Martin, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque de l'Arsenal I* (Paris, 1885), pp. 247-248.

<sup>14</sup> Incipit: *Res grandis immo permaxima*; on this treatise, cf. S. Kuttner, 'Pierre de Roissy and Robert of Flamborough', *Traditio*, II (1944), 492-499. A critical edition of this Penitential is being prepared by Francis Firth C.S.B.

<sup>15</sup> Fol. 195<sup>ra</sup>: *Grauter igitur, ut michi uidetur, offendunt simplices sacerdotes qui sine dispensatione et sola sua auctoritate ordinari permittunt peruiros, fures, fornicatores, adulteros, incestuosos et grauiore. Ego autem ad istud uitandum inconueniens a duobus parisiensis episcopis Odone et Petro habui ut ubique eorum auctoritate dispensarem ubi ipsi dispensarent.*

<sup>16</sup> Fol. 225<sup>vb</sup>: *In nomine domini nos Gallus miseratione diuina sancte Marie in porticu diaconus cardinalis apostolice sedis legatus excommunicauimus omnes sacerdotes et clericos etc.* Cf. Mansi, XXII, 763 ff; Hefele-Lecleercq, V, 1307; the latter date these

canons about 1210. This appears a bit late. On May 29, 1208, Innocent III wrote to 'the archbishops, bishops, abbots and other prelates of the kingdom of France' asking them to receive Gualo as legate. (Cf. Potthast, no. 3424; PL 215, 1401-1403). Apparently the legate was recalled in 1209 as a result of the dissatisfaction of Philip Augustus. Cf. A. Luchaire, *Histoire de France*, ed. E. Lavisse, III (Paris, 1901), p. 149. Since Bishop Odo died in July of 1208, it is extremely unlikely that Gualo issued these decrees during the lifetime of Odo.

<sup>17</sup> Martin, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque de l'Arsenal II*, pp. 89-92.

<sup>18</sup> Bishop of Paris 1160 to 1196.

<sup>19</sup> Fol. 46<sup>v</sup>: *Cum de penitentia tractare proposuimus . . . In margin: Incipit liber penitentialis.*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. note 14 *supra*.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. note 16 *supra*.

<sup>22</sup> Fol. 115<sup>v</sup>: *Statuta concilii Parisiensis sub magistro Roberto de Curceon. Inc. Cum ex iniuncto legationis officio.* Cf. Hefele-

evidence then it is clear that both parts were written later than 1213. On fol. 42<sup>v</sup> we find the title: *In nomine sancte et individue trinitatis incipiunt prohibitiones et precepta obseruanda ab omnibus sacerdotibus a uenerabili Odone parisiensi episcopo*. The statutes begin on fol. 43<sup>r</sup> with the decree: *Districte precipitur sacerdotibus ut ieiuni intrent sinodum*. There is a rubric for each section on the sacraments and the content for this part of the statutes is almost identical with that of Arsenal 386. The next division is entitled: *Incipiunt communia precepta sinodalia*, and contains no. 6 of Mansi's c. VIII, *the communia praecepta* nos. 1-58, and two other decrees which do not appear in Mansi but are given in the *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisiensis*.<sup>23</sup> The final section is entitled: *Ante sinodum* and corresponds to Mansi's c. I and c. II, 1-2; at the end is added a *benedictio sinodi*. The text of this manuscript is almost identical with that of the *Synodicon*; in fact the latter may well have been taken from this manuscript since we are told by the editor of the *Synodicon* that the statutes of Bishop Odo are printed *ad fidem codicis sancti Victoris Parisiensis*.<sup>24</sup> It is to be noted that this manuscript, written some time after 1213, does contain the decree on the elevation.

The most interesting, from many points of view, is Manuscript *Lat.* 14,443 of the Bibliothèque nationale of Paris.<sup>25</sup> The statutes of Bishop Odo are found on fol. 290<sup>rb</sup>-291<sup>rb</sup> between two of Stephen Langton's commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul. The handwriting is quite distinct from that of the rest of the manuscript but belongs, I think, to the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The statutes have no title, no divisions and no rubrics. The text begins, as in the Arsenal manuscripts, with the canon: *Districte precipitur sacerdotibus ut ieiuni intrent sinodum*, and continues, with the usual minor variations, up to, and including, no. 17 of the *communia praecepta*. From there on the order and content are quite unique. Following no. 17, come nos. 33-38, then a decree on the relations of Christians and Jews. Next in order are the Constitutions of the Papal Legate Gualo;<sup>26</sup> then nos. 18-32 and 39-41.

The next canon is quite a lengthy one prescribing prayers for various intentions. It is interesting to note that this one manuscript, at least, has preserved for us an example of *preces pro necessitate locorum et personarum*<sup>27</sup> which were an integral part of a synod. The canon itself is of particular interest, not only for the topographical information on Paris and its neighborhood at this period, but also for the chronological details which enable us to date the synod that prescribed these prayers as certainly later than the time of Odo of Sully. It is quite obvious that the one who is asking prayers is Peter of Nemours, bishop of Paris 1208-1219; one of the petitions is for: *decessoribus nostris episcopis et maxime pro episcopo Mauritio et pro episcopo Odone*.<sup>28</sup> The synod was as late as 1209 since there is another petition 'for the king, his wife, for the Lord Louis and his son'. Louis' oldest son, Philip, was born in 1209.<sup>29</sup> We give the complete canon because of its interest from many points of view:

Leclercq, V, 1308; for the date, cf. M. and C. Dickson, 'Le cardinal Robert de Courson. Sa Vie', *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.*, IX (1934), 91.

<sup>23</sup> *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisiensis* (Paris, 1674), p. 21: Item praecipitur singulis Presbyteris quod dicant Episcopo . . . de decimis etc. Item praecipitur omnibus et singulis quod pro domino rege et pro filio suo etc.

<sup>24</sup> *Synidicon* p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> This manuscript is also from the Abbey of St. Victor; it is fully analyzed in: G. Lacombe, 'Studies on the Commentaries of

Cardinal Stephen Langton', *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.*, V (1930), 54-57.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. note 16 *supra*.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. the rules for holding a synod, *supra* p. 88.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. text *infra*.

<sup>29</sup> The reference is more probably to Philip, the oldest son of Louis VIII and Blanche of Castille, born in 1209 and died in 1218. If this were after 1215 the prayer would be for the "sons" of Louis, as Louis IX was born in 1215: cf. *L'art de vérifier les dates* (Paris, 3rd ed., 1783), I, p. 583.

Deinde sequuntur preces pro necessitatibus locorum. Primo pro fabrica ecclesie beate Marie,<sup>30</sup> et pro hospicio Dei,<sup>31</sup> et pro Sancto Victore<sup>32</sup> et pro Sancto Antonio<sup>33</sup> et Sancto Thoma<sup>34</sup> et pro aliis hospitalibus que sunt in ciuitate ista; et [pro] Hermeriis<sup>35</sup> et pro Monte Estiuo<sup>36</sup> et pro Heriuallis,<sup>37</sup> pro Liuriaco,<sup>38</sup> pro Giff,<sup>39</sup> pro Valle Profunda,<sup>40</sup> pro Hedera,<sup>41</sup> pro abbatiis de fossatis<sup>42</sup> et de Latiniaco,<sup>43</sup> de Sancto Maglorio,<sup>44</sup> de Sancto Lazaro,<sup>45</sup> pro ponte de fossatis<sup>46</sup> et de Sancto Clodoaldo,<sup>47a</sup> et pro reclusis istius ciuitatis et pro aliis qui sunt in diocesi; pro pauperibus uerecundis; et deinde pro domino papa et ecclesia Romana et pro archiepiscopis et omnibus ecclesie prelati; deinde pro rege et uxore sua, pro domino Ludouico et filio suo<sup>47</sup> et pro aliis domini regis; pro terra Ierosolimana (*sic*) et Constantinopolitana, pro christianitate de Albigeis et pro succursu faciendo; et fiat mentio de magna remissione peccatorum quam facit dominus papa pro illa terra quia tantum remittitur illis qui se accingunt ad succursum dicte terre quantum uisitantibus sepulchrum domini;<sup>48</sup> deinde pro mortuis uidelicet pro decessoribus nostris episcopis et maxime pro episcopo Mauritio<sup>49</sup> et pro episcopo Odone<sup>50</sup> et pro matre domini regis<sup>51</sup> et regina Elisabeth que hic iacet;<sup>52</sup> pro cantore Petro<sup>53</sup> et aliis personis et canonicis istius ecclesie qui mortui sunt et similiter pro presbiteris istius episcopatus defunctis, item pro animabus parentum nostrorum; deinde pro nobis specialiter uidelicet ut pro nobis specialiter celebrent tres missas, unam de Sancto Spiritu uel de Trinitate, aliam de Beata Virgine, terciam pro mortuis; deinde moneantur ut post absolutionem et benedictionem perceptam preparant ornamenta ecclesie si que sunt benedicenda et corporalia sacrentur si ibi fuerint.<sup>54</sup>

Our manuscript then resumes with seven more of the *communia praecepta*—nos.

<sup>30</sup> The cathedral of Notre Dame, Paris.

<sup>31</sup> Hôtel-Dieu.

<sup>32</sup> Abbey of St. Victor founded 1113; cf. Dom. L. H. Cottineau, *Répertoire topographique des abbayes et prieurés* (Mâcon, 1935-1937), col. 2221-2222.

<sup>33</sup> St-Antoine-des-Champs founded in 1198 by Foulques de Neuilly; Cottineau, 2202.

<sup>34</sup> Unknown but probably a hospital judging from what follows.

<sup>35</sup> Hermeries (Hermeriae); Cottineau, 1407.

<sup>36</sup> Montétif (Notre Dame de Monte Estivo) founded by Maurice de Sully cir. 1164; Cottineau, 1944.

<sup>37</sup> Herivaux (Herivallis); Cottineau, 1406.

<sup>38</sup> Livry-en-l'Aunoy (Livriacum in Alneto); Cottineau, 1630.

<sup>39</sup> Ms. Gift. Val de Gif (Giffense, Givense); Cottineau, 1282. Rigord, *De gestis Philippi Augusti ad annum 1196* (Receuil des historiens XVII), p. 46: Mauricius uererandae memoriae Parisiorum episcopus . . . quatuor abbatias fundauit . . . uidelicet Herivallem, Hermerias, Hederam, Gif.

<sup>40</sup> Valprofond, later Val-de-Grâce in Paris; Cottineau, 2200.

<sup>41</sup> Yverres (Hedera); Cottineau, 3473; Cf. note 39 *supra*.

<sup>42</sup> St-Maur-des-Fossés (Fossatensis) on the Marne; Cottineau, 2800.

<sup>43</sup> Lagny-sur-Marne (Latiniacum ad Matronam); Cottineau, 1538.

<sup>44</sup> St-Magloire, benedictine abbey at Paris; Cottineau, 2214.

<sup>45</sup> St-Lazare, Paris; priory of the Canon Regulars of St. Victor; Cottineau, 2213. Also known as Saint Ladre; cf. A. Longnon,

*Pouillés de la province de Sens* (Receuil des historiens de la France, *Pouillés IV*), p. 363.

<sup>46</sup> Probably a bridge over the Marne near St-Maur-des-Fossés. There seems to be reference to this bridge in the life of Odo of Sully in the *Gallia Christiana* VII (PL 212, 53): Guidoni Fossatensi abbati recognouit nullum praedictum monasterio oriturum ob pontem quem in portu qui dicitur Olins fieri permittebat abbas.

<sup>47a</sup> St-Cloud (St. Chlodoaldus prope Parisois); Cottineau, 2637.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. note 29 *supra*.

<sup>48</sup> Reference to the crusade against the Albigensians and very probably to the letter of Innocent III to the episcopate of France, dated Oct. 9, 1208; (Potthast, 3511), in which he offers full remission of sin to those who join this crusade.

<sup>49</sup> Maurice de Sully, bishop of Paris 1160-1196.

<sup>50</sup> Odo of Sully, bishop of Paris 1196-1208. <sup>51</sup> Adèle of Champagne, mother of Philip Augustus, d. 1206; Cf. Rigord, *De gestis Philippi Augusti* (Receuil des historiens XVII), p. 60.

<sup>52</sup> Elisabeth of Hainault the first wife of Philip Augustus died in 1190 and was buried in Notre Dame; Cf. Rigord, *De gestis Philippi Augusti*, p. 29.

<sup>53</sup> The famous theologian Peter of Rheims, cantor of the church of Paris, known as Peter Cantor, who died September 22, 1197. Cf. I. Jung, 'Pierre le chantré' *Dict. Théol. Cath.* XII, 1901-1906.

<sup>54</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 14,553, fol. fol. 291<sup>va</sup>.

42, 53, 51, 47, 48, 46, 49, and 50 of the Mansi edition. The text ends with a decree on the Quarter Tenses for September.

Our examination of these three manuscripts of the Statutes of Bishop Odo has shown that they contain a common fund of material, namely the decrees on the sacraments and the first seventeen of the *communio praecepta*. For the remainder of these precepts, there are wide variations both in content and order. One manuscript, composed definitely after the death of Odo of Sully, does not contain nos. 18-60 of the *communio praecepta*, and consequently does not have the decree on the elevation. The other two manuscripts do contain this decree, but in one of these (Paris B.N. Lat. 14,443) the order of the *communio praecepta* is quite different from that of Mansi, and both before and after the section containing the decree on the elevation, we find material that seems to be later than 1208.<sup>65</sup>

## II. EVIDENCE FROM OTHER SOURCES

In an earlier number of this review,<sup>66</sup> when dealing with the problem of the moment of consecration and its relation to the elevation of the host, we pointed out that Robert Courson was teaching as late as 1204-1207 a theory quite inconsistent with the practice of showing the host for the adoration of the people immediately after the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. Following in the footsteps of his master, Peter Cantor, he maintained that the two forms act together to produce the transsubstantiation of both the bread and the wine and that one cannot be sure that anything has been effected in the middle point before the pronouncement of the second form: *Hic est enim calix* etc. We repeat here the essential part of his text:

Unde quamvis quidam presumptuose asserunt et sine omni auctoritate quod una confectio possit sine altera, tamen nolumus hic aliquid asserere; immo dicimus cum Cantore magistro nostro quod in medio illo tempore non est asserendum quod corpus Christi sit confectum neque ideo est negandum. Solus enim deus vel cui inspiravit novit utrum illud sit verum. Hoc tamen asserimus quod cum utriusque forme prolatio completa est, tunc utrumque confectum est et una confectio ex altera pendet . . .<sup>67</sup>

It is indeed very difficult to imagine that one of the most prominent Parisian theologians would persist in this view after the official authority of the diocese had decreed the elevation of the host immediately after the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*.

Stephen Langton, whose *Quaestiones* date from about the same period,<sup>68</sup> was a firm believer in the theory of the separate consecration of the bread and the wine.<sup>69</sup> To prove his point that the bread is actually consecrated by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* he cites the practice of genuflecting when these words are said:

Sed secundum hoc quare flectamus genua in prolatione prime forme cum nulla sit transsubstantiatio? Nobis videtur quod prius fiat transsubstantiatio

<sup>65</sup> The Constitutions of Gualo precede the decree; these are most likely later than July 1208, the date of the death of Odo of Sully, since Gualo received his commission as legate from Innocent III only on May 29, 1208; cf. note 16 *supra*.

<sup>66</sup> V. L. Kennedy, 'The Moment of Consecration and the Elevation of the Host', *Mediaeval Studies*, VI (1944), 121-150.

<sup>67</sup> For the complete text and the application of Courson's doctrine to the problem involved, cf. *ibid.* 144-147.

<sup>68</sup> They were composed before 1206, but may have been re-worked after that date; cf. G. Lacombe, A. Landgraf, 'The Quaestiones of Cardinal Stephen Langton', *New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 115-164; A. L. Gregory, 'Indices of Rubrics and Incipits . . . of the Quaestiones of Stephen Langton', *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.*, V (1930), 220-226.

<sup>69</sup> Langton's teaching on this point will be found in: Kennedy, *art. cit.*, *Mediaeval Studies*, VI (1944), 135-138.

sub una forma quam sub alia et in prolatione prime forme transsubstantiatur panis in corpus Christi, in prolatione secunde forme transsubstantiatur vinum in sanguinem tamen sub utraque forma est totus Christus.<sup>59</sup>

Had the practice existed at that time of elevating the host for the adoration of the faithful, immediately after the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, would not that fact been even a better argument for Stephen Langton?

In our previous article on the moment of consecration, we assumed that the decree on the elevation was the work of Bishop Odo. On that basis and taking into consideration Courson's teaching and Langton's silence in regard to the elevation, we concluded that the decree must have been enacted as late as 1205 to 1208.<sup>60</sup> It may be that the real explanation is that the introduction of the elevation is not the work of Odo. There are, however, a number of facts that still remain to be presented here; some tend to confirm the traditional view, others to deny it. Let us first see when we are on absolutely sure ground in regard to the practice of the elevation of the host at Paris quite independently of the decree assigned to Bishop Odo.

William of Auxerre seems to refer to the practice in his *Summa Aurea* written between 1215 and 1220. He asks the question: Whether they who are in mortal sin, sin gravely, if they look at the host? He answers in the negative and states that many petitions are heard *in ipsa visione Corporis Christi*.<sup>61</sup> In his *Summa de officiis ecclesiasticis*, probably written about the same time, William's testimony is explicit; and the reason he gives for the elevation is the same as in the Parisian decree 'that the faithful may see'.

Verba domini dicens virtute quorum convertitur panis et vinum in carnem et sanguinem et nota quod sub utraque specie est totus Christus. Quo facto sacerdos elevat Corpus Christi ut omnes fideles videant et petant quod prosit ad salutem.<sup>62</sup>

If we date these treatises as early as possible, we may say that we are reasonably sure of the existence of the practice of elevating the host at Paris as early as 1215. Can we go back further? It is very difficult to be sure because the term *elevatio corporis Christi* does not always refer to our present practice. As is well known it was the practice, long before the time of Odo of Sully, to raise the host to some height while saying over it the words of consecration.<sup>63</sup> As a consequence we sometimes find expressions that would seem to indicate the existence of the elevation, but it is not the elevation in our sense of the term. Let us take, for example, the *Statuta* of the Cistercian Order; in the year 1152 they prescribe:

Quando campana pulsatur in elevatione hostiae salutis omnis petat veniam praeter eos qui sunt in dormitorio.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 138.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 147.

<sup>61</sup> *Summa Aurea* (Paris, Pigouchet, 1500), fol. 290<sup>v</sup>-291<sup>r</sup>: Utrum peccant mortaliter aspiciendo corpus christi et tangendo illi qui sunt in mortali peccato . . . Solutio. Ad primo ergo obiectum dicimus quod aspicere corpus christi non est peccatum immo bonum est quia cum caritas, ut dicit Augustinus, idem sit quod desiderium videndi deum et fruendi deo, aspicere corpus christi provocativum est ad dilectionem dei, unde huiusmodi aspicere exercitatur et preparatur ad dilectionem, et multorum petitiones ex-

audiuntur in ipsa visione corporis christi, unde multis infunditur tunc gratia.

<sup>62</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 14.145, fol. 45<sup>v</sup>. On the work and author, cf. R. M. Martineau, 'La Summa de officiis ecclesiasticis de Guillaume d'Auxerre', *Etudes d'histoire litt. et doct.*, II (1932), 25-58.

<sup>63</sup> On this point, cf. E. Dumoutet, *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), pp. 46-48; P. Browe, *Die Verehrung der Eucharistie im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1933), pp. 29ff.

<sup>64</sup> J. Canivez, *Statuta Capitulum Generalium Ordinis Cisterciensis I* (Louvain, 1933), p. 49.

In the year 1210:

In elevatione Corporis Christi omnes petant veniam et tamdiu sic maneant donec post consecrationem sanguinis sacerdos eleuet manus suas.<sup>65</sup>

In the year 1215:

Quando minor campana pulsatur in elevatione hostiae salutaris, in missis de conventu, omnes qui pulsationem audierint, flectant genua praeter eos qui in dormitorio fuerint, orationem quam deus inspiraverit facientes.<sup>66</sup>

In the year 1232:

In elevatione hostiae salutaris, consecratione peracta, hostia aliquantulum elevetur, ut videri possit.<sup>67</sup>

We should like to submit that only in the last instance, where it states specifically that the host is to be elevated so as to be seen, do we have sure evidence of the elevation as we understand it now, and as it was understood by the Parisian synod.

In his handbook on the divine services composed about 1210-1213,<sup>68</sup> Peter of Roissy, chancellor of Chartres, has a short paragraph on the question: What should we say when the priest elevates the host? In his answer he gives the various pious practices of his day but he seems to place the elevation of the host during the consecratory prayer and not after it:

In his prefatis verbis levat hostiam sacerdos cum dicit: *Accepit panem in s. et. v. m. s. Unde mos est laudabilis in ecclesia ut omnes iunctis manibus ad terram prosternant se quia tunc venit dominus super altare et cum reverentia et honore debent eum suscipere dicentes cum propheta: Domine miserere nostri etc.*<sup>69</sup>

It was precisely to avoid the danger of material idolatry inherent in this practice of showing the host during the consecration prayer, that the Parisian synod forbade the raising of the host until after the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. Peter of Roissy is a witness that the new type of elevation prescribed at Paris had not yet reached the neighboring diocese of Chartres by 1210-1213. Nor does any council or synod, other than that of Paris, deal with the matter before 1215—the earliest possible date for the Constitutions of the diocese of London.<sup>70</sup>

It may help to fix the date of the Parisian decree on the elevation if we consider one other statute ascribed to Bishop Odo. The twenty-second of the *communia praecepta* deals with the problem which arises when the priest forgets to put wine and water in the chalice and notices the omission only when he has finished the Canon of the Mass. The parisian synod gives a solution which is based on the same theological position which underlies the decree on the elevation, namely that the bread is fully consecrated once the priest has said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. The priest is instructed by the synod to supply the deficiency of wine and water and to repeat the Canon from the words: *Simili modo*, i.e. the consecration of the chalice. It is not necessary to repeat the consecratory form over the bread:

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 369.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 434.

<sup>67</sup> *Statuta Capitulorum* II (1934), p. 101.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. V. L. Kennedy, 'The Handbook of Master Peter Chancellor of Chartres', *Mediaeval Studies*, V (1943), 1-38.

<sup>69</sup> The complete text is given in the article mentioned in the previous note.

<sup>70</sup> R. M. Woolley, 'Constitutions of the Dio-

cese of London c. 1215-22', *English Historical Review*, XXX (1915), 293: Caveant sibi sacerdotes ne elevent hostiam sed caute teneant eam ante pectus suum quousque protulerunt hec verba, 'Hoc est corpus meum', quia si forte prius elevent circumstantes potius creaturam adorarent quam creatorem.

Si negligentia evenerit ut, perlecto Canone et peracta consecratione nec vinum nec aqua reperiatur in calice, debet statim infundi utrumque, et sacerdos reiterabit consecrationem ab illo loco Canonis: *Simili modo posteaquam coenatum est usque ad finem . . .*<sup>71</sup>

In view of the fact that the two decrees are based on the same theory of the moment of consecration, it is quite possible that both are the work of the same synod. If they are of different date, the order in which they come indicates the priority of the decree on the problem of the deficiency of the wine and water; this latter is no. 22 of the *communia praecepta*, the decree on the elevation is no. 28.

Now it is interesting to note that Robert of Flamborough, canon-penitentiary of the Abbey of St. Victor, Paris, deals with this problem of the wine and water in his *Penitential* written between 1209 and 1215.<sup>72</sup> His solution is quite different from that of the Parisian synod, and in fact he shows no indication that he ever heard of the synod's ruling in this matter. He advises the priest caught in this dilemma to repeat the whole Canon, and even suggests that it would be safer if he placed a new host on the altar when he puts the wine and water in the chalice:

Item in altari non numquam accidit quod super panem canone prolato in calice nihil reperitur; consulunt ergo quod vinum cum aqua in calicem infundatur et priori pane retento incipiat sacerdos: *Te igitur* et ordinate usque in finem prosequatur. Hoc ideo dicunt quia sacramenti altaris duplex est forma, vocalis scilicet verba ipsa sic prolata ut debent, forma realis panis et vinum, et ubicumque aliquod istorum trium deest vel aliud quod est de substantia sacramenti vel ordinis vel consecrationis vel benedictionis nihil actum est. Mihi tutius videtur quod novus panis apponatur sicut novum vinum et missa ordinate completa, panis prior extra altare per totam missam cum reverentia conservatus ab alia persona cum reverentia sumatur.<sup>73</sup>

We simply cannot imagine a man in Robert's position ignoring the ruling of the bishop of Paris in this matter and we can only conclude that this particular decree is later than 1209 to say the least.

When we come to the *Penitential* of Peter of Poitiers, also a canon of St. Victor's, we find in that treatise, composed shortly after 1215,<sup>74</sup> two solutions to this problem, one of which corresponds to the decree of the Parisian synod. He does not refer specifically to that decree but he implies that he is familiar with a synodal ruling since he states that priests should, if their synodal statutes do not rule on such matters, consult wiser men or their bishop, or follow the custom of their diocese:

Si vero sacra (facta?) consecratione super hostiam deprehendatur non esse vinum in calice, imponatur cum aqua. Secundum quosdam debet continuare ab illo loco: *Simili modo . . .* Secundum alios iterari debent omnia verba consecrationis . . . Si hec et alia sacerdotibus necessaria non promulgantur in synodis vel non continentur in eorum scriptis consulendi sunt ab eis periti in dubiis casibus et maxime sui prelati et consuetudines episcopatum attende.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> *Synodicon Ecclesiae Parisensis* pp. 14-15; PL 212, 64-65.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. notes 14 and 15 *supra*.

<sup>73</sup> Arsenal 526, fol. 10<sup>rb</sup>-10<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. note 12 *supra*.

<sup>75</sup> A. Teetaert, 'Le Liber Poenitentialis de Pierre de Poitiers', *Beiträge*, Supp. III, 1 (1935), 323.

It would then seem a safe inference to draw that the Parisian decree on the procedure to be followed in the Mass when the wine and water have been forgotten must be dated somewhere between the composition of the Penitential of Robert of Flamborough and that of Peter of Poitiers. Since Robert certainly wrote after the death of Bishop Odo, it would appear that, not Odo but his successor, Peter of Nemours is responsible for this particular decree. If that be true, the chances are that the decree on the elevation should likewise be assigned to Bishop Peter.

To sum up. The evidence of the manuscripts which we have examined lead us to believe that the *communia praecepta*, published by Mansi as parts of the statutes of Bishop Odo, are the work of several synods, and that some of these decrees—including the one on the elevation—are later than 1208 the year in which Odo died. This evidence is confirmed from other sources. Neither Courson, nor Langton, nor Peter of Roissy seem to know of the elevation as prescribed by the Parisian synod; the parallel, and perhaps earlier, decree—no. 22—seems unknown to Robert of Flamborough about 1210; no other council or synod deals with the question of the elevation before 1215.

Until such time as we have a critical text of the statutes of Paris and can determine exactly what belongs to Bishop Odo's time, we hesitate to draw any hard and fast conclusion, but the indications are that, not Odo of Sully but, Peter of Nemours should be given the credit for the introduction of our present form of the elevation into the Mass.



## Caxton's *Golden Legend* and De Vignai's *Légende Dorée*

SISTER MARY JEREMY O.P.

IN his edition of the great mediaeval compilation of saints' lives, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Varagine, William Caxton augmented by about one-third the original Latin.<sup>1</sup> Much of the new material was drawn from two translations, one French and one English, which he used in addition to the text of Varagine.<sup>2</sup> Among these three versions, the French translation is of notable importance since Caxton's edition frequently follows it in omissions, errors, and additions to the original material of the *Legenda*. It is the purpose of the present study to demonstrate the influence of this redaction upon Caxton's *Golden Legend*, his most ambitious undertaking as translator, editor, and printer.

That early French translations of the *Legenda Aurea* were rather numerous is a fact not often mentioned. Paul Meyer, in a list which he admits is probably not complete, notes six versions.<sup>3</sup> Two among these are of special interest. The first is a complete translation which appears to go back to the end of the thirteenth or the beginning of the fourteenth century. Two copies exist, one belonging to the Seminary of Puy-en-Velay, the other to the Bibliothèque Nationale (fr. 20330). From this version numerous borrowings were made by the compilers of three manuscripts all ascribed to Jean "Belet" or "Beleth".<sup>4</sup> The saints' lives contained in these "Belet" manuscripts are not all taken from the *Legenda Aurea*. M. Meyer concludes that the most important of the various sources of these three compilations was a complete translation of the *Legenda* made by a Jean Belet otherwise unknown. While the Puy-en-Velay and Bibliothèque Nationale manuscripts do not contain the name of the translator, it seems reasonable to suppose that the version they contain is in fact the work of this Jean Belet, the rapprochement between this version and the miscellaneous compilations ascribed to Belet being so very close. Great confusion has resulted from the fact that the obscure translator, Jean Belet, has the same name as the well-known theologian whose *Summa de Divinis Officiis*, written in the twelfth century, contains a series of abbreviated lives of the saints and is often quoted by Varagine.<sup>5</sup>

A second translation of importance is a very literal one made about the second quarter of the fourteenth century. This version is of primary significance in the study not only of Caxton's version but of the English prose translation which

<sup>1</sup> For the relationship between the plan, content, and detail of Caxton's version and the text of Varagine, see S. M. Jeremy, 'Caxton's *Golden Legend* and Varagine's *Legenda Aurea*', *Speculum* XXI (1946), 212-221.

<sup>2</sup> For the identification and description of these translations, see Pierce Butler, *Legenda Aurea, Légende Dorée, Golden Legend* (Johns Hopkins University, Dissertation, Baltimore, 1899), *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> P. Meyer, 'Notice du Med-Pal. 141 de la laurentienne', *Romania* XXXIII (1904), 3-5. For Meyer's analyses of these manuscripts, see *Bulletin de la société des anciens textes français* (Paris, 1897), pp. 39-85; and 1902, pp. 68-96. Omitted from Meyer's list is B.N.

fr. 1054, a nearly complete translation described by Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>4</sup> P. Meyer, 'Notice sur trois légendiers français attribués à Jean Belet', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits* XXXVI (second part, 1899), 409-485. When M. Meyer was writing this study, he did not yet know of the Puy-en-Velay and B.N. manuscripts of the complete version.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 409, note, for evidence that the name Belet was not uncommon in Normandy and in England. See also Meyer's review of Butler's *Golden Legend, Romania* XXIX (1900), 292-294. Note that Butler's discussion of the Belet manuscripts has been superseded by M. Meyer's studies.

preceded it.<sup>6</sup> The French work must have been completed before 1348, since it was dedicated to Jeanne de Bourgogne who died in that year. It is curious that, as in the case of the Belet translation, a confusion of names has created some misconceptions about the identity of the translator. There were two men bearing the name Jehan de Vignai: one, a grammarian, is the author of *Margarita Philosophiarum*; the other, a hospitaller of Saint Jacques du Haut-Pas, is the translator of the *Legenda Aurea*.<sup>7</sup> Meyer, who implies that the *Legenda* is unworthy of its panegyric title and that all the French versions are mediocre, believes that Vignai's is the worst of all: *mot à mot inintelligent et dépourvu de style*.<sup>8</sup> In its original form this translation follows the arrangement of the Latin text as printed by Graesse, omitting very little and adding nothing.<sup>9</sup> The oldest Vignai manuscript, B.N. fr. 241 (formerly 6888) is apparently representative of the earliest, unamplified form of the hospitaller's translation.<sup>10</sup> By 1402 a new list of legends had been added to the original, but the translation is still ascribed to Vignai. B.N. fr. 242 (formerly 6888<sup>2</sup>) is a representative of this group. Arrangement and content are similar to those of B.N. fr. 241 until after the *Dedication of a Church*, which is the last chapter of the original Varagine material. At this point the following passage occurs:

Cy apres commence la table et les Rubriques des festes nouvelles selon l'usage de paris, translatees de latin en francois par un maistre en theologie de lordre de nostre dame du carme. Lan mil quatre cens et deux.

It is not necessary to list the new legends here, but it should be observed that some of them—for example, *S. Peronelle* and *SS. Nazarian and Celsus*—are simply duplicates of those already in the original, i.e. Varagine portions of the manuscripts, while others that deal with identical saints are entirely different in content, e.g., *S. Donast* and *S. Amand*.<sup>11</sup>

The third form in which the Vignai version appears is that wherein the traditional order of the chapters is altered and still more new legends are incorporated. Varagine had followed the liturgical calendar; his first six chapter-headings will show the arrangement of sanctoral and seasonal commemorations: *De adventu Domini*, *De sancto Andrea apostolo*, *De sancto Nicolao*, *De sancta Lucia virgine*, *De sancto Thoma apostolo*, *De nativitate domini nostri Jesu Christi*, etc. In the revised Vignai the temporal cycle, *proprium de tempore*, is separated from the sanctoral cycle, *proprium de sanctis*. The legends for Advent, the Nativity, the Circumcision, Epiphany, Septuagesima, etc., are grouped at the

<sup>6</sup>For a suggested identification of the translator of the pre-Caxton English version, see S. M. Jeremy, 'The English Prose Translation of *Legenda Aurea*' *Modern Language Notes* LIX, 3 (March, 1944), 181-183.

<sup>7</sup>B. Hauréau et al., *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXX, (Paris, 1733 sqq.) 280-293; U. Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge: Bio-Bibliographie* II, (Paris, 1905), p. 2507; P. Meyer [Review of] *The Aesopic Fables in the Miroir historique de Jehan de Vignay* by G. E. Snaveley, *Romania* XXXVIII (1909), 476-477. The last article exposes erroneous identification of the two Vignais.

<sup>8</sup>P. Meyer, 'Notice du MS Med-Pal. 141' *Romania* XXXIII (1904), 6.

<sup>9</sup>T. Graesse, *Jacobi a Voragine Legenda Aurea Vulgo Historia Lombardica Dicta* (Dresden and Leipzig, 1846). Numerals im-

mediately following quotations or citations from Varagine refer to pages in this edition. P. Butler, *Golden Legend*, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup>P. Paris, *Les Manuscrits français de la bibliothèque du roi II*, (Paris, 1838), p. 254. Other manuscripts of this type are B.M. Royal 19 B xvii; B.M. Add. 16907; B.M. Egerton 645.

<sup>11</sup>Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40, lists the forty-two new chapters found in this manuscript and suggests, pp. 40-41, that the edition printed by Bartholomew Buyer at Lyons in 1476 may be based on the same translation. The colophon attributes the work to "maistre Jehan Battalier, docteur en la sainte theologie a Paris, de l'ordre des Precheurs de la ville de Lion." The new legends are introduced by the statement that they are the work of "un maistre en theologie de l'ordre de notre Dame du Carme."

beginning; then come four chapters on the Mass, a chapter on the ten commandments, and one on the twelve articles of faith. This portion of the work is followed by saints' legends arranged according to the sanctoral cycle, beginning with Saint Andrew and ending with the Dedication of a Church. After this feast, which concludes the ecclesiastical year, come forty-five chapters set down without regard to the church calendar. All but a few of these additional legends have appeared in the earlier French versions. The distinction of this translation lies not in its incorporation of new legends, but in the alteration of content. As will be shown presently, Caxton's use of this version accounts for many notable differences between his *Legend* and the original Latin.

This work, which still goes under the name of the Vignai, or more properly, the revised Vignai translation, is found in two manuscripts and two printed books. British Museum Stowe 50-51, written in the late fifteenth century, is complete, with two hundred and thirty-six legends.<sup>12</sup> Fitzwilliam 22, (Cambridge) written in 1480, is incomplete, ending with the title for the feast of Saint Valerian (fol. 266).<sup>13</sup> The two printed copies are also in England, one in the British Museum (number 1275 h.3.) the other in the University of Cambridge (University Library, number A.B. i 17).

The British Museum catalogue dates its printed Vignai 1480 with a query. The absence of a printer's name, date and place of publication has presented an interesting problem to bibliographers. That the paper was fabricated at Troyes seems evident from the water-mark, the arms of France with a T pendant—not a cross as the British Museum catalogue states.<sup>14</sup> M. Claudin at one time believed that the volume came from the atelier of Pierre César (*alias* Petrus Keyser) and Jean Stoll who owned the second printing press in Paris between 1474 and 1479, but according to F. S. Ellis, he has since changed his opinion.<sup>15</sup>

Butler believes that the British Museum printed Vignai copy was made from the Stowe manuscript with which it is practically identical, some of the same errors occurring in each.<sup>16</sup> That the Cambridge book is also from the same press seems evident from various similarities. In both books the titles of the chapters on Saints Sebastian, Losmer, and Donat are omitted from the table of contents but are in the text; in both books after the life of Saint Waudrut, with which the first volume of the manuscript ends, a blank space of nearly a leaf is left in the printed copies so as to begin the next life at the beginning of a new page; both books omit from the etymology of Saint Vitus the word *vie*. (The Stowe manuscript reads: *Vy est dit de vie*.)<sup>17</sup>

That this late form of the Vignai translation, not the *lourd mais exact* version in its unrevised form, was Caxton's French source is obvious from a comparison

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-46, for a description of the manuscript.

<sup>13</sup> For description see M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Fitzwilliam Museum* (Cambridge, 1895), pp. 43-51. Apparently Butler did not know of this manuscript.

<sup>14</sup> A. Claudin, *Histoire de l'imprimerie en France au XV<sup>e</sup> et au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* I, (Paris, 1901), p. 204, note. Caxton himself used paper with this water-mark. See S. Sotheby, *Principia Typographica* III, (London, 1858), pp. 83-104.

<sup>15</sup> Claudin, *op. cit.*, I, p. 202; II, pp. 379 ff. F. S. Ellis, *The Golden Legend or Lives of the Saints as Englished by William Caxton* VII, (London, 1931), p. 292. (All references to Caxton's *Golden Legend* are

to this edition, volume and page numbers following quotation immediately.) Mlle. Pellechet does not include the printed Vignai in question in her article, 'Jacques de Voragine: Liste des éditions de ses ouvrages publiées au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Revue des bibliothèques* V (1895) 89 ff., 225 ff. See also R. F. Seybolt, 'Fifteenth Century Editions of the *Legenda Aurea*', *Speculum* XXI (1946) 333, item 117.

<sup>16</sup> Butler, *Golden Legend*, pp. 44, 93-95. I am dependent on his description and extracts from the Stowe Ms. and the B.M. printed Vignai. I have used a microfilm of the Cambridge book for all quotations from the revised Vignai.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

of various passages in his work with the corresponding ones in the revised Vignai translation and the earlier, unrevised form of the work. To this late and free redaction of the *Legenda*, the production of an unknown writer, the English printer was indebted for the arrangement and general plan, the chapters on the Mass, the articles of faith, thirty-five new French or Dutch saints, and a great mass of miscellaneous material not found in the original *Legenda*.

Caxton probably used a manuscript of the revised Vignai version rather than one of the printed books. The reviser, as has been said, added many details not found in the Latin of Varagine or in the pre-Caxton English translation. In several places, notably in the life of Saint John the Evangelist, the printed book omits, probably by accident, portions of these interpolations.<sup>18</sup> When they are found given in full by Caxton, it seems safe to conclude that his French source was a manuscript which contained them. I should surmise that his manuscript also contained a life of Saint Margaret. This legend is missing from the Stowe manuscript and the printed books, and Caxton's version of it contains many details not found in Varagine or the earlier English translation.

Caxton's *Golden Legend* leaves out some material which had appeared in Varagine.<sup>19</sup> Examination of the Cambridge printed book shows a remarkable similarity between the English printer's omissions and those of the French reviser. The rejected passages include narrative episodes (chiefly variants of incidents already related) panegyric material, citation of authorities, scriptural quotations, controversial or doctrinal dialogues, and, most important of all, expressions of incredulity. It appears that Caxton nearly always followed his French model rather than the earlier English translator who almost invariably retained such passages. One concludes, then, that in omitting material, Caxton was not governed by personal preferences but was simply following the revised Vignai translation.

Of eight legends which are briefer in Caxton than in Varagine, six are alike in the French and in the printer's version.<sup>20</sup> Caxton's *S. John Chrysostom*, however, follows the Latin closely except for the omission of one long passage which the revised Vignai gives in full. In *S. Austin, Doctor*, Caxton omits a number of miracles which are found in his French source, but notes the omission with the words: "Many other miracles hath God showed by his life and also after his death, which were overlong to write in this book, for they would, I suppose, contain a book as much as all this and more . . ." (V, 65)<sup>21</sup>

A number of passages in Caxton definitely misrepresent the original Latin. For this distortion the French translator must bear much, though by no means all, of the blame. It is, I think, fair to say that for every ten errors transmitted by Caxton from the French, he adds one of his own. The total should be sufficiently impressive to deter scholars who are tempted to quote Caxton rather than Varagine in references to the *Legenda Aurea*.

Some types of mistake are traceable to his imperfect comprehension of the French. When, for example, the Latin *vel* and *sive* are rendered *where*, it is clear that the French translation has intervened and that the printer has

<sup>18</sup> All between "And then after this" (II, 169) and "S. John wrote his gospels," (II, 173).

<sup>19</sup> See S. M. Jeremy, 'Caxton's *Golden Legend* and Varagine's *Legenda Aurea*', *Speculum* XXI (1946), 212-221.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>21</sup> The earlier English translation apparently furnished Caxton's model for this sentence: "meny a noble and glorious miracle this holi seinte dide bi the goodnes

of our lorde in his life and aftir his dethe whiche wer to longe to be write in this litil volume for hit conteyneth more than al this booke wher fore I leue at this tyme . . ." (fols. 312-313) All references to the pre-Caxton English translation are to *Harleian Ms 4775*. Because the scribal numbering is very often inaccurate, I use the Library of Congress pagination in MLA rotograph 343.

misunderstood *ou*. This error occurs in the *Circumcision* where Varagine's *Vel duo primi dies* (85) is translated "where the first two days" (I, 39). The translation of *ubi* as *or* points to the same confusion between *ou* and *ou*. The most striking example of this sort of error is seen in *The Dedication of the Temple* in the translation of the passage:

"Mens enim sancti viri, ut dicit Gregorius, dolore afficitur considerando, ubi fuit, ubi erit, ubi est, et ubi non est. Ubi fuit, inquit: in peccato; ubi erit: in iudicio; ubi est: in miseria; ubi non est: in gloria." (856)

The first part of the quotation is correctly translated, but the remainder is rendered: "Or he was said in sin; or he shall be in judgment; or he is in maleurte; and there is where is no joy." (I, 166) Another error pointing to the use of the French appears in the *Assumption of Our Lady* where the words: "there were two hundred and twenty tapers" (IV, 258) stand for the Latin: *Aderant CXX virgines*. (519) Here obviously *vierges* has been read *cierges*. In the etymological introduction to *S. Marcel*, Caxton's meaningless "his confuse" (II, 223) represents the Latin *sonus confusus* (103). His misunderstanding of the French *son confus* is reflected in this mistake. The puzzling translation of *si scribas* (81) as "if thou be Christ" (I, 32) is explained by his reading *si tu es* as four words.

The following group of representative errors will illustrate the influence of Caxton's often unreliable French model. For purposes of comparison I give also the original Latin and the pre-Caxton English translation:

| Varagine  | Pre-Caxton English  | Revised Vignai  | Caxton   |
|---|---|---|--|
| radiavit (230)  | shined (fol. 120)   | habonde   | aboundeth (I, 78)  |
| a capite fons<br>olei et a pedibus<br>fons aquae profluxit<br>(26)  | a feire wel of Oile<br>sprang out at his<br>hede and another<br>of water at his feet<br>(fol. 7)  | vne fontaine doille<br>decourut du cheues<br>iusques aux pies   | a fountain of oil<br>sprang out from the<br>head unto his feet<br>(II, 117)                            |
| Totiens in oratione<br>genua flexerat, ut<br>callos in genibus<br>sicut in calcaneis<br>videretur habere<br>(296) | And also he kneled<br>so ofte in his pray-<br>ers that the skynne<br>of his knees were<br>as harde as the solis<br>of his ffete (fol.<br>150) | Il sagementouloit si<br>souuent en oroisons<br>que ses genoulx es-<br>toient aussi durs<br>comme de camel | He knelt so oft<br>in prayers that his<br>knees were as hard<br>as the horns of a<br>camel. (III, 159) |
| Postmodum ingen-<br>tem massam veri<br>auri reperit, sed ut<br>incendium aurum<br>fugit (105)                     | ... but it was as it<br>had be brennyng<br>fire (fol. 42)   | ... quil prist et le<br>getta ou feu  | ... which he took<br>and cast it into<br>the fire and anon it<br>vanished away. (II,<br>226)           |
| porci (758)   | hoggis (fol. 435)   | les pos   | pots (VI, 220)   |
| pulvinar (580)  | Pilowe (fol. 316)   | platine   | platter (V, 88)  |
| expavit (208)   | was a ferde<br>(fol. 106)   | et tantost trespassa  | and died anon. (III,<br>87)  |
| instruxit (829)   | taught (fol. 486)   | introduist  | introduced (VII,<br>114)   |
| cum quidam vir<br>quoddam flagitium<br>perpetrasset (253)   | Ther was a man had<br>do right a greuous<br>sinne (fol. 128)  | ... qui estoit grief-<br>ment mesfait   | ... a man who<br>was grievously mis-<br>made. (III, 116)   |

# MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

|  |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|
| super glaciem (573)  | vppon a tyme (fol. 214)   | a leaue   | upon the water (V, 75)  |
| Si merito prae omnibus Mariae venti, tanta est gratia donata, et gratia mortuae erit minuenda? (527) | for so moche grace is yeue to Marie in her lyvinge bi her desert than shold that grace be lessid (MS blessed) to her affir her dethe (fol. 292) | car par la desserte de marie tant de grace est donnee a lomme viuant sera donc la grace a peticee a celle morte | If by the desert of Mary is given to living men much grace, shall then the grace be lessed to her being dead? (IV, 270) |
| non esse conveniens maledicto legis, obnoxium oblationem domino legis offerre (587)                  | it was not fitting ne couenabill that any man whiche was cursid in the lawe shulde make any offering to oure lorde (fol. 321)                   | que ce nestoit pas chose convenable que ung homme maudist en la foy feist offerande a nostre seigneur           | it was convenable that a man cursed in the faith should not offer to our Lord (V, 100)                                  |

Having considered the French translation as a source of some of Caxton's errors, I come now to its more important character—as a source for his numerous interpolations. The lesser types of expansion, explanatory, transitional, summarizing, are frequently but not always modeled on the revised Vignai although they sometimes appear to be suggested by it. A few examples will illustrate these minor augmentations:

| Varagine   | Pre-Caxton English   | Revised Vignai  | Caxton  |
|--|--|---|---|
| divina more solito non celebraret (367)  | songe not his masse as he was wonte to doo (fol. 217)  | ne chantoit point si comme il soloit  | sang no mass and did not divine service solemnly as he was wont to do (IV, 10)  |
| Tertio propter nostram instructionem ut scilicet magnam poenam post hanc vitam infligi peccantibus cognoscamus, sicut Parisiis contigisse legitur, ut ait cantor Parisiensis (731) | Thridli for our instruccionn that we knowe how grete peine there is araied to sinneris aftr this dethe of the bodie Narracio Hit bi felle at Paris so as the Chauncelor of Paris toolde . . . (fol. 417) | Tiercement cest pour notre infirmite cest a ce que nous sachons que grant-paine est appareillee aux pecheurs apres ceste mortelle vie. Si comme il aduint a paris si comme le chantre de paris dist | Thirdly, for our infirmity, that is, that we know what great pain is made ready to sinners after this mortal life. Also divers places be deputed to divers souls for our instruction, as it happened at Paris. There was a master which was chancellor at Paris . . . (VI, 114) |
| in equuleo . . . distentus (712)   | vppon the turmente that is callid Eculee (fol. 403)  | et fut estendu ou tourment de culee   | and was strained on the eculee, an instrument to torment saints on (VI, 82)   |
| stercus involutum diceretur (532)  | . . . al by wrappid in stynginge filthe (fol. 295)   | lui dist quelle estoit vne ordure puant enuelopee   | a foul ordure stinking, wrapped in gay array (V, 20)  |
| Quapropter ad lep-<br>rosorum habitacula<br>properat et eorum<br>manus devote oscu-  | for whiche thinge he went to the dwellinge of pore menn and of sike  | pour laquelle chose il ala a la habitation des malades et baisoit deuotement  | wherefore he went to the habitation of the lazars and kissed devoutly their   |

|                              |  |  |   |
|------------------------------|--|--|---|
| lans pecuniam donat<br>(663) | menn and kissid<br>deuoutelie her hon-<br>dis and yaffe hem<br>moneie (fol. 369) | leur mains et leur<br>donnoit de la pec-<br>une et ne les lais-<br>soit en nulle neces-<br>site de ce quil<br>pouoit | hands and gave to<br>them money, and<br>let them have no<br>need of such as he<br>might do (V, 216) |
|------------------------------|--|--|---|

The foregoing expansions are relatively unimportant in that they merely develop the implications of the original Latin. The Vignai reviser is, however, responsible for another and highly significant class of interpolation. In the case of at least thirteen legends his text—and, as a consequence, Caxton's—contains material not found in the *Legenda Aurea*.

Varagine wrote nineteen legends based on the *Vitae Patrum*,<sup>22</sup> some coming directly therefrom and some through the *Speculum Historiale*.<sup>23</sup> His versions (except for *Thais*, which is extremely short in the original) are condensed. In Caxton's work, the accounts of four saints, Paul the first Hermit, Eugenia, Mary of Egypt, and Paula, differ from Varagine's. Dr. Constance Rosenthal has pointed out some of these divergencies. In *S. Paul*, Caxton names both Decius and Valerianus as persecutors, while Varagine mentions only the former. He also adds the sentence: "In this time, Saint Paul tofore said, was young, about sixteen years of age, and dwelt in Thebaid, which is a part of Egypt, with his sister Maurice." (II, 205) Caxton likewise includes the story of Anthony's journey across the desert for the cloak of Athanasius and his speech to his companions when he returns. As none of this is in Varagine, Dr. Rosenthal believes that Caxton perhaps consulted the longer account in the *Vitae Patrum* and drew therefrom the foregoing details.<sup>24</sup> They are, however, all found in the Vignai revision, which also accounts for Paul's sister "Maurice". The Latin phrase from the *Vitae Patrum*: cum sorore jam viro tradita<sup>25</sup> is the source of the French *mariee* which was misread as a proper name.

Caxton's second departure from the *Legenda* version of the *Vitae Patrum* material is his repeating under a separate caption the story of Eugenia, which is included in the legend of Prothus and Jacinthus (II, 151-152; V, 120-125). In this he was merely following the Vignai reviser.

Details which may be added to those listed by Dr. Rosenthal appear in the legends of Paula and Mary of Egypt. Caxton's sentence: "When she was passed, as said is, her lips ne her face were not pale, but was as reverent to look on as she had yet been alive" (III, 8) has no counterpart in Varagine but is translated from the French. The Vignai reviser found the detail in Jerome: *Quodque mirum sit, nihil pallor mutaverat faciem, sed ita dignitas quaedam et gravitas ora compleverat, ut eam putares non mortuam, sed dormientem*.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, the account of the mourning of the poor, ". . . all the poor people of the country, which plained that they had lost their good mother that had

<sup>22</sup> The title *Vitae Patrum* was first attributed to a collection of lives written by Saint Jerome: "An anthology of works written in or translated into Latin before 500 A.D. on the subject of the Christian martyrs dwelling in the wastelands of Egypt." Constance Rosenthal, *The Vitae Patrum in Old and Middle English Literature*, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, Dissertation, 1936), p. 11. PL 73, 74. Material by Rufus and Jerome in 21 and 23.

<sup>23</sup> Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-66. Note that Hilary (Hylarion), the eighth in Dr. Rosenthal's table, is not in the *Legenda* proper, but in the post-Varagine section, Graesse, *op. cit.*, pp. 864-865, and that Varagine does not give a separate chapter to Eugenia, who

appears in the chapter on Saints Prothus and Jacinthus.

<sup>24</sup> Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71. Dr. Rosenthal explains that she uses the name of Caxton here to describe the edition and does not wish "to imply that he was personally responsible for the additions which may have come through the French or earlier English translations." It is now possible to assert that the additions do come through the revised Vignai translation.

<sup>25</sup> PL 23, 20. Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 70: "Jerome fails to name Paul's sister, so where Caxton came upon the 'Maurice' is a mystery."

<sup>26</sup> PL 22, 905.

nourished them," (III, 8) goes back to the *Vitae Patrum: Omnis inopum multitudo matrem et nutritiam se perdidisse clamabat*<sup>27</sup>—again through the Vignai reviser.

Transmission of details from Jerome through the French intermediary also explains the appearance in Caxton's *Mary of Egypt* of the report of her actions at the time when the monk Zosimas brought her the Holy Eucharist, the statement that she subsisted on herbs after her three loaves were gone, and the greatly expanded account of her temptations and deliverance. (III, 107)<sup>28</sup>

Not Caxton, but the enterprising French reviser of the Vignai translation, is responsible for the additional material from Jerome. He is also the interpolator of non-*Legenda* details in the following lives: *Saint Lucy*, *Saint John the Evangelist*, *The Holy Innocents*, *Saint Sebastian*, *Saint Agnes*, *Saint Agatha*, *Saint Juliana*, *S. Longinus*, and *Saint Alexis*. In these legends the augmentations all go back to the various Latin lives from which Varagine compiled his legends. The Vignai reviser apparently retraced the steps of his Italian predecessor and gleaned numerous items that Varagine had chosen to omit. I shall briefly indicate these additions:

*Saint Lucy* (II, 130-136). The augmentation consists of numerous expansions of the dialogue and the addition of transitional clauses.<sup>29</sup>

*Saint John the Evangelist* (II, 161-176). Caxton's etymological introduction is about twice as long as Varagine's though much of the material is repetitious. Other augmentations are of various types, some of them substitutions for passages in Varagine. An example of this sort of divergency is to be found in the conclusion of the narrative of Drusiana's resuscitation (II, 164). Another typical expansion is the suggestion of the dramatic conversion of the philosopher Crato and two of his young followers, the introduction of dialogue into the encounter between Saint John and two other young men,<sup>30</sup> and the addition of a summary to the apostle's sermon on the vanity of riches (II, 165). Other notable differences between Varagine and Caxton are the latter's interpolation of a long acknowledgment of repentance spoken by the youths, Actius and Eugenius (Varagine does not name them), Saint John's prayer of longing for death—twice as long in Caxton as in the *Legenda*—and the comment following the account of the burial.<sup>31</sup>

*History of the Innocents* (II, 176-182). Caxton's version of this legend is distinguished by additions of a narrative, explanatory, or moralizing character, most of which emphasize the justice of Herod's sufferings.

*S. Sebastian* (II, 232-245). The extremely elaborate accretions to Varagine's narrative include the lamentations spoken by the relatives of Marcellianus and Marcus and the exhortations of the saint on the subject of the perils of this life and the joys of heaven. The most arresting addition to this legend is the exemplum of the ring in the mire. All may be found in the *Acta S. Sebastiani* whence the Vignai reviser drew them.<sup>32</sup>

*S. Agnes* (II, 245-252). Varagine's account of the saint is condensed from the pseudo-Ambrosian *Gesta*.<sup>33</sup> The *Legenda Aurea*, however, omits the following

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> PL 43, 684.

<sup>29</sup> For the Latin source, see M. Mombricitus, *Sanctuarium seu Vitae Sanctorum* II, (Paris, 1910), pp. 107-108.

<sup>30</sup> Caxton, presumably misled by the earlier English translator, implies that these are the youths who figure in the first episode, but Varagine wrote: "Duo insuper juvenes honorati horum exemplo . . ." (57)

<sup>31</sup> For the Latin life, see Mombricitus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 56-58.

<sup>32</sup> *Acta Sanctorum* (Paris and Brussels, 1863—), January II, pp. 636 ff. A curious reading of the Latin "vix in manibus portaretur" (italics mine) must be responsible for the assertion in the French and in Caxton that Tranquillinus had suffered from the gout for eleven (xi) years.

<sup>33</sup> Mombricitus, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 40 ff. See A. J. Denomy, *The Old French Lives of Saint Agnes* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 154.



items, all of which are present in the French and in Caxton's English: (1) The parents' prompt knowledge of their son's infatuation (Varagine does not mention them until the youth has fallen ill from unrequited love;); (2) The assertion of the servant that Agnes is enchanted; (3) Expansions of the saint's remarks to the prefect, her prayer, the prefect's expostulations over the death of his son, and the speech of the youth after his resuscitation; (4) The saint's prayer when she is cast into the flames and the extinction of the fire; (5) The sentence in the speech of Agnes to her parents: *et illi iuncta sum in coelis: quem in terris posita anima intentione dilexi*.

*S. Agatha* (III, 32-39). Caxton's legend includes additional material in the form of dialogue expansions, new details, and the interpolation of proper names not found in Varagine. One of the most striking of these augmentations occurs in the report of Aphrodisia, mother of nine daughters, "over foul like unto the mother"<sup>34</sup> who tells Quintianus, the provost, of her unsuccessful attempt to make the saint consent to him.<sup>35</sup>

*S. Juliana* (III, 45-50). Caxton's *S. Juliana* contains a long and interesting dialogue between the saint and the devil. Varagine had abbreviated from the *Acta* the account of this dramatic conversation.<sup>36</sup>

*S. Longinus* (III, 70-76). Caxton's *Longinus* differs from Varagine's by introducing the name of the provost, and—a more notable addition—the story of Aphrodisius, the advocate of the saint. The dialogue between Longinus and his persecutors is much more extensive in the revised Vignai and in Caxton than it is in the *Legenda*, and the descriptive touches are more numerous.<sup>37</sup>

*S. Alexis* (VI, 205-212). Various minor additions and variations; e.g., in Varagine the mother, and in Vignai and Caxton, the father, on learning that Alexis cannot be found, lies on the floor, refusing to rise. These changes might all be explained by a careless use of Varagine's text.

*S. Margaret* (IV, 66-72). The known manuscripts and printed copies of the revised Vignai version do not contain a life of this saint.<sup>38</sup> Caxton's legend, however, incorporates some data not found in Varagine or in the earlier English translation.<sup>39</sup> This may indicate that his French source was a manuscript which included this legend, and not the Stowe manuscript or the printed books described in this study.

In at least four of Caxton's legends not strikingly divergent from Varagine's, one or two details may be traced to Latin lives antedating the *Legenda Aurea*. Thus in the English printer's *S. Gregory* one finds the account of a sermon preached by the saint "ere that he was sacred pope" (III, 63). This might be taken for an original interpolation by Caxton but for its close resemblance to a passage in Mombritius.<sup>40</sup> Inspection of the Vignai version shows that it was transmitted to Caxton through the French. In Caxton's *S. Martha*, certain details in the description of the dragon with "head like a lion, tail like a

<sup>34</sup> Cf. the exemplum concerning the nine daughters of the devil; T. Crane, *The Exemplum or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones Vulgares of Jacques de Vitry* (Folk-Lore Society Publications, 26, London, 1890), pp. 101-102; 235-236.

<sup>35</sup> For the Latin life, see *Acta SS.*, February I, p. 621.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, February II, pp. 875 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, March II, p. 380.

<sup>38</sup> Margaret "called Pelagien", whose legend is in the French, is not the famous saint of this name.

<sup>39</sup> The new details include the devil's confession that his name is Veltis and that the vessel in which he had been enclosed was

broken by men of Babylon; the coronation of the saint by a dove from heaven; the name "Campolymeth, the city of Aurelia" as the scene of the martyrdom of five thousand men converted by the spectacle of Margaret's deliverance from drowning; the name of the headman, Malchus; Margaret's prayer and the answer from heaven given *in extenso*; the refusal of Malchus to execute her; her conversation with him, and his death; details of her burial; a panegyric by "an holy man". Some of these amplifications appear in the Latin life printed by Mombritius, *Sanctuarium*, II, pp. 193-195.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 590.

serpent . . . and . . . as strong as twelve lions or bears" (IV, 136) go back to a passage in the Latin: *et caput habens leoninum . . . caudam uipeream . . . Duodecim leones aut totidem ursi: illum superare nequibant.*<sup>41</sup> Likewise, in *S. Benet*, after the account of the miraculous repairing of his nurse's sieve by the child-saint, Caxton writes: "then they of the country took and hung it on the front of the church in witness of one so fair a miracle" (III, 81). This statement was probably drawn by the Vignai reviser from the life of the saint written by Gregory the Great.<sup>42</sup> Finally, in *S. Ignatius*, Caxton's statement that the martyr told the Romans that their gods had been "thieves, ribalds, and men of abominable and evil life" (III, 18) goes back to a passage in the Latin life by Simon Metaphrastes whence the French translator took it.<sup>43</sup>

The result of this infusion of new material is that certain legends in Caxton correspond only nominally to those in the *Legenda Aurea*. So far as I know, the presence of these pre-Varagine data has not hitherto been observed, except in the case of the lives from the *Vitae Patrum*. In the course of his study of Caxton's sources, Dr. Pierce Butler notes that the Vignai reviser adds two anecdotes from the writings of Saint Gregory to his *Saint Patrice*. Later he observes that "he has changed the form of the original about as much as Caxton usually does," but does not mention the presence or origin of other interpolations in the Vignai revision.<sup>44</sup> So far as the present investigation has gone, it reveals that the industrious Caxton, aided by an enterprising and as yet unknown predecessor, gave to his readers, "such people as be not lettered," much additional material not found in the Latin original which his work purported to translate.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 235.

<sup>42</sup> *Acta SS.* March III, p. 276.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. I, p. 26.

<sup>44</sup> Butler, *Legenda Aurea*, p. 129, note 1; p. 144.

# The *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277

A. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

PREFACED to the list of two hundred and nineteen propositions condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, on the seventh of March, 1277, is the specific condemnation of a book entitled "*De Amore*" sive "*De Deo amoris*". This book is singled out by its incipit: *Cogit me multum*, etc. and explicit: *Cave igitur, Galtere, amoris exercere mandata*, etc.<sup>1</sup> It has been definitely identified by Msgr Grabmann as the treatise on love written by Andreas Capellanus<sup>2</sup> sometime between 1184-1186.<sup>3</sup> Along with a treatise on necromancy, singled out, too, by its incipit and explicit, the condemnation is levelled further against *libros, rotulos seu quaternos nigromanticos aut continentes experimenta sortilegiorum, invocationes demonum, sive coniurationes in periculis animarum, seu in quibus de talibus et similibus fidei orthodoxae et bonis moribus evidenter adversantibus tractatur*.<sup>4</sup> It is plain, then, that, in the mind of the Bishop of Paris, Andreas Capellanus' book was grouped with such works as contrary to orthodoxy and to good morals. On these general grounds it merited condemnation.

Stephen Tempier felt it necessary to proceed to the condemnation for the following reason: the zealous faith of great and grave personages had frequently drawn to his attention the fact that students of the Faculty of Arts at Paris, exceeding the proper limits of their particular Faculty, were daring to treat as doubtful in their schools and to dispute such manifest and abominable errors, such conceits and idiotic falsities and propositions as he set forth in this document.<sup>5</sup> The *De Amore* might be dismissed simply as containing some of these *vanitates et insanias falsas* aimed at by the Bishop of Paris were it not for the fact that it does contain, at the same time, certain *manifestos et execrabiles errores* mentioned specifically in the list of condemned errors. As Msgr Grabmann has pointed out, Andreas' definition of love, his doctrine relating to pure and mixed love and to the celibacy of the clergy, all agree with the content of certain condemned propositions dealing with sexual matters. He concludes that Bishop Stephen had in mind primarily the *De Amore* in making up the list of such propositions, a fact that is proven by the inclusion of the title in the Introduction to the Decree itself.<sup>6</sup> Msgr Grabmann suggests, moreover, that the

<sup>1</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I, ed. Denifle et Chatelain (Paris, 1889), p. 543; Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIII<sup>m</sup> siècle* II (2nd ed., Louvain, 1908), p. 176.

<sup>2</sup> "Das Werk *de Amore* des Andreas Capellanus und das Verurteilungsdekret des Bischofs Stephan Tempier von Paris vom 7. März 1277", *Speculum* VII (1932), pp. 75-79.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arpad Steiner, "The Date of the Composition of Andreas Capellanus *de Amore*", *Speculum* IV (1929), pp. 92-95 and "The Identity of the Italian Count in Andreas Capellanus *de Amore*", *Speculum* XIII (1938), pp. 304-308.

<sup>4</sup> *Chartularium*, p. 543; Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> *Magnarum et gravium personarum crebra*

*zeloque fidei accensa insinuavit relatio, quod nonnulli Parisius studentes in artibus propriae facultatis limites excedentes quosdam manifestos et execrabiles errores, immo potius vanitates et insanias falsas in rotulo seu cedulis, presentibus hiis annexo seu annexis contentos quasi dubitabiles in scolis tractare et disputare presumunt. Chartularium, p. 543; Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 175.*

<sup>6</sup> Diese Ausführungen erinnern uns doch deutlich an die von Stephan Tempier verurteilten gegen die geschlechtliche Enthaltsamkeit gerichteten Sätze. Es besteht sonach kein Zweifel, dass wir in dem Buche des Andreas in erster Linie die Unterlage für die Sätze der Verurteilungsliste von 1277 sehen dürfen, welche auf sexuelle Materien sich beziehen. *Art. cit.*, p. 78.

method adopted by Andreas in justifying and teaching Walter the theory and technique of illicit and extra-marital love in his first two Books and then in condemning and rejecting such love in his *De Reprobatione Amoris* recalls the method of the so-called double truth used by the philosophers of Latin Averroism.<sup>7</sup> It is the purpose of this study to develop these suggestions made by Msgr Grabmann, first by bringing into clearer focus the teaching of Andreas against the background of the condemned propositions. An examination of the text and a comparison of the doctrine of the first two Books brings to light that inherent in them are ideas and statements that are contrary to Catholic orthodoxy and that coincide with the teaching of the 'manifest and execrable errors' condemned by the Bishop of Paris. Secondly, a comparison of the technique used by Andreas in the first two Books and that used in the Third shows that whereas Andreas had used the arguments of reason and nature to justify, prove and refute objections to his thesis that love is the greatest good in the world and that all men are bound to practice it, in his Rejection of Love, he bases himself on faith and on divine authority to condemn human love and to show that it is essentially an evil and to be avoided.

## I. Quosdam Manifestos et Execrabiles Errores.<sup>7a</sup>

### 1.° *Quod simplex fornicatio, utpote soluti cum soluta, non est peccatum.*<sup>8</sup>

It is only fair to Andreas to note that he distinguishes sharply between what he calls pure love and mixed love.<sup>9</sup> Although contrary to Christian morality in its licence to lovers to indulge in impure thoughts, desires, touches and embraces and in its permission to them to abandon themselves to occasions of sin, pure love definitely denies them fornication.<sup>10</sup> The practice of the latter is confined to mixed love.<sup>11</sup> Andreas states his definite preference for the former as the origin of all excellence, as permanent and ever-increasing, as very slightly injurious to God and inoffensive to one's neighbor, as harmless to maidens, wives or widows and their reputations,<sup>12</sup> but he does not condemn mixed love: 'But mixed love, too, is real love, and it is praiseworthy, and we say that it is the source of all good things'.<sup>13</sup> In reality, therefore, while Andreas' teaching to

<sup>7</sup> Sein Verfahren erinnert hier an die Methode der doppelten Wahrheit bei den Philosophen des lateinischen Averroismus, welche zuerst eine mit den Lehren des christlichen Glaubens in Widerspruch stehende These, z. B., die Lehre von der Ewigkeit der Welt, eingehend begründen und die dagegen vorgebrachten Einwände entkräften und so daraus, dass sie dieser Lehre zustimmen, kein Hehl machen, dann aber die Glaubenslehre augenscheinlich aus Erwägungen der Vorsicht danebenstellen. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>7a</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 183, p. 553; Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, No. 205, p. 190.

<sup>9</sup> Et purus quidem amor est, qui omni-modi dilectionis affectione duorum amantium corda coniungit. Hic autem in mentis contemplatione cordisque consistit affectu; procedit autem usque ad oris osculum lacer-tique amplexum et verecundum amantis nudaee contactum, extremo praetermisso solatio; nam illud pure amare volentibus exercere non licet. *Andreae Capellani de Amore libri tres*, ed. Amadeu Pagès (Castello de la Plana, 1930), pp. 105-106 (182). Reference to the edition of E. Trojel (Havnia, 1892) is made in parentheses. The pagination of the Trojel edition is indicated

by Pagès. *The Art of Courtly Love*, John Jay Parry (New York, 1941), p. 122.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. A. J. Denomy, 'Fin' Amors: the Pure Love of the Troubadours, its Amorality, and Possible Source', *Mediaeval Studies* VII (1945), especially pp. 142-143, 175-179.

<sup>11</sup> Mixtus vero amor dicitur ille, qui omni carnis delectationi suum praestat effectum et in extremo Veneris opere terminatur. *De Amore*, p. 106 (183); Parry, p. 122.

<sup>12</sup> Hic quidem amor est, quem quilibet, cuius est in amore propositum, omni debet amplecti virtute. Amor enim iste sua semper sine fine cognoscit augmenta, et eius exercuisse actus neminem poenituisse cognovimus; et quanto quis ex eo magis assumit, tanto plus affectat habere. Amor iste tantae dignoscitur esse virtutis, quod ex eo totius prohibitis origo descendit, et nulla inde procedit iniuria, et modicam in ipso Deus recognoscit offensam. Ex tali nempe amore neque virgo nunquam corrupta nec vidua vel coniugata potest aliquod sentire gravamen vel propriae famae dispendium sustinere. Hunc ergo colo amorem, hunc sequor et semper adoro et instanter vobis postulare non cesso. *De Amore*, p. 106 (182-183); Parry, p. 122.

<sup>13</sup> Parry, pp. 122-123. Nam et mixtus amor verus est amor atque laudandus et cuncto-

Walter on the theory and technique of love makes a distinction between what he calls pure and mixed love, and,—as he himself says,—although they are seemingly different, nevertheless they are substantially the same. They are merely different manners, forms and ways of practicing the same thing. In fact, if two lovers, who have long been united in pure love, afterwards decide to enjoy the pleasures of mixed love, the substance of their love remains the same, although the manner and form of practicing it are different.<sup>14</sup> When, then, a decision is demanded whether one lover may hold back at the insistence of the other from practicing mixed love, the answer is clearly foreseen. The lover cannot do so unless an agreement was made at the beginning of the affair that the parties would not engage in mixed love except at the free will and consent of both of them. Even in that case, it is not right for the beloved to refuse her lover's desires if he persists in them.<sup>15</sup>

Andreas' attitude towards pure and mixed love and the possibility of transition from the practice of one to that of the other is more fully developed in the Dialogue between the man of the higher nobility and the woman of the same class.<sup>16</sup> The point at issue is the question raised by the woman in the case of a lady of the most excellent character: which of her two lovers has made the more worthy choice: he who chose the upper half of his beloved or he who chose the lower? The man of the higher nobility answered unhesitatingly that he who chose the upper half should be preferred by her.<sup>17</sup> Against the woman's arguments to the contrary, he maintains that as far as the solaces of the lower part go, we are like brute beasts; as regards those of the upper, they are peculiar to the nature of man.<sup>18</sup> He readily admits that the final cause of love may be situated in the lower part and that lovers are chiefly concerned with and inclined to those solaces, but it is a shameful and improper use of the body to practice the lower without the upper. It is only after the solaces of the upper

rum esse dicitur origo bonorum. *De Amore*, p. 106 (183).

<sup>14</sup> Licet enim purus et mixtus diversi videantur amores, recte tamen intuitibus purus amor quo ad sui substantiam idem cum mixto indicatur amore et ex eadem cum ipso cordis affectione procedit. Eadem est in illis amoris substantia, sed varius est modus atque respectus amandi, ut in exemplo tibi poterit liquere praesenti. Videmus enim aliquando aliquem purum bibendi vinum habere appetitum, et eidem postmodum aquam solam vel mixtum cum ea bibere vinum similiter suadet appetitus; quamvis huic sit varius appetendi respectus, ipsius tamen appetitus substantia eadem et invariata consistit. *De Amore*, p. 153 (264-265); Parry, p. 164.

<sup>15</sup> Quaeris etiam, Gualteri, si duo coamantes puro concorditer amore fruantur, postmodum alter petit mixtum vel communem, an liceat alteri reluctari. Ad hoc igitur te volumus penitus edoceri, quod, licet purus amor potius quam mixtus sive communis sit cunctis hominibus eligendus, non tamen uni licet amantium sui coamantis rebellem existere voluntati, nisi forte inter amoris initia concorditer pepigerunt, quod nunquam mixto fruerentur amore, nisi libera utriusque voluntas et plena concordia postulare. Sed quamvis talis conventio colligavit amantes, ut non liceat amatori ultra nisi plena concordia postulare, non tamen recte agit mulier, si sui coamantis in hoc parere voluntati recuset, si ipsum viderit in

sua persistere voluntate. *De Amore*, p. 156 (269-270); Parry, pp. 166-167.

<sup>16</sup> The Eighth Dialogue, *De Amore*, pp. 90-127 (155-219); Parry, pp. 91-107. It is important to note that, in the Dialogues, it is the *homo* who advances and upholds the ideas and teachings of Andreas. He is invariably the spokesman and champion of Courtly Love. The *mulier* of the Dialogues, on the contrary, is the foil, the 'stooge' so to speak, who maintains the traditional views and argues against the man's doctrine: for example on the question of nobility by birth against nobility by character, the sinfulness of illicit love, the liberty of choice of the woman in choosing a lover, the human impossibility of practicing pure love etc. Sometimes the woman is won over by the man's reasoning and forcefulness; generally, she remains unconvinced.

<sup>17</sup> Quis enim dubitat partis eminentioris solatii electorem inferiora praeferendum petenti? *De Amore*, p. 120 (208). Parry, p. 135.

<sup>18</sup> Quantum enim ad partis pertinet inferioris solatia, a brutis in nullo sumus animalibus segregati, sed eis nos hac parte ipsa natura coniungit. Superioris vero partis solatia tanquam propria humanae sunt attributa naturae et aliis animalibus universis ab ipsa natura negata. Ergo inferioris partis elector tanquam canis ab amore repellitur indignus, et superioris tanquam naturae amplexator admittatur elector. *De Amore*, *ibid.*; Parry, pp. 135-136.

part are obtained that a reasonable man may proceed to the enjoyment of the lower.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, inherent in the teaching of the *De Amore* is the doctrine that it is right to practice mixed love which admits of fornication. However, Andreas does not say that it is not a sin; he admits that through it *proximus laeditur et Rex coelestis offenditur*.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, he takes occasion to belittle the seriousness of the sin later on in the same Dialogue. To the woman's objection that since to love is offensive to God, then it is more expedient to keep clear of it, the man replies: 'Your statement that God is offended by love cannot keep you from it; it seems to be generally agreed that to serve God is a very great and an extraordinarily good thing, but those who desire to serve Him perfectly ought to devote themselves wholly to His service, and according to the opinion of Paul they should engage in no worldly business. Therefore if you choose to serve God alone, you must give up all worldly things and contemplate only the mysteries of the Heavenly Country, for God has not wished that anybody should keep his right foot on earth and his left foot in heaven, since no one can properly devote himself to the service of two masters. Now since it is clear that you have one foot on earth from the fact that you receive with a joyful countenance those who come to you and that you exchange courteous words with them and persuade them to do the works of love, I believe you would do better to enjoy love thoroughly than to lie to God under the cloak of some pretence. I believe, however, that God cannot be seriously offended by love, for what is done under the compulsion of nature can be made clean by an easy expiation'.<sup>21</sup> It is not right for lovers to refuse to practice mixed love and therefore to refuse to commit the sin of fornication. Mixed love is true love and as such *laudandus et cunctorum esse dicitur origo bonorum*.<sup>22</sup> 'Besides', as Andreas says, 'it does not seem at all proper to class as a sin the thing from which the highest good in this life takes its origin and without which no man in the world could be considered worthy of praise'.<sup>23</sup>

## 2.° *Quod continentia non est essentialiter virtus*.<sup>24</sup>

Nowhere is it stated explicitly in the *De Amore* that continence by which one withholds himself from venereal pleasures is not essentially a virtue or principle of good works. That Andreas does not consider it so is implied in his teaching that incontinence must be a virtue since from it arise all good works, worth and excellence of character.

<sup>19</sup> Superioris autem solatia portionis commodissime ac curialiter et agentium utriusque salvo pudore sumuntur, etiam delectatione inferiori omissa. Immo rationis istud ordo poscit amandi, ut superioris primo partis aliquis ad multam instantiam lasciva solatia consequatur, postmodum vero gradatim ad inferiora procedat. *De Amore*, p. 122 (211-212); Parry, pp. 137-138.

<sup>20</sup> *De Amore*, p. 106 (183); Parry, p. 122. Cf. *infra*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>21</sup> Parry, pp. 110-111. Nec ob stare potest, quod Deum in amore narratis offendi, quia cunctis liquido constare videtur, quod Deo servire summum bonum ac peculiare censetur; sed qui Domino contendunt perfecte servire, eius prorsus debent obsequio mancipari et iuxta Pauli sententiam nullo saeculari debent adimpleri negotio. Ergo, si servire Deo tantum vultis eligere, mundana vos oportet cuncta relinquere et coelestis patriae solummodo contemplari secreta. Non enim Deus voluit, aliquem dextrum in terris

pedem et in coelo tenere sinistram, quia nemo potest duorum intendere competenter obsequiis. Unde quum, alterum vos pedem in terrenis habere, ex eo sit manifestum, quod ad vos venientes hilari receptione suscipitis et curialitatis verba secum adinvicem confertis et amoris eis opera suadetis, credo, vobis esse consultius efficaciter amori vacare quam Deo sub alicuius coloris palliatione mentiri. Credo tamen, in amore Deum graviter offendi non posse; nam quod natura cogente perficitur, facili potest expiatione mundari. *De Amore*, pp. 93-94 (161-162).

<sup>22</sup> *De Amore*, p. 106 (183); Parry p. 123.

<sup>23</sup> Parry, p. 111. Praeterea fas nullatenus esse videtur, id inter crimina reputare, a quo bonum in hac vita summum habet initium, et sine quo nullus in orbe posset laude dignus haberi. *De Amore*, p. 94 (162).

<sup>24</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 168, p. 553; Mandonet, No. 208, p. 190. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 155, 1.

All men and women are obliged to love<sup>29</sup> and Andreas implies that not to love is a defect of nature.<sup>30</sup> Since love is the root and principle cause of everything good,<sup>31</sup> for a woman to refuse to love is to withhold the necessary incentive to good deeds and the occasion of improvement in character.<sup>32</sup> It is a terrible error for a woman not to love and only those women who do love are accounted worthy of praise among men and in the courts of rulers.<sup>33</sup> In fact, the Countess of Flanders, in the course of rendering a judgment in a case of love, directly states that 'a woman who wants to have the praise of the world must indulge in love'.<sup>34</sup>

In the Eighth Dialogue wherein a man of the higher nobility speaks with a woman of the same class, the woman argues that it would be highly improper for her to accede to his blandishments: 'Love may therefore be safe for any married woman, but it seems that maidens should fear it greatly and consider it shameful'.<sup>35</sup> If she were to grant him her love, when she married later, her husband would hate and despise her for it. The man condemns this position as a serious error because, since a maiden may rise in reputation only through love, she would never deserve otherwise to have a praiseworthy husband.<sup>36</sup> Her incontinence could not be hateful to a good husband but, on the contrary, must be praiseworthy, 'for a good husband always believes that he could never have found such a worthy wife if she had not learned the theory of love and carried out what it requires'.<sup>37</sup> If it were her lot to have a bad husband, then his hate would be better than his love and certainly her reputation would not suffer thereby.<sup>38</sup>

In the Fifth Dialogue, under the form of an allegory, a nobleman describes to a noblewoman the torments that await her should she refuse to enlist under the banner of the God of Love. He classes her amongst those women who have been assigned to the northern gate of the Castle of Love. They are accursed. They have been placed upon the left hand of the God of Love because,

<sup>29</sup> Cognosco igitur manifeste, quod amor non consuevit homines discretionis stilo discernere, sed omnes pariter angit in suo, id est, amoris exercitu militare, non excipiens formam, non genus, neque sexum, neque sanguinis inaequalitatem distinguens, sed hoc solum discernens, an aliquis si aptus ad amoris arma ferenda. Res enim est amor, quae ipsam imitatur naturam. *De Amore*, pp. 19-20 (37-38); Parry, p. 45.

<sup>30</sup> Quando te divina formavit essentia, nulla sibi alia facienda restabant: Tuo decori nihil deesse cognosco, prudentiae nihil, immo nil prorsus in te deficit quidquam, nisi quod tuo, ut mihi videtur, neminem distanti amore. *De Amore*, p. 11 (21); Parry, p. 37.

<sup>31</sup> Nam quum omnibus, quae fiunt in saeculo, bonis amor praestet initium, merito in primis tanquam omnium bonorum radix et causa principalis est postulandus. *De Amore*, p. 38 (69); Parry, p. 61.

<sup>32</sup> Profitetur etenim, quod magnis sunt digna praeterita facta muneribus, verumtamen universis constat hominibus, quod nullum in mundo bonum vel curialitas exercetur, nisi ex amoris fonte derivetur. Omnis ergo boni erit amor origo et causa. Cessante igitur causa eius de necessitate cessat effectus. Nullus ergo poterit homo facere bona, nisi amoris suasionem cogatur. Petition itaque largiri debes amorem, ut benefaciendi causa mihi a te videatur indulta et per te valeam bonis moribus informari et stabili semper in firmitate durare. *De Amore*, p. 15

(28-29); Parry, pp. 40-41.

<sup>33</sup> Absit, te, domina mea te in tam acerrimo errore durare. Illae namque solummodo mulieres, quae amoris noscuntur aggregari militiae, veris apud homines laudibus dignae iudicantur et propter suam probitatem meruerunt in omnium curia nominari. *De Amore*, p. 49 (86); Parry, p. 71.

<sup>34</sup> Parry, p. 172. Quaelibet mulier, si mundi laudes optat habere, vacare teneatur amori. *De Amore*, p. 162 (283).

<sup>35</sup> Parry, p. 121. Amare igitur, cuicumque sit mulieri securum, virginibus videtur prorsus timendum atque probrosum. *De Amore*, p. 105 (180-181).

<sup>36</sup> Error quidem maximus ex vestra videtur doctrina procedere, quum in virginibus expresse damnatis amorem, quia infinitae et omni probitate gaudentes leguntur amasse . . . Nam, nisi virgo amoris instinctu suum studeat attolere famam, nec maritum merebitur habere laudabilem nec aliquid grande pleno poterit effectu percipere. *De Amore*, p. 105 (181); Parry, p. 121.

<sup>37</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Sed nec inde bono poterit esse odiosa marito; bonus enim semper hoc cogitabit in corde maritus, quod nunquam tantae probitatis potuisset invenire uxorem, nisi amoris esset experta doctrinam eiusque secuta mandata. *De Amore*, p. 105, (181-182).

<sup>38</sup> Nam si improbo fuerit destinata marito, potius sibi expedit tali existere odio quam ei aliqua cordis affectione coniungi, nec ex hoc probae mulieris laeditur diu fama laudata. *De Amore*, p. 105 (182); Parry, *ibid.*

although they have been loved by many, they have refused to love.<sup>35</sup> He relates to her the sufferings and torments such women have to undergo because of their recalcitrance and, too, the rewards of the true servants of love.<sup>36</sup> He conveys to her the words of warning entrusted to him by one of those unfortunate women to whom he has spoken.<sup>37</sup> The nobleman urges upon the woman the wisdom of incontinence: 'It is unsafe, therefore, to offend such a god, and it is safest to serve in all things him who can reward his own with such gifts and afflict with such heavy torments those who scorn him'.<sup>38</sup> Finally, he gives her the message of the King of Love Himself: 'You have been permitted to see our mighty works that through you our glory may be revealed to those who know it not, and that this sight which you now see may be a means of salvation for many ladies. We therefore command and firmly enjoin upon you that wherever you find a lady of any worth departing from our pathway by refusing to submit herself to love's engagements, you shall take care to relate to her what you have seen here and shall cause her to leave her erroneous ideas so that she may escape such very heavy torments and find a place here in glory'.<sup>39</sup>

In the sixth chapter of the Second Book, Andreas treats of the contingencies that arise if one lover is unfaithful to the other. He shows clearly that that woman may be said to be unfaithful to her lover who has encouraged him and has even advanced to the second or third stage of love<sup>40</sup> and then has refused to grant the love which she has promised. If a woman grants her lover the hope of her love or gives him any of the preliminary gifts of love and if she finds that man not unworthy of this love, then it is dishonest on her part to try to deprive him of the love he has sought and hoped for.<sup>41</sup> After all, it is shameful in a woman to give a man a kiss and embrace and then to go no further; these are always considered signs of love and are given as indications of what is to follow.<sup>42</sup> It is to sin against the very nature of love to hold back from the embraces of a faithful lover. This was the decision of Queen Eleanor in the case of a lover who, wishing to test the constancy of his beloved, asked and received permission of her to obtain the embraces of a different woman. These embraces, however, he had never received or wished to receive. Later, when

<sup>35</sup> Septentrionales vero sunt illae mulieres, quae amare recusant, quamvis illae amentur a multis, et merito, quia in sinistra positae deus non respicit ipsas, quia sunt maledictae. *De Amore*, pp. 52-53 (91); Parry, p. 74.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, p. 54 (94), Parry, pp. 75-76; pp. 56-60 (97-104), pp. 77-80.

<sup>37</sup> Caveant ergo mulieres in saeculo viventes, ne harum sint nobis consortes poenarum, quia post mortem nulla sibi poterit poenitudine subveniri. *De Amore*, p. 57 (98); Parry, p. 78.

<sup>38</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Talem igitur deum non est offendere tutum, sed in omnibus est sibi servire tutissimum, qui talibus suos novit praemiis munere et suos contemptores tam gravibus poenis affligere. *De Amore*, p. 57 (99).

<sup>39</sup> Parry, p. 81. Nostra tibi sunt concessa videre magnalia, ut per te nostra valeat ignorantibus gloria revelari, et ut tua praesens visio sit multarum dominarum salutis occasio. Tibi ergo firmiter mandamus atque iniungimus, ut, ubicunque dominam alicuius valoris inveneris a nostra semita deviare amoris recusando subire certamina, hanc sibi visionem narrare procures et eam ab erroris proposito revocare, ut poenas possit tam gravissimas evitare et in praesenti valeat gloria collocari. *De Amore*, p. 61 (105).

<sup>40</sup> What the second and third stages are may be gathered from Andreas' description of the four stages of love: Ab antiquo quatuor sunt gradus in amore constituti distincti. Primus in spei datione consistit, secundus in osculi exhibitione, tertius in amplexus frutione, quartus in totius personae concessione finitur. *De Amore*, p. 17 (32-33); Parry, p. 42.

<sup>41</sup> Et firmiter credimus esse tenendum, ut, si mulier alicui spem sui largiatur amoris vel alia sibi amoris primitiva concesserit, et ipse tali non reperiatur indignus amore, magna mulieris iudicator offensae, si diu sperata denegare contendat. Non enim probam decet feminam sua quaecunque sine causa retardare promissa . . . Turpissimum etenim in femina iudicatur, si de ipsa non curet expectare promissa. *De Amore*, p. 155 (268); Parry, p. 166.

<sup>42</sup> Sed quid, si mulier extraneo praestet oscula viro aut ipsum suscipiat amplectendo lacertis sibi nulla alia concedendo? Et huic volumus digna increpatione occurrere, et dicimus quidem, quia turpiter agit femina, si alicui extraneo sui osculi vel amplexus munera praestet, quum haec indicia semper credantur amoris et in signum futuri amoris soleant hominibus exhiberi. *De Amore*, p. 152 (262); Parry, p. 163.



he returned to his beloved and asked her love, she refused him. Queen Eleanor's opinion was as follows: 'We know that it comes from the nature of love that those who are in love often falsely pretend that they desire new embraces, that they may the better test the faith and constancy of their co-lover. Therefore a woman sins against the nature of love itself if she keeps back her embraces from her lover on this account or forbids him her love, unless she has clear evidence that he has been unfaithful to her'.<sup>43</sup>

Andreas' attitude towards such a teaching as this is summarized pretty well by his judgment concerning a case of voluntary continence on the part of one of two lovers. The question raised is not whether continence is a virtue but whether in so acting that lover may be said to be unfaithful to the other. The answer parodies a text of Saint Paul spoken to the married.<sup>44</sup> He may lawfully abstain from the delights of the world even to serve God rather than sensual delights. But should that lover decide to return to love again, to its delights and pleasures, he is required only to return to his first love, the more so if his co-lover demands it. Andreas does not condemn continence; he is conscious that it is even licit to be continent. But he firmly holds that if one decide on incontinence,—and one should,—then the code of love demands that his incontinence be directed towards the woman with whom it was first practiced.<sup>45</sup>

### 3.<sup>o</sup> *Quod castitas non est maius bonum, quam perfecta abstinencia.*<sup>46</sup>

The term *abstinencia* is usually used in relation to those acts which are ordained towards the conservation of the individual, that is to eating and drinking.<sup>47</sup> In the above condemned proposition, it is concerned, evidently, rather with those acts which are ordained towards the conservation of the species, that is with carnal acts. This is borne out from the further use of the word in another condemned error where it is thus qualified: *Quod perfecta abstinencia ab actu carnis corrumpit virtutem et species.*<sup>48</sup> Thus, *abstinencia* is to be equated with continence, the virtue by which one abstains from venereal delights.<sup>49</sup> Chastity on the other hand, is a virtue to which pertains the moderate use of the bodily members according to the judgment of the reason and the election of the will.<sup>50</sup> The difference between chastity and continence is set forth by St. Thomas: Chastity restrains man from illicit things, continence from licit things.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, the proposition would seem to mean that in regard to carnal acts the virtue through which one abstains from illicit things is not a greater good than the state of abstaining from licit things. In other words, the abstinence from venereal

<sup>43</sup> Parry, pp. 168-169. Ex amoris quippe agnoscimus natura procedere, ut falsa coamantes saepe simulatione confingant, se amplexus exoptare novitios, quo magis valeant fidem et constantiam percipere coamantis. Ipsius ergo naturam offendit amoris, qui suo coamanti propter hoc retardat amplexus vel eum recusat amare, nisi evidenter cognoverit, amantem sibi fidem fregisse. *De Amore*, p. 158 (274).

<sup>44</sup> I Cor. vii, 7.

<sup>45</sup> Sed consules me forsitan, an, si unus coamantium amoris nolens ulterius vacare solatiis, alteri se subtraxerit amanti, fidem videatur infringere coamanti. Et nullo istud praesumimus ausu narrare, ut a saeculi non liceat delectationibus abstinere ne nostra videatur doctrina ipsius Dei nimis adversari mandatis. Nec esset enim credere tutum, non debere quemquam Deo potius quam mundi voluptatibus inservire. Sed si novo postmodum se coniungat amori, dicimus,

quod dominarum iudicio ad prioris coamantis est reducendus amplexus, si prior coamans istud postulare voluerit. *De Amore*, p. 154 (266-267); Parry p. 165.

<sup>46</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 181, p. 553; Mandonnet, No. 209, p. 190. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, 152, 5.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, II-II, 151, 3 ad Resp.

<sup>48</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 169, p. 553; Mandonnet, No. 210, p. 190.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, II-II, 155, 1 ad Resp.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, II-II, 151, 2 ad 2.

<sup>51</sup> Haec duo distinguantur per hoc quod castitas refrenat hominem ab illicitis, continentia vero a licitis; sive per hoc quod continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castitas autem neque patitur, neque deducitur. *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 70, 3 ad Resp.

delights in the unmarried,—spinsters and bachelors and those in Orders or under vow is not a greater good than the abstinence of married people; that chastity in clerics is not a greater good than continence in the lay folk.

In regard to the married, one of the cardinal laws advanced by Andreas is: *Causa coniugii ab amore non est excusatio recta*.<sup>53</sup> In regards to clerics whose chastity is directed towards the more fruitful and easier cultivation of the things of God, his teaching is equally plain. Clerics are no more bound to keep their body chaste than is any layman; any argument in favor of abstinence from carnal delights applies equally well both to laity and to the clergy since God did not wish to lay upon clerics any greater abstinence of the flesh and so weary them with a double burden.

In the Eighth Dialogue, the woman of the higher nobility rejects the solicitations of a man of the same class on the grounds that he is a cleric. She argues thus: 'Although other men may choose either kind of love [pure or mixed], you ought not to enter into the service of either, for a clerk ought to concern himself only with the services of the Church and to avoid all the desires of the flesh. He ought to be a stranger to all forms of delight and above all to keep his body unsported for the Lord, since the Lord has granted him privileges of such great dignity and rank that he may consecrate His flesh and blood with his own hands and by his words he may absolve the offenses of sinners. If you should see my mind inclining to a lapse of the flesh, you are bound by virtue of the office God has granted you to call me back from the errors I am starting to commit, and to persuade me to be chaste in every respect, and to set me such an example that you may freely castigate the sins of others. For according to the Gospel truth, a man with a beam in his own eye ought to cast it out before he tries to take out the mote from his brother's eye, and anyone would be open to the derision of mankind if he were bound in this fashion and should try to loose the bonds of his fellow prisoners. Therefore it is not safe for women to stain with fleshly contagion those whom God has chosen to be His ministers and whom He wishes to keep themselves in all things pure and chaste in His service'.<sup>54</sup> The man of the higher nobility admits that he is a cleric but he is, nevertheless, like all men, conceived in sin and naturally prone to lapses of the flesh. When God chose him to perform His services and to make known His message, He did not take from him the stimulus of the flesh and the incitement to sin that is natural to him: 'Therefore I do not believe that God has wished to lay upon them any greater abstinence of the flesh and to weary them with a double burden. Why, then, is a clerk more bound to keep his body chaste than any layman is? You must not believe that the delight of the flesh is forbidden to the clergy alone, since God bids every Christian to be on his guard against all bodily uncleanness and wholly to avoid fleshly desires. Your argument may therefore apply equally well to the clergy and to the laity'.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> De Amore, p. 178 (310); Parry, p. 184. Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 82-90 (141-154); Parry, pp. 100-107.

<sup>54</sup> Parry, pp. 123-124. Sed, licet uterque sit amor electus, vos tamen neutrius decet affectare militiam; clericus enim ecclesiasticis tantum debet vacare ministeriis et omnia carnis desideria declinare; ab omni enim debet delectatione alienus existere et suum prae omnibus corpus immaculatum Domino custodire, quum tanta fuerit a Domino dignitatis et ordinis praeerogativa concessa, ut eius carnem et sanguinem propriis mereatur manibus consecrare et suis sermonibus peccantium crimina relaxare. Nam, si ad carnis lapsum meum videritis animum inclinare, vos tamen ex indulto a

Domino vobis officio me a conceptis teneremini erroribus revocare et in cunctis mihi castimoniam suadere et talia de vobis exempla monstrare, ut libera voce possitis aliorum crimina castigare. Primo namque iuxta evangelicam veritatem proprio trabem gestans in oculo ipsam debet prius eicere, quam de fratris oculo festucam conetur evellere. Derisui enim humano generi patebit, si pariter ligatus colligatorum studeat vincula relaxare. Non est ergo mulieribus tutum illos carnis contagio maculare, quos Deus sibi elegit ministros et puros voluit in cunctis atque castos suis obsequiis conservare. De Amore, p. 107 (184-185); Parry, pp. 123-124.

<sup>54</sup> Parry, p. 124. Quamvis clericorum sim

As for her argument that it belongs to the clergy to castigate and to correct the sin of others, he admits that he is in a special sense, by virtue of his office, bound to that and to make known the word of God. But that power is not granted by God to the clergy alone but equally to the layfolk: 'A clerk does well, and a layman does well, if he abstains from all wordly delight and confirms the hearts of his neighbors in all good works'.<sup>53</sup> As for the cleric, specially bound, if he discharges that duty by his tongue, then he is freed of all obligation and any sins he may commit are no more severely punished in him than in any layman 'since he is naturally driven to them by the incentive of the flesh just like all the rest of mankind'.<sup>54</sup> He is subject to temptation and liable to fall just as the layman and he is not to be punished more than they nor to be discriminated against in matters of love. On the contrary, the woman of higher nobility must choose him as her lover for he is more prudent, more cautious than a layman, more moderate, more experienced in all things. Therefore, he is to be preferred to a layman since these are qualities so necessary in all things connected with love. 'So if you find me otherwise worthy of your love, you cannot with propriety cast me aside just because you see that I am enrolled among the clergy'.<sup>57</sup>

In the seventh chapter of the First Book entitled *De Amore Clericorum*, Andreas states that the cleric, ennobled by God's grace, 'ought therefore to be a stranger to every act of love and to put aside all uncleanness of body, or he will deserve to be deprived of this special nobility granted him by God'.<sup>58</sup> But, since naturally and quite apart from his special prerogative, the cleric remains human, if he chooses to love, then he should speak and apply himself according to the rank of his parents: 'But since hardly anyone ever lives without carnal sin, and since the life of the clergy is, because of the continual idleness and the great abundance of food, naturally more liable to temptations of the body than that of any other men, if any clerk should wish to enter into the lists of Love let him speak and apply himself to Love's service in accordance with the rank or standing of his parents'.<sup>59</sup>

4.<sup>o</sup> *Quod non est possibile esse peccatum in potentiis animi superioribus. Et ita peccatum fit passione non voluntate.*<sup>60</sup>

It should be observed that the error is stated according to the norm of Christian

sorti coniunctus, homo tamen sum in peccatis conceptus et carnis lapsui sicut et ceteri homines naturaliter pronus existens. Licet enim Dominus in suis ministeriis et verbi nuntiatione divini clericos sua voluit fungi legatione et honore ipsos magno gravavit, eorum tamen in hoc voluit conditionem facere meliorem, ut carnis ab eis stimulum et peccati fomitem removeret. Unde non credo, ipsos Deum maiori voluisse carnis abstinencia colligare et duplici eos sarcina fatigare. Quare igitur magis clericus quam quilibet laicus castimoniam tenetur corporis conservare? Nec enim soli clerico corporalem credatis delectationem inhibitam, quum cuilibet etiam christiano praecipitur a Deo ab omni suum corpus immunditia custodire et carnis desideria penitus evitare. Ergo aequale laicum sicut et clericum vestra posset argutio remonere. *De Amore*, p. 108 (185-186).

<sup>53</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Bene enim facit clericus et bene laicus, si ab omni saeculari delectatione absteineat et in bonis operibus proximorum corda confirmet. *De Amore*, p. 108 (187).

<sup>54</sup> Parry, p. 125. Quum itaque carnis incentivo naturaliter instigetur sicut et reliqui

universi mortales. *De Amore*, p. 109 (187-188).

<sup>57</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Et ideo, si alias me vestro dignum amore noveritis hac me causatione non recte potestis abiicere, quod me clericorum videtis militiae deputari. *De Amore*, p. 109 (189).

<sup>58</sup> Parry, p. 142. Ab omnibus igitur clericus amoris actibus alienus existat, et omnis corporalis immunditia eum relinquat, alias enim sua speciali et a Deo sibi nobilitate largita merito privatus existat. *De Amore*, p. 128 (221).

<sup>59</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Quia vix tamen unquam aliquis sine carnis crimine vivit, et clericorum sit vita propter otia multa continua et ciborum abundantiam copiosam prae aliis hominibus universis naturaliter corporis tentationi supposita, si aliquis clericus amoris voluerit subire certamina, iuxta sui sanguinis ordinem sive gradum, sicut superius edocet plenarie de gradibus hominum insinuata doctrina, suo sermone utatur et amoris studeat applicari militiae. *De Amore*, *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 165, p. 552; Mandonnet, No. 167, p. 189.

morality and not according to that of Courtly Love. From the point of view of Courtly Love and from Andreas' viewpoint, pure love, the love of the will and heart,—the superior faculties,—is refined, modest, the source of all virtue, wholly in accord with the nature of man. The question of the possibility of sin in the practice of pure love, which permits all in sexual relations except fornication, hardly arises with Andreas any more than it does in the case of the *fin' amors* of the troubadours.<sup>60a</sup> For what serious sin can there be in what is done under the compulsion of nature?<sup>60b</sup> The sin in Courtly Love is the enjoyment of fleshly delights of and for themselves. This is sinful according to the courtly code as alien to the nature of man and reducing man to the level of brute creation.

Andreas' teaching, therefore, agrees with the condemned proposition, at least with the first part of it, if it is considered from the Christian point of view and not from that of Courtly Love. In the Eighth Dialogue, the man of the higher nobility develops the theme that in love the solaces of the upper part of the body are not violation of modesty but, on the contrary, are most proper and refined. The solaces of the lower part of the body when enjoyed of and for themselves are, on the other hand, shameful and the indecent use of the body.<sup>61</sup>

5. *Quod pauper bonis fortunae non potest bene agere in moralibus.*<sup>62</sup>

It is the teaching of the *De Amore* that only those are considered worthy of love who are of excellent character and who do noble deeds.<sup>63</sup> It is excellence of character that gives men the privilege and title of nobility for nobility is determined by character and not by birth.<sup>64</sup> Although love offers everybody in the world an incentive to do good and it is to be sought as the root and principle cause of everything good,<sup>65</sup> still it remains true that only those who have proven themselves of excellent character by the nobility of their deeds may be found worthy to love or to be loved.<sup>66</sup> It is on these grounds that Andreas holds that poverty is a bar to love because poverty prevents a man from acting nobly and from doing good deeds; it is a bar to excellence of character.

In the Second Dialogue a woman of the nobility rejects the attentions of a man of the middle class on the grounds that he engages in business. A man who devotes all his efforts and time for six days of the week to the building up of wealth ought not on the seventh day try to enjoy the gifts of love. If he does so, he dishonors Love and confounds the distinction of rank long established. The man answers that it is no disgrace to engage in business. On the

<sup>60a</sup> Cf. A. J. Denomy, 'Fin' Amors: the Pure Love of the Troubadours', *Mediaeval Studies* VII, 183-184.

<sup>60b</sup> Credo tamen, in amore Deum graviter offendi non posse; nam quod natura cogente perficitur, facili potest expiatione mundari. *De Amore*, p. 94 (162); Parry, p. 111.

<sup>61</sup> Quamvis enim ad inferioris partis solatia quilibet principaliter tendat amator, et ibi sit amoris causa finalis, turpis tamen et inepta videtur nimis gestio corporis et plurimum feminae verecundum, inferiora sine superioribus solatiis exercere. Immo inferioris delectationis impossibilis sine superiori videtur assumptio, nisi indecens corporis dispositio nimis inde ac verecunda sequatur. Superioris autem solatia portionis commodissime ac curialiter et agentium utriusque salvo pudore sumuntur, etiam delectatione inferiori omissa. Immo rationis istud ordo poscit amandi, ut superioris primo partis aliquis ad multam instantiam lasciva solatia consequatur, postmodum vero gradatim ad inferiora procedat. Mulieres enim

tantum sui corporis volentes facere quaestum et quae publico sunt Veneris mercimonio prostitutae inferioris tantum impetunt solatia partis et superiora cuncta contemnunt. Ergo praedictus quasi naturalis est ab omnibus ordo sequendus. *De Amore*, p. 122 (211-212). Parry, pp. 137-138.

<sup>62</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 170, p. 553; Mandonnet, No. 212, p. 190.

<sup>63</sup> Sola ergo probitas amoris est digna corona. *De Amore*, p. 9 (18); Parry, p. 35.

<sup>64</sup> Nam quum sola probitas faciat hominem dignum nobilitari, et sola nobilitas nobili reperitur digna amore, merito sola probitas nobilis amoris est digna corona. *De Amore*, p. 33 (61); Parry, p. 57.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 27.

<sup>66</sup> Si homines igitur sola morum probitas nobilitatis meruit virtutibus decorare ac generositatis assumere nomen, errorem praedictum penitus deponere curate, et sola morum probitas compellat vos amare. *De Amore*, p. 24 (45); Parry, p. 48.

contrary, it is in accordance with his position in life and with his nature. His purpose in business is not to pile up dishonest gain, but to enable him to be liberal, to acquire nobility of character by the doing of noble deeds. Moreover, if he did not engage in business, he would fall into poverty and then would disappear all opportunity of acting in a noble manner and, therefore, of acquiring and retaining nobility of character.<sup>67</sup>

The poor man is a prey to sadness and to torturing cares; melancholy and dejection step in where joyousness should reign. So the things that cause love to increase fail, the things that nourish love begin to leave. The lover who is suddenly impoverished begins to act in a changed manner towards his lady and to appear frightful to her. When poverty comes in, love begins to fail.<sup>68</sup> That is why, when speaking of the ways in which love may be increased and, therefore, how one's worth and excellence may be increased, Andreas mentions the sudden loss of the lover's wealth. He describes the evils that follow upon such a calamity: 'For a lover who suffers from great poverty is so tormented by the thought of household affairs and his urgent necessities that he can give no heed to the impulses of love and cannot allow it to increase as it should; as a result everybody tries to find fault with his character and his life, and he is despised and hated by all, and no one will look upon him as a friend because

While you are fortunate you will number many friends,  
When the skies grow dark you will be alone.

Because of all these things a man's face and figure begin to change, and restful sleep deserts him, and so he can hardly escape becoming contemptible in the eyes of his beloved.<sup>69</sup>

Therefore, Andreas advises Walter to avoid those women whose love is got by money. Such women will lead him on to give presents. Thus he will come to poverty and eventually to contempt 'and so, taken in by a clever woman, you will be forced to sail to the coast of poverty and will be in all respects an object of contempt.'<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, if a woman is in need, she may accept

<sup>67</sup> Illud autem, quod de mercimoniis in contumeliam est mihi a vobis obiectum, si attentis mea curaveritis verba auribus percipere, sine omni dubitatione cognoscetis, nullo mihi posse de iure nocere. Nam quod mercimoniorum honorabilia lucra diligenter attendo, contendo proprio generi deservire, quia talia studeo meis actibus exercere, quae meae possunt naturae congruere. Et ex hoc murmura vulgi depellere curo, quod dicere consuevit: "Talia quemque facere decet, quae genus pariter cum ordine quaerit". Sed quod praedicta lucra improbe futuri intuitu cumulare non insisto, sed ea provide et largissime suo loco et tempore aliis dispensare contendo, in hoc meam morum et probitatis nobilitatem defendo. Praeterea, si honestis et licitis non curem insistere lucris, obscura me detinebit inopia, et ideo nobilitatis opera exercere non potero, et sic mea morum nobilitas in solo et nudo verbo manebit, quae curialitas vel nobilitas ab hominibus nullatenus credi consuevit. *De Amore*, p. 24 (45-46); Parry, p. 48-49.

<sup>68</sup> Nam inopiae quisque necessitati suppositus deflexo incipit incedere vultu et multis cogitationibus cruciari, et omnis eum alacritas derelinquit. Qua quidem cessante illico melancolia ex adverso consurgit, in eo

suum sibi locum vindicat ira, et ita incipit esse alteratus amanti et ei terribilis apparere, sicutque incipiunt amoris incrementa deficere; ergo incipit amor diminui. Amor enim semper minuitur vel augetur. Manifesto igitur experimento cognosco, quod ita superveniente inopia incipiunt fomenta amoris deficere, quia: "Non habet unde suum paupertas pascat amorem". *De Amore*, p. 4 (8); Parry, p. 30.

<sup>69</sup> Parry, pp. 154-155. Amator enim inopia multa detentus tanta rei familiaris et necessitatis instantis cogitatione quassatur, ut amoris non possit actibus inservire nec debita sibi incrementa praestare, et inde suos cuncti mores et vitam improbare nituntur, et omnibus contemptibilis et odiosus existit, et neminem cognoscit amicum, quia:

"Quum fueris felix, multos numerabis amicos,  
Tempore quum fuerint nubila, solus eris".  
Unde propter haec omnia, incipit facies et forma mutari, et eum somni requies derelinquit, et sic vix esse poterit, quod ipse penitus non vilescat amanti. *De Amore*, p. 142 (245-246).

<sup>70</sup> Parry, p. 147. Et postea, quidquid in orbe carius possidebis, videbitur tibi modicum pro impensi nutus fallacis honore conferre,

a rich lover in preference to a poor one provided, of course, that he be the equal of the poor in birth and life and morals. This was the judgment of the Countess of Champagne and it was made for the following reasons: 'for if both lovers are oppressed by poverty there is little doubt that their love will be of short duration. Poverty brings a great feeling of shame to all honorable men and gives them many an anxious thought and is even a great disturber of quiet sleep; so as a result it commonly puts love to flight'.<sup>71</sup>

6.° We turn now to a group of errors concerned with the psychology of the will. In general, the error aimed at in the condemnation of them is the determinism of the will. They deny human liberty and suppress the role of freedom in human actions. Just as the movement of the sensitive appetite is not in the power of the animal, just as the animal cannot help but be drawn towards a delectable object, so the rational appetite or the will cannot help but be drawn necessarily in the face of the good it desires. Like the sensitive appetite, the rational is beyond the power of man to control. The force of passion is so strong that the will necessarily follows it. Thus, a man acting through stress of passion is constrained to that action. The general trend of these errors is perhaps best summed up in terms of the statement of one of them: *Quod anima nichil vult, nisi mota ab alio. Unde illud est falsum: anima seipsa vult. Error, si intelligatur mota ab alio scilicet ab appetibili vel objecto, ita quod appetibile vel objectum sit tota ratio motus ipsius voluntatis*.<sup>72</sup>

The error in all of these propositions consists in their destruction of the role of reason and its liberty of judgment with regards to the exercise of the will. They deny that man is the master of his judgment, that reason permits him to judge whether to act or not to act. On the contrary, man is not determined by his nature as is the animal nor by the object of his desires, but he dominates the judgment that dictates his choice. He and not the object is the cause of the movement of his will. In that sense the soul is the cause of its own movement and is not determined to act. Passion, if it entirely blinds the reason, reduces man to the level of brute creation. There is no liberty there because there is no reason and in so acting, man is not acting as man but as an animal. Passion may influence the judgment as dispositions but in so far as the reason remains free, the will is left free not only to consent to it but to run counter to it.<sup>73a</sup>

Andreas teaches that it is passion that compels a man to love the beloved, that the will is not free to act counter to desire but must follow there where love directs. In the Fourth Dialogue, a nobleman demands the love of a woman

et sic mulieris captus ingenio ad inopiae compelleris litora navigare et in omnium devenire contemptum. *De Amore*, p. 133 (229-230).

<sup>71</sup> Parry, p. 169. Sed, si mulier inopiae obscuritate gravetur, licentius opulentis admittit amorem, quia, utroque coamantium in egestatis unda reperto, eorum erit amoris procul dubio constantia brevis. Inopia namque verecundiam summam probis cunctis adducit hominibus et eos in varias cogitationum deducit angustias et in somni etiam vehementer quiete fatigat et inde consequenter fugare consuevit amorem. *De Amore*, p. 159 (276).

<sup>72</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 194, p. 554; Mandonnet, No. 151, p. 187. Cf. also, *Quod appetitus, cessantibus impedimentis, necessario movetur ab appetibili. Error est de intellectivo. Chartularium*, No. 134, p. 551; Mandonnet, No. 159, p. 187; *Quod voluntas secundum se est indeterminata ad opposita sicut materia; determinatur autem ab appetibili, sicut ma-*

*teria ab agente. Chartularium*, No. 135, p. 551; Mandonnet, No. 161, p. 187. *Quod homo agens ex passione coacte agit. Chartularium*, No. 136, p. 551; Mandonnet, No. 168, p. 188. *Quod homo in omnibus actionibus suis sequitur appetitum, et semper maiorem.—Error, si intelligatur de maiori in movendo. Chartularium*, No. 164, p. 552; Mandonnet, No. 153, p. 187. *Quod voluntas hominis necessitatur per suam cognitionem, sicut appetitus bruti. Chartularium*, No. 159, p. 552; Mandonnet, No. 164, p. 188. *Quod duobus bonis propositis quod fortius est fortius movet.—Error, nisi intelligatur quantum est ex parte boni moventis. Chartularium*, No. 208, p. 555; Mandonnet, No. 157, p. 187. *Quod voluntas manente passione et scientia particulari in actu non potest agere contra eam. Chartularium*, No. 129, p. 551; Mandonnet, No. 169, p. 188.

<sup>73a</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 82, 1; I-II, 6, 7; 9, 1-4; 10, 2-3; 13, 6; *De Malo* VI; *De Veritate* 24, 1.

of plebeian rank. She rejects his suit on the ground that he is thereby transgressing the limits of his own social class. She advises him to seek for love within his own class and not to try to sue for the love of a woman in another lest he meet with a well-merited rebuke for his presumption. The nobleman condemns her stand as a lack of experience in the art of love and as ignorance of a well-known fact. It is not excellence of birth or beauty of person that arouses desire, but it is love alone that impels men's hearts to love, so strongly in fact that often it constrains them to throw aside all equality of rank and beauty. In his own case, she seems to him to surpass all other women in beauty and nobility even though to others she may appear ugly, misshapen and spiritless. Compared to her, other women seem plain. It is Love which compels him to love her.<sup>73</sup>

In the next Dialogue, a nobleman speaks with a woman of his own class. The lady, in answer to the nobleman's plea for her love, replies that she is firmly resolved never to subject herself to the servitude of Venus or to endure the torments of love. The man implores her not to persist in such a horrible error. The lady gives as her reasons the utter impossibility of freely leaving the service of love once it is entered. While love persists, the will necessarily does its bidding: 'he has no will to do or not to do anything except what Love's table sets before him or what may be pleasing to the other lover. Therefore we ought not to seek a court of this kind, for one should by all means avoid entering a place which he cannot freely leave'.<sup>74</sup> She compares the Court of Love to the gates of Hell and concludes that she would prefer to remain in France, poor but free, than to be subject to a foreign power even though she be enriched thereby.<sup>75</sup> On the contrary, the nobleman argues that for a person to have what he desires most constitutes the fullest liberty. Love is the most appetible thing in the world and must be embraced. Freedom consists in not wishing to be separated from what one desires with all his heart. That man ought to be delighted if he finds it impossible not to wish what he desires most, provided that the object be desirable. Now love is the most desirable thing in the world since 'from it comes the doing of every good thing and without it no one would do anything good in the world'. Therefore, there is perfect freedom in not being able not to love and in not wishing to be separated from it.<sup>76</sup>

Indeed, Andreas bolsters up this teaching with the doctrine of a certain

<sup>73</sup> Multum videris amoris ignara doctrinae, quum id, quod omnibus est manifestum, te prorsus ignorare demonstras. Lippis namque videtur omnibus atque patere tonsoribus, quod nec sanguinis generositas nec decora multum species pertinet ad amoris emittendam sagittam; sed amor est ille solus, qui hominum ad amandum corda compellit, et saepius ipsos instanter cogit amantes alienigenae mulieris amorem exigere, id est ordinis et formae nullatenus aequalitate servata . . . Mirari ergo non debes, si te quamvis ignobilem genere omni tamen decoris fulgore et morum probitate fulgentem tota contendo amare virtute, quia non talia postulo quasi a mei ordinis mulieribus recusatus, sed ab amore taliter amare coactus. *De Amore*, pp. 41-42 (74-75); Parry, p. 65.

<sup>74</sup> Parry, p. 71. In amoris curiam facillimus est inventus ingressus, sed propter imminentes amantium poenas ibi est perseverare difficile, ex ea vero propter appetibiles actus amoris impossibilis deprehenditur exitus atque durissimus. Nam post verum amoris curiae ingressum nihil potest amans velle vel nolle, nisi quod mensa sibi proponat

amoris, et quod alteri possit amanti placere. Ergo talis non est curia appetenda; eius namque loci est omnino fugiendus ingressus, cuius libere non patet egressus. *De Amore*, p. 50 (86-87).

<sup>75</sup> Tartareae etenim talis potest locus curiae comparari; nam, quum Tartari porta cuilibet intrare moretur aperta volenti, nulla est post ingressum exeundi facultas. Malo igitur aere modico Franciae contenta adesse et liberum eundi, quo voluero, possidere arbitrium quam Ungarico quidem onusta argento alienae subici potestati, quia tale multum habere est nihilum habere. *De Amore*, p. 50 (87); Parry, pp. 71-72.

<sup>76</sup> Parry, p. 72. Liberius nulli potest esse arbitrium, quam si ab eo, quod quis tota mentis intentione desiderat, velle separari non possit. Gratum namque cuilibet esse debet, si illud nolle non possit, quod tota virtute desiderat, si tantum res illa sit appetibilis. Sed amore in orbe nihil appetibilis reperitur, quum ex eo omnis boni procedat instructio, et sine eo nihil boni aliquis operetur in orbe. Ergo illius videtur curia utrisque amplectenda lacertis. *De Amore*, p. 50 (87-88).

Donatus<sup>77</sup> to the effect that the will cannot be controlled in the sense that it is so very free that no effort can deflect it from a purpose once that purpose is firmly formed. In the Seventh Dialogue, a man of the higher nobility answers the objection raised by a woman of the same class who says that it would be unjust and unfair of her to assume the credit and merit of inspiring all the good deeds he has performed in the service of other ladies. They, too, are as worthy and even more worthy than she is. He should be devoted to all women in general rather than to her in particular. Moreover, he should not ask her to show partiality to him to the detriment of others who serve her even though he claims to be her devoted servant and, as such, worthy of the hoped for reward. The nobleman answers that he does no injustice to other women in crediting her with all his good deeds since a man should do them to the special praise of one woman. That woman, even though she be pleased at everyone's good deeds, can laudably praise those of only one man. Therefore, no woman is injured if he has devoted these good deeds to her service and has acknowledged her as his special mistress. Other women are to be honored by the special service of other men. So she should not vex herself in looking out for them, 'since my will is fixed on serving you in everything and the will cannot be controlled, as the teaching of the most learned Donatus will show you, for the human will is so very free that no one's efforts can divert it from a purpose firmly formed'.<sup>78</sup>

In instructing Walter on the technique and art of love, Andreas devotes a chapter to those cases where one of the lovers is unfaithful to the other. The question is asked 'whether the woman or the lover may properly seek a new love'?<sup>79</sup> His solution recognizes the necessity of the action of the will under the impulse of passion: 'Rightly or wrongly, people do it, and after one has been smitten with a new love he is just as forcibly compelled to give way to his own impulses as though he were under the domination of some other person'.<sup>80</sup> But a true lover never desires a new love unless he knows certainly that the old love is dead. Andreas illustrates the truth of this rule of love from his own experience. He had fallen in love with a woman of most excellent character of whom he had never had or ever hoped to have any consolation. Because of her lofty station in life he never dared to speak of his love to her and now, having fallen so deeply in love, he can never think of a new love.<sup>81</sup>

Andreas considers another case: a passing infidelity on the part of the lover. Should he be judged unfaithful? Andreas answers that in this case the irresistibility of passion is sufficient excuse from blame. The man has been unfaithful, not with an eye to a new love, but he has been driven to it simply by an

<sup>77</sup> The use of the adjective *peritissimus* would seem to indicate that Andreas had in mind Aelius Donatus the Grammarian. Such a statement has not been found in the latter's works. Neither has Parry been able to locate it in the work of Tiberius Claudius Donatus the Commentator (*op. cit.*, p. 96, n. 44).

<sup>78</sup> Parry, pp. 96-97. Nihil enim earum videtur expedire utilitatibus hac vos pro eis sollicitudine fatigari, quum vestris per omnia ministeriis mea sit annexa voluntas, cui imperari non potest peritissimam hoc Donati vobis insinuante doctrina: In tantum enim liberrima reperitur humana voluntas, quod nullius eam posset a firmiter concepta dispositione conatus avertere. *De Amore*, p. 79 (134).

<sup>79</sup> Parry, p. 163. Utrum autem mulier vel amator novum licenter petat amorem. *De*

*Amore*, p. 152 (263).

<sup>80</sup> Parry, p. 163. Quia sive licite sive minus licenter istud agatur, postquam novi quicumque radio fuerit pertactus amoris, violenta cogitur attractione propriis motibus obedire tanquam alieno subiectus arbitrio. *De Amore*, p. 152 (263).

<sup>81</sup> Nam et nos excellentissimi amoris concitamus aculeis, quamvis inde nullum sumpsimus nec speramus assumere fructum. Nam tantae altitudinis cogimur amore languescere, quod nulli licet exprimere verbo, nec supplicantium audemus iure potiri, et sic demum compellimur proprii corporis sentire naufragia. Sed quamvis in tanta sumus audacter et improvide tempestatis unda prolapsi, de nova tamen amore cogitare non possumus vel alium liberationis modum exquirere. *De Amore*, p. 152 (263-264). Parry, p. 164.



irresistible passion for another woman when there was the occasion and the means of satisfying that passion. Therefore, he is not to lose the love of his beloved unless, of course, the too frequent occurrence of that sort of thing prove him to be overpassionate.<sup>63</sup>

It is generally agreed throughout the *De Amore* that the passion of love forces all men to love. Even the women of the Dialogues who ordinarily oppose the doctrines of Andreas agree to that.<sup>64</sup> But in the case of the beloved whose love is sought, is she, too, so driven? There is a wide divergence of opinion and of doctrine between the two protagonists. The lover is driven necessarily and inexorably to love the beloved; is she free in her choice to accept him or to reject him? That question forms the substance of two Dialogues.<sup>64</sup> In both of them the lady upholds her freedom and liberty of choice; the man denies that she is free given two conditions: his excellence of character and her freedom from previous attachment, and affirms and argues the doctrine of Courtly Love against her. In the first of these two Dialogues, a man of the middle class speaks with a woman of the nobility. He is of a lower social class. It is his desire and passion that compel him to seek above it and in this he follows the law of Love that love makes no distinction of rank. He speaks to her of his love because his will cannot restrain the force of his desire; he is compelled to speak. The more he sought to cover up his wound, the more the pain of it increased until at length 'its mighty power forced me to ask for great things and to seek for a cure for my ever-present pain'.<sup>65</sup> He feels that he may select her for his beloved, as long as his character does not debase him because he is supported by an unanswerable argument: 'Just as love inflames men of all classes, so lovers should draw no distinctions of rank, but consider only whether the man who asks for love has been wounded by Love'.<sup>66</sup>

The noble lady patiently bears with these foolish arguments; she ignores his effrontery in daring to pass beyond the limits of his social order and his presumption in so upsetting the natural order of things. She concentrates on the man's foolish claim that she be required to return his love. That assertion rests on a falsehood: 'I admit that Love forces everyone, without distinctions, to love, but that which follows (that a lover ought not to distinguish beyond asking whether he who seeks for love is in love) I do not accept, because it rests wholly on a falsehood'.<sup>67</sup> The results of such a position would be ruinous:

<sup>63</sup> Quid ergo, si vir fidem frangit amanti non renovandi amoris intuitu, sed quia sic eum compulsi ulterius non reversura voluptas? Quid enim, si loci opportunitas feminam ei representavit incognitam, vel quid, si meretricula vel cuiuscunque famula tempore Veneris incitantis huic, de quo loquor, occurrat amanti, numquid ab hoc coamantis debet amore privari, si secum ludit in herba? Et secura quidem possumus responsione docere, quod ob hoc amator suae coamantis non indicatur indignus amore, nisi saepius forte cum pluribus tales ipse committat excessus ita scilicet, ut nimia de eo voluptatis abundantia praesumatur. *De Amore*, p. 150 (258-259); Parry, p. 161.

<sup>64</sup> Sine omni contradictione profiteor, quod amor indifferenter cogit amare. *De Amore*, p. 22 (42); Parry, p. 47.

<sup>65</sup> Dialogues Two and Six. *De Amore*, pp. 19-28 (36-53), 64-73 (110-124); Parry, pp. 44-53, 84-91.

<sup>66</sup> Parry, p. 45. Viso enim vestro aspectu adeo meum perterret ingenium mentemque perturbat, quod eorum etiam, quae mente attente conceperam, penitus obliviosus ex-

sisto. Merito ergo meum studebam celare dolorem; quanto tamen magis meum conabar tegere vulnus, tanto magis mihi crescebat poena doloris. Tam diu tamen vulnus permansit absconsum, quam diu me dolor suis non potuit viribus superare. Postquam vero sua virtute me devicit, pro magna potentia sui grandia me postulare cogit et instantis doloris remedia cogitare. *De Amore*, p. 20 (39).

<sup>67</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Cognosco igitur manifeste, quod amor non consuevit homines discretionis stilo discernere, sed omnes pariter angit in suo, id est, amoris exercitu militare . . . hoc solum discernens, an aliquis si aptus ad amoris arma ferenda . . . Sicut igitur uniuscuiusque generis homines amor cogit accendi, ita et amantes non genera discernere debent sed hoc solum, an sit sauciatus amore, qui petit amari. *De Amore*, pp. 19-20 (37-38).

<sup>68</sup> Parry, p. 47. Sed aliud, quod sequitur, scilicet, amantem non debere distinguere nisi, an amet, qui petit amari, non suscipio, quia penitus est falsitati subnixum. *De Amore*, p. 22 (42).

a beggar, even a farmer, might legitimately compel a queen, for example, to love him; everyone would feel driven to seek a lover in a higher level of society. No, the truth is that 'although he [Love] sees that all men are by the natural desire of their passions drawn to anybody of the opposite sex, he considers it shameful for him to pitch his tents at once over against the other person, so that she whose love is sought must immediately be driven to love.'<sup>88</sup> On the contrary, 'Love regularly leaves it to the choice of each woman either to love or not, as she may wish, the person who asks for her love'.<sup>89</sup>

On the point of nobility, the man argues that it is an error to suppose that it rests on the privilege of birth. It is character that confers nobility. Since he has cultivated an excellent character, he is well within the ranks of nobility. Therefore, he cannot be judged presumptuous if he seeks a love among the nobility since character and not birth determine nobility.<sup>90</sup> The nobleman then qualifies somewhat his doctrine that the object of love should ask only if the one who seeks has been smitten by love. That law is to be interpreted in the sense 'that she whose love is sought ought not to ask whether the man who seeks it comes of a noble or ignoble family; she should ask only whether he has good habits and a good character'.<sup>91</sup> Secondly, when asked by a worthy lover for her love, the woman remains free to give her love or not as she chooses, yes! but if she yields, she is to be rewarded unutterably; if she refuses, she is to be punished unbearably: 'Therefore a woman ought to inquire diligently whether the man who asks for her love is worthy of it, and if she finds that he is perfectly worthy, she ought by no means to refuse him her love unless she is obligated to love someone else'.<sup>92a</sup>

The teaching of Andreas in this Dialogue really amounts to this: that whereas the lover yields necessarily to the object of his love, the beloved is under moral necessity of yielding to him. After due investigation that proves the lover to be of good character and therefore worthy of her love, after her reason has shown her that she ought to yield to him, the beloved may only at her peril exercise her liberty of choice and refuse his petition. She is bound,

<sup>88</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Nam quum cerneret amor, homines universos ex ipso instinctu cupidinis naturaliter in cuiuslibet alterius sexus personae libidinem provocari, turpe nimis putavit exemplum sua statim ex adverso tentoria ponere, ut eam, cuius quaeritur amor, statim compellat amare. Si hoc enim esset, quilibet horridus, hispidus, agriculturae deserviens vel in plateis publice pro cibo mendicans reginae sibi provocare posset amorem. *De Amore*, pp. 22-23 (43).

<sup>89</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Cuiuslibet generaliter personae amor commisit arbitrio, ut, si velit amet eum, qui petit amari, vel non amet, si nolit amare. *De Amore*, p. 23 (43).

<sup>90</sup> Praeterea illud, quod dixisti, quia quisque intra sui generis saepia debeat permanere et maioris ordinis amorem nullatenus postulare, diffiteri non possum. Sed si me morum probitatis cultura perlustrat, intra nobilitatis me credo moenia constitutum et vera generis coruscare virtute, et sic me morum probitas intra nobilitatis ordinem facit esse repositum; et ideo nulla potest reputari praesumptio, si ex nobilitate mihi quaeram amorem eligere; magis enim ex moribus quam ex sanguine deprehenditur cuiusque nobilitas. *De Amore*, p. 25 (47); Parry, p. 49.

<sup>91</sup> Parry, p. 50. Nam quod dixi, amantem non debere distinguere, ita recipias, quia non debet, cuius postulatur amor, distin-

guere, utrum de nobili an de ignobili sit genere ortus, qui petit amari, debet tantum distinguere, utrum bonis moribus et an sit multa probitate decoratus. *De Amore*, p. 26 (49).

<sup>92</sup> Nam altero amantium amoris sagitta pertacto non immerito alter proprio servatur arbitrio, ut, si ea fecerit, quae bene placita inveniuntur amori, magnis ab eo sit dignus honorari muneribus multisque in plebe laudibus effereundus, si vero eius voluntati contraria, contraria debet munera ferre. Ideo ergo amor in arbitrio posuit amantis, ut, quum amatur, et ipsa, si velit, amet, si vero nolit, non cogatur amare, quia maioribus censetur meritis dignus, qui bona sponte peregit, quam qui ea coactus exercuit. Et hoc ad instar coelestis regis creditur esse indultum, qui boni et mali percepta notitia quemque hominum proprio relinquit arbitrio, bene quidem agentibus ineffabilia praemia pollicendo, mala vero operantibus poenas intolerabiles comminando. Debet ergo mulier diligenti animo investigare, an sit dignus amari, qui petit amari, et, si ipsum dignum omnino invenit, nullatenus eum suo debet amore frustare, nisi forte sit alterius amore ligata. Si alterius igitur non est obligata amori, nulla te poterit ratio excusare. *De Amore*, pp. 26-27 (50-51). Parry, p. 51.

<sup>92a</sup> *Ibid.*

if she is to attain the rewards that she expects and to avoid unbearable torments, to accede to the lover's demands.<sup>83</sup> Thus, her freedom of choice is conditioned on the one hand by her knowledge, on the other by moral necessity. In this Andreas' teaching comes very close to the following condemned article: *Quod voluntas necessario prosequitur, quod firmiter creditum est a ratione: et quod non potest abstinere ab eo, quod ratio dictat. Haec autem non est coactio, sed natura voluntatis.*<sup>84</sup>

Andreas develops at some length this same doctrine in syllogistic fashion in the second of the two Dialogues concerned with this question,—the Sixth Dialogue wherein a man of the higher nobility speaks with a woman of the plebeian class. In an attempt to prove to her that she is in error in fearing to transgress the limits of her social order, he states the principle that 'every man ought to ask for love where love's persuasion impels him'.<sup>85</sup> He cannot be blamed for his choice of her 'since you are worthy of the honorable court of Love and my will impels me to love you'.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, she must not refrain from loving him unless it be because of his lack of good character. Overriding her arguments drawn from the dangers that may trouble such a mesalliance from within and without,—scandal, loss of good name etc.,—he demands that she make careful investigation of his deeds and character. If she finds that his character makes him worthy, then to refuse him her love would be to do an injury to him. The woman then asserts her freedom of choice.<sup>87</sup> The nobleman concedes her the right to give her love or not as she pleases and it would seem that there is no injury done to the man if she refuses. But he argues that such a refusal does a very real injury to a worthy lover, to a lover who is a just man, since he is wrongly defrauded of his just due; his efforts go unrewarded. She ought not deny him her love unless his character is evil or unless she is bound to another. He maintains that we are all bound to love since to love is a good and an appetible thing. If she knows him to be worthy, she cannot deny him her love; her love must follow upon that knowledge: 'Now I shall prove to you that you cannot properly deprive me of your love. Loving is either a good thing or a bad thing. It is not safe to say that it is a bad thing, because all men are clearly agreed that the rule of Love shows us that neither woman nor man in the world can be considered happy or well-bred, nor can he do anything good, unless love inspires him. Wherefore you must needs conclude that loving is a good thing and a desirable one. Therefore if a person of either sex desires to be considered good or praiseworthy in the world, he or she is bound to love. But if you are bound to love you must love either bad men or worthy ones. But certainly you cannot love bad men, because Love's precepts forbid that; it follows then that you must give your love only to good men. Therefore if you find my character is good you do wrong in denying me your love'.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, pp. 51-61 (88-105); Parry, pp. 73-81.

<sup>84</sup> *Chartularium*, No. 163, p. 552; Mandonnet, No. 163, p. 187.

<sup>85</sup> Parry, p. 85. Ibi quisque debet sibi postulare amorem, ubi amoris suasionem restringitur. *De Amore*, p. 66 (112).

<sup>86</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Nam quum honorabili amoris curia digna permaneat [honore] et ad vestrum voluntas me cogit amorem. *De Amore*, p. 66 (113).

<sup>87</sup> Nam in cuiuslibet est positum mulieris arbitrio, ut, quum ab ea postulatur amor, recuset amare, si placet. *De Amore*, p. 68 (116); Parry, p. 87.

<sup>88</sup> Parry, p. 88. Probo ergo, quod me non recte potestis amore vestro privare. Nam amare aut est bonum aut est malum. Quod

sit malum, non est asserere tutum, quia satis omnibus constat et est manifestum, et amoris hoc nobis doctrina demonstrat, quod neque mulier neque masculus potest in saeculo beatus haberi nec curialitatem nec aliqua bona perficere, nisi sibi haec fomes praestet amoris. Unde necessario vobis concluditur ergo, bonum esse amare et appetibile. Satis ergo utriusque sexus homo amare tenetur, si bonus et laudabilis in orbe cupit haberi. Si autem amare tenemini, ergo aut malos aut probitate decoros. Malos quidem non, quia praeceptum contradicit amoris. Sequitur ergo, solis bonis vestrum esse largiendum amorem. Quare, si me moribus novertis decoratum, improbe mihi vestrum denegatis amorem. *De Amore*, pp. 69-70 (118).

The man of the higher nobility uses a second argument to prevail upon the woman, an argument that is but a repetition of the argument used in the preceding Dialogue. He concedes to her the freedom of choice which is granted to every lover but contends that Love has given her that liberty not to abuse such a privilege 'but that you might deserve from him greater rewards by being careful to choose, for his sake, the way of service when you are placed at such a parting of the ways; but if you go astray on the other path, you may be sure that he will be greatly offended'.<sup>99</sup> The woman replies that she cannot accede to his suit because of her lack of love for him. Her heart, her affections will not submit to her will. She would love him did her heart only obey and submit to her will. Her heart forbids her to love him much as she desires to do so.<sup>100</sup> She asks the man to solve the dilemma in which she finds herself placed: 'Tell me, I pray you, which I should follow—my heart or my head'.<sup>101</sup> The man reiterates his position, namely, that the heart and the will desire the same thing, that the will in its actions follows the movement of the heart, the passions.<sup>102</sup> The woman concludes nevertheless: 'What sort of love can it be that is undertaken against the desire of the heart? Only that which is first desired by the heart and the will should have the rewards of love, but I do not see how I can love what I do not desire with my heart'.<sup>103</sup> It is her contention that, in loving, her will must follow her heart, and until her will is so moved by her heart, she cannot love. The love of her suitor is conditioned by her passion for him, the movement of her rational appetite is conditioned by her sensitive appetite. In her very refusal of him and in her reason for so doing, she agrees with the man in his teaching that the will must be moved by passion, by an appetible object, in such a fashion that that object is the whole reason of its movement.

The power of passion and the necessity of the will to follow upon it is illustrated again in the solution of a case proposed and solved in the Eighth Dialogue.<sup>104</sup> A woman of the higher nobility proposes the following case to a man of the same class: a noble lover, on a royal expedition, is falsely rumored to have died. Therefore, the woman, after a suitable period of mourning, takes another lover. Shortly after, the first lover returns and asks for the usual embraces of her. The second lover forbids her to give them because their love—the second one—has been perfected. The point is that neither of the lovers ought to be deprived of their love. In the case of the second, if the woman driven by the force of love were to ask him to embrace her, the first might rightly feel injured; there is good reason why, too, the second lover should remain in his firmly established position. The solution of the case, according to the woman, depends on the principle of love that 'no one can love anywhere except where the spirit of love leads him and his will compels him'.<sup>105</sup> The man's

<sup>99</sup> Parry, p. 89. Non enim ob hoc vobis amor liberum voluit conferre arbitrium, ut concessa debeatis abuti licentia, sed ut maioribus apud ipsum mereamini praemiis honorari, si in tali posita bivio sibi studueritis serviendi viam eligere; unde, si in aliam contigerit vos divertere semitam, eum non mediocriter credatis offensum. *De Amore*, p. 70 (119).

<sup>100</sup> Ea quae dicitis, satis ratione nituntur, si cor meum propriae annueret voluntati. Mea namque voluntas esset, quae proponitis, adimplere, sed cor contradicit omnino et dissuadet per omnia fieri, quod plena voluntate desidero. *De Amore*, p. 71 (120); Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Parry, p. 89. Quaeso, ut mihi asseratis,

cui potius sit favendum: cordi scilicet an voluntati. *De Amore*, *ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Hanc discordiam me amplius audisse, non recolo, quod aliud corde et aliud voluntate quaeratur. *De Amore*, *ibid.*; Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> Parry, p. 89. Praeterea qualis posset esse amor contra cordis voluntatem praesumptus? Nam, quod primitus corde ac voluntate appetitur, illud solum amoris debet amplecti muneribus; quod autem corde non peto, quo modo possem amare, non video. *De Amore*, p. 71 (120-121).

<sup>104</sup> *De Amore*, pp. 123-125 (214-216); Parry, pp. 138-140.

<sup>105</sup> Parry, p. 139. Amare etenim alibi nemo potest, nisi ubi spiritus trahit amoris et voluntas cogit. *De Amore*, p. 124 (214-215).

solution turns rather on the choice or desire of the beloved, a choice that is induced by affection and passion. If the spirit of love compels her even in the slightest degree towards the first lover, then she is to return to him. But if her will is not compelled or coerced by that affection, if her feeling of passion for him is dead, she may keep the second lover 'for to say that she should, absolutely, return to the first one, unless she does it under the persuasion of love's remorse, would be a shameful thing to say and would defeat the precept of Love'.<sup>108</sup>

## II. Due Contrarie Veritates<sup>1</sup>

In the latter part of his treatise, Andreas rejects all the teaching on the art of love and on the laws governing the conduct of lovers he had set forth in its first two Books. In the Third Book, the *De Reprobatione Amoris*, he retracts all that he had taught his dear friend Walter on the nature of love, all the rules and regulations he must follow to acquire and conserve it, all the pitfalls and snares he must avoid if he would be a virtuous, honest and constant lover. Not only does he reject and retract all that he had pointed out so fully and systematically, but he shows clearly the utter incompatibility of sexual love with divine love. His final word of advice to Walter is to avoid the practice of the mandates of love, to shun its sinful delights and to cultivate the love of God and good works that thereby he may attain the eternal company of the Divine Bridegroom.<sup>14</sup>

Rightly, then, does Andreas call to his friend's attention that the doctrine contained in his little book really presents two points of view.<sup>2</sup> First, there is the art of love set forth completely, point by point, at Walter's own eager request. By the faithful practice of this system, Andreas promises him that he will attain the delights of the flesh in the fullest measure but not the grace of God, not the companionship of the good or the friendship of praiseworthy men. Because of love, he will suffer great harm to his good name and it will be difficult for him to obtain the honors of this world.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, there is the rejection of love, added of his own accord and fully treated, in the hope that it will be of use to

<sup>108</sup> Parry, p. 140. Instantis quidem enodatio quaestionis ex mulieris potius pendet arbitrio vel voluntate quam ex regularis intellectu praecepti vel amoris speciali mandato. Credo namque, dominam illam . . . recte agere, si se ipsam penitus priori restituat amatori, si quocunque tantum adversus eum vinculo movetur affectionis. Quod si nullus adversus eum nec etiam modicus in ipsa spiritus movetur amandi, dico tamen adhuc, ipsam suam violenter debere cogere voluntatem ad id petendum, quod maxima primitus aviditate suscepit et cordis desiderio comprobavit. Summae namque sapientiae est, aliquem suum animum ab eo, cui errando consenserat, revocare . . . Sed, si ipsa viderit, suam voluntatem nullius coactionis sentire fomenta, et, extinctum adversus amantem primum spiritum reviviscere non posse, cognoverit, amantem potest servare secundum. Nam dicere, quod ad primum debeat praecise redire, nisi hoc faciat amoris compunctione suasa, esset asserere turpe et amoris praecepta fraudare. *De Amore*, pp. 124-125 (215-216).

<sup>1</sup> Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie veritates. *Chartularium*, p. 543; Mandonnet, p. 175.

<sup>14</sup> Studeas ergo, Gualteri, lampades sem-

per ornatas habere, id est caritatis et bonorum operum ornamenta tenere. Memento etiam vigilare semper, ne in peccatis dormiendo te inveniat sponsi repentinus adventus. Cave igitur, Gualteri, amoris exercere mandata et continua vigilatione labora, ut, quum venerit sponsus, inveniat te vigilantem. *De Amore*, p. 209 (360); Parry, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Haec igitur nostra subtiliter et fideliter examinata doctrina, quam tibi praesenti libello mandamus insertam, tibi duplicem sententiam propinabit. *De Amore*, p. 208 (358); Parry, pp. 210-211.

<sup>3</sup> Nam in prima parte praesentis libelli tuae simplici et juvenili annuere petitioni volentes ac nostrae quidem in hac parte parcere nolentes inertiae artem amatoriam, sicut nobis mente avida postulasti, serie tibi plena dirigimus et competenti ordinatione dispositam delegamus, quam si iuxta volueris praesentem exercere doctrinam, et sicut huius libelli assidua tibi lectio demonstrabit, omnes corporis voluptates pleno consequeris effectu, Dei tamen gratia, bonorum consortio atque virorum laudabilium amicitia iusta manebis ratione privatus, tuamque famam non modicam facies sustinere iacturam, nec facile huius saeculi consequeris honores. *De Amore*, p. 208 (358-359); Parry, p. 211.

him, even do him good against his will. A complete understanding and the practice of what it teaches will show him plainly that no man ought to misspend his days in the pleasures of love. He promises, if Walter will abstain from them, that 'the Heavenly King will be more favorably disposed towards you in every respect, and you will be worthy to have all prosperous success in this world and to fulfil all praiseworthy deeds and the honorable desires of your heart, and in the world to come to have glory and life everlasting'.<sup>4</sup>

These two points of view as contained in the *De Amore* and the *De Reprobatione Amoris* are unalterably opposed. There is nothing in their respective doctrines that they have in common; between them there is an unbridgable chasm. To sexual love is opposed the love of God, to the service of women the service of God and to the ephemeral delights of sensual pleasure the eternal beatitude of divine glory. Human, sexual love and divine love are incompatible; they belong to two different worlds: the human to the natural and temporal; the divine to the supernatural and eternal. Never do the two worlds meet and Andreas makes no attempt to reconcile them. In the *De Amore* Andreas had taught Walter the excellence of love and the necessity of loving by arguments based on reason and human nature. In the *De Reprobatione*, in presenting the case of Christian morality against illicit and adulterous love, Andreas appeals to Scripture and to divine authority. Reason and nature demand that Walter enrol in the army of the God of Love, that he seek the pleasures and delights of the flesh that thus he may be ennobled and grow in worth and praise. The teaching of Our Lord and of Holy Mother Church, the doctrine of the Fathers demand that he set aside all human love and seek the love of God alone. Here is the conflict of faith and reason, of grace and nature. In the first two Books we are on the level of reason and human nature; in the Third on that of faith and grace. The two orders are true each on its own level and in its own realm but opposed one to the other.

In the *De Amore* Andreas is intent on the temporal, natural order. He conceives of the world, as Ovid did, as ruled by the God of Love.<sup>5</sup> This god, from whom comes every good, holds court in his Palace of Love situated in the middle of the world<sup>6</sup> and from it emerges at regular intervals to judge everyone according to his just deserts.<sup>7</sup> To those women who have served him and welcomed those who love, he grants his choicest rewards and a place in the inner part of his realm, the *Locus Amoenitatis*.<sup>8</sup> Those who have refused to love are accursed and to them the king adjudges unbearable torments in the third circle, the *Locus Siccitatis*, prepared for them of old.<sup>9</sup> Those mean and abject women who have made common use of their bodies are assigned to the

<sup>4</sup>Parry, *ibid.* In ulteriori parte libelli tuae potius volentes utilitati consulere, de amoris reprobatione tibi nulla ratione petenti, ut bona forte praestemus invito, spontanea voluntate subiunximus et pleno tibi tractatu conscripsimus. Quem tractatum nostrum si attenta volueris investigatione disquirere ac mentis intellectu percipere et eiusdem doctrinam operis executione complere, ratione manifesta cognosces, neminem in amoris voluptatibus debere male suos expendere dies, ac inde rex coelestis in cunctis tibi propitius permanebit et in hoc saeculo prosperos mereberis habere successus et universa laudabilia et honesta desideria cordis implere, ac in futuro gloriam et vitam possidebis aeternam. *De Amore*, p. 208 (359-360).

<sup>5</sup>Sed omnes amoris postulantes deservire militiae abiecerunt et tanquam sibi odiosos repulerunt eum non recolentes omnino, qui

deus amoris dicitur . . . per quem universus regitur mundus, et sine ipso nihil boni aliquis operatur in orbe. *De Amore*, pp. 56-57 (98); Parry, p. 77.

<sup>6</sup>Fertur enim et est verum, in medio mundi constructum esse palatium . . . In ipso autem palatio solus amor et dominarum meruerunt habitare collegia. *De Amore*, p. 51 (89); Parry, p. 73.

<sup>7</sup>Miles, quem vides . . . deus est amoris, qui singulis septimanis una die praesenti cernitur adiunctus militiae et cuique, prout bene vel male gessit in vita, mirabiliter pro cuiusque retribuit meritis. *De Amore*, p. 55, (96); Parry, pp. 76-77.

<sup>8</sup>Quanta quidem istis erat beatitudo et gloria, humana non posset vobis lingua referre. Nam totus amoenitatis locus istarum est voluptatibus assignatus. *De Amore*, p. 59 (103); Parry, p. 80.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *De Amore*, p. 60 (104); Parry, *ibid.*

central part, the *Locus Humilitatis*, where there is wailing and lamenting.<sup>10</sup> Their physical pain and pain of loss is increased by the sight of the happiness and glory of the blessed.<sup>11</sup> It is not safe, then, to offend such a god but safest by far to serve him who can reward so richly and punish so terribly.<sup>12</sup> This is the revelation made to the nobleman through vision by the God of Love and revealed along with the Rules of Love to the noblewoman to the end that it may be, with its promise of reward and punishment, the salvation of womankind.<sup>13</sup>

It is with the temporal kingdom of this world that Andreas is solely preoccupied in his first two Books. When it is a question whether a woman should grant her love to a youth or to an older suitor, Andreas decides that the youth who has had no opportunity as yet to do good should be preferred 'because this course is more profitable to society' and because 'society gains more when one man who is not good is rendered excellent than when the worthy character of some good man is increased'.<sup>14</sup> There is nothing good in this world, nothing worthy of praise before men, unless it takes its origin from love. Love is the cause and origin of all good but that good is always of this world.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, to love is the sweetest thing in this life;<sup>16</sup> the greatest favor that this world can give is the delight of one's beloved.<sup>17</sup> As such, love is the most desirable thing in the world<sup>18</sup> and the lover longs for nothing so much in this life as to enjoy his beloved.<sup>19</sup> He counts as nothing the riches under heaven in comparison to her.<sup>20</sup> Possession of her constitutes the worldly beatitude of the lover.<sup>21</sup> To

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, p. 60 (103); Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Talem igitur deum non est offendere tutum, sed in omnibus est sibi servire tutissimum, qui talibus suos novit praemiis munerare et suos contemptores tam gravibus poenis affligere. *De Amore*, p. 57 (99); Parry, p. 78.

<sup>13</sup> Nostra tibi sunt concessa videre magnalia, ut per te nostra valeat ignorantibus gloria revelari, et ut tua praesens visio sit multarum dominarum salutis occasio. Tibi ergo firmiter mandamus atque iniungimus, ut, ubicunque . . . hanc sibi visionem narrare procures et eam ab erroris proposito revocare, ut poenas possit tam gravissimas evitare et in praesentia valeat gloria collocari. *De Amore*, p. 61 (105); Parry, p. 81.

<sup>14</sup> Parry, p. 42. Iuvenis, qui bona nulla peregit, est eligendus amator, non quod magis sit dignus amari, quam qui bona plurima fecit, sed quia maius inde bonum sequitur mundo . . . maius fit mundo lucrum, si quis non bonus probus efficiatur, quam si alicuius boni probitas augmentetur. *De Amore*, pp. 16-17 (31-32).

<sup>15</sup> Nullum in mundo bonum vel curialitas exercetur, nisi ex amoris fonte derivetur. Omnis ergo boni erit amor origo et causa. *De Amore*, p. 15 (28-29); Parry, p. 40; Nam quum omnibus, quae fiunt in saeculo, bonis amor praestet initium, merito in primis tantum omnium bonorum radix et causa principalis est postulandus. *De Amore*, p. 38 (69); Parry, p. 61; Quid enim valeat in saeculo bonum ab aliquo exerceri, nisi ex amore suamumat originem, videre non possum. *De Amore*, p. 49 (86); Parry, p. 71; Praeterea fac nullatenus esse videtur, id inter crimina reputare, a quo bonum in hac vita summum habet initium, et sine quo nullus in orbe posset laude dignus haberi. *De Amore*, p. 94 (162); Parry, p.

111; Dico enim, quod in hac vita nil est laudabilius quam sapienter amare, et nullus ad plenum potest ea, quae homines dignos laude constituunt, adimplere, nisi amoris haec faciat compulsione suasus. *De Amore*, p. 97 (167-168); Parry, p. 114; Sed quum sciam . . . in hac vita nullum posse fieri bonum, nisi illud ex amore originis sumpserit incrementa, non immerito extra nuptialia mihi foedera postulare cogor amorem. *De Amore*, p. 99 (172); Parry, p. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Fateor, quod amari posco, quia dulcior, quam sit in orbe vita, est in amore vivere. *De Amore*, p. 31 (58); Parry, p. 55.

<sup>17</sup> Quid enim in hoc saeculo alicui potest gratius exhiberi quam optatae mulieris [divitiis] amore potiri? *De Amore*, p. 148 (255-256); Parry, p. 160.

<sup>18</sup> Sed amore in orbe nihil appetibilius reperitur, quum ex eo omnis boni procedat instructio, et sine eo nihil boni aliquis operetur in orbe. *De Amore*, p. 50 (87-88); Parry, p. 72. Res est igitur amor ab omnibus appetenda et a cunctis diligenda per orbem. *De Amore*, p. 100 (173); Parry, p. 117; Nihil in orbe sedet, quod meus tam avide desideret animus ut evidenter facere possim, quam quod laudibus sit et praemio dignum. *De Amore*, p. 77 (130-131); Parry, p. 95.

<sup>19</sup> Nam sine ipso nihil mihi videtur in saeculo possidere, et omnium saecularium rerum abundantia pro summa mihi reputatur inopia. *De Amore*, p. 65 (111); Parry, p. 84.

<sup>20</sup> Quid enim homo posset possidere vel habere sub caelo, pro quo vellet tot subiacere periculis, quot assidue videmus amantes ex libero arbitrio se subiugare? *De Amore*, p. 4 (7); Parry, p. 30.

<sup>21</sup> O, si inceperis militare amori, beatus erit ille super omnibus, quem tuo coronabis amore. *De Amore*, p. 11 (21); Parry, p. 37; Sciatis igitur . . . nihilque me posse in

serve her is to reign in this life for thence is his title to virtue, to happiness and the praise of the world.<sup>22</sup> Love constitutes the glory of this life<sup>23</sup> and those women who refuse to love are considered as dead in so far as they live only for themselves to the profit and glory of no one.<sup>24</sup> In truth, then, he who is touched by the arrow of Love is concerned with nothing else in this world except with his beloved and her service, considers everything as nothing in comparison with the beatitude of her favor.<sup>25</sup>

Reason and nature have led Andreas to this idea of the world and its felicity. The key, so to speak, of the entire method Andreas adapts to teach Walter the art of love, how to approach the women of various social levels and how to win them, is expressed pretty well in the answer made by the man of the higher nobility to the plebeian woman: 'Then in the present case there is no help left for me but to argue with you at length and by discussing the matter find out whether or not it is proper for you to deny me your love'.<sup>26</sup> The series of Dialogues is a chain of argument in which the man strives to prove his theses of Courtly Love and to refute the objections to them advanced by the woman. The fact that he has been wounded by Love is sufficient reason why his love should be returned;<sup>27</sup> the superiority of nobility of character over nobility of birth is proven by irrefutable reason;<sup>28</sup> reason shows that marriage cannot be a barrier to love.<sup>29</sup> Almost invariably in all the Dialogues, the man appeals to the reasonableness of his case. He had said that even the hope of her love would suffice to save him from death not with the purpose of leading his beloved into deception but 'to give you a clear proof what affection I feel for you';<sup>30</sup> if his determination to serve her be not more or as much as any one else's 'I ask that I may get no aid from you, nor may any laws of reason protect

*saeculo isto beare nisi pretiosissimum personae vestrae thesaurum. De Amore*, pp. 64-65 (111); Parry, p. 84; neque mulier neque masculus potest in saeculo beatus haberi nec curialitatem nec aliqua bona perficere, nisi sibi haec fomes praestet amoris. *De Amore*, pp. 69-70 (118); Parry, 88; Fateor . . . prae cunctis in orbe viventibus beatitudinis gaudiis honorari, qui vestrae celsitudinis gaudia suo meruit amplexu percipere. *De Amore*, pp. 82-83 (141); Parry, p. 100; sine quo [Amor] etiam diu non potest corporali vita beari. *De Amore*, p. 151 (262); Parry, p. 163.

<sup>22</sup> Quod vobis servire solum est cunctis in hac vita regnare, et sine ipso nihil posset ab aliquo in hoc saeculo dignum laudibus adimpleri. *De Amore*, p. 74 (125); Parry, p. 92; Nam quidquid boni faciunt dicuntque viventes, totum mulierum solent laudibus indulgere et eis obsequendo ea perficere, ut earum possint gloriari muneribus, sine quibus nemo posset in hac vita proficere nec aliqua laude dignus haberi. *De Amore*, p. 91 (157); Parry, p. 108; per eas ad beneficiendum mundus disponitur universus . . . Immo laudum decoratae virtute cuncta, quae in mundo bona fiunt, occasionem praestant agendi. *De Amore*, p. 134 (231-232); Parry, p. 148.

<sup>23</sup> Licet amor sit res utilis valde ac iuvenibus appetenda et eis, quos gloria mundana delectat . . . *De Amore*, p. 99 (172); Parry, p. 117.

<sup>24</sup> Nam ab amoris aula semotae sibi tantummodo vivunt ex earum vita nemine sentiente profectum; prodesse autem nulli volentes pro mortuis saeculo reputantur, et earum fama nullatenus est digna relatu. *De Amore*,

p. 91 (157-158); Parry, p. 109.

<sup>25</sup> Quem enim vere gladius pertingit amoris, de coamantis cogitatione continua sine intermissione quassatur nullisque divitiis nullo in hoc saeculo tantum posset honore beari vel aliqua dignitate, quantum si iuxta proprii animi voluntatem suo recte fruatur amore. Nam, etsi mundum universum lucretur amator, sui autem amoris detrimentum vel aliquod patiat adversum, omnia tamen pro summa reputaret inopia, nihilque sibi credit [ad] egestatem posse nocere, donec suae voluntati bene concordaverit amor. *De Amore*, p. 184 (319); Parry, p. 190.

<sup>26</sup> Parry, p. 88. Ergo mihi nullum in disputatione praesenti reservatur auxilium nisi vobiscum pleno sermone certare atque disputando cognoscere, utrum vos deceat vel non mihi vestrum denegare amorem. *De Amore*, p. 69 (118).

<sup>27</sup> Hac ergo invincibili ratione munitus cuiuslibet mihi licet amorem mulieris eligere. *De Amore*, p. 20 (38); Parry, p. 45; id solummodo postulare curabo, quod nulla mihi poteritis iusta ratione negare. *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Illa vos edocet ratio manifesteque irrefragabili ratione demonstrat. *De Amore*, pp. 23-24 (46); Parry, p. 48.

<sup>29</sup> Quia nec sub amoris verae definitionis potest ratione comprehendi. *De Amore*, p. 83 (142); Parry, p. 100; Sed alia iterum ratio coniugatis mutuum contradicit amorem . . . scilicet zelotypia. *De Amore*, p. 83 (143); Parry, p. 101.

<sup>30</sup> Parry, p. 56. Ut vobis aperta ratione monstrarem, quanta vobis affectione adnecto. *De Amore*, p. 32 (60).



me';<sup>31</sup> even if she be bound to another by love, he should still try to talk her out of it.<sup>32</sup>

In her turn, the woman strives to answer the man's arguments and advances her own to establish the truth of her position. To the man's argument in favor of nobility of character, she answers: 'You are trying to bolster up your errors with so much eloquence that it will not be easy for me to reply to your more-than-empty words, but I shall try by my argument to refute some of them'.<sup>33</sup> She argues that proximity is favorable to love against the man's claim to the contrary: 'Your argument must therefore fall before this most obvious one on the other side'.<sup>34</sup> Usually she denies the cogency of the man's reasons<sup>35</sup> but often confesses herself convinced by their truth and forcefulness.<sup>36</sup> In the same way, the man refuses to be convinced by the woman's arguments which he claims are unfounded and indefensible. Ungallantly he never agrees with her.<sup>37</sup> Only once is there complete agreement and that arises not from the recognition of the truth of each other's reasons, but from a decision rendered by the Countess of Champagne. The reason why the decision is left to her is characteristic of the Dialogues,—the impasse which they have reached after their investigation of the Rules of Love, their long debate and their laborious arguments: 'Now on a certain day, as we sat under the shade of a pine tree of marvellous height and great breadth of spread, devoted wholly to love's idleness and striving to investigate Love's mandates in a good-tempered and spirited debate, we began to discern a two-fold doubt, and we wearied ourselves with laborious arguments . . . After we had argued the matter back and forth and each of us seemed to bolster up his position with reasonable arguments, neither one would give in to the other or agree with the arguments he brought forward. We ask you to settle this dispute . . .'.<sup>38</sup> After carefully examining the

<sup>31</sup> Parry, p. 97. *Nulla me possint apud vos iuvamina suffragari nec rationis aliqua iura tueri. De Amore*, p. 79 (135).

<sup>32</sup> Sed, etsi in veritate cognoscerem, amoris vos alterius obligari . . . si meis possem vos sermonibus a tali copula remove, nunquam ex hoc credo amoris me praecepta corrumpere. *De Amore*, p. 118 (204); Parry, p. 134.

<sup>33</sup> Parry, p. 51. *Quosdam tamen ex eis mea curabo ratione comprimere. De Amore*, p. 27 (51).

<sup>34</sup> Parry, p. 100. *Cessat ergo ratio vestra evidentissima ratione collisa. De Amore*, p. 82 (140).

<sup>35</sup> *Nulla quidem a vobis videtur ratio demonstrata, quae meam possit infirmare sententiam. De Amore*, p. 87 (148); Parry, p. 104; *Vestra multum in hoc iudicio videtur errare sententia et a veritatibus tramite deviare. De Amore*, p. 120 (209); Parry, p. 136.

<sup>36</sup> *Rationabili videris te tuitione defendere. De Amore*, p. 34 (62); Parry, p. 58; *quia vero tua rationabiliter dicta defendis, in hanc declino sententiam. De Amore*, p. 41 (73); Parry, p. 64; *Etsi dictis rationibus ad vestrum forte me possetis amorem coartare, alia me ratio ab hac necessitate defendit. De Amore*, p. 66 (113-114); Parry, p. 86; *Ea quae dicitis, satis ratione nituntur. De Amore*, p. 71 (120); Parry, p. 89; *Licet opinio vestra multis videatur rationibus impugnari, quia tamen omnimoda cernitur aequitate iuvare et rationabili firmitate vallari, meo iudicatur arbitrio comprobanda et tanquam subnixae veritate sequenda. De Amore*,

p. 123 (213); Parry, p. 138.

<sup>37</sup> *Nulla tamen possum ratione videre. De Amore*, p. 28 (52); Parry, p. 52; *non multum de ratione procedit. De Amore*, p. 33 (61); Parry, p. 57; *Utraque igitur a vobis supposita ratio optima iacet responsione sopita et in nullo meis dictis valet obviare propositis. De Amore*, pp. 80-81 (138); Parry, p. 98; *Vos illud quidem curatis asserere, quod omni videtur rationi contrarium. De Amore*, p. 81 (139); Parry, p. 99; *Unde cunctis liquide constat, interpretationem vestram rationis veritate destitui. De Amore*, p. 86 (148); Parry, p. 104; *Quum meis igitur intentionibus vestra rationabili non potestis responsione obsistere. Ibid.* *Nulla igitur potestis vos ratione tueri. De Amore*, p. 94 (163); Parry, pp. 111-112; *istud nulla videtur ratione negatum. De Amore*, p. 95 (165); Parry, p. 113; *non videtur meis posse rationibus obviare. De Amore*, p. 97 (169); Parry, p. 115; *nulla potestis ratione tueri. De Amore*, p. 99 (171); Parry, p. 116; *nulla potest mihi ratione nocere. De Amore*, p. 111 (192); Parry, p. 127; *Vestra mihi penitus in hac parte videtur arguenda opinio. De Amore*, p. 113 (196); Parry, p. 129; *nec superius enarrata vos poterit defensare ratio. De Amore*, p. 117 (202); Parry, pp. 132-133; *Vere mentis laboraret ineptia, qui hoc, quod dicitis, ex cordis deliberatione asserere vellet. De Amore*, p. 122 (211); Parry, p. 137.

<sup>38</sup> Parry, pp. 105-106. *Quadam ergo die, dum sub mirae altitudinis et extensae nimis latitudinis umbra pini sederemus et amoris essemus penitus otio Mancipati eiusque*

arguments on both sides and inquiring into the truth of the matter, the gracious lady delivers her judgment in favor of the man. It is the reasonableness of his arguments and their agreement with the Rules of Love that have influenced her decision that love cannot exist between married people and that jealousy between lovers is never blameworthy. The same criterion will guide the decisions rendered by various noble ladies in the love-cases set forth by Andreas.<sup>39</sup>

The second means that Andreas uses to teach and to prove the art and necessity of love is nature. He distinctly says that 'Love is a thing that copies Nature herself'.<sup>40</sup> Just as nature is common to all men, just as all men are one by nature,<sup>41</sup> so love is common to all. All men are forced by their very nature to love. Even the woman is forced to agree to the argument that all men naturally love.<sup>42</sup> Nature is irresistible whether it be a question of advancing in age or in loving.<sup>43</sup> It is this irresistibility of nature that justifies clerics loving the opposite sex though bound by vow to the service of God.<sup>44</sup> To love cannot be a serious sin since it is done under the compulsion of nature.<sup>45</sup> Besides forcing all to love, it is nature that determines who may love, the persons: not the aged,<sup>46</sup> not man with man<sup>46</sup> nor the over-passionate. The latter, like animals, are moved by their lower nature, a nature that we have in common with them. The true lover is moved by his true nature, his human and rational nature, which sets him apart from brute creation.<sup>47</sup> It is for this reason that peasants are barred from love; theirs is not true nature but such as is common to animals.<sup>48</sup> Even though, contrary to their nature, a peasant fall in love,—a thing that may happen but rarely,—Andreas feels it unwise to instruct them in the art of love 'lest while they are devoting themselves to conduct which is not natural to them the kindly farms . . . may through lack of cultivation prove useless to us'.<sup>49</sup> It is this same true nature and not the nature that we have in common with animals that demands in love that the solaces of the upper

suavi et acerrimo disputationis conflictu studeremus investigare mandata, duplicis dubitationis nos coepit instigare discretio et laboriosi fatigare sermones . . . Quorum quidem dubitationum quum frequens inter nos valde disputatio verteretur, et uterque nostrum suam partem videretur rationabili sententia roborare, neuter alterius voluit acquiescere voluntati vel productis rationibus consentire. Super quo vestrum postulamus arbitrium . . . *De Amore*, p. 88 (151).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, pp. 156-169 (271-295); Parry, pp. 167-177.

<sup>40</sup> Parry, p. 45. Res enim est amor, quae ipsam imitatur naturam. *De Amore*, p. 20 (37-38).

<sup>41</sup> Omnes homines uno sumus ab initio stipite derivati unamque secundum naturam originem traximus omnes. *De Amore*, p. 9 (17); Parry, p. 35; Nam homines universos ab initio prodiit una natura. *De Amore*, p. 12 (23); Parry, p. 38.

<sup>42</sup> Homines universos ex ipso instinctu cupidinis naturaliter in cuiuslibet alterius sexus personae libidinem provocari. *De Amore*, p. 22 (43); Parry, p. 47.

<sup>43</sup> Senectus quidem res improbanda non est, quia pariter ad eam trahimur omnes unaque ad ipsam cunctos natura deducit, cui nemo resistere potest. *De Amore*, p. 13 (25-26); Parry, p. 39.

<sup>44</sup> Homo tamen sum in peccatis conceptus et carnis lapsui sicut et ceteri homines naturaliter pronus existens. *De Amore*, p. 108 (186); Parry, p. 124; carnis incentivo naturaliter instigetur sicut et reliqui uni-

versi mortales. *De Amore*, p. 109 (188); Parry, p. 125; videns enim Dominus, suos clericos iuxta humanae naturae infirmitatem in varios lapsuros excessus. *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Nam quod natura cogente perficitur, facili potest expiatione mundari. *De Amore*, p. 94 (162); Parry, p. 111.

<sup>46</sup> Quia calor naturalis ab ea aetate suas incipit amittere vires. *De Amore*, p. 6 (11); Parry, p. 32. Cf. also *De Amore*, p. 168 (292); Parry, p. 176.

<sup>47</sup> Nam quidquid natura negat, amor erubescit amplecti. *De Amore*, p. 4 (7); Parry, p. 30.

<sup>48</sup> Istorum talis amor est, qualis est canis impudici. Sed nos credimus asinis comparandos; ea namque solummodo natura moventur, quae ceteris animantibus homines ostendit aequales, non vera, quae rationis differentia nos a cunctis facit animalibus separari. *De Amore*, p. 7 (13-14); Parry, p. 33.

<sup>49</sup> Dicimus enim vix contingere posse, quod agricolae in amoris inveniantur curia militare, sed naturaliter sicut equus et mulus ad Veneris opera promoventur, quemadmodum impetus eis naturae demonstrat. *De Amore*, p. 136 (235); Parry, p. 149.

<sup>50</sup> Parry, pp. 149-150. Sed, etsi quandoque, licet raro, contingat, eos ultra sui naturam amoris aculeo concitari, ipsos tamen in amoris doctrina non expedit erudire, ne, dum actibus sibi naturaliter alienis intendunt, humana praedia . . . nobis facta infructifera sentiamus. *De Amore*, pp. 136-137 (235-236).

part of the beloved be enjoyed in preference to the lower.<sup>50</sup> Hence Andreas qualifies this order, from the higher to the lower, as 'quasi-natural' to distinguish it from the purely natural.<sup>51</sup> What is beyond the nature of love in man lasts but a short while;<sup>52</sup> a defect of nature, in fact, puts a complete end to love with no possibility of revival.<sup>53</sup> Even in his Rejection of Love, Andreas is loathe to condemn nature. When he hopes that Walter will never be spotted with the filth of impurity, with evil thoughts and desires, he feels forced to add: 'But let us pass by these things for the present, lest we be thought in some way to accuse nature'.<sup>54</sup>

The women of the Dialogues at times use arguments drawn from nature. This is true especially in the attempt to show that true nobility is of blood.<sup>55</sup> It is on these grounds that the woman demands that lovers remain within their own social class or seek for love in a higher.<sup>56</sup> The plebeian woman asserts that if she were to accept a lover from a higher social rank, she would be reprehended.<sup>57</sup> The man answers that it is instinctive and natural to man to rise through good works and by character.<sup>58</sup> This nobility of character is not something artificial or accidental but is, again, 'quasi-natural' in so far as it springs from the human and rational nature of man.<sup>59</sup>

Along with the nature of man, Andreas makes use of the nature of love to establish his point. It belongs to the nature of love to lose its natural increase should it be divulged to many;<sup>60</sup> it is of the nature of love that no one can be bound by a twofold love;<sup>61</sup> that one may test his beloved's constancy by feigned infidelity.<sup>62</sup> In fact, a beloved who would refuse the usual solaces to her lover on this account is thought to sin against the very nature of love.<sup>63</sup>

By reason and nature, then, Andreas proves that the greatest good in this world is love and that it is the source of all good for from it comes fleshly delights, worldly fame and praise, worldly glory and renown. To serve one's beloved in this world is to reign; the possession of her constitutes earthly beatitude. Because of that, all men are bound to love, even the clergy and the married are bound to cultivate it. To refuse to do so and to follow the

<sup>50</sup> Quantum enim ad partis pertinet inferioris solatia, a brutis in nullo sumus animalibus segregati, sed eis nos hac parte ipsa natura coniungit. Superioris vero partis solatia tanquam propria humanae sunt attributa naturae et aliis animalibus universis ab ipsa natura negata. Ergo inferioris partis elector tanquam canis ab amore repellatur indignus, et superioris tanquam naturae amplexator admittatur elector. *De Amore*, p. 120 (208); Parry, pp. 135-136.

<sup>51</sup> Ergo praedictus quasi naturalis est ab omnibus ordo sequendus. *De Amore*, p. 122 (212); Parry, p. 138.

<sup>52</sup> Nam quod ultra cuiusque noscitur pervenire naturam, modica solet aura dissolvi et brevi momento durare. *De Amore*, p. 30 (55); Parry, p. 54. Cf. also *De Amore*, p. 65 (112); Parry, p. 85.

<sup>53</sup> Si vero ex coamantis delicto procedat vel ipsius naturae defectu, eum aliquando revixisse, memores minime sumus, hoc tamen non impossibile iudicamus nisi forte ubi naturae defectus occurrat. *De Amore*, p. 145 (250); Parry, 157.

<sup>54</sup> Parry, p. 138. Sed haec omittamus ad praesens, ne qualitercunque credamur in eis accusare naturam. *De Amore*, p. 193 (334).

<sup>55</sup> Ea namque, quae secundum cuiusque noscuntur provenire naturam, magis videntur appetenda, quam quae extrinsecus et

quasi aliunde adveniunt. *De Amore*, p. 39 (71); Parry, 63.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, p. 23 (43-44); Parry, pp. 47-48.

<sup>57</sup> Quasi ultra modum propriae naturae metas excesserim. *De Amore*, p. 67 (114); Parry, p. 86.

<sup>58</sup> Meum genus in mea non potuit persona propriis finibus contineri, instinctu quidem istud cooperante natura. Quum ergo natura ipsa noluit mihi certos ordinis terminos stabiliri nec sublimiorum ordinum mihi voluit claudere fores . . . *De Amore*, p. 32 (59); Parry, p. 56.

<sup>59</sup> Sed in plebeia probitas ex solius animi innata virtute optima mentis dispositione procedit, et sic quasi naturale censetur. *De Amore*, p. 40 (72); Parry, p. 63.

<sup>60</sup> Amor enim postquam ad plurimum coepit devenire notitiam, statim naturalia deserit incrementa. *De Amore*, p. 138 (238); Parry, p. 151.

<sup>61</sup> Ipsius enim amoris naturali ac generali traditione docemur, neminem posse vere duplici amore ligari. *De Amore*, p. 148 (255); Parry, p. 159.

<sup>62</sup> Ex amoris quippe agnoscimus natura procedere, ut falsa coamantes saepe simulatione confingant. *De Amore*, p. 158 (274); Parry, p. 168.

<sup>63</sup> *De Amore*, *ibid.*; Parry, pp. 168-169.

mandates of Love calls down the most terrible torments from the God of Love who rules this world.

In his Third Book, Andreas tears down the whole structure of Love he had erected in the *De Amore* and builds anew a conception of a supernatural world with a supernatural purpose. To sexual love he opposes the love of God, to the God of Love the Heavenly King, to the Rules of Love the laws of God and His Church and to the vile delights of earthly love the eternal untarnishable glory of companionship with God.<sup>64</sup> It is stupidity of the worst kind to prefer the former to the latter.<sup>65</sup> It is only by refraining from them that man may hope to attain the eternal reward for which he was created and even happiness in this life.<sup>66</sup> That man is a wretch, a madman, worse than a beast who would prefer for a momentary pleasure to lose eternal glory and to merit the perpetual fire of Hell.<sup>67</sup> Even in this life, human love leads to continual pain and anxiety of soul, and in the life to come the exterior darkness where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.<sup>68</sup> To indulge in love is a crime of the worse kind; nothing good can come from it; it is the cause of the loss of divine grace and the friendship of God.<sup>69</sup> To think of women, to desire them, to be stained with illicit commerce with them is the most loathesome, the most wearisome thing in this world.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, 'bodily purity and fleshly abstinence are things that every man should have in the presence of God and of men, and he should preserve them by all means, because if they are neglected no good in a man can be completely perfect'.<sup>71</sup> That is why Andreas is writing his Rejection of Love,—to dissuade Walter from love and to exhort him to keep his body chaste. His hope is that his words and divine help may accomplish that purpose.<sup>72</sup> 'Therefore it is not advisable, my respected friend, for you to waste your days in love, which for all the reasons already given we agree ought to be condemned. For it deprives you of the grace of the Heavenly King, and costs you every real friend, and takes away all the honors of this world as well as every breath of praiseworthy reputation . . . and is followed by every sort of evil . . . why should you, like a fool, seek for love, or what can you get from it that will repay you for all these disadvantages?'<sup>73</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Cernas ergo, Gualteri, et acuto mentis disquiras ingenio, quanto sit praeferendus honore, qui coelesti rege contempto eiusque neglecto mandato pro mulierculae cuiusdam affectu antiqui hostis non veretur se vinculis alligare. *De Amore*, p. 182 (315); Parry, p. 188.

<sup>65</sup> Cuiuslibet igitur hominis satis est admiranda stultitia, qui pro vilissimis Veneris amplectendo terrenis hereditatem amittit aeternam. *De Amore*, *ibid.*; Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Praemium consequaris aeternum et maiori ex hoc apud Deum merearis munere gloriari. *De Amore*, p. 181 (314); Parry, p. 187.

<sup>67</sup> O miser et insanus ille ac plus quam bestia reputandus, qui pro momentanea carnis delectatione gaudia derelinquit aeterna et perpetuae gehennae flammis se mancipare laborat! *De Amore*, p. 182 (315); Parry, p. 188.

<sup>68</sup> O, quam mirabile debet cunctis illud sapere bonum, quod viventibus poenam sine intermissione promittit et morientibus cruciatur minatur aeternum, illamque amantibus universis spondet hereditatem, quam in tenebris exterioribus sitam evangelica Scriptura demonstrat, ubi scilicet fletus et stridor dentium erit! *De Amore*, p. 186 (322); Parry, p. 192.

<sup>69</sup> Quum igitur omnia sequantur ex amore nefanda, nullumque inde bonum evenire cognoscatur sed infinitas hominibus procedere poenas, cur, stulte iuvenis, quaeris amare et te Dei gratia et aeterna hereditate privare? *De Amore*, p. 192 (332); Parry, p. 197.

<sup>70</sup> Mulieris enim qualitatem sive statum districtius agitare nil foedius vel magis taediosum reperitur in orbe. *De Amore*, p. 193 (334); Parry, p. 198.

<sup>71</sup> Parry, p. 198. Quia corporis pudicitia et abstinentia carnis res est, quam apud Deum et homines expedit cunctis habere et eam modis omnibus conservare, quin ea neglecta nullum in homine bonum posset esse perfectum plene. *De Amore*, *ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> Sola enim haec ad praesens est intentio nostra amorem tibi penitus dissuadere ac corporis te pudicitiam admonere. Quod si potentia cooperante divina pro nostra poterimus voluntate perficere, nil nobis in hac vita posse gratius evenire cognoscas. *De Amore*, *ibid.*; Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Parry, p. 210. Non expedit ergo, venerande amice, tuos in amore consumere dies, quem tot superius improbatum rationibus constat. Nam, si te facit regis gratia carere coelestis et omni te penitus vero privat amico et huius saeculi cunctos subducit

We come now to the reasons, referred to above, why human, sexual love is to be condemned. As contained in the *De Reprobatione*, these reasons are concerned not so much with a positive doctrine on the love of God as with why human love is evil and to be avoided. They emerge from his accusations against womankind and from his attacks on love. It is with these two points that the Third Book is almost entirely concerned.<sup>4</sup> In his diatribe against women, Andreas does little more than develop the theme of the various evils to which they are by nature addicted. In the majority of his indictments against love, he relies pretty well on the arguments he had used to convince Walter of the necessity and utility of loving,—reason and human nature. In certain cases, however, he does make use of additional arguments, especially to show how displeasing love is to God, how it offends one's neighbor, how it destroys marriage and separates husband and wife, how it has its origin in Satan, how it is wrong for clerics to engage in love. It is interesting to set these arguments alongside those he had used in the *De Amore* for they are based on Scripture and divine authority. It is in them that the conflict of reason and faith most clearly appears.

The essential characteristics that set aside the courtly conception of sexual love and distinguish it from that of previous ages is the cult of the beloved on the one hand,—the elevation of the lady loved far beyond the level of ordinary mortals in physical, moral and intellectual worth,—and secondly, the ennobling force of that love whereby the lover grows in virtue, worth and esteem.<sup>1</sup> In the first two books of the *De Amore*, in the course of his series of instructions to Walter, Andreas had insisted on the importance and necessity of these two traits. To the courtly lover, the beloved is a paragon of beauty and good sense, free of all defect of body and mind: 'When the Divine Being made you there was nothing that He left undone. I know that there is no defect in your beauty, none in your good sense, none in you at all except, it seems to me, that you have enriched no one by your love.'<sup>2</sup> That beauty and character are famed throughout the world: 'It doesn't seem at all profitable to dwell very much on the praise of your person, for your character and your beauty echo through widely separated parts of the world'.<sup>3</sup> These are the qualities of soul and body that arouse the thoughts of love and desire in the lover's heart: 'It is no wonder that I was driven by so great an impulse to see you and was tormented by so great a desire, since the whole world extols your virtue and your wisdom, and in the farthest parts of the world courts are fed upon the tale of your goodness just as though it were a sort of tangible food. And now I know in very truth that a human tongue is not able to tell the tale of your beauty and your prudence or a human mind imagine it'.<sup>4</sup>

honores, omnisque famae laudabilis per eundem supprimitur aura . . . et ex eo . . . mala cuncta sequuntur, cur stulte quaeris amare, vel quod inde posses acquirere bonum, quod tibi valeret tot incommoda compensare? *De Amore*, p. 207 (357-358).

<sup>1</sup> Andreas' attack on love begins at p. 181 (314) and contains some twenty-one reasons why it should be avoided. His indictment of women follows at p. 195 (338) and continues to p. 207 (357).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. J. Denomy, 'An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love', *Mediaeval Studies* VI (1944), especially pp. 176-180.

<sup>3</sup> Parry, p. 37. Quando te divina formavit essentia, nulla sibi alia facienda restabant: Tuo decori nihil deesse cognosco, pruden-

tiae nihil, immo nil prorsus in te deficit quidquam, nisi quod tuo, ut mihi videtur, neminem ditasti amore. *De Amore*, p. 11 (21).

<sup>4</sup> Parry, p. 54. Vestrae personae multum insistere laudibus nullatenus expedire videtur; per diversas namque mundi partes vestra probitas resonat atque venustas. *De Amore*, p. 30 (56).

<sup>5</sup> Parry, p. 92. Nec est mirum, si vos videndi tam magno agebar affectu et tam grandi voluntate angebar, quia vestri decoris ac sapientiae laudes mundus universus attollit, et per infinitas mundi partes curiae probitatis vestrae relatione quasi cibo quodam corporali pascuntur. *De Amore*, p. 74 (125).

To this fond picture of the lover's lady as the apogee of all that is pure, noble and virtuous, to his exaltation of her as the flawless work of creation, Andreas opposes his analysis of feminine nature in the Rejection of Love. He establishes the utter impossibility of the existence of such a creature and bases his conception of her on the very nature of her sex. The vices that infest women's character are natural to them. No woman is immune from them. They are avaricious, grasping, incapable of returning love for love, swayed in the granting of their favors by their insatiable greed.<sup>5</sup> This is his estimate of womankind: 'Furthermore, not only is every woman by nature a miser, but she is also envious and a slanderer of other women, greedy, a slave to her belly, inconstant, fickle in her speech, disobedient and impatient of restraint, spotted with the sin of pride and desirous of vainglory, a liar, a drunkard, a babbler, no keeper of secrets, too much given to wantonness, prone to every evil, and never loving any man in her heart'.<sup>6</sup> Andreas goes on, then, to develop each of these charges at some length, bolstering his statements with appropriate references to classical and biblical examples of feminine vice and defect.<sup>7</sup> He emphasizes that these accusations are not against specific women but are general in their application. Of the miserly woman, for example, he says: 'You will find that this rule never fails and admits of no exception';<sup>8</sup> of the envious woman: 'That every woman is envious is also found to be a general rule';<sup>9</sup> of the greedy woman: 'Every woman, likewise, is sullied by the vice of greediness . . . To this rule there are no exceptions, not even in the case of the Queen';<sup>10</sup> of the gluttonous woman: 'Therefore let it be laid down for you as a general rule that you will rarely fail to get from a woman anything you desire if you will take the trouble to feed her lavishly and often'.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout his diatribe, Andreas was drawing heavily on a tradition that is as ageless and universal as love itself,—satire on women.<sup>12</sup> As Andreas the *Capellanus*, as Christian and cleric, condemning love and satirizing women, he had not far to go for his materials,—to the treatises of the Fathers of the Church on chastity and marriage, to St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, especially to the *Contra Jovinianum* of St. Jerome and, closer to his own day, to the Twelfth Century ascetics,—Marbod of Rennes and Hildebert of Le Mans.<sup>13</sup> As Andreas the mediaeval writer, familiar with the codified courtly ideas on love, marriage and women, he saw, as did Jean de Meun and the vernacular satirists of later centuries, the paradox of illicit and chaste love, of human and divine love, of

<sup>5</sup> *Amorem namque mutuum, quem in femina quaeris, invenire non poteris. Non enim aliqua unquam dilexit femina virum nec amanti mutuo se novit amoris vinculo colligare. Mulier [quoque] namque quaerit in amore ditari, non autem coamanti placita solatia exhibere; nec istud debet aliquis admirari, quum de natura procedat. Nam et mulieres omnes de sexus generali natura tenacitatis et avaritiae vitio maculantur et pecuniae quaestui et lucris attentae sunt vigilique aere sollicitae. De Amore, pp. 195-196 (338-339); Parry, p. 200.*

<sup>6</sup> Parry, p. 201. Ad haec mulier omnis non solum naturaliter reperitur avara, sed etiam invida et aliarum maledica, rapax, ventris obsequio dedita, inconstans, in sermone multiplex, inobediens et contra interdicta renitens, superbiae vitio maculata et inanis gloriae cupida, mendax, ebriosa, verlingosa, nil secretum servans, nimis luxuriosa, ad omne malum prona et hominem cordis affectione non amans. *De Amore*, ed. cit., p. 197 (340-341).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, pp. 197-208 (341-358);

Parry, pp. 201-210.

<sup>8</sup> Parry, p. 202. Et haec non reperitur regula fallax sed omni exceptione carere. *De Amore*, p. 197 (342).

<sup>9</sup> Parry, p. 202. Invida quoque mulier omnis generali regula invenitur. *De Amore*, p. 198 (342).

<sup>10</sup> Parry, p. 203. Rapacitatis quoque vitio mulier quaelibet inquinatur . . . et ab hac quoque regula non excipitur ulla quoque regina. *De Amore*, p. 199 (344).

<sup>11</sup> Parry, p. 204. Sit ergo tibi pro generali regula definitum, quod [in] nihilo facile poteris in muliere carere, si saepius curaveris eam splendida mensa cibare. *De Amore*, p. 200 (345).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Francis Lee Utley, *The Crooked Rib*, (Columbus, 1944), pp. 3-38.

<sup>13</sup> Parry says that it is possible that Andreas made use of the writings of these two men. Cf. Parry, op. cit., p. 18 and also August Wulff, *Die frauenfeindlichen Dichtungen in den romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters* (Romanistische Arbeiten IV, Halle, 1914), pp. 65-72.

Eve and Mary and the contradictions inherent in those courtly ideas: 'The courtly ideal, being a civilized code superimposed on another, the moral code of Christianity, involved contradictions which in the more subtle authors could not be ignored. There were none but fictional resolutions for the conflict between the adulterous courtly system and celibacy of chaste marriage, and the setting up of the fiction demanded mention of the conflict. The simultaneous view that women are merciless and full of pity, that they bring a man to honor and bring him to his doom, that they should be revered and reviled—these paradoxes are the very essence of the courtly tradition. Codify it men might try, but the war went on within the frame'.<sup>14</sup>

The second essential characteristic of Courtly Love is the ennobling force of love. It is love which is the fount and origin of all that is good; there is no good or courtly deed that has not its origin in love.<sup>15</sup> Love and good have the relation of cause and effect; when love ceases, then its effects must necessarily cease.<sup>16</sup> That is why it is incumbent on everyone to seek love: 'Since love offers everybody in the world an incentive to do good, properly before everything else we ought to seek love as the root and principle of everything good'.<sup>17</sup> That is why, too, love is the most desirable thing in the world.<sup>18</sup> Love is the source of happiness and nobility for everyone just as it is the source of praise: 'Neither woman nor man in this world can be considered happy or well-bred, nor can he do anything good, unless love inspires him. . . . Therefore if a person of either sex desires to be considered good or praiseworthy in this world, he or she is bound to love'.<sup>19</sup>

Since love is of such a nature, it is the duty of ladies to so conduct themselves towards their lovers that through them their virtue may increase. God has given women a great privilege in that men taste of the fountain of goodness through their persuasion. In this way they are the cause and origin of everything good.<sup>20</sup> They are obligated 'to be attentive to keeping the hearts of good men set upon doing good deeds and to honor every man according to his deserts. For whatever good things living men may do or say, they generally credit them all to the praise of women, and by serving these they so act that they may pride themselves on the rewards they receive from them, and without these rewards no man can be of use in this life or be considered worthy of any

<sup>14</sup> Francis Lee Utley, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> Quum enim omnis ex amoris rivuli plenitudine procedat urbanitas, eoque magistro omni benefacto praestetur initium, omnisque exitus bonitatis peragatur . . . *De Amore*, p. 34 (63); Parry, p. 58; Nam si non liceret hominibus sui, quum vellent, cordis dominabus aperire secreta, iam amor perisset omnino, qui omnium dicitur fons et origo bonorum, et nullus sciret aliis subvenire, omniaque curialitatis opera hominibus essent ignota. P. 46 (81); Parry, p. 68. Cf. also, p. 38 (69); Parry, p. 61; p. 49 (86). Parry, p. 71; p. 57 (98); Parry, p. 77; p. 106 (183); Parry, p. 122; p. 97 (167-168); Parry, p. 114.

<sup>16</sup> Omnino ergo boni erit amor origo et causa. Cessante igitur causa eius de necessitate cessat effectus. *De Amore*, p. 15 (29); Parry, p. 40.

<sup>17</sup> Parry, p. 61. Nam quum omnibus, quae fiunt in saeculo, bonis amor praestet initium, merito in primis tanquam omnium bonorum radix et causa principalis est postulandus. *De Amore*, p. 38 (69).

<sup>18</sup> Sed amore in orbe nihil appetibilius reperitur, quum ex eo omnis boni procedat

instructio, et sine eo nihil boni aliquis operetur in orbe. *De Amore*, p. 50 (87-88); Parry, p. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Parry, p. 88. Neque mulier neque masculus potest in saeculo beatus haberi nec curialitatem nec aliqua bona perficere, nisi sibi haec fomes praestet amoris . . . Satis ergo utriusque sexus homo amare tenetur, si bonus et laudabilis in orbe cupit haberi. *De Amore*, pp. 69-70 (118).

<sup>20</sup> Credo quidem et est verum, bonos omnes ob hoc a Deo in hac vita disponi, ut vestris et aliarum dominarum voluntatibus obsequantur, et lucidissima videtur mihi ratione constare, quod homines nil esse possunt nilque de bonitatis valent fonte praelibare, nisi dominarum hoc fecerint suadela commoti. Sed quamvis ex mulieribus cuncta videantur bona procedere, et multam eis Dominus praerogativam concesserit, et omnium dicantur esse causa et origo bonorum, necessitas sibi tamen evidenter incumbit, ut tales se debeant bona facientibus exhibere, ut eorum probitas earum intuitu de virtute in virtutem modis omnibus crescere videatur. *De Amore*, pp. 90-91 (156); Parry, p. 108.

praise'.<sup>21</sup> It is incumbent on women, therefore, for their own sakes to grant their love to the worthy lover, otherwise 'they are looked upon as dead to the world, and their reputation is in no wise worth speaking of, but ought by all means to be buried under the weight of silence. But those who desire to enjoy the solaces of love seem to be trying to increase their own good character and to be profitable to others. Therefore with good reason they are considered worthy of the greatest honor, and all men try to exalt their fame'.<sup>22</sup>

When in the course of his instructions Andreas warns Walter against the snares of a greedy woman as deceitful and avaricious, he does so merely to point out the distinction between the influence of such a woman and that of an honorable lady. It is the latter who confer praise, who give the occasion for doing all the good things that are done in the world: 'God forbid that we should ever wish, or be able, to cast a slur upon the deeds of honorable women, or to run them down in the least in this little book of ours, because it is through them that all the world is induced to good deeds, the rich increase in wealth, abundant provision is made for the needs of the poor, and the avaricious are brought again to the path of rectitude and learn the way of generosity. Indeed, since women are able to confer praise, they give the occasion for doing all the good things that are done in the world'.<sup>23</sup>

On the contrary, in his Rejection of Love, Andreas states flatly that 'if you will consider the thing rightly and trace it out diligently, you will find that there is not a criminal excess that does not spring from this same love'.<sup>24</sup> Love is not the origin and fount of virtue and good deeds but from it spring homicide, adultery, perjury, theft, false witness, lying, wrath, incest, idolatry.<sup>25</sup> By argument and example he shows that love regularly leads men to deadly, inescapable warfare and does away with treaties of perpetual peace.<sup>26</sup> Through its weakening effects, men are made less powerful in war<sup>27</sup> and, like Solomon, man's wisdom is dissipated together with his sense of moderation and restraint.<sup>28</sup> Love is the origin of strife and enmity among men, inclines towards selfishness, dissolves friendship.<sup>29</sup> It binds its devotees in a harsh kind of slavery, subjects them to jealousy, fear, anxiety, in the cruel servitude to another's will, whims and fancies.<sup>30</sup> It destroys the honor and reputation of men and women, of noble, cleric and layman and causes them the loss of their good name before God and men.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Parry, *Ibid.* Ipsae autem plurimum tenentur esse sollicitae in bonis actibus corda servare bonorum et quemlibet pro suis meritis honorare. Nam quidquid boni faciunt dicuntque viventes, totum mulierum solent laudibus indulgere et eis obsequendo ea perficere, ut earum possint gloriari muneribus, sine quibus nemo posset in hac vita proficere nec aliqua laude dignus haberi. *De Amore*, p. 91 (157).

<sup>22</sup> Parry, p. 109. Nam ab amoris aula semotae sibi tantummodo vivunt ex earum vita nemine sentiente profectum; prodesse autem nulli volentes pro mortuis saeculo reputantur, et earum fama nullatenus est digna relatu sed momento prorsus silentii subhumanda. Quae vero amoris student vacare solatiis, suae videntur probitatis incremento studere et aliorum profectui deservire. Unde merito dignissimae multo iudicantur honore, et ipsarum universi nituntur attollere famam. *De Amore*, pp. 91-92 (157-158).

<sup>23</sup> Parry, pp. 147-148. Absit enim, nos unquam velle vel posse laudabilem feminarum actibus insidiari vel eis in aliquo praesenti derogare libello, quia per eas ad benefaciendum mundus disponitur univer-

sus, et divitibus rerum abundantia crescit, egenorum abundanter inopiae providetur, et ad viam rectitudinis redeuntur avari viamque largitatis cognoscunt. Immo laudum decoratae virtute cuncta, quae in mundo bona fiunt, occasionem praestant agendi. *De Amore*, p. 134 (231-232).

<sup>24</sup> Parry, p. 193. Recte namque intuentibus et vestigantibus rem diligenter, nullius criminis notatur excessus, qui ex ipso non sequatur amore. *De Amore*, p. 187 (324).

<sup>25</sup> *De Amore*, pp. 187-188 (324-326); Parry, p. 193.

<sup>26</sup> Parry, p. 196. Amor praeterea inextricabiles consuevit hominibus et mortales guerras parare ac perpetuae pacis foedera remove. *De Amore*, p. 191 (330).

<sup>27</sup> *De Amore*, p. 194 (335-337); Parry, p. 199.

<sup>28</sup> *De Amore*, p. 195 (337-338); Parry, pp. 199-200.

<sup>29</sup> *De Amore*, pp. 183-184 (316-318); Parry, pp. 188-189.

<sup>30</sup> *De Amore*, pp. 184-185 (318-320); Parry, pp. 190-191.

<sup>31</sup> *De Amore*, pp. 187-189 (323-327); Parry, pp. 192-194.



Interspersed among these specific attacks Andreas makes upon love are certain ones in which he turns aside from his usual method of approach to rely on divine authority to prove to Walter the necessity of abstaining from sexual love and of loving God. In doing so, the opposition between reason and nature on the one hand, and divine authority on the other emerges quite clearly. What Andreas had proven to be a good in the natural order in the *De Amore*, in the *De Reprobatione* he proves an evil in the supernatural order. Reason and human nature had demanded that all men love the opposite sex, even illicitly and adulterously, because that is their natural end and earthly beatitude and because through love man is made ever more virtuous. Faith and divine authority demand that all men shun the love of the opposite sex as a source of evil and a diversion from their supernatural end, the eternal beatitude of heaven. An analysis of the arguments Andreas uses in both orders makes clear this fundamental opposition.

It is seen in the first two reasons advanced by Andreas to turn Walter away from human love and to direct him to the love of God that thereby he may win an eternal recompense, life everlasting. The first reason why 'a wise man is bound to avoid all the deeds of love and to oppose all its mandates' is one which it is not proper to oppose:<sup>32</sup> 'no man, so long as he devotes himself to the service of love, can please God by any other works, even if they are good ones'.<sup>33</sup> That man, moreover, is stupid who 'because he embraces the lowest and most earthly love loses that eternal heritage which the heavenly King, with His own blood, restored to all men after it had been lost. Indeed, for a mortal man we consider it a very great disgrace and an offence against Almighty God if by following the enticements of the flesh and the pleasures of the body he slips back again into the snares of Hell, from which the Heavenly Father Himself once redeemed him by shedding the blood of His Only-begotten Son'.<sup>34</sup> This reason is based on the hatred of God of impurity, His condemnation of it in both the Old and New Testaments, and the fact that he who goes contrary to the Will of God acts in contempt of Him and in neglect of the divine law.<sup>35</sup> This is a repetition of the objection against love raised by the woman of higher nobility in the Eighth Dialogue to the solicitations of the man of equal rank:<sup>36</sup> to show love is greatly to offend God and to prepare for many the perils of death. 'So what good can there be in a deed by which the Heavenly Bridegroom is offended'?<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Parry, p. 187. Sapiens ergo quilibet amoris cunctos pluribus ex causis actus tenetur abicere et eius semper obviare mandatis et imprimis ea scilicet ratione, cui nulli resistere fas est. *De Amore*, p. 181 (314).

<sup>33</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Nullus enim posset per aliqua benefacta Deo placere, quousque voluerit amoris inservire ministeriis. *De Amore*, *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Parry, p. 188. Cuiuslibet igitur hominis satis est admiranda stultitia, qui pro vilissimis Veneris amplectendo terrenis hereditatem amittit aeternam, quam ipse Rex coelestis cunctis hominibus proprio sanguine recuperavit amissam. Immo ad summam scimus verecundiam pertinere viventis et Dei omnipotentis iniuriam, si carnis illecebras et corporis voluptates secutus ad Tartareos iterum laqueos elabatur, ex quibus laqueis pater ipse coelestis semel eum unigeniti filii sui sanguinis effusione salvavit. *De Amore*, p. 182 (315-316).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Lev.* xx, 10; *Prov.* vi, 32; *Apoc.* xxi, 8. Odit namque Deus et utroque iussit test-

amento puniri, quos extra nuptiales actus agnoscit Veneris operibus obligari vel quocunque voluptatis genere detineri. Quod ergo bonum ibi poterit inveniri, ubi nihil nisi contra Dei geritur voluntatem? . . . Cernas ergo, Gualteri, et acuto mentis disquiras ingenio, quanto sit praeferendus honore, qui coelesti rege contempto eiusque neglecto mandato pro mulierculae cuiusdam affectu antiqui hostis non veretur se vinculis alligare. *De Amore*, pp. 181-182 (314-315); Parry, pp. 188-189.

<sup>36</sup> We repeat that it must be borne in mind that in the Dialogues the man propounds the theory and the rules of love. It is the woman who brings forth the objections and who serves as a foil and 'stooge' for the man in his exposition.

<sup>37</sup> Parry, p. 110. Amorem autem exhibere est graviter offendere Deum, et multis mortis parare pericula . . . Quod ergo bonum esse potest in eo facto, in quo coelestis sponsus offenditur? . . . *De Amore*, p. 92 (159-160).

On the contrary, the man of the higher nobility argues that love does not greatly offend God. In the case of mixed love, he will say later on in the same Dialogue that 'the Heavenly King is offended':<sup>38</sup> how gravely, however, is not indicated. In the case of pure love, he will say that 'God sees very little offence in it'.<sup>39</sup> But here replying to the woman's charge, he argues that God is not seriously offended because 'what is done under the compulsion of nature can be made clean by an easy expiation'.<sup>40</sup> Hence, if sin there be, it is at worst a venial one. Moreover, he goes on to say that 'it does not seem at all proper to class as a sin the thing from which the highest good in this life takes its origin and without which no man in this world can be considered worthy of praise'.<sup>41</sup> What is fitting and proper is arrived at on rational grounds. He agrees with the general proposition that to serve God is a great and good thing. But if such be the case, then one must serve God perfectly because no one can serve two masters, no one can keep his right foot in heaven, as it were, and his left on earth. Therefore, to serve God one must devote himself wholly to God's service, eschew all worldly business and contemplate the divine mysteries solely. Now the fact is that this lady to whose love he aspires is of the earth, earthy, with one foot fast on earth. This is clear from the fact that she receives gladly those who approach her and converse with her, and persuades them to do the works of love. The conclusion that he arrives at, therefore, is that she would do better 'to enjoy love thoroughly than to lie to God under cloak of some pretence'.<sup>42</sup>

The second reason advanced by Andreas to dissuade Walter from love is that by it one's neighbor is injured and by divine law one is bound to love his neighbor as himself.<sup>43</sup> The woman of higher nobility had objected in the same way to the suit of the man of the same class that love not only offends God but injures one's neighbor.<sup>44</sup> The man will agree later on that mixed love is injurious to one's neighbor,<sup>45</sup> but in the case of pure love, though he does not specifically mention the neighbor, he states that 'no injury comes from it'.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, in his reply to the lady's objection, he states that 'one's neighbor feels no injury from love' and immediately qualifies it: 'that is, he should feel none'.<sup>47</sup> There are many wrongs in the world that are only apparent wrongs and

<sup>38</sup> Parry, p. 122. *Rex coelestis offenditur. De Amore*, p. 106 (183).

<sup>39</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Et modicam in ipso Deus recognoscit offensam. *De Amore*, *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Parry, p. 111. Credo tamen, in amore Deum graviter offendi non posse; nam quod natura cogente perficitur, facili potest expiatione mundari. *De Amore*, p. 94, (162).

<sup>41</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Praeterea fas nullatenus esse videtur, id inter crimina reputare, a quo bonum in hac vita summum habet initium, et sine quo nullus in orbe posset laude dignus haberi. *De Amore*, *ibid.* *Fas* in its original meaning belonged to religious language. It is possible that here Andreas had in mind that use to express the dictates of religion, of divine law as opposed to *jus* or human law, rather than its predominant and general meaning. Cf. Cicero. *Att.*, 1, 16; *Varr.*, 2, 5, 13.

<sup>42</sup> Nec obstat potest, quod Deum in amore narratis offendi, quia cunctis liquido constare videtur, quod Deo servire summum bonum ac peculiare censetur; sed qui Domino contendunt perfecte servire, eius prorsus debent obsequio mancipari et iuxta Pauli sententiam nullo saeculari debent adimpleri negotio. Ergo, si servire Deo tantum vultis eligere, mundana vos oportet

cuncta relinquere et coelestis patriae solummodo contemplari secreta. Non enim Deus voluit, aliquem dextrum in terris pedem et in coelo tenere sinistram, quia nemo potest duorum intendere competenter obsequiis. Unde quum, alterum vos pedem in terrenis habere, ex eo sit manifestum, quod ad vos venientes hilari receptione suscipitis et curialitatis verba secum adinvicem confertis et amoris eis opera suadetis, credo, vobis esse consultius efficaciter amori vacare quam Deo sub alicuius coloris palliatione mentiri. *De Amore*, pp. 93-94 (161-162): Parry, pp. 110-111.

<sup>43</sup> Nam ex amore proximus laeditur, quem ex mandato divino quisque tanquam se ipsum iubetur diligere. *De Amore*, p. 182 (316): Parry, p. 188. Cf. *Luke*, x, 27.

<sup>44</sup> Quod ergo bonum esse potest in eo facto, in quo coelestis sponsus offenditur, et ipse proximus laeditur. *De Amore*, p. 92 (160): Parry, p. 110.

<sup>45</sup> Per eum proximus laeditur. *De Amore*, p. 106, (183): Parry, p. 122.

<sup>46</sup> Nulla inde procedit iniuria. *De Amore*, *ibid.*: Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Parry, p. 111. Ad haec ex amore proximus nullam sentit iniuriam, id est: sentire non debet. *De Amore*, p. 94 (162).

this is one of them. He argues why the neighbor feels no injury, that is, should feel none. When we ask something of another, that is, something we should ask, the person whom we ask is bound to suffer it freely when it is asked. Now love which is held to be a wrong by many people, seems to contain no wrong. Therefore, when it is asked of another,—and it should be demanded because it is the greatest good in the world,—then the person who is asked is bound to suffer it. This rather tortuous argument is based on Andreas' rational interpretation of a Scripture text. The text in question is the second member of the law of charity upon which depends the whole law and the prophets.<sup>48</sup> Now that law is to be interpreted this way: "What you do not wish others to do to you—that is, what you should not wish—do not do to others".<sup>49</sup> In an analogous manner, then, one may interpret "what one asks" as "what one should ask" and certainly one should ask for love since from it flows every good. Therefore in asking for what one should ask, the person asked is bound to grant the request.<sup>50</sup> In concluding his twofold argument against the lady's objections, the man of higher nobility states: 'You cannot, therefore, defend yourself with the argument that love is not for all a desirable good towards which we are bound to strive with all our might'.<sup>51</sup> Not only is it naturally fit and proper to love but it is reasonable.

The opposition between faith and reason emerges clearly in another reason why love must be avoided. Love must be rejected because it 'wickedly breaks up marriage and without reason turns a husband from his wife'.<sup>52</sup> Andreas points out that husband and wife are indissolubly joined by divine law for the Scripture says 'Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder'.<sup>53</sup> Once lawfully bound together in holy matrimony, a man ought to love his wife more than anything else in this world, because God has told us that the wife is one flesh with her husband and commanded her to forsake all others and to cleave to her husband. God has said 'For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh'.<sup>54</sup> The woman of the simple nobility had replied to the man of the higher nobility in just the same fashion when he had sought her love. She had told him that she was married to a worthy man, that to leave his bed and board would be a wicked thing, that they loved each other, were devoted to each other. She appeals to the authority of the law—divine law—that forbids her leaving her husband: 'The laws themselves bid me refrain from loving another man when I am blessed with such a reward for my love'.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. *Matt.* xxii, 40.

<sup>49</sup> Parry, p. 111. Sic enim dicimus: "Quod tibi non vis fieri, id est: velle non debes, alii non facias". *De Amore*, p. 94 (163). Cf. *Matt.* vii, 12.

<sup>50</sup> Multi tamen suae ascribunt iniuriae, quod nullam videtur iniuriam continere. Nec vobis videatur absurdum, quod taliter vobis exposui: "exigit, id est: exigere debet", quia quoddam evangelicae legis verbum, ex quo tota lex et prophetae pendere dicuntur, eodem modo docemur exponere. Sic enim dicimus: "Quod tibi non vis fieri, id est: velle non debes, alii non facias". *De Amore*, p. 94, (162-163); Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Parry, pp. 111-112. Nulla igitur potestis vos ratione tueri, quod amare non sit cunctis appetibile bonum, ad quod omnes tenemur tota virtute conari. *De Amore*, p. 94 (163).

<sup>52</sup> Parry, p. 196. Amor enim inique matrimonia frangit et cogit sine causa ab uxore

avertere virum. *De Amore*, p. 191 (331).

<sup>53</sup> *Matt.* xix, 6; *Mark*, x, 9.

<sup>54</sup> *Matt.* xix, 5-6; *Mark*, x, 7-9. Quos Deus lege data firmiter non posse statuit ab homine separari. Ait enim Scriptura: "Quos Deus coniunxit, homo non separat". Immo iam plures novimus coamantium, eos amore cogente in uxoris interitum cogitare ac eas crudelissima trucidatione necare, quod cunctis constat scelus esse nefandum. In hoc enim saeculo nihil debet aliquis homo tanta affectione diligere quanta uxorem, quae legitimo est sibi iure coniuncta. Nam cum viro carnem unam Deus indicavit uxorem et aliis cunctis relictis uxori iussit adhaerere maritum. Ait enim: "Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una [personal]". *De Amore*, *ibid.*, Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Parry, p. 100. Praeterea quoddam est aliud non modicum, quod me contradicit amare. Habeo namque virum omni nobilitate urbanitateque ac probitate praeclarum, cuius

It is then that the man of higher nobility enunciates and attempts to prove on rational grounds the principle of Courtly Love that marriage is no bar to love.<sup>56</sup> The point of his whole argument is that love cannot exist between married people. That marital affection that binds husband and wife together is not love at all nor can it take the place of love.<sup>57</sup> Love is the same as friendship. Love and the affection that exists between married people are analogous to the relation between friendship and the affection that exists between father and son. Just as there is no friendship between the latter but only affection, so there is no love between husband and wife. They are simply two different things.<sup>58</sup> The man of the higher nobility bases his argument on two facts: the definition of love and the nature of jealousy. The love of married people does not fit the true definition of love. It lacks what is of its definition,—the element of furtiveness. How can there be furtiveness in their embraces since they belong to one another and may satisfy each other's desires without fear of objection?<sup>59</sup> Moreover, marital affection lacks the very substance of love without which true love cannot exist,—jealousy. True jealousy among the married is condemned as shameful and improper involving as it does the suspicion of marital fidelity. Thus, it cannot have its natural place between them. Between lovers, however, jealousy is the mother and nurse of love, the preservative of it because there it may exert all three aspects that are essential to the lover: fear that his services may not be sufficient to retain the love of the beloved; that she may not love him as he does her; the anxiety that gives rise to the questioning if she may have another lover.<sup>60</sup>

nefas esset violare torum vel cuiusquam me copulari amplexibus. Scio namque, ipsum me toto cordis affectu diligere, et ego sibi cuncta cordis devotione constringor. Tanti ergo amoris praemio decoratam ab alterius amore ipsa iura praecipiant abstinere. *De Amore*, p. 82 (141).

<sup>56</sup> Causa coniugii ab amore non est excusatio recta. *De Amore*, p. 178 (310); Parry, p. 184.

<sup>57</sup> Vehementer tamen admiror, quod maritalem affectionem quidem, quam quilibet inter se coniugati adinvicem post matrimonii copulam tenentur habere, vos vultis amoris sibi vocabulum usurpare, quum liquide constet inter virum et uxorem amorem sibi locum vindicare non posse. Licet enim nimia et immoderata affectione coniungantur, eorum tamen affectus amoris non potest vice potiri, quia nec sub amoris verae definitionis potest ratione comprehendendi. *De Amore*, p. 83 (141-142); Parry, p. 100.

<sup>58</sup> Nec vobis videatur absurdum, quod dixerim, quamvis omnimoda coniugati dilectionis affectione iungantur, eorum tamen affectum amoris non posse vice perfungi; quia videmus idem in amicitia evenire. Licet enim mutua se in omnibus pater et filius diligant affectione, vera tamen inter eos amicitia non consistit, quia Ciceronis hoc traditione testante sanguinis sola propago inter eos dilectionis conservat affectum. Tantum igitur distare constat inter omnimodam coniugatorum affectionem et amantium obligationem, quantum distat inter patris et filii mutuam dilectionem et firmissimam duorum virorum amicitiam, quia, sicut nec ibi dicitur esse amor, ita et amicitia hic fertur abesse. *De Amore*, p. 83 (142-143); Parry, pp. 100-101.

<sup>59</sup> Quid enim aliud est amor nisi immoder-

ata et furtivi et latentis amplexus concupiscibiliter percipiendi ambitio? Sed quis esse possit, quaeos, inter coniugatos furtivus amplexus, quum ipsi se adinvicem possidere dicantur et cuncta sine contradictionis timore suae voluntatis desideria vicissim valeant adimplere? *De Amore*, p. 83 (142); Parry, p. 100.

<sup>60</sup> Zelotypia invenitur ab omni inter amantes amoris commendata perito et inter coniugatos in universis mundi partibus reprobata; quod quare contingat, zelotypiae descriptione percepta lucidissima vocis veritate constabit. Est igitur zelotypia vera animi passio, quae vehementer timemus, propter amantis voluntatibus obsequendi defectum amoris attenuari substantiam, et inaequalitatis amoris trepidatio ac sine turpi cogitatione de amante concepta suspicio. Unde manifeste apparet, tres species in se zelotypiam continere. Nam verus zelotypus semper timet, ne ad suum conservandum amorem propria non valeant sufficere obsequia, et ut, qualiter amet, ametur, atque recogitat, quanto cogereur anxii dolore, si coamans eius alteri copularetur amanti, quamvis hoc credat posse nullatenus evenire. Hanc autem ultimam speciem coniugatis convenire non posse, satis patet et est manifestum. Nam maritus de uxore sine turpi cogitatione suspicionem habere non potest. Pura namque zelotypia applicata marito ex ipsius subiecti vitio maculatur et desinit esse, quod erat . . . Satis igitur constat, evidenter esse probatum, zelotypiam inter coniugatos naturalem sibi locum vindicare non posse, et per consequentiam inter eosdem amorem esse cessare necesse, quia haec duo pariter se per omnia comitantur. Inter amantes vero ipsa zelotypia amoris conservativa narratur, quia omnes tres partes supra zelotypiae attri-

The woman of the simple nobility attempts to reason in her turn from what she considers to be the true definition of love. She is not convinced by the man nor is her resolution against granting him her love weakened. But she is struck with the verisimilitude of his arguments and rather than lay herself open to a charge, suggests laying the matter for decision before a lady or man of character. The Countess of Champagne is chosen and a letter is drafted to her explaining the impasse and their inability to agree mutually with the reasonable arguments advanced by each in turn. They appeal for a decision on the point: 'Whether true love can find any place between husband and wife'.<sup>61</sup> The reply is unequivocal: 'We declare and we hold as firmly established that love cannot exert its powers between two people who are married to each other'.<sup>62</sup> That judgement is bolstered by a threefold reason: the compulsion to give in to each other's desires, the inability of marital affection to increase the worth of either, the lack of true jealousy between them.<sup>63</sup>

In the following Dialogue between a man of the higher nobility and a lady of the same class, the lady objects that the man already has a most beautiful wife and that if he were not over-passionate, he should never reject her solaces and seek for love away from home.<sup>64</sup> The man confesses that he has a beautiful wife and that he feels for her all the affection that a husband can have. But he appeals to the judgement of the Countess of Champagne that love cannot exist between husband and wife. Then he argues that since nothing good can be done in his life unless it has its origin in love 'I am naturally compelled to seek for love outside the bonds of wedlock'.<sup>65</sup> By nature and by reason, marriage cannot be a bar to love. Moreover, the lady who refuses her lover on the grounds of marriage is judged to be of evil character.<sup>66</sup>

Marriage puts love to flight.<sup>67</sup> This is one way in which love may come to an end. The reason is that love and marital affection are two quite different things arising from two entirely different sources. This is made very clear from a case of love submitted to the Lady Ermengarde of Narbonne. She was asked to make clear where there was the greater affection: between lovers or between married people.<sup>68</sup> That lady based her answer on philosophical reasoning (*consideratio*).<sup>69</sup>

butae necessariae iudicantur amanti; ergo zelotypia inter amantes ipsos non damnatur. *De Amore*, pp. 85-86 (145-147); Parry, pp. 102-103.

<sup>61</sup> Parry, p. 105. An scilicet inter coniugatos verus amor locum sibi valeat invenire. *De Amore*, p. 88 (151).

<sup>62</sup> Parry, p. 106. Dicimus enim et stabiliore tenore firmamus, amorem non posse suas inter duos iugales extendere vires. *De Amore*, p. 89 (153).

<sup>63</sup> Nam amantes sibi invicem gratis omnia largiuntur nullius necessitatis ratione cogente. Iugales vero mutuis tenentur ex debito voluntatibus obedire et in nullo se ipsos sibi invicem denegare. Praeterea quid iugalis crescit honori, si sui coniugalium amantium more fruatur amplexu, quum neutrius inde possit prohibitas augmentari, et nihil amplius [augmentum] videantur habere nisi, quod primitus iure suo tenebant? Sed et alia istud ratione asserimus, quia praeceptum tradit amoris, quod nulla etiam coniugata regis poterit amoris praemio coronari, nisi extra coniugii foedera ipsius amoris militiae cernatur adiuncta. Alia vero regula docet amoris, neminem posse duorum sauciari amore. Merito ergo inter coniugatos sua non poterit amor iura cognoscere. Sed et alia quidem ratio eis obstat videtur,

quia vera inter eos zelotypia inveniri non potest, sine qua verus amor esse non valet ipsius amoris norma testante, quae dicit: Qui non zelat, amare non potest. *De Amore*, pp. 89-90 (153-154); Parry, pp. 106-107.

<sup>64</sup> Mulier ait: Si vos falsa voluptatis abundantia non vexaret, nunquam pulcherrimae vestrae uxoris reiectis solatiis extranearum quaereretis amorem. *De Amore*, p. 99 (171-172); Parry, p. 116.

<sup>65</sup> Sed quum sciam, inter virum et uxorem posse nullatenus esse amorem . . . non immerito extra nuptialia mihi foedera postulare cogor amorem. *De Amore*, p. 99 (172); Parry, *ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *De Amore*, p. 161 (280); Parry, p. 171.

<sup>67</sup> Sed et superveniens foederatio nuptiarum violenter fugat amorem. *De Amore*, p. 145 (249); Parry, p. 156.

<sup>68</sup> Quidam a praefata postulavit, ut ei faceret manifestum, ubi maior sit dilectionis affectus: inter amantes an inter coniugatos. *De Amore*, p. 161 (280); Parry, p. 171.

<sup>69</sup> The words of Andreas are: 'Cui eadem domina philosophica consideratione respondit'. Parry translates: 'The lady gave him a logical answer'. It is true the answer is based on logic. But there is involved, too, the question of the nature of the objects

She reasons this way: Marital love and true love are wholly different. Love as applied to them is an equivocal term. In the case of things grouped under such a term, one cannot compare them because they belong to different species. There is no basis of comparison. Therefore, one cannot say that love is greater or less between married people and true lovers because the love of married people is different specifically from that of true lovers although they are grouped under the same equivocal term. Thus, it is no true comparison to say 'that a name is simpler than a body or that the outline of a speech is better than the delivery'. No more true is it to say that the love of husband and wife is greater or less than the love of true lovers because they are simply different orders of beings.<sup>70</sup>

In teaching Walter the nature of love, Andreas had enumerated its effects, the virtues and good traits of character with which it adorns a man. One of these virtues is chastity. The reason why a lover is chaste is that while in love with one lady, he cannot think of another, even of a beautiful lady. Such a woman seems rough and rude in comparison to his beloved.<sup>71</sup> That is why one of the chief rules of love enumerated by the King of Love is 'Thou shalt keep thyself chaste for the sake of her whom thou lovest'.<sup>72</sup> In the Rejection of Love, Andreas uses Scripture to prove that God is the fountainhead and origin of chastity and modesty and that the devil is the source of love and lechery.<sup>73</sup> He bases his teaching on a text from the Book of Job: His strength is in his loins and his force, especially on St. Jerome's commentary on this passage.<sup>74</sup> Because of their respective sources, therefore, we are bound to observe modesty and chastity and to avoid love and lechery since the devil can never give rise to what is good and praiseworthy for men. On the contrary, God is the Way, the Truth and the Life<sup>75</sup> and from Him arises all that is good and perfect. The devil deceives his followers by falsely promising them rewards but rewarding them actually with torments and torture. But with God, that is not so. He richly rewards far beyond His promises those who follow Him.<sup>76</sup> 'With good reason,'<sup>77</sup>

rather than the nature of the words used. For this reason, it might have been better to retain the original meaning and kept the word 'philosophical'.

<sup>70</sup> Parry, p. 171. *Ait enim: Maritalis affectus et coamantium vero dilectio penitus iudicantur esse diversa et ex motibus omnino differentibus suam sumunt originem. Et ideo inventio ipsius sermonis aequivoca actus comparationis excludit et sub diversis ea facit speciebus adiungi. Cessat enim collatio comparandi pro magis et minus inter res aequivoce sumptas, si ad commune nomen, cuius respectu dicuntur aequivocae, comparatio referatur. Non enim competens esset comparatio talis, si diceretur, nomen corpore simplicius esse vel propositio magis dictione composita. De Amore, p. 161 (280-281).*

<sup>71</sup> O, quam mira res est amor, qui tantis facit hominem fulgere virtutibus tantisque docet quolibet bonis moribus abundare! Est et aliud quiddam in amore non brevi sermone laudandum, quia amor reddit hominem castitatis quasi virtute decoratum, quia vix posset de alterius etiam formosae cogitare amplexu, qui unius radio fulget amoris. *De Amore*, p. 5 (10); Parry, p. 31; cf. also *De Amore*, p. 127 (219); Parry, p. 141.

<sup>72</sup> II. Castitatem servare debes amanti. *De Amore*, p. 61 (106); Parry, p. 81.

<sup>73</sup> Praeterea ipsum Deum sine omni dubi-

tatione castitatis et pudicitiae caput esse scimus atque principium; diabolum vero amoris et luxuriae auctorem esse, scriptura referente cognovimus. Et ideo auctoris quoque ratione tenemur in perpetuum pudicitiam conservare et castitatem, luxuriam penitus evitare, quia, quod diabolo auctore constat esse perfectum, nihil posset hominibus parare salubre nec aliquid conferre laudandum. Quod autem Deo auctore perficitur, malum nullo modo posset sortiri effectum vel quidquam hominibus parare sinistram. *De Amore*, pp. 189-190 (328); Parry, pp. 194-195.

<sup>74</sup> Job xl, 11. Cf. *Epistola ad Eustochium* XXII, 11; PL 22, 401. Cf. Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 195, note 14.

<sup>75</sup> John xiv, 6.

<sup>76</sup> Deus autem non sic, sed pro bonis promissis atque suavibus optima nobis et suavissima solvit, quum ipse est via, veritas et vita, et ideo non immerito uberiori solutione sua nobis promissa persolvit, et, quicunque illius se vult comitatu plena fide committere, nullius hostis patietur insidias sed ad optata loca securus et ad gloriam deducetur aeternam. *De Amore*, pp. 190-191 (330); Parry, p. 196.

<sup>77</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Merito ergo quisque teneat amorem luxuriaeque actus abicere et corporis pudicitiam penitus amplexari. *De Amore*, p. 191 (330).

therefore, every man is bound to reject love and deeds of wantonness and to strive for complete bodily chastity'.

Moreover, love is not the source of virtue and excellence as Andreas had insisted throughout the *De Amore*. On the contrary, love is a crime that soils and defiles not only the soul but also the body. That is why divine authority classes it as the gravest of all crimes.<sup>78</sup> In the *De Amore*, Andreas had attempted to prove by reason that love is a desirable good and that all men are bound to strive towards it.<sup>79</sup> In his Rejection of Love, he asserts that it is not a good, cannot be a good by its very nature but that it is damnable, a sin from which nothing but evil can arise. He bolsters his assertion by Scripture purporting to show that if a venial sin accompanies the practice of love among the married, then by so much the more is illicit love a grave sin.<sup>80</sup>

In the Fifth Dialogue of the *De Amore* a nobleman attempted to induce a lady of the same class to accede to his demands on the grounds that if she did not consent to love, she would suffer the torments and punishments that the God of Love inflicts on those who refuse to enlist under his banner. He pictured those torments through the vision of Lord Robert's squire. He painted on the other hand, the rewards granted to the followers of the great King,—a hundred-fold to those who do the things pleasing to Love, and on the other hand, the punishment due to those who sin against and offend Love.<sup>81</sup> After relating the vision and enumerating the chief laws handed him by the King of Love for the guidance of lovers, he exhorts the noble lady: 'Behold then, my lady, how great is the affliction of those who will not love—to what torments they are subjected, and what glory and honor those have earned who did not close the gates of Love to those who desired to enter—so that you may lay aside your erroneous opinion and be worthy to receive the rewards and escape the torments I have told you about. For it would seem unseemly and a desperate evil were a woman so wise and so beautiful as you to be subjected to such heavy torments or to endure so many perils'.<sup>82</sup> In his Rejection of Love, Andreas rejects all that he had taught Walter on the rewards of love. Now he argues against it, on the grounds that it brings intolerable torments to all men during their lifetime, and infinitely greater ones after their death. Ironically Andreas exclaims: 'O what a marvellously good thing should everybody consider that which provides to the living unremitting pain and threatens the dying with everlasting torment, and provides for all lovers that heritage which the Holy

<sup>78</sup> *Alia quoque ratio crimen nobis contradicit amoris. Nam, quum omnia crimina ipsam animam tantum de sui soleant inquinare natura, istud crimen solum animam simul cum corpore foedat, ergo super omnibus est criminibus evitandum, unde non immerito evidenter divina clamat auctoritas, crimen nullum esse gravius fornicatione repertum. De Amore, p. 184 (318); Parry, p. 189. The divine authority in question is I Cor. vi, 18.*

<sup>79</sup> *Nulla igitur potestis vos ratione tueri, quod amare non sit cunctis appetibile bonum, ad quod omnes tenemur tota virtute conari. De Amore, p. 94 (163); Parry, pp. 111-112.*

<sup>80</sup> *Quum enim ex amore mala cuncta sequantur, nullum penitus hominibus inde video procedere bonum, quia delectatio carnis, quae inde multa aviditate suscipitur, non est de genere boni, immo constat, esse damnable crimen, quae etiam in coniugatos ipsis vix cum veniali culpa sine crimine toleratur, propheta testante, qui ait: "Ecce enim [et] in iniquitatibus conceptus*

*sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea" (Psalm l. 7.) De Amore, p. 188 (326); Parry, pp. 193-194.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ut video et manifeste cognosco, qui amori elegerit beneplacita facere, centuplicata illa retributione suscipiet, et eundem qui offendere fuerit ausus, commissum impune transire non poterit, sed, ut mihi videtur, ultra millicuplum, quam fuerit commissum in eum, constat vindicari delictum. De Amore, p. 57 (98-99); Parry, p. 78.*

<sup>82</sup> *Parry, pp. 82-83. Aspicias ergo, domina mea, quanta est amare afflictio nolentis, quantisque subiciatur angustiis, et quantum decus mereantur et gloriam, quae amoris portam intrare non clausere volentibus, ut vestrae opinionis errore deposito praedicta mereamini suscipere praemia et praefatas angustias declinare. Indecens enim esset et desperabile malum induceret, si mulier tam sapiens tamque venusta specie decorata inveniat poenis subiacere tam gravibus totve pericula sustinere. De Amore, p. 63 (108).*

Scripture shows us is situated in outer darkness where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth'.<sup>85</sup> The authority of Scripture shows us that it is the children of the Kingdom of earth as contrasted with the Kingdom of heaven whose heritage shall be the exterior darkness and where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth;<sup>84</sup> those who have not the wedding garment of grace and purity;<sup>85</sup> those unprofitable, wicked and slothful servants of the lord who returned to make a reckoning with them.<sup>86</sup>

Throughout the *De Amore*, Andreas stresses the parallel that exists between the worldly and the spiritual, between the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of God, between the natural and the supernatural. To prove to the woman of the middle class the truth of his assertion that it is for the profit of society that she should grant her love to a young man who has done no good nor has had the opportunity to do so in preference to a man who has done much good, the man of the same class says: 'For as the Heavenly King rejoices over the conversion of one sinner more than over ninety-nine just, because of the good that follows therefrom, so a woman does better if she takes a man who is none too good, makes him praiseworthy through her good character, and by her instruction adds him to the court of Love, than if she makes some good man better. In other words, just as there is more profit to God in the conversion of one sinner than in the improvement of the ninety-nine just, so society gains more when one man who is not good is rendered excellent than when the worthy character of some good man is increased'.<sup>87</sup> On much the same grounds, the lover who is advanced in years, but whose long life is replete with good deeds and courtly services, is to be preferred to the younger whose short span of life has precluded the doing of as many laudable deeds: 'And that he who serves more and has done many services deserves greater rewards than a man who has done fewer laudable deeds is clear enough from the fact that in the court of the Heavenly King, as well as all those of earthly princes, we see that all men are rated according to the rule that he who does more service gets the greater rewards'.<sup>88</sup>

The assumption that a proposition may be true on two different levels is continued in his comparison of the freedom granted to the beloved to return love for love and the lack of compulsion in love to man's freedom to choose between good and evil: 'Love therefore leaves it to the woman's choice, so that when she is loved she may love in return if she wishes to, but if she does not wish, she shall not be compelled to, since a person is thought to deserve greater rewards when he does well of his own accord than when he has done so under compulsion. And we believe that this is done after the example of the Heavenly King, who leaves each man to his own free choice after he has acquired knowledge of good and evil, promising unutterable

<sup>85</sup> Parry, pp. 191-192. O, quam mirabile debet cunctis illud sapere bonum, quod viventibus poenam sine intermissione promittit et morientibus cruciatus minatur aeternos, illamque amantibus universis spondet hereditatem, quam in tenebris exterioribus sitam evangelica Scriptura demonstrat, ubi scilicet fletus et stridor dentium erit. *De Amore*, p. 186 (322).

<sup>84</sup> *Matt.* viii, 12.

<sup>85</sup> *Matt.* xxii, 13.

<sup>86</sup> *Matt.* xxv, 30.

<sup>87</sup> Based on *Luke* xv, 7. Parry, p. 42. Sicut enim magis ille quoque Rex coelestis super unius peccatoris gaudet conversione quam super nonaginta novem iustis, et hoc propter bonum, quod sequitur inde, ita melius facit mulier, si aliquem minus bonum per suam

doctrinam aulae coniungat amoris suaeque faciat probitate laudandum, quam si bonum aliquem faciat meliorem, id est, sicut est maius Deo lucrum super unius peccatoris conversione quam super nonaginta novem iustorum melioratione, ita maius fit mundo lucrum, si quis non bonus probus efficiatur, quam si alicuius boni probitas augmentetur. *De Amore*, pp. 16-17 (32).

<sup>88</sup> Parry, p. 39. Tum autem, qui plus servit et obsequia plura facit, praemiis esse maioribus dignum quam qui pauciora laudabilia fecit, ex eo satis est manifestum, quod tam in coelestis curia regis quam etiam principum terrenorum omnes cernimus, iuris istius peritia censi, ut qui plus servit, maiora praemia ferat. *De Amore*, p. 14 (27).



rewards to those who do well, but threatening unbearable torments to those who do evil'.<sup>80</sup> The same type of reasoning is used to refute the argument of the woman of the higher nobility that she should prefer her tacit and reluctant suitor to the more voluble and importunate man of the same class: 'Besides there seems to be every argument in favor of my being permitted to ask for what I want and urgently desire; even the Author of truth Himself said, "Ask, and it shall be given you: knock and it shall be opened to you"'.<sup>81</sup> In the Third Dialogue, in much the same way, the man of the middle class refutes the argument of the woman of the higher nobility that he should remain in his own class. Nature does not wish him to remain in his own class; rather it wishes him to rise to a higher one. Instinct and cooperating nature drive him to rise from rank to rank. From ancient times the only distinction of class has been valid in the case of those who are unworthy of the class to which they have been assigned or of those who remain in their class because they are unworthy of a higher one. His reasoning, he adds, is based on sacred Scripture; 'I say this because of the resemblance to that passage in Holy Writ which says that the law is not made for the just man, but for sinners'.<sup>82</sup>

The parallel between the effects of divine love and those of human love is stressed by the woman of the plebeian class in her refusal to love the man of the higher nobility unless under the impulse of love. Just as nothing good serves God and avails towards eternal beatitude unless it proceeds from charity,<sup>83</sup> so nothing serves the King of Love or profits towards the rewards of love unless it is done under the impulse of love: 'No matter how much good any man does in this world, it is of no profit to him in attaining the rewards of eternal blessedness unless it is prompted by love. For the same reason, no matter how much I may strive to serve the King of Love by my deeds and my works, unless these proceed from the affection of the heart and are derived from the impulse of love, they cannot profit me toward obtaining the reward of love'.<sup>84</sup> The parallel between the two orders is further illustrated by the comparison Andreas makes of a lady who receives a lover with fair words and joyful face but, when adversity threatens, refrains from doing more than persuading him to do good rather than actually helping him by her love: 'It is like a wicked priest who by pretending to do many good deeds and by urging upon others the works of eternal life condemns himself by his own judgment, while he shows others how to obtain heavenly reward'.<sup>85</sup>

The opposition between reason and faith, between nature and grace appears most clearly in Andreas consideration concerning the love of clerics. That clerics do practice and are expected to practice love is made quite plain from

<sup>80</sup> Parry, p. 51. Ideo ergo amor in arbitrio posuit amantis, ut, quum amatur, et ipsa, si velit, amet, si vero nolit, non cogatur amare, quia maioribus censetur meritis dignus, qui bona sponte peregit, quam qui ea coactus exercuit. Et hoc ad instar coelestis regis creditur esse indultum, qui boni et mali percepta notitia quemque hominum proprio relinquit arbitrio, bene quidem agentibus ineffabilia praemia pollicendo, mala vero operantibus poenas intolerabiles comminando. *De Amore*, pp. 26-27 (50).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *Matt.* vii, 7; *Luke* xi, 9. Parry, p. 130. Praeterea, quod cupio et instanter desidero postulare, omni videtur ratione permissum, ipso etiam veritatis auctore testante, qui dicit: "Petite et accipietis, pulsate et aperietur vobis." *De Amore*, p. 113 (196).

<sup>82</sup> Based on *I Tim.* i. 9. Parry, p. 56. Et hoc ad eius assero similitudinem, quod in theologica invenitur exaratum scriptura,

quae dicit, legem non esse positam iusto sed peccare volentibus. *De Amore*, p. 32 (59).

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *I Cor.* xiii, 1-3.

<sup>84</sup> Parry, p. 91. Et quantumcunque quisque bonum operetur in orbe quo ad aeternae beatitudinis praemia capiendi sibi valere non potest, nisi ex caritatis illud procedat affectu. Eadem igitur ratione, quantumcunque actibus propriis et operibus studeam regi servire amoris, si illud non ex cordis affectione procedat et ex actu derivetur amandi, ad amoris mihi praemia valere non potest. *De Amore*, p. 73 (123).

<sup>85</sup> Parry, p. 110. Est enim malo similis sacerdoti, qui de ipso plurima bona simulando et alios aeternae vitae opera commonendo propria se ipsum damnat sententia et aliis modum remunerationis ostendit. *De Amore*, p. 93 (161).

Andreas' direction to them: 'not to affect the manners or the dress of the laity, for no one is likely to please his beloved, if she is a wise woman, by wearing strange clothing or by practicing manners that do not fit his status'.<sup>95</sup> He treats the question of the love of clerics specifically in two places: first, in the Eighth Dialogue between the man of the higher nobility and the woman of the same class and secondly in the seventh chapter of the First Book entitled 'The Love of the Clergy'. The woman of the higher nobility refuses the love of the man of the same class because he is a cleric and as such ought to concern himself only with the service of the Church and avoid all the desires of the flesh. She argues that since God has granted him the great privilege of consecrating His Flesh and Blood and of absolving sinners, the cleric must keep himself unspotted for the Lord. By virtue of the office granted him by God, he is bound to recall men from the error of impurity and to persuade them to be chaste, to set them an example of purity of life. Otherwise he would become a laughing stock to men in that he would be trying to take out the mote from his brother's eye with a beam in his own eye.<sup>96</sup> Her argument then is founded on the fact that the cleric is bound by virtue of his calling and by virtue of his state and office conferred on him by God to remain pure and chaste.<sup>97</sup>

The argument of the man is founded on reason and the nature of man, and not on something extrinsic or accidental conferred on him. God has raised the cleric to a new and higher state of life but He has not destroyed his nature as man. The cleric is still subject to the stimulus of the flesh and incited to indulge it just as any other man. That being so, the cleric is under no more obligation to abstinence of the flesh than is the layman. He along with them is commanded by God to abstain from all fleshly uncleanness and impure desires. Moreover, not only the clergy but every Christian is in duty bound to correct the error of his brethren. The command given by the Gospel is general in its application: 'If thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone'.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the cleric is: 'A clerk does well, and a layman does well, if he abstains from all worldly delights and confirms the hearts of his neighbors in all good works'.<sup>99</sup> However, the cleric goes on to say, he does admit that as a cleric, by virtue of his office, he is obliged in a special way to make known the truth and to admonish and confirm the people in the true faith in Church and among the people. If he neglects to do this, then he deserves everlasting punishment unless he repents. But he is freed of this obligation imposed by his office if he discharges that duty by word of tongue, if he stands at the altar and proclaims the word of God. If he discharges the duties of his state in life in this way, that is, if as

<sup>95</sup> Parry, p. 152. Clericus vero laicalia sibi exercitia sive habitum non assumat; nemo enim alieni habitus assumptione vel gestus suo non congruentes ordini exercendo suae sapientiae facile posset amanti placere. *De Amore*, p. 140 (241-242).

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *Matt.* vii, 5; *Luke* vi, 42.

<sup>97</sup> Clericus enim ecclesiasticis tantum debet vacare ministeriis et omnia carnis desideria declinare; ab omni enim debet delectatione alienus existere et suum prae omnibus corpus immaculatum Domino custodire, quum tanta fuerit a Domino dignitatis et ordinis praerogativa concessa, ut eius carnem et sanguinem propriis mereatur manibus consecrare et suis sermonibus peccantium crimina relaxare. Nam, si ad carnis lapsum meum videritis animum inclinare, vos tamen ex indulto a Domino vobis officio me a conceptis teneremini erroribus revocare et

in cunctis mihi castimoniam suadere et talia de vobis exempla monstrare, ut libera voce possitis aliorum crimina castigare. Primo namque iuxta evangelicam veritatem proprio trabem gestans in oculo ipsam debet prius eiicere, quam de fratris oculo festucam conetur evellere. Derisui enim humano generi patebit, si pariter ligatus colligatorum studeat vincula relaxare. Non est ergo mulieribus tutum illos carnis contagio maculare, quos Deus sibi elegit ministros et puros voluit in cunctis atque castos suis obsequiis conservare. *De Amore*, p. 107 (185-186); Parry, pp. 123-124.

<sup>98</sup> *Matt.* xviii, 15.

<sup>99</sup> Parry, p. 124. Bene enim facit clericus et bene laicus, si ab omni saeculari delectatione absterneat et in bonis operibus proximorum corda confirmet. *De Amore*, p. 108 (187).

a cleric he teaches the word of God, directs men along the way of righteousness with his tongue, then he is freed of any other obligation. If he yields, he is no more to be punished than any other man because 'he is naturally driven to them by the incentive of the flesh just like the rest of mankind'.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the man of higher nobility distinguishes between what the cleric is obligated to by virtue of his office and what is expected of him as a mortal man, between what he is obliged to by the grace of his calling and from what his nature drives him to. There is a distinct cleavage between the two,—the cleric and the man. The office sets him apart from the rest of mankind in so far as he is bound to make known by tongue and at the altar the true faith and to direct by tongue the actions of men. This duty he discharges by word. He claims the authority of the Gospel for this: that the cleric as God's deputy must be believed in what he says; as for the actions of clerics they must not be regarded if they are in error because, as men, they are children of original sin and subject to the weaknesses and failings of mankind just like other men: 'This is what the authority of the Gospel proclaims; for the Lord, seeing His clergy, in accordance with the frailty of human nature, about to fall into various excesses, said in the Gospel, 'the scribes and the Pharisees have sitten on the chair of Moses. All things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do: but according to their works do ye not',<sup>101</sup> just as though He said, 'You must believe what the clergy say, because they are God's deputies; but because they are subject to the temptation of the flesh like other men, you must not regard their works if they happen to go astray in anything'. Therefore it is enough for me if, when I stand by the altar, I devote myself to proclaiming the word of God to my people'.<sup>102</sup>

The same separation of the office of the cleric or his state in life from the cleric considered as man is apparent in the chapter Andreas devotes to 'The Love of the Clergy'. The cleric is of the fourth class, the most noble of all men by virtue of his sacred calling. This nobility is not of blood but a gift granted by God's grace. No secular power can touch it and its privileges can be annulled only by God. It is something foreign and extraneous to his nature.<sup>103</sup> But this nobility does not authorize a cleric to look for love. In fact, as a cleric, he is bound to renounce absolutely the delights of the flesh and to keep himself unspotted for the service of God. If he does not, he will be deprived of that special nobility by God. Therefore Andreas concludes that, as far as clerical nobility is concerned, it would be highly improper for him to treat of the love of the clergy from the standpoint of the dignity of his rank and the nobility of his order. On the other hand, Andreas recognizes that the cleric is still a man by his very nature. He reasons that since hardly any man lives without sins of the flesh and since the life of the cleric is naturally more liable to

<sup>100</sup> Parry, p. 125. Nam alia commissa crimina nequaquam in eo gravius quam in quolibet laico vindicantur, quum itaquel carnis incentivo naturaliter instigetur sicut et reliqui universi mortales. *De Amore*, pp. 108-109 (187-188).

<sup>101</sup> Matt. xxiii, 2-3.

<sup>102</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Et hoc est, quod evangelica clamat auctoritas; videns enim Dominus, suos clericos iuxta humanae naturae infirmitatem in varios lapsuros excessus, ait in evangelio: "Super cathedram Moisi sederunt scribae et pharisaei; omnia, quaecunque dixerint, vobis servate et facite, secundum autem opera illorum nolite facere", quasi dicat: "Credendum est dictis clericorum quasi legatorum Dei, sed quia

carnis tentationi sicut homines ceteri supponuntur, eorum non inspicatis opera, si eos contigerit in aliquo deviare". Sufficit ergo mihi, si altari assistens meae plebi Dei studeam verbum annuntiare. *De Amore*, p. 109 (188).

<sup>103</sup> Clericus ergo nobilissimus iudicatur ordinis praerogativa sacra, quam nobilitatem ex Dei constat gremio processisse et divina clericis voluntate fuisse largitam . . . Clerico igitur nobilitatem non sanguinis propinat origo, nec saecularis valet removere potestas, sed ex Dei gratia tantum concessa probatur et eo ministrante largita, et a Deo solo huiusmodi possunt nobilitatis pro sui tantum excessibus privilegia denegari. *De Amore*, p. 127 (220); Parry, p. 142.

temptations of the flesh than is that of ordinary men by reason of his continuously idle life and the great abundance of food, if a cleric should wish to love,—and naturally he does,—he is to conduct himself, to speak and act according to his natural nobility, that namely of his parents, in the way that Andreas had indicated for the other ranks and social levels.<sup>104</sup> He may lose his nobility through his own fault or through the taking back of it by God: he can never, as long as he lives, lose his human nature.

### III. Andreas and the So-called Doctrine of the Double Truth

On rational grounds Andreas proved in the *De Amore* that sexual love is the most desirable thing in this world, that it is the source of all that is good and noble here below. He taught Walter that by his very nature man is compelled to love and that he must do so if he would rise in natural virtue and attain to the natural felicity of this world. In the *De Reprobatione* Andreas repudiated this teaching entirely and proved,—significantly enough in regard to just those parts which would later form the matter of propositions to be condemned in 1277,—from divine authority that such love is sinful before God and before man, that it is the source of all criminal excesses. As such, therefore, it must be avoided as incompatible with one's good name and with the friendship and grace of God, as detrimental to the love of God and to man's eternal salvation. On the contrary, Andreas counsels the preservation of bodily purity and fleshly abstinence without which there can be no good in man. Nature may compel man to love, to enjoy the delights of the flesh; strength of character, the avoidance of occasions and the grace of God are sufficient and equal to the task of repressing passion and lust.

In teaching Walter the art and technique of love, Andreas based his doctrine on philosophical grounds, on reason and on the nature of man; in condemning such love and in rejecting his former teaching, he based himself on theological grounds, on Scripture and on faith. There is never any attempt on his part to reconcile the two opposing doctrines, nor is there ever any doubt in his mind within the two parts of the truth of what he teaches in both parts. The very doctrines he condemns so vehemently in his retraction are to be held, he tells us in the *De Amore*, as 'firm and indubitable truth'.<sup>1</sup> Likewise in the *De Reprobatione*, for example, he tells us that that man 'who devotes his efforts to love loses all his usefulness',<sup>2</sup>—just the very opposite of his teaching in the *De Amore* that love is the source of all good.

Thus, there is built up an opposition between the *De Amore* and the *De Reprobatione*, between the rational, natural teaching of the former and the theological and supernatural teaching of the latter. In them is seen to be erected an opposition between nature and grace, between reason and faith, between philosophy and theology. What Andreas teaches to be true according to nature and reason, he teaches to be false according to grace and to divine authority. Thus emerges in his book the doctrine of the so-called double truth wherein contradictory propositions are held to be true at the same time. It is not surprising, therefore, that Stephen Tempier included *nominatim* the work of Andreas in his condemnation of those 'who say that those things may be

<sup>104</sup> Parry, *ibid.* Quia vix tamen unquam aliquis sine carnis crimine vivit, et clericorum sit vita propter otia multa continua et ciborum abundantiam copiosam prae aliis hominibus universis naturaliter corporis tentationi supposita, si aliquis clericus amoris voluerit subire certamina, iuxta sui sanguinis ordinem sive gradum, sicut superius edocet plenarie de gradibus homi-

num insinuata doctrina, suo sermone utatur et amoris studeat applicari militiae. *De Amore*, p. 123 (221).

<sup>1</sup> Parry, p. 107. Pro indubitabili vobis sit ac veritate constanti. *De Amore*, p. 90 (154).

<sup>2</sup> Parry, p. 197. Immo totam illius credimus deperire utilitatem, qui suos in amore labores expendit. *De Amore*, p. 181 (313-314).

true according to philosophy but not according to Faith as if there were two contrary truths and as if the truth that lies in the sayings of the accursed gentiles were against the truth of Holy Scripture'.<sup>3</sup>

We know that the condemnation of the Bishop of Paris was levelled especially against the Latin Averroists, particularly against Siger de Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. It was their procedure to establish a truth according to philosophy but contrary to Faith and then to posit along with that philosophical truth the doctrine of Faith. Because Andreas' procedure is much the same, are we to look upon Andreas Capellanus as a Latin Averroist? If he is, then certainly he is the earliest known since he was contemporary of Averroes (1126-1198). Chronologically, it would have been difficult, nay impossible, for Andreas writing in 1184-86 to have been influenced by the Great Commentator, who wrote his *Philosophy and Theology* in 1179. Yet it remains true that Andreas and the Latin Averroists fell into the same error of contradictory doctrines condemned at Paris in 1277.

It would seem that there is some connection between them. It is hardly a connection of dependency as has been pointed out. What seems more likely is that those influences that contributed towards the formation of the Latin Averroists were operative too in the case of Andreas. In other words, the connection would seem to be one of common origin. To establish that, it would be necessary first to compare the method and results obtained from it by Andreas with those of the Latin Averroists to see if there is identity of method and result or merely parallelism; secondly, to examine the influences that worked upon the Latin Averroists in producing such a method and such results. It may be that those same influences worked upon Andreas and resulted in his contradictory teachings that resemble so much the "double truth" of the Latin Averroists. This I hope to do in a forthcoming article.

<sup>3</sup> Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie veritates, et quasi contra veritatem sacre scrip-

ture sit veritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum. *Chartularium*, p. 543; Mandonnet, p. 176.

# Notes sur le Vocabulaire de l'Etre

ETIENNE GILSON

## I. "Ens" et "Quod Est"

**MORPHOLOGIQUEMENT**, *ens* dérive de *sum*, mais non pas directement, car le participe présent de *sum* serait *sens*, qui s'est d'ailleurs conservé dans des composés tels que *ab-sens*, *prae-sens*, *con-sentes*, etc.<sup>1</sup> Ce mot, disent les philologues, a été "créé par la langue philosophique pour rendre le Grec *ὄν*; *entia- τὰ ὄντα*".<sup>2</sup> On va voir que rien n'est plus exact, mais il n'est pas sans intérêt, pour l'histoire de la philosophie, de savoir comment cette création s'est effectuée.

Priscien fait observer que les Grecs usent du participe présent comme d'un substantif, ce que font rarement les Latins. Mais ils pourraient le faire et même, à l'en croire, César l'aurait fait, en proposant précisément le mot *ens*:

Graeci autem participio utuntur substantive: . . . quo nos quoque secundum analogiam possemus uti, nisi usus deficeret participii frequens. Quamvis Caesar non incongrue protulit *ens* a verbo *sum*, *es*, quomodo a verbo *possum*, *potes*: *potens*.<sup>3</sup>

Malheureusement, Priscien ne cite ni texte ni source, et comme nous ne connaissons aucun ouvrage de César où ce terme soit employé, le témoignage de notre grammairien demeure sujet à caution.

Aucun texte classique actuellement connu n'atteste le mot *ens*. Il semble pourtant qu'un certain Sergius Flavius l'ait employé, à l'imitation du Grec, et Quintilien, qui rapporte le fait, regrette en somme que la timidité devant le néologisme ait détourné les Latins de l'adopter:

Multa ex Graeco formata nova ac plurima a Sergio Flavio, quorum dura quaedam admodum videntur, ut *ens* et *essentia*: quae cur tantopere aspernemur, nihil video, nisi quod iniqui iudices adversus nos sumus, ideoque paupertate sermonis laboramus.<sup>4</sup>

Par où l'on voit à la fois que le mot avait été déjà créé, antérieurement au I<sup>er</sup> siècle de l'ère chrétienne, qu'on le sentait répondre à un besoin, mais que l'on n'osait encore l'adopter. La preuve certaine de cette hésitation nous est d'ailleurs donnée par un texte bien connu de Sénèque, sur lequel nous aurons à revenir, et dans lequel, ayant à traduire *τὸ ὄν*, il se déclare embarrassé, puis propose enfin, non pas du tout *ens*, qui nous paraît aujourd'hui si simple, mais *quod est*.<sup>5</sup> Le terme *ens* ne venait donc même pas à l'esprit d'un écrivain comme Sénèque vers l'an 30 de l'ère chrétienne. Même plus tard, ni Augustin

<sup>1</sup> A. Ernout et A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* (Paris, C. Klincksieck, 1939), p. 302.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Priscien, *Institutionum Grammaticarum* lib. XVIII, 8, 75; ed. M. Hertz, (Leipzig, 1858), t. II, p. 239. Cf. à propos du mot *onipotens*: Ex tribus corruptis, *omnium* et *potis* et *ens*, id est eo quo est *sum*, *es*. Ideo ergo a *possum* verbo *potens* nascitur, tam participium quam nomen. Priscien, *Partitionum*, X; ed. cit., t. II, p. 506. Il ne précise pas qui sont ces *antiqui*, le seul qu'il avait jamais cité à ce propos étant

César. Vu du début du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle de notre ère, César pourrait en effet passer pour un ancien.

<sup>4</sup> Quintilien, *De institutione oratoria*, VIII, 3, 33. Sur Sergius Flavius, indications dans A. Ernout et A. Meillet, *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Magis damnabis angustias Romanas, si scieris unam syllabam esse, quam mutare non possim.—Quae haec sit, quaeris? *to on*. Duri tibi videor ingenii: in medio positum posse sic transferri, ut dicam: *quod est*. Sed multum interesse video: cogor verbum pro vocabulo ponere; sed ita necesse est, ponam: *quod est*. Sénèque, *Ad Lucilium*,

ni, à ma connaissance, aucun autre écrivain chrétien ne l'a employé, et tout se passe même comme si on l'évitait, puisque Chalcidius, écrivant vers la fin du III<sup>e</sup> siècle ou le début du IV<sup>e</sup>, traduit les *ὄντα* de *Timée*, 35a par *existentia*<sup>6</sup> comme il traduit *ὃν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν* (*Timée*, 52d) par *existens, locum et generationem*.<sup>7</sup> Pour voir *ens*, *entia* franchement acceptés en dépit des résistances de l'usage, c'est à Boèce, c'est-à-dire à la fin du V<sup>e</sup> siècle, qu'il faut en venir.

On n'a jamais su très exactement combien il y eu de Boèces. Présentement, il n'y en a qu'un, auteur des Commentaires sur Porphyre, de la *Consolatio philosophiae* et des opusculs théologiques. Du point de vue du vocabulaire de l'être, tout se passe comme s'il y en avait deux: l'auteur des Commentaires sur Porphyre d'une part et, d'autre part, celui de la *Consolatio* et des opusculs. Le premier connaît le mot *ens* et s'emploie à le faire accepter; le second l'ignore complètement et fait même tout pour l'éviter.

Il est d'ailleurs évident que le Boèce des Commentaires a conscience de recommander ici un terme inusité. Il fait violence à l'usage latin, mais c'est un terme commode. Le premier texte à citer présente l'intérêt de donner à la fois les deux formes *ens* et *entia*:

At dicat quis haec omnia decem genera si vere sunt subsistentia, quodammodo vel entia dici posse. Flexus enim hic sermo est ab eo quod est esse, et in participii abusionem tractum est propter angustationem linguae Latinae compressionemque. Haec igitur, ut dictum est, entia poterunt appellari, et ens hoc ipsum, id est esse, genus eorum fortasse dici videbitur. Sed falso.<sup>8</sup>

La décision une fois prise, Boèce usera du terme chaque fois que l'occasion lui en sera offerte. D'abord dans la traduction du texte de Porphyre, où il permet de serrer de près le grec,<sup>9</sup> mais aussi dans le Commentaire qui l'accompagne:

Fuere enim qui hac opinione tenerentur, ut rerum omnium quae sunt unum putarent esse genus quod ens nuncupant, tractum ab eo quod dicimus est; omnia enim sunt et de omnibus esse praedicatur. Itaque et substantia est et qualitas est itemque quantitas caeteraque esse dicuntur; nec de his aliquid tractaretur, nisi haec quae praedicamenta dicuntur, esse constaret. Quae cum ita sint, ultimum omnium genus ens esse posuerunt, scilicet quod de omnibus praedicaretur. Ab eo autem quod dicimus est participium inflectentes, Graeco quidem sermone *ὃν*, Latine ens appellaverunt. Sed Aristoteles sapientissimus rerum cognitor reclamavit huic sententiae nec ad unum res omnes putat duci posse primordium, . . .<sup>10</sup>

58, 5-6. Comme on le voit, Sénèque voudrait un nom pour traduire un nom, et il ne semble pas qu'*ens* se soit offert à lui comme possible.

<sup>6</sup> Chalcidius, *In Timaeum Platonis*, cap. 28; ed. Mullach, (Paris, Didot, 1881), p. 186.

<sup>7</sup> Chalcidius, *Timée*, trad. cit., cap. 27; p. 180. *Existens* n'étant pas alors un néologisme moins surprenant que ne l'eût été *ens*, il faut vraiment que ce dernier terme soit resté inusité jusqu'au début du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle. On notera que, même au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, traduisant le *Ménon* de Platon, Henri Aristippe ne rendra pas *on* par *ens*, mais par *existens*. Cf. *Méno*, ed. V. Kordeuter et C. Labowsky, (Institut Warburg, Londres, 1940). L'index latin pour le verbe *sum* ne

signale pas *ens* (p. 90), mais il donne, p. 81, *existens* comme traduction de *on*.

<sup>8</sup> Boèce, *In Isagogen Porphyrii*, ed. prima, lib. I, c. 24; ed. S. Brandt, CSEL, vol. 48 (Vienne, 1906), p. 74.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, ed. secunda, lib. III, c. 7; ed. cit., p. 220, l. 14 et p. 221, l. 4, où *ens* traduit *on*. Cf. ed. prima, lib. I, c. 24, p. 74, l. 24: nam quoniam substantia ens est, et item qualitas ens, . . .

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, ed. secunda, lib. III, c. 7; ed. cit., pp. 221-222. Pour *entia*, p. 221, l. 2 et l. 5. Cf. loc. cit., p. 223: Itaque id quod dicitur ens, etsi de omnibus dicitur praedicamentis, quoniam tamen nulla ejus definitio inveniri potest quae omnibus praedicamentis possit aptari, idcirco non dicitur univoce de prae-

On ne s'étonne donc plus de voir bientôt paraître le couple *ens-unum*, qui jouera un rôle si important dans la spéculation médiévale:<sup>11</sup> le terme *ens* est entré dans la langue philosophique, pour n'en plus sortir, vers la fin du V<sup>e</sup> siècle de l'ère chrétienne.

Le problème se complique pourtant quelque peu si l'on passe du premier Boèce au second. Car le deutéro-Boèce, si l'on peut dire, semble ignorer complètement le progrès réalisé par le premier dans l'ordre du vocabulaire philosophique. *Ens*, nous l'avons dit, ne se rencontre pas une seule fois dans la *Consolatio philosophiae*, ce qui peut s'expliquer par le caractère littéraire de l'oeuvre, mais on ne le trouve pas davantage dans les opuscules théologiques, hérissés pourtant de termes techniques et où Boèce pouvait l'introduire, non seulement sans les obscurcir davantage, mais plutôt en les éclaircissant.<sup>12</sup>

En effet, Boèce a parlé de l'être dans ses traités théologiques, mais jamais il ne le nomme *ens*. Tout se passe comme si l'auteur de ces écrits avait lu Sénèque et adopté sa terminologie sur ce point important. Comme on l'a vu, Sénèque propose de traduire *το ὄν* par *quod est*. Il ne le fait pas sans scrupules, mais enfin il le fait.<sup>13</sup> Or chacun sait que *quod est* est un élément caractéristique de la terminologie de l'auteur des Traités. On en pourrait citer plusieurs exemples tirés du seul *De Hebdomadibus*, où *quod est* s'oppose curieusement à *esse*, le premier désignant la substance, le second désignant un accident. Lorsqu'il écrit: *Diversum est esse et id quod est: ipsum enim esse nondum est; at vero quod est, accepta essendi forma, est atque consistit*,<sup>14</sup> on ne peut guère hésiter sur le sens de sa formule. *Esse* est un verbe, et ce verbe désigne ce qui échoit au *quod est*;<sup>15</sup> donc ce que *quod est* désigne est une substance et la formule qui le désigne fait elle-même fonction de nom. Ce nom, nous le connaissons par Sénèque, c'est *τὸ ὄν*. Chez le deutéro-Boèce, le couple latin *esse-quod est* correspond exactement au couple grec *εἶναι — ὄν*.<sup>16</sup> Boèce a donc mis en usage, parmi les écrivains chrétiens, deux traductions du *τὸ ὄν* des Grecs: l'*ens* de ses Commentaires sur Porphyre et le *quod est* du *De Hebdomadibus*. Cette dernière formule signifie simplement l'"être" substantif et, chaque fois qu'on le juge utile, on ne doit pas hésiter à la traduire en français par ce mot.

## II. *Essentia*

Sénèque n'a pas fait usage du mot *ens*; il n'en a même pas fait mention, fût-ce pour le rejeter; mais il a pris *essentia* en considération comme équivalent possible d'*οὐσία* et s'est réservé le droit d'en user, quitte d'ailleurs à ne pas le faire. On va voir qu'il invoque deux autorités en faveur de ce terme:

dicamentis, id est ut genus, sed aequivoce, id est ut vox plura significans. Convincitur etiam hac quoque ratione id quod dicimus ens, praedicatorum genus esse non posse. Pour justifier la place de cette dernière virgule, *ibid.*, p. 225, l. 8.

<sup>11</sup> *Ens* igitur atque unum neutrum neutri supponitur; neque enim unius dicere possumus genus ens nec ejus quod dicimus ens, unum. Nam quod dicimus ens, unum est et quod unum dicitur, ens est, etc. *Op. cit.*, c. 7; p. 224.

<sup>12</sup> Cette absence est une certitude quasi absolue, puisque le mot *ens* ne figure même pas dans *A Concordance of Boethius, the Five Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy*, de Lane Cooper, (Cambridge, Mass., 1928). C'est un très précieux

instrument de travail.

<sup>13</sup> Quid ergo erit, ex quo haec deducantur? Illud cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, *quod est*. Sic enim in species secabitur, ut dicamus: *quod est* aut corporale est aut incorporale . . . Illud genus *quod est* generale, supra se nihil habet. Initium rerum est . . . *quod est* in has species divido, ut sint corporalia aut incorporalia. Sénèque, *Ad Lucilium*, 58, 11-14.

<sup>14</sup> Boèce, *De hebdomadibus*, PL 64; 1311B.  
<sup>15</sup> *Diversum est, tantum esse aliquid, et esse aliquid in eo quod est: illic enim accidens, hic substantia dicitur. Loc. cit.*, 1311C.

<sup>16</sup> Sur la correspondance entre *einai* et *esse*, voir Boèce, *De persona et duabus naturis*, Cap. III; PL 64, 1344C.



Quid, inquis, sibi ista vult praeparatio? Quo spectat? Non celabo te: cupio, si fieri potest propitiis auribus tuis, *essentiam* dicere; sin minus, dicam et iratis. Ciceronem auctorem hujus verbo habeo, puto locupletem; si recentiorum quaeris, Fabianum disertum et elegantem, orationis, etiam ad nostrum fastidium, nitidae. Quid enim fiet, mi Lucili? Quomodo dicetur *οὐσία*, res necessaria, naturam continens, fundamentum omnium? Rogo itaque, permittas mihi hoc verbo uti: nihilominus dabo operam, ut jus a te datum parcissime exerceam: fortasse contentus ero mihi licere.<sup>1</sup>

Nous n'avons aucun texte de Cicéron où paraisse le mot *essentia*, mais le témoignage de Sénèque nous assure qu'il l'a au moins proposé. Quant à Sergius Flavius Papirius Fabianus, dont Sénèque parle ailleurs encore,<sup>2</sup> il n'a certainement pas assuré le succès de ce terme, que Sénèque lui-même se croit obligé de réintroduire avec tant de précautions.

C'est peut-être le même Fabianus qui reparaît un peu plus tard, dans un texte de Quintilien, sous le nom de Flavius: *Et haec interpretatio non minus dura est, quam illa Flavii essentia atque entia*.<sup>3</sup> Il est remarquable que Quintilien ne cite pas Sénèque, mais remonte ici directement au rhéteur qui semble n'avoir pas hésité devant le néologisme. Fabianus avait en effet essayé, non seulement *essentia*, mais le substantif féminin *entia*, qui serait à *essentia* comme un français *sence* serait à *essence*. Pour des raisons diverses,<sup>4</sup> et, de toute manière, en fait, *entia* n'a pas vécu et l'on voit qu'*essentia* semble encore dur aux oreilles de Quintilien, mais les écrivains chrétiens vont bientôt en faire librement usage et le vulgariser. C'est que, selon la remarque de Quintilien lui-même, il n'y a pas d'autre mot latin pour traduire le nom dont Aristote désigne la première des catégories:

Ac primum Aristoteles elementa decem constituit, circa quae versari videatur omnis quaestio: *οὐσία*, quam Flavius *essentiam* vocat; neque sane aliud est ejus nomen latinum.<sup>5</sup>

Il est d'ailleurs remarquable que Quintilien ait interprété ce terme, non pas au sens d' "essence" comme nous faisons aujourd'hui, mais comme signifiant le fait même que la chose "est", car il ajoute aussitôt, parlant de l'*essentia*: *sed ea quaeritur: an sit?* Ce qui répond pour lui à la question *quid sit* n'est pas l'essence, mais la qualité.

Au III<sup>e</sup> siècle, Arnobe (260-327) use au contraire d'*essentia* pour désigner, non le fait même d'être, mais la nature de ce qui est: . . . *sint unius essentiae vel unius debeant esse naturae* . . .<sup>6</sup> D'un sens à l'autre, le passage est inévitable par la notion de réalité:

certum est utique Minervam non fuisse neque rerum in numero aut ulla esse in substantia computatam, sed ex quo capite Jovis enata est, et esse res coepit et nonnulla in essentia constituta . . .<sup>7</sup>

C'est en effet à partir du moment où Minerve acquiert une certaine *essentia*, qu'elle peut être comptée pour une sorte de *substantia*, donc aussi de réalité.

Il semble donc qu'Arnobe ait usé sans scrupule de ce terme technique et l'on peut d'ailleurs se demander, sans d'ailleurs pouvoir répondre, si nos

<sup>1</sup> Sénèque, *Ad Lucilium* 58, 4-5. Le néologisme a continué de surprendre copistes et éditeurs, qui ont longtemps écrit: *quid sentiam dicere* au lieu de *essentiam dicere*.

<sup>2</sup> Sénèque, *Consolatio ad Marciam* 23, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Quintilien, *De institutione oratoria* II, 14, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Voir A. Ernout et A. Meillet, *Diction-*

*naire étymologique*, p. 302.

<sup>5</sup> Quintilien, *De institutione oratoria* III, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Arnobe, *Adversus Gentes*, éd. Aug. Reifferscheid (CSEL .t. 4), p. 252, l. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Arnobe, *Adversus Gentes*, lib. II; éd. cit., p. 105. Cf. lib. VII, p. 262, l. 4-5: Cum enim sint essentiae dispaes substantiaequae unae . . .

éditions actuelles des auteurs latins n'ont pas involontairement éliminé *essentia* de textes où il se lisait primitivement, mais d'où les copistes, qui ne le connaissaient pas, l'ont spontanément éliminé. Le fait s'est produit pour le texte de Sénèque, *Ad Lucilium*, 58, 4, que nous venons de citer. Au lieu de *cupio, si fieri potest propitiis auribus tuis, essentiam dicere*, certaines éditions anciennes s'accordaient à donner: *cupio, si fieri potest propitiis auribus tuis, quid sentiam dicere*". En ce qui concerne Arnobe, Reifferscheid s'est corrigé deux fois lui-même sur ce point, et il a dû rétablir dans sa Préface un *essentiae* auquel s'était substitué *sententiae*, puis un *essentia* auquel s'était substitué un *substantia*.<sup>8</sup> C'est donc là un point sur lequel les éditeurs ont lieu de se tenir en éveil.

Ainsi, l'essence commence à se faire accepter, en des sens d'ailleurs variables, puisque le terme qui la désigne signifie tantôt le fait même d'être, au sens d'*esse*, tantôt la nature de ce qui est, tantôt même la substance qui possède cette nature. *Essentia* n'en demeure pas moins rare à cette date. Je ne l'ai noté ni chez Minucius Felix, ni chez Tertullien, ni chez Lactance, ni chez Cyprien, ni chez saint Ambroise, et, sans oser affirmer qu'il ne s'y trouve pas, je crois pouvoir douter qu'on l'y rencontre. Au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle, les controverses sur le dogme de la Trinité, où l'*ousia* des Grecs et ses composés occupaient une place si importante, semblent avoir contribué à répandre l'usage du terme. C'est du moins ce que suggère un passage de saint Hilaire de Poitiers qui, argumentant contre les Ariens, définit l'*essentia*: "la chose qui est, ou ce dont elle est (*sc. composée*) et qui subsiste dans ce qui demeure".<sup>9</sup> Ce dernier sens conduit au sens propre du terme: "ce qui est toujours", par où l'on rejoint une de ses connotations les plus fréquentes dans la langue de saint Augustin.

Le mot est donc déjà formé, et plus ou moins en usage, lorsqu'on en arrive au temps de saint Augustin. Pourtant, il n'a pas encore réussi à s'imposer puisque, dans le *De moribus Manichaeorum* (vers 388), nous le voyons une fois de plus présenté comme un néologisme:

Itaque ut nos jam novo nomine ab eo quod est esse, vocamus *essentiam*, quam plerumque *substantiam* etiam nominamus: ita veteres qui haec nomina non habebant, pro *essentia* et *substantia naturam* vocabant.<sup>10</sup>

D'où une série d'équivalences qui permettent de s'assurer que le sens d'*essentia* est simplement ici: la propriété d'être un *sens*, si l'on peut dire. En d'autres termes, *essentia* signifie ce qu'aurait signifié, s'il eût réussi, le substantif féminin singulier mentionné par Sénèque: *entia*.

Les controverses trinitaires, dont nous avons noté l'influence sur la diffusion

<sup>8</sup> . . . Deo, cujus nutu et arbitrio omne quod est constat et in *essentiae* (*sic*, au lieu de *sententiae*) suae perpetuitate defixum est. Arnobe, *Adversus Gentes*, lib. I; éd. cit., p. 18; ll. 20-21. Pour la correction, voir Préface, p. XV. . . . atque in sui nominis *essentia* (et non pas *esse substantia*) praedicari". *Op. cit.*, lib. II, p. 77. Pour la correction, voir Préface, p. XVII. On peut d'ailleurs se demander si *sui nominis* n'est pas une autre erreur, pour *veri nominis*.

<sup>9</sup> Sed quia frequens nobis nuncupatio *essentiae* ac *substantiae* necessaria est, cognoscendum est quid significet *essentia*, ne de rebus locuturi, rem verborum nesciamus. *Essentia* est res quae est, vel ex quibus est, et quae in eo quod manet subsistit. Dicit autem *essentia*, et *natura*, et *genus*, et *substantia* uniuscujusque rei poterit. Proprie autem *essentia* idcirco est dicta, quia semper

est. Quae idcirco etiam *substantia* est, quia res est quae est, necesse est subsistat in sese: quicquid autem subsistit, sine dubio in genere, vel in *natura*, vel *substantia* maneat. Cum ergo *essentiam* dicimus, significare *naturam*, vel *genus* vel *substantiam* intelligimus ejus rei quae in his omnibus semper esse subsistat. Nunc igitur praescriptas ab orientalibus fidei definitiones recenseamus". Hilaire de Poitiers, *De Synodis adversus Arianos*, dans *Opera* (Paris, 1572), p. 125 BC. Cf. Augustin, *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3; PL 42, 912, où le terme *essentia*, présenté comme un équivalent du grec *ousia*, se trouve appliqué au Dieu de l'Exode, iii, 14, parce qu'étant l'être immuable par excellence, il mérite suprêmement et en toute vérité le titre d'*essentia*.

<sup>10</sup> Augustin, *De moribus Manichaeorum* II, 2, 2; PL 32, 1346.

du terme *essentia*, invitent Augustin à l'employer souvent dans le *De Trinitate* pour rendre l'*οὐσία* des Grecs et, dans la *Cité de Dieu*, il n'hésitera pas à parler des degrés qui déterminent la hiérarchie naturelle des essences, l'essence suprême étant, bien entendu, Dieu lui-même:

Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summa sit, et ideo immutabilis sit . . . naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia, sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia: novo quidem nomine, quo usi non sunt latini sermonis auctores, sed jam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant *οὐσίαν*. Hoc enim verbum e verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia.<sup>11</sup>

Aussi, lorsqu'il écrivait la *Cité de Dieu*, Augustin pouvait constater que le terme *essentia*, quoique inconnu des Anciens, était usité de son temps. C'est la première fois, à notre connaissance, qu'on en ait parlé comme d'un terme usuel. Il semble donc l'être devenu vers la fin du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle ou le début du V<sup>e</sup>. En fait, on le rencontre plus fréquemment à partir de cette date, par exemple, au V<sup>e</sup> siècle, dans un poème de Sidoine Apollinaire, avec le sens qu'a le terme "être" dans la formule "hiérarchie des êtres";<sup>12</sup> dans la *De statu animae* de Claudianus Mamertus, où il est plusieurs fois employé au sens de ce qui a l'esse;<sup>13</sup> enfin et surtout chez Boèce, dont l'influence seule aurait suffi à l'imposer.

De quel Boèce s'agit-il? Non plus, cette fois, de celui des Commentaires sur Porphyre, que nous avons vu adopter *ens*, mais de celui des opuscules théologiques, et d'eux seuls, car le terme *essentia* ne figurait même pas dans la *Consolatio philosophiae*. Entre les opuscules, il se rencontre une fois dans le *De Hebdomadibus*, une fois dans le *De Trinitate* et neuf fois dans le *De persona et duabus naturis*.<sup>14</sup> Reçu par lui comme équivalent de l'*οὐσία* grecque,<sup>15</sup> il se retrouve étroitement lié à la spéculation théologique, et particulièrement au problème de la Trinité dont il semble avoir eu quelque peine à se détacher.

### III. *Existentia*

Nom féminin singulier dérivé du verbe *exsisto*, -is. Ce verbe, composé de *ex* et de *sisto*, ne signifie pas "exister", du moins dans la langue classique. Il signifie proprement "sortir de", d'où, au figuré, "paraître", "se manifester". Cf. *velles ut transiret quidquid existit in praesentia* . . . ; *quod ex homine syro, docto prius graecae facundiae, post in latina etiam dictor mirabilis exstitisset*<sup>16</sup> . . . Certains emplois de ce verbe suggèrent combien était facile le passage au

<sup>11</sup> Augustin, *De civitate Dei* XII, 2; PL 41, 350. Cet ouvrage date de 413-426, et il se peut que le terme *essentia* ait gagné du terrain depuis 388.—Pour l'équivalence *substantia*—*essentia* dans la langue théologique, cf. *De Trinitate* II, 2, 3 (PL 42, 912) avec préférence en faveur d'*essentia*; V, 8, 9-10; 917: *Essentiam dico, quae ousia graece dicitur, quam usitatis substantiam vocamus*; VII, 4, 7, qui renvoie au texte précédent, etc.

<sup>12</sup> *Invenit hic princeps quid prima essentia distet*

A summo sextoque bono.  
Sidoine Apollinaire, *Epithalamium Polemio et Araneolae dictum*, PL 58, 714. Cette première *essentia* et celles des pierres, qui "sunt tantum", les autres êtres se hiérarchisant jusqu'au sixième degré, qui est Dieu.

<sup>13</sup> *Pati vero non est nisi passibilis creataque substantiae, quae quoniam a summa*

*essentia, quae Deus est, ut existeret vocata de nihilo est* . . . Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae* I, 3; ed. A. Engelbrecht, CSEL, XI (Vienne, 1885), p. 27. . . . "qui (sc. creator) illi (sc. homini) ineffabilis benignitatis largitate essentiam cum lapidibus, vitam seminalem cum herbis et arboribus . . . dedit. Op. cit., I, 21, p. 71. . . . sicut tenebras luci, sicut essentiae nihilum, ita incorporeo corpus esse contrarium . . . , Op. cit., II, 2, p. 103. On notera que l'*essentia* est entendue ici comme signifiant l'entia.

<sup>14</sup> Voir *essentia* — *ae* — *am*, dans Lane Cooper, *A Concordance of Boethius* (Cambridge, 1928), p. 128.

<sup>15</sup> . . . *essentiam quidem ousia* . . . Idem est igitur *ousia* esse quod *essentiam* . . . Boèce, *De persona et duabus naturis*, cap. III; PL 64, 1344CD.

<sup>16</sup> S. Augustin, *Conf.* VII, 11, 17; PL 32.

<sup>17</sup> S. Augustin, *op. cit.*, IV, 14, 21; PL 32, 702.

sens français d' "exister", par exemple: *Existunt in animis varietates*.<sup>3</sup> S'il "se rencontre" des diversités dans les esprits, c'est qu' "il y en a", donc qu'il en "existe". Pourtant la langue classique a toujours maintenu la connotation d'origine introduite par *ex*; le verbe *existere* n'y signifie jamais "exister" au sens où nous disons qu'une chose "est", ou "existe".

Le passage au sens français d' "exister" est chose faite, semble-t-il, dès la traduction du *Timée* par Chalcidius (III<sup>e</sup>-IV<sup>e</sup> siècles). Ainsi, τῷ δὲ ὄντως ὄντι (*Timée*, 52c) s'y trouve rendu par: *At enim vere existentium rerum* . . . , où *existentium* signifie, si non "qui existent", du moins "qui sont". De même, où Platon écrit ὃν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν (*Timée*, 52d) Chalcidius traduit: *existens, locum, generationem*.<sup>4</sup> Dans le passage de *Timée* 52b, où Platon dit que ce qui n'est pas quelque part n'est pas du tout, Chalcidius traduit οὐδὲν εἶναι par *minime existere*.<sup>5</sup> Enfin, dans le Commentaire de sa propre traduction, ayant à paraphraser τρία . . . ἀντὰ ὄντα (*Timée*, 35a), Chalcidius rend ce dernier mot par *existentia*.<sup>6</sup> Tout se passe comme si le terme *ens*, qui aurait convenu dans tous ces passages, ne s'était même pas offert à son esprit. Notons en outre que le dérivé *existentia* n'existe pas chez lui. Du moins ne l'y ai-je pas rencontré. Les dictionnaires qui le lui attribuent se fondent peut-être sur une méprise avec le pluriel neutre d'*existens* qui, on vient de le voir, appartient en effet à son vocabulaire.

Par contre, *existentia* féminin singulier paraît dès Candide l'Arien (IV<sup>e</sup> siècle), qui en fait libéralement usage et l'accompagne d'ailleurs de plusieurs dérivés:<sup>8</sup> *Nulla enim neque substantia neque substantialitas, neque existens neque existentitas, neque existentia neque existentialitas*.<sup>9</sup> Ainsi, l'*existentitas* est le propre de l'*existens* comme l'*existentialitas* l'est de l'*existentia*. Or on ne peut douter que Candide n'entende désigner par là ce que nous nommons l'"existence", en tant qu'elle est la propriété de ce qui "est" ou "existe".

Differt autem existentia ab existentialitate, quoniam existentia jam in eo est, ut sit jam esse ei: at vero existentialitas potentia est, ut possit esse, quod nondum est. Multo magis autem differt existentia a substantia, quoniam existentia ipsum esse est, et solum est, et non in alio non esse, sed ipsum unum et solum esse; substantia vero non solum habet esse, sed et quale et aliquid esse<sup>10</sup> (*Op. cit.*, 2; 1014).

Marius Victorinus, contemporain de Candide, use également du terme *existentia* au sens d' "être".<sup>11</sup>

Il ne semble pourtant pas que, pris en ce sens, le mot ait d'abord réussi. On ne le retrouve ni chez Augustin, ni chez Boèce. Au moyen âge, il reparait avec au moins deux sens différents, qui ne sont pourtant pas sans se refléter parfois l'un dans l'autre:

1<sup>o</sup> comme dérivé d'*existere* pris au sens classique, avec connotation d'origine; par exemple, dans le texte si intéressant de Richard de Saint-Victor:

Possumus autem sub nomine existentiae utramque considerationem subintelligere, tam illam scilicet quae pertinet ad rationem essentialiae, quam

<sup>3</sup> Cicéron, *De Officiis* I, 107.

<sup>4</sup> Ch. 26 dans *Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum*, ed. Aug. Mullach II (Paris, 1867), p. 180.

<sup>5</sup> Ch. 27, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Ch. 28, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. H. Baxter et Ch. Johnson, *Mediaeval Latin Word-list from British and Irish Sources* (Oxford University Press, 1934), p.

162 où *existentia* est signalé vers 1220 et 1363; *existere* vers 1362; *existo*, au sens de l'auxiliaire *to be*, au 13<sup>e</sup> siècle et vers 1453. Il ne s'agit ici, notons-le, que de sources anglaises ou irlandaises.

<sup>9</sup> Candidus Arianus, *De Generatione divina* I; PL 8, 1013.

<sup>10</sup> Candidus Arianus, *op. cit.*, 2; PL 8, 1014.

<sup>11</sup> Marius Victorinus, *De Generatione Verbi divini*, ch. 2; PL 8, 1021.

scilicet illam quae pertinet ad rationem obtinentiae; tam illam, inquam, in qua quaeritur quale quid sit de quolibet, quam illam in qua quaeritur unde habeat esse. Nomen existentiae trahitur ex verbo quod est exsistere. In verbo sistere notari potest quod pertinet ad considerationem unam; similiter per adjunctam praepositionem *ex* notari potest quod pertinet ad aliam. Per id quod dicitur aliquid sistere, primum remouentur ea quae non tam habent in se esse quam alicui inesse, non tam sistere, ut sic dicam, quam insistere, hoc est alicui subjecto inhaerere . . . Quod igitur dicitur sistere, tam se habet ad rationem creatae quam increatae essentiae. Quod autem dicitur exsistere, subintelligitur non solum quod habeat esse, sed etiam aliunde, hoc est ex aliquo habeat esse. Hoc enim intelligi datur in verbo composito ex adjuncta sibi praepositione. Quid est enim exsistere nisi *ex* aliquo *sistere*, hoc est *substantialiter ex aliquo* esse? In uno itaque hoc verbo exsistere, vel sub uno nomine *existentiae*, datur subintelligi posse et illam considerationem quae pertinet ad rei qualitatem et illam quae pertinet ad rei originem.<sup>12</sup>

Ainsi définée à propos de l'existence des personnes divines, mais étendue à celle des personnes humaines (*op. cit.*, IV, 14), l'*existentia* a désormais conquis droit de cité dans la théologie médiévale. Cf. chez Alexandre de Hales: *nomen existentiae significat essentiam cum ordine originis*;<sup>13</sup>

2° comme dérivé d'*exsistere* pris au sens secondaire et impropre du français "exister"; par exemple dans la traduction latine du *Fons Vitae* de Gebirol, où l'on rencontre *exsistere per se in actu, accidens non intelligitur existens per se*,<sup>14</sup> *esse est existentia formae in materia*.<sup>15</sup> Notons pourtant qu'*existentia* peut, chez Gebirol, connoter franchement l'origine, et qu'il semble qu'un reste de cette connotation première l'accompagne généralement:

Nonne vides quod existentia essentiae omnium rerum non est nisi ex materia et forma, et existentia materiae et formae ex voluntate, ideo quia ipsa est actor earum et conjunctor et retentor earum?<sup>16</sup>

Ici, le rapport d'origine est aisément reconnaissable. Il l'est moins dans la phrase suivante: *omnis forma ad existentiam suam eget materia quae sustinet eam*,<sup>17</sup> et plus loin: *minor pars quantitatis non est existens in non-materia*. Il me semble avoir disparu dans la phrase que voici:

et quando volueris imaginari quomodo est existentia simplicis substantiae in substantia simplici . . . imaginare existentiam colorum et superficierum in corporibus . . . etc.<sup>18</sup>

Pris en ce sens, les termes *existentia* et *exsistere* ne me paraissent pas appartenir à la langue de saint Thomas, qui emploie *esse*, par exemple, en décrivant la composition de l'*esse* avec l'*essentia*. Par contre, peu après lui, Gilles de Rome introduit une distinction intéressante entre *esse* et *exsistere*:

Redeamus ergo ad propositum et dicamus quod quaelibet res est ens per essentiam suam; tamen quia essentia rei creatae non dicit actum completum sed est in potentia ad esse, ideo non sufficit essentia ad hoc quod res actu

<sup>12</sup> Richard de Saint-Victor, *De Trinitate* IV, 12; PL 196, 937-938.

<sup>13</sup> Alexandre de Hales, *Summa theologiae*, pars II, Inq. II, Tr. I, Quaest. I, no. 349, éd. Quarrachi, 1924, I, pp. 517-518.

<sup>14</sup> *Fons Vitae* V, 23, éd. C. Baeumker (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie

des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen, Münster, 1892), p. 300.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, V, 10, éd. cit., p. 274.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, V, 39, éd. cit., p. 327.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 19, éd. cit., p. 59.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 15, éd. cit., p. 50.

existat nisi ei superaddatur aliquod esse quod est essentiae actus et complementum. Existunt ergo res per esse superadditum essentiae vel naturae. Patet itaque quomodo differat ens per se acceptum et existens.<sup>19</sup>

Ainsi l'être existe en vertu de l'addition de son *esse* à son *essentia*. D'où la formule *actu exsistere*<sup>20</sup> et l'identification: *verum quia nominibus utimur ut volumus, multotiens pro eodem accipitur ens et existens*.<sup>21</sup> La controverse avec Henri de Gand sur l'*esse essentiae* et l'*esse existentiae* doit avoir contribué à vulgariser l'emploi du terme. En tout cas, à partir du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, *existentia* se rencontre fréquemment.

En français, "existence" semble n'avoir été que tardivement accepté. Dans la 2<sup>e</sup> édition de *La Métaphysique ou science surnaturelle*,<sup>22</sup> Scipion du Pleix, traitant de la différence qu'il y a "entre essence et existence", écrit au Liv. II, ch. 3, 8; p. 124): "Il est donc certain qu'il y a notable différence entre l'existence et l'essence des choses. Mais pour le mieux entendre il faut observer qu'en notre langue française nous n'avons point de terme qui réponde énergiquement au latin *existentia*, qui signifie la nue entité, le simple et nu être des choses sans considérer aucun ordre ou rang qu'elles tiennent entre les autres". Par contre, en 1637 Descartes use du terme "existence" sans aucun scrupule, comme on peut s'en assurer en relisant la IV<sup>e</sup> Partie du *Discours de la méthode*: "... je pris garde aussi qu'il n'y avait rien du tout en elles (sc. ces démonstrations) qui m'assurât de l'existence de leur objet"; et un peu plus loin: "Au lieu que, revenant à examiner l'idée que j'avais d'un être parfait, je trouvais que l'existence y était comprise . . ." etc.<sup>23</sup> Le terme "existence" s'est donc fait recevoir des philosophes d'expression française entre 1609 et 1637.

En anglais, le substantif *existence* est relativement ancien. Il s'y double d'un autre nom, dont le sens semble le même: *existency*. Le *New English Dictionary*<sup>24</sup> distingue deux sens principaux d' *existence*, dont les deux premiers intéressent notre problème: 1° *Actuality, reality*, opposé à *appearance*, comme nous disons aujourd'hui "apparence et réalité"; on cite trois exemples, dont deux empruntés à Chaucer (1384 et 1400), et un à Lydgate (1430); 2° être (*being*), le fait ou l'état d'exister; exemple de 1430, Lydgate: *Thing counterfeyted hath non existence*. On peut donc dire que, au sens 1°, ce nom date du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, et, au sens 2°, du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle. Sans réserve, bien entendu, d'attestations plus anciennes que l'on pourra éventuellement découvrir.

<sup>19</sup> Gilles de Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* XIII, éd. Edgar Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), p. 83.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, XXI, éd. cit., p. 130.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, XIII, éd. cit., p. 83.

<sup>22</sup> Ed. Paris, Gueffier, 1617; première édition,

1609.

<sup>23</sup> *Discours de la méthode*, IV<sup>e</sup> partie, éd. E. Gilson (Paris, 1935), p. 91.

<sup>24</sup> *New English Dictionary* III (Oxford, 1897), p. 413.

## A Note on St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 1-2

ANTON C. PEGIS

IT is natural that the historical opinions of any writer should change with the progress of his knowledge. St. Thomas Aquinas is no exception to this principle. Even supposing, as some like to do, that his philosophical views were formed early and remained pretty constant throughout his career, the fact remains that his historical judgments were subject to many contingencies—to the books that he had at hand and to the continuously growing picture that he was forming of the history of human thought. That is why it would not be at all surprising for St. Thomas Aquinas to reverse his historical judgments from one work to another.

Among the more notorious texts in which he seems to have changed his mind are the miniature histories of philosophy which he has given in *De Potentia*, III, 5, and *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 2. In the former of these two texts, he seems to attribute to Plato and to Aristotle what he denies to them in the latter. St. Thomas' students have been not a little puzzled by this change. Some have held that the *Summa Theologica* has reversed the position of the *De Potentia*.<sup>1</sup> Others have suggested that St. Thomas' historical opinions have a somewhat vague framework.<sup>2</sup> And still others have tried to insist upon *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 2, as the authentic Thomistic position and to harmonize the other texts with it.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of the present note is not primarily to discuss the question as to how the *De Potentia* and the *Summa* may be harmonized. It is scarcely possible to harmonize the historical opinions contained in different texts unless there is some reason for thinking that, according to St. Thomas Aquinas himself, these opinions were somehow in agreement with one another. Now there exists such a reason; in fact, there exist two such reasons. In the *Summa* itself, St. Thomas has repeated the position of the *De Potentia* more than once; and having repeated it, he nevertheless felt that he could say what he had to say in *Summa*, I, 44, 2. In the *De Substantiis Separatis*, he maintains both the positions of the *Summa* and the *De Potentia*. In other words, according to St. Thomas Aquinas himself, there is no incompatibility between the historical judgments which he has expressed in *De Potentia*, III, 5, and *Summa*, I, 44, 2. I am not arguing here that these two texts might not be incompatible in their historical opinions; I am simply saying that St. Thomas thought them to be compatible. To be convinced on this point, we have only to examine the texts.

In *De Potentia*, III, 5, it is asked: *Utrum possit esse aliquid quod non sit a Deo creatum*. On the occasion of this question, St. Thomas Aquinas has given one of the several and justly famous constructions of the history of philosophy. The ancients, he says, advanced in their consideration of the nature of things according to the order of human knowledge. And since human knowledge begins with the sense before it reaches the intellect, the earlier philosophers busied themselves with sensible things and from these advanced slowly towards intelligible things. Within the framework of this large principle, St. Thomas Aquinas locates the Greek philosophers on three different levels of development. As

<sup>1</sup> J. Maritain, *La philosophie bergsonienne* (2nd ed., Paris: P. Tequi, 1930), 426.

<sup>2</sup> A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Somme theologique: la création* (Ia, Questions 44-49) (Paris: Desclée et Cie, 1927), 237.

<sup>3</sup> E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), I, 240-242. Cf. also A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1939), 101-104.

our interest is with the third level, we can here deal with the first two briefly. According to the first, matter was the only substance and the only cause; which would mean both that matter itself had no cause and that there was no efficient cause whatever. According to the second, some efficient causes were used to explain change, but these were particular—*mind* in Anaxagoras and *love and strife* in Empedocles. And since these particular efficient causes had as their business to dispose already existing matter, it is clear that, even according to Anaxagoras and Empedocles, not all beings proceed from an efficient cause, since matter was presupposed, according to them, to the action of the efficient cause. Then came Plato and Aristotle. What did they do?

Later philosophers, St. Thomas continues, such as Plato, Aristotle and their followers, arrived at the consideration of universal be-ing (*esse*) itself. That is why they were the only ones to posit some universal cause of things from which all other things came into be-ing. This is clear, St. Thomas pursues, from St. Augustine's *City of God*.<sup>4</sup> What is more, this is the doctrine with which the Catholic faith is in agreement. Now, the doctrine can be proved by three arguments. The first of these arguments is that of Plato, the second is that of Aristotle, and the third is that of Avicenna. For the moment, we are interested in the arguments of Plato and Aristotle since they will reappear, in various places, within the *Summa*.

Let us ask, first, by what argument Plato arrived at the consideration of universal be-ing itself. It is necessary to ask this question since it affects our understanding of what St. Thomas includes within Plato's *arrival*. Here is the text:

"Oportet enim, si aliquid unum communiter in pluribus invenitur, quod ab aliqua una causa in illis causetur; non enim potest esse quod illud commune utrique ex se ipso conveniat, cum utrumque, secundum quod ipsum est, ab altero distinguatur; et diversitas causarum diversos effectus producit. Cum ergo esse inveniatur omnibus rebus commune, quae secundum illud quod sunt, ad invicem distinctae sunt, oportet quod de necessitate eis non ex se ipsis, sed ab aliqua una causa esse attribuitur.

Et ista videtur ratio Platonis, qui voluit, quod ante omnem multitudinem esset aliqua unitas non solum in numeris, sed etiam in rerum naturis".<sup>5</sup>

No one can doubt that this is the Platonic argument of participation, which led Plato himself to the embattled doctrine of Forms or Ideas. If something one is found in a common way in several things, then this something one-and-common must be caused in these things by some one cause. For many things, *qua* many, do not explain what is common in them, since diverse effects have diverse causes, and it is clear that manyness and community are diverse effects. Now since it is be-ing that is common to all things, which yet are distinct from one another in what they are, it follows that be-ing belongs to them, not of themselves, but from some one cause. This is, St. Thomas concludes, the Platonic argument. Plato, therefore, held that unity existed

<sup>4</sup> St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, VIII, 4ff; PL, 32, 229ff; cf. A. C. Pegis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine' *Mediaeval Studies* VI (1944), 19-21.

The translation of *esse* by be-ing is an experiment. In his review of my *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (cf. *The Modern Schoolman* XXIII, 1 [Nov., 1945], 47-48), Father Henri Renard, S.J., has suggested that *esse* should be rendered by *to be*. I can quite agree that *being* leads to ambiguities in English, but I wish I were

convinced that *to be* as a translation of *esse* would not lead to linguistic barbarisms. Perhaps *be-ing* would do. We can, of course, refuse to translate such Latin terms as *esse*, *ens rationis*, *habitus*, etc., but that does not solve the problem. Rather than admit defeat at the outset, we should make the effort to find, and even to invent, appropriate English equivalents for the philosophical vocabulary that we have inherited from the Latin.

<sup>5</sup> *De Potentia* III, 5.



before multitude, and this not only in the case of numbers, but also in things themselves. In short, what St. Thomas here attributes to Plato is an argument according to which Plato rose to the consideration of universal *esse* and posited the existence of unity above multitude as the origin of what is common in multitude. This certainly looks as though St. Thomas Aquinas is attributing to Plato some share in the doctrine of creation.

Let us now look at the argument by which Aristotle arrived at the consideration of universal *be-ing* itself:

"Secunda ratio est, quia, cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode participatum, oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuatur omnibus illis in quibus imperfectius invenitur. Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habent ex accessu remotiori vel propinquiori ad aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non esset ratio cur perfectius in uno quam in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus calidis. Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et verissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est probatio Philosophi (in II *Metaph.*, text. com. 4)."

According to this Aristotèlian argument, therefore, we can say that a perfection is found more in one thing and less in another only if we locate both things nearer and farther in relation to some common measure. Without their approach to this common measure, there would be no reason why the perfection in question would be more perfectly in the one thing than in the other. Thus, we see that fire, which is maximal heat, is the principle of heat in all hot things. Now, there is one being which is the most perfect and truest being. The proof of this is that there is a moving cause which is absolutely immobile and most perfect, as the philosophers have proved. Hence it is necessary that less perfect beings receive their *be-ing* from it. This, concludes St. Thomas, is the argument of Aristotle, and can be found in the Second Book of the *Metaphysics*. Once again, we must observe that St. Thomas is here attributing to Aristotle some share in the doctrine of creation.

The difficulties facing us become clear just as soon as we confront these results from *De Potentia*, III, 5, with what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say in *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 2. There he asks the question whether prime matter is created by God. In answer to this question, he gives another survey of the history of Greek philosophy which differs noticeably, at first glance, from the *De Potentia*. What distinguishes the text of the *Summa*, from the point of view of the present problem, is that Plato and Aristotle are considered to have explained the origin of things in a particular way rather than in a universal way. Thus, they had in common with their predecessors the principle that matter itself was uncreated; but whereas their predecessors held that the very substance of bodies is uncreated, and therefore posited causes for accidental changes, Plato and Aristotle distinguished between substantial form and matter in things and then explained change, not merely as an accidental transmutation in an enduring underlying substance, but as being according to the essential determinations of things. In short, Plato and Aristotle knew substantial change and therefore sought the causes of substantial becoming. Aristotle's explanation was the oblique circle, while Plato's explanation was the Forms. Here ends the first part of St. Thomas' text:

\* *Ibid.*—Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, 1, 993<sup>b</sup>25.

"Respondeo. Dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim et quasi pedetentim intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, per congregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentielles. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universales ponebant, ut obliquum circulum secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas secundum Platonem.<sup>7</sup>

There now follows a critique of the foregoing positions. Matter is limited by form to a determinate species in the same way as the substance of a given species is determined by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being—as man is determined by white to be-ing white. That is why both those who limited themselves to accidental change and those who rose to the consideration of substantial change (Plato and Aristotle) looked upon being in a particular way; for either they considered it as *this* being or as *such* being. And since they considered being in a particular way, they assigned to it particular efficient causes. The inference is clear: Plato and Aristotle did not rise above substantial change in the explanation of the origin of being. If this means anything at all, it means that St. Thomas is here denying to Plato and to Aristotle (and, of course, to their predecessors) a knowledge of the doctrine of creation:

"Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem: sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens. vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt".<sup>8</sup>

And now, *paulo maiora canamus*. After Plato and Aristotle, there came others who rose to the consideration of being as being. These tantalizing *aliqui*<sup>9</sup> investigated the cause of things not only according as things were *these* or *such*, but according as they were *beings*. What this implies St. Thomas immediately explains. A cause of things in so far as they are beings must be their cause not only according as they are *such* things through their accidental forms, nor only according as they are *these* things through their substantial forms; rather, a cause of the being of things must be their cause according to all that which pertains to their be-ing in any way whatever. That is why, St. Thomas concludes with classic brevity, prime matter itself is a creature of the universal cause of beings:

"Et ulterius aliqui exerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod

<sup>7</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 44, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps a reminiscence of St. Augustine: cf. *supra*, note 4. But it seems certain that St. Thomas understands *aliqui* in a re-

stricted sense here, and has in mind those Christian thinkers who listened more to *Genesis* than to Platonism or to Aristotelianism.

sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium<sup>10</sup>.

Neither the Platonic Forms nor the Aristotelian cause of generation and corruption can qualify as a universal cause of being thus defined. According to St. Thomas, Plato and Aristotle explained the coming-to-be of being in the sense that they explained the coming-to-be of particular beings as particulars rather than as beings. In this sense, they were evidently not aware of the doctrine of creation.

The question that remains is how St. Thomas Aquinas can attribute to Plato and to Aristotle both what he says in *De Potentia*, III, 5, and what he says in *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 2. It may be that he simply changed his mind. However, as I have indicated, there is proof to the contrary in the *Summa* itself. But it is necessary to proceed with some caution. The question is not whether St. Thomas Aquinas affirmed in the *De Potentia*, and denied in the *Summa*, that Plato and Aristotle arrived at the doctrine of creation. In some sense he did make such an affirmation and such a denial. But in what sense did he deny in the *Summa* what he was affirming in the *De Potentia*? In other words, within the general doctrine of creation, what was it that he attributed to Plato and to Aristotle, and what was it that he denied to them? The question, it seems to me, must be put in this way, since it is a fact that in the *Summa* he reaffirms, in relation to Plato and to Aristotle, the affirmations of the *De Potentia*. And this must mean that the affirmations of the *De Potentia* and the denials of the *Summa* do not bear entirely on the same point.

In the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas Aquinas repeats in at least three different places the arguments that we have seen in *De Potentia*, III, 5. The *probatio philosophi* of the *De Potentia* reappears as the cornerstone of the *quarta via* in *Summa Theologica*, I, 2, 3. There we are told that *more and less* are said of different things according as they approach a maximum differently, just as that thing is hotter which is nearer to the maximum hot. In brief, since we experience things which are good, true and noble in varying degrees, we can prove the existence of a maximum. This is what is truest, best and most noble. It is consequently most being, for what is most true is most being.<sup>11</sup> Now the point of this Aristotelian argument is that that which is most such in any genus is the cause of all the members in that genus. Thus, fire, which is most hot, is the cause of all hot things, as it is said in the *Metaphysics*.<sup>12</sup> Hence, the *quarta via* concludes, there exists a being which is for all other beings the cause of their be-ing, their goodness and every other perfection. This being is God.<sup>13</sup> Let us conclude: there is no observable difference between the *probatio philosophi* in *De Potentia*, III, 5, and the *quarta via* in *Summa Theologica*, I, 2, 3.

Nor did St. Thomas forget Plato. In *Summa Theologica*, I, 6, 4, it is asked whether all things are good through the divine goodness. To raise this question meant, of course, to face at least implicitly the problem of Platonic participation. This is what St. Thomas presents in the name of Plato:

"Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas participando, ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat

<sup>10</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 44, 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 2, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, 1, 993<sup>b</sup>25.

<sup>13</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 2, 3; cp. *Contra Gentiles*, I, 28. For a recent discussion of the *quarta via*, cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5th ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1945), 106-111. I have not

entered here into the discussion of the *quarta via* and its exemplarism since my main point concerns the mere historical question of St. Thomas' attitude towards Plato and Aristotle in the *De Potentia* and the *Summa*.

ideam hominis et equi separatam, quam vocabat 'per se hominem' et 'per se equum', ita ponebat ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat 'per se ens' et 'per se unum'; et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel unum. Hoc autem quod est per se ens et per se unum, ponebat esse summum bonum. Et quia bonum convertitur cum ente, sicut et unum, ipsum per se bonum dicebat esse Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis".<sup>14</sup>

What is the Platonic argument? It is based throughout on the separateness of the Forms and on the participation of sensible things in them. Thus, the individual man Socrates is said to be a man because he participates in the separate Form or Idea *man*—in man-in-himself. In the same way, each thing is said to be a *being* and *one* by participation in being-in-itself and one-in-itself. But being-in-itself and one-in-itself are really the highest Good for Plato. Hence, since the good is convertible with being, as is the one, Plato called the good-in-itself (or highest Good) God, from whom all things are said to be good by way of participation.

In this extraordinary presentation of Plato, what does St. Thomas accept and what does he reject? Although, he writes, the opinion of Plato is contrary to reason in so far as he posited the species or essences of things subsisting in themselves in separation from sensible things, nevertheless, it is absolutely true that there exists a first reality which is being and good through its very essence. That reality is God, as St. Thomas has already proved in the *Summa*. What is more, and the point is not without its interest, Aristotle is in agreement with this view:

"Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter improbat, tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod aliquid est primum, quod per suam essentiam est ens et bonum, quod dicimus Deum, ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles".<sup>15</sup>

Granted, therefore, that there are errors in the Platonic theory of Forms, it yet remains that for St. Thomas Aquinas Plato said something which was absolutely true. This truth is that there is a first being which is being and good through its very essence. With this truth Aristotle is in agreement, and St. Thomas Aquinas has deposited the Aristotelian version of this same truth in the *quarta via*.

The reader of the Thomistic text quoted above must be asking himself the following question. If St. Thomas Aquinas repeats in the *Summa* the arguments attributed by him to Plato and to Aristotle in *De Potentia*, III, 5, exactly how does he harmonize the oppositions in which he has involved us? Perhaps our next encounter with Plato and Aristotle may help to answer this question. It is a surprising encounter, and a challenging one. It is particularly challenging for those who reject the *De Potentia* in the name of the *Summa*. For St. Thomas Aquinas, who surely knew what he was going to write in *Summa*, I, 44, 2, chose to reaffirm *De Potentia*, III, 5, in *Summa*, I, 44, 1. It is this fact which, more than any other, gives the proper perspective to St. Thomas' criticisms of Plato and Aristotle on the doctrine of creation.

The point of this conclusion may appear more sharply if we say that anyone who argues that there exists an opposition between *De Potentia*, III, 5, and

<sup>14</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 6, 4. For the likely sources of this text, cf. the Ottawa edition of the *Summa* (vol. I, 1941, 36a).  
<sup>15</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 6, 4.

*Summa*, I, 44, 2, must argue likewise for a parallel opposition between *Summa*, I, 44, 1 and I, 44, 2. In other words, St. Thomas Aquinas would be changing his mind in going from the first to the second article of the 44th question of the *Prima Pars*. Rather than believe such a remarkable reversal, it seems more reasonable to ask what it is that the denials of *Summa*, I, 44, 2, do not disturb or affect in his previous assertions. Now, what does St. Thomas assert in the very article which precedes his denial that Plato and Aristotle had arrived at the doctrine of creation?

Article 1 of *Summa*, I, 44, is concerned with the question whether it is necessary for every being to be created by God. From the point of view of the present problem, the importance of St. Thomas' answer lies in the fact that it makes use of Platonic and Aristotelian principles—principles that we have already seen on more than one occasion. If something is found in a thing by participation, writes St. Thomas, it must necessarily be caused in that thing by the being to which it belongs essentially. In this way, iron is made to be hot by fire (that is, by that which is essentially heat). Now St. Thomas has already shown that God is self-subsistent be-ing. He has shown that subsistent be-ing can be only one. It follows from this that all beings other than God are not their own be-ing, but participate be-ing. It is necessary, therefore, that all things which differ from one another according to a different participation in be-ing (which makes them to be more or less perfect) should be caused by the First Being which is most perfectly.<sup>16</sup>

A God who is the pure actuality of existence surely verifies the deepest aspirations of the Thomistic metaphysics. That is why St. Thomas' loyalty to Plato and to Aristotle at this precise moment is extraordinary. For we are being made aware in our own day of the profound differences between Greek essentialism and Thomistic metaphysical existentialism.<sup>17</sup> Now the conclusion that we have reached in the preceding paragraph is a distinctive monument in that existentialism. And yet, the sequel to that text is historically noteworthy:

"Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristoteles dicit, in II *Metaph.*, quod id quod est maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri; sicut id quod maxime calidum est, est causa omnis caliditatis".<sup>18</sup>

St. Thomas has, therefore, not forgotten or repudiated *De Potentia*, III, 5. Far from denying to Plato and to Aristotle some share in the rise of philosophical speculation to the First Cause of reality, St. Thomas acknowledges that share at exactly the time when he will also say that they did not arrive at the doctrine of creation. The commentator of St. Thomas Aquinas can have no option on this point. The Angelic Doctor means to hold that Plato and Aristotle rose to the consideration of the First Cause of reality and yet did not assert creation. And if it be asked how this is to be understood, the very organization of *Summa*, I, 44, seems to suggest an answer.

In the first article of this question, St. Thomas has dealt with the proposition that all beings must be created by God. In the second article, as we have seen, he proves that prime matter itself is created by God. In the third and fourth articles, he proves that God is the exemplary and the final cause of all beings.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.* I, 44, 1.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*,<sup>5</sup> Part I, ch. 2, 4, 6; Part III, ch. 7. For an appreciation of the existential character of this book, cf. Gerard Smith, S.J., in *The Modern Schoolman* XXIII, 3 (March, 1946), 168-172; for a

more general discussion of M. Gilson and Thomism, cf. A. C. Pegis, 'Gilson and Thomism', *Thought*, XXI, 82 (Oct., 1946), 435-454.

<sup>18</sup> *Sum. Theol.* I, 44, 1.

And in the reply to the very last objection of the last article in the whole question, we can even find a sort of summary of what he has done in *Summa*, I, 44:

"Dicendum quod cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis omnium rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod principium omnium rerum sit unum secundum rem".<sup>19</sup>

God is one and first in reality, and He is the measure of all other things; furthermore, He is the universal cause of being. All this He is because He is being. That is to say, He is one and Creator because He is being, and because He is Creator, His causality extends, not merely to the thinness and suitness of things, but to their being. It is a fact that Plato and Aristotle did not see or assert the universal causality of God. That is the burden of *Summa*, I, 44, 2. But according to St. Thomas, they saw His primacy and, in some sense, His unity. Having seen these divine attributes, they should have seen that God was by nature being, they should have probed and discovered the consequences of the primacy they attributed to Him, and they should have arrived at His universal causality. To have made God one and the measure of reality was to have laid the foundation for discovering His universal causality. That discovery Plato and Aristotle did not make. Indeed, the whole history of Greek and Arabian philosophy is there to prove that countless philosophers, from Plotinus to Avicenna and after, foundered on the problem of the universal causality of God. St. Thomas himself was not exactly unaware of this situation when he came to write the *De Substantiis Separatis*.

In the history of the origin of the world which is to be found in the 7th chapter of this magnificent tractate, we find ourselves thinking of Plato and Aristotle in terms of *De Potentia*, III, 5, and *Summa*, I, 44, 1. After the first philosophers who knew only accidental change, who thought that the substance of things, matter, was a first and uncaused principle; after other philosophers who investigated the origin of substance, but who explained substances entirely in terms of corporeal principles; after those who explained substances according to their essential parts, namely, matter and form, and interpreted change in terms of the succession of forms in matter:—after these came Plato and Aristotle. St. Thomas does not say that Plato and Aristotle actually conceived a higher mode of origin for the world than generation. He rather says that, following their views, it is necessary to posit a higher mode of origin for the world than generation. How much, we may well ask as we read the following text, belongs to Plato and to Aristotle in St. Thomas' estimation?

"Sed ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est, secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis, ponere alium altiore. Cum enim necesse sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, necesse est quod non hoc modo esse ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi ipsum esse existens. Quia vero esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut supra habitum est, necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia. Oportet igitur communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus huiusmodi fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est, et in suum esse. Oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod esse attribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente, quod est suum esse".<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit. I, 44, 4, ad. 4.

<sup>20</sup> *De Substantiis Separatis*, VII; ed. P.

Surely St. Thomas is not saying that Plato and Aristotle are the authors of all these celebrated Thomistic doctrines. There is plenty of evidence in the *De Substantiis Separatis* itself to show how critical St. Thomas could be of both Plato and Aristotle. Thus, in the first chapter of this work, we have an elaborate presentation of Platonism, which is followed by the following critical reflection at the beginning of the second chapter: "Hujus autem positionis radix invenitur efficaciam non habere"; and the *radix* of this Platonic position, which St. Thomas immediately eliminates, is the well-known abstractionism according to which the intellect attributes separate existence to whatever it thinks separately: "Non enim necesse est ut ea quae intellectus separatim intelligit, separatim esse habeant in rerum natura".<sup>21</sup>

As for Aristotle, it is true that he shone brightly in defeating the abstractionism of Plato and the Platonists.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, having admitted this, St. Thomas will have none of Aristotelian physicism. He does not hesitate to write that the Aristotelian conception of the world of separate substances *minus sufficiens videtur quam Platonis positio*.<sup>23</sup> In brief, the same St. Thomas who can develop such remarkable conclusions *secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis* can write as follows in a work of the same period:

"Sed istae viae non sunt multum nobis accommodae; quia neque ponimus mixtionem sensibilibus cum Anaxagora, neque abstractionem universalium cum Platone, neque perpetuitatem motus cum Aristotele. Unde oportet nos aliis viis procedere ad manifestationem proposti".<sup>24</sup>

Both critic and defender of Plato and Aristotle, St. Thomas accepts from them principles which in fact they held but which they were far from seeing with his vision. Plato did say that unity is above multitude. Aristotle did say that that which is first in a genus is the measure and cause of its members. This is the basis of St. Thomas' willingness to proceed *secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis*. On this basis one could build an enduring natural theology. St. Thomas himself did precisely that.<sup>25</sup> Without the principles that St. Thomas attributes to Plato and to Aristotle, it is impossible to defend the universal causality of God and His immediateness to His creatures. With these principles, Plato and Aristotle yet stumbled on their way to the notion of God. Their worlds, though ordered, are eternal and uncaused in their existence, and generation is a moment of devaluation within eternity.

Need we then see any opposition between *De Potentia*, III, 5, and *Summa*, I, 44, 2? It seems safe to say that St. Thomas did not think so. The implication is that what he attributed to Plato and to Aristotle in the *De Potentia* is what is to be found, not in the entire tradition of which they are a part, but in their own arguments. These arguments St. Thomas repeatedly used, but he invested them with an existential significance that they did not originally have. The Platonic principle of the transcendence of unity and the Aristotelian principle

Mandonnet, O.P., *Opuscula Omnia* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1927), I, 100-101. For a recent historical introduction to the *De Substantiis Separatis*, cf. J. O. Riedl, 'The Nature of the Angels' in *Essays in Thomism*, ed. R. E. Brennan, O.P. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, 113-148, 374-378.

<sup>21</sup> *De Sub. Sep.*, II; ed. cit., 74-75. For an analysis of the Platonism in the first chapter of this work, cf. A. C. Pegis, 'Cosmogony and Knowledge, I' *Thought* XVIII, 71 (Dec., 1943), 654-658.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *De Sub. Sep.*, II, IX (ed. cit., 75, 109-

110); *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* X, ad 8 (ed. L. Keeler, S.J., Romae: Apud Aedes Pont. Universitatis Gregorianae, 1933, 132-133); *Sum. Theol.* I, 84, 4.

<sup>23</sup> *De Sub. Sep.*, II; ed. cit., 76. For the critique of Aristotelianism, cf. *ibid.*, 76-79, and the whole of the polemic against Averroistic Aristotelianism in *op. cit.*, VII, 98-104.

<sup>24</sup> *De Spirit. Creat.* V; ed. cit., 66.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 67.

concerning what is first in a genus may be true principles, but they are only principles. Not only do they have to be understood correctly, but it is also a fact that a great many conclusions concerning the relations between God and the world still await explicitation even after these principles are known. St. Thomas knew these principles in the first article of *Summa*, I, 44, and the whole question is answered, in principle, in that article. But St. Thomas wrote three further articles to bring out all the implications of the first article, and to correct the wrong implications on the causality of God which he attributed to Plato and to Aristotle.

Having true principles, Plato and Aristotle could have developed the whole philosophy of creation that St. Thomas did. They did not do so. They arrived at the idea of creation only to the extent of asserting the principles upon which creation could be based. This St. Thomas acknowledges in *De Potentia*, III, 5. But they did not see these principles correctly, since they never saw them in terms of the be-ing of things. Platonic abstractionism and Aristotelian physicism are, to St. Thomas at least, clear revelations of these shortcomings. *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 2, is an appraisal of this fact.



## Esse and *Existere* in St. Bonaventure

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ S.J.

WHEN historians of Mediaeval philosophy came to the conclusion that Scholasticism was not a single unified body of doctrine characterized by greater or less perfection, but admitted of real doctrinal divergencies, it became necessary to study the individual thinkers of the period. This work is by no means completed as yet.

It is admitted that a thinker, and particularly a Mediaeval thinker, cannot be classified simply by the authorities he quotes.<sup>1</sup> A further difficulty is offered by the fact that technical terms, definitions, and examples have a quite different meaning and bearing in different authors. Detailed textual studies are the only way to ascertain the exact thought of a given writer.

The textual study of the meaning of *esse* and *existere* has a two-fold importance. The pre-eminent position of St. Bonaventure makes any work devoted to him significant for the understanding of the thought of the Middle Ages. Secondly, such a study is timely because of the present interest in "existence".

The meaning of *esse* in St. Bonaventure is a real problem. Some writers maintain the traditional view<sup>2</sup> that he held the real distinction between essence and existence. This has been asserted recently by J. Bittremieux.<sup>3</sup> Others have denied that the Seraphic Doctor held this distinction.<sup>4</sup>

There are, naturally enough, many texts in St. Bonaventure which taken by themselves afford no clue to the meaning of *esse*. Thus, for example, there is the answer to the question: can a creature be actually infinite:

Ratio est etiam, quia hoc nullo modo convenit creaturae. Infinitum enim in actu est actus purus, alioquin si aliquid haberet de limitatione et arctatione,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. D. Chenu, O.P., "Authentica et Magistralia," *Divus Thomas* (Placentiae), 28 (1925), pp. 257-285.

<sup>2</sup> It was expressed in November 1885 by B. R. P., "De Mente S. Bonaventurae et Alexandri Halensis circa Distinctionem Essentiae ab Existencia," *Divus Thomas* (Placentiae) 2 (1882-1885), pp. 525-555. It is also found somewhat cautiously expressed, in *Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae*, Quaracchi (1882-1902), vol. 1, p. 169, scholion.

<sup>3</sup> J. Bittremieux, "Distinctio inter essentiam et esse apud S. Bonaventuram," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, Bruges, May, 1937, pp. 302-307.

Bittremieux cites two texts: *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, "Utrum Summa Simpliciter Soli Deo Conveniat?" (*Opera Omnia* ed. Quaracchi, 1882-1902; 10 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 167-169; where the key words are: "tertia [differentialis] est entis et esse" and *Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1: "Utrum Angeli sint Compositi ex Materia et Forma?" vol. 2, pp. 89-91, where there is question of the "compositio entis et esse." He argues that these words state the real distinction of essence and existence. In summary, the argument is this: St. Bonaventure admits that the creature is not its own *esse*; and that the

creature receives its *esse* from God; but, an *esse* which is received from outside is really distinct from the essence; therefore, St. Bonaventure holds the real distinction of essence and existence.—The assumption is that *esse* means "the act of existence" just as it would in St. Thomas in a parallel text.

<sup>4</sup> E. g., P. Patrice Robert, O. F. M., *Hylémorphisme et Devenir chez Saint Bonaventure* (Montreal, Librairie Saint-François, 1936), p. 80, says: "La composition thomiste de l'essence et de l'existence lui est absolument étrangère." On p. 66, P. Robert gives what may be considered his reason for this statement: "la forme donne indistinctement au composé et l'essence et l'existence."

Charles de Koninck, in the Preface to P. Robert's book just cited, says: "La doctrine de l'analogie se trouve bien chez le Docteur Séraphique, mais lorsqu'il s'agit de l'ordre de l'univers, elle n'y est pas vécue. Et ne serait-ce pas cet esprit qui cacha aux yeux de saint Bonaventure la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence?" op. cit., p. xiii.

Kurt Ziesché, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 20 (1908), pp. 61-63, holds that St. Bonaventure held a logical distinction of essence and existence on the ground that *quo est* meant existence.

esset finitum; sed quod est actus purus, est suum esse per essentiam, et nihil tale accipit esse ab alia essentia nec ex nihilo. Si igitur creatura, eo ipso quod creatura, aliunde est et ex nihilo, nullo modo potest esse actus purus, nullo modo potest esse infinita.<sup>5</sup>

This text (and others like it) tells us about the relations between *esse*, infinity, limitation, pure act. But it sheds no light on the meaning of the terms.—Again, it is easy to show that St. Bonaventure used technical distinctions, like those of *esse* and *esse tale*, *esse* and *bene esse*:

Per vocem incomplexam [significatur res] quantum ad esse simpliciter, per orationem sive complexionem quantum ad esse tale vel tale.<sup>6</sup>

Deus, cum sit nobilissimus, nihil potest se ipso habere nobilius, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad bene esse; anima vero Christi, licet sit nobilior ceteris creaturis, ratione gratiae unionis, tamen differunt in ipsa esse et bene esse, substantia et dispositio accidentalis.<sup>7</sup>

Here the distinctions are clearly in evidence, but there is very little to show the bearing of those distinctions.

There are, however, other texts which do reveal with greater or less clarity the meanings of *esse* and *existere*.

It is possible to arrange pertinent texts so as to begin with the clearest and interpret all the others in the light of those. The method of this paper has been to choose a restricted number of problems and investigate them. The texts are grouped around the following points: the object of metaphysics, *esse divinum*, *esse creaturae* as such, *esse dependens*, *forma* and *esse*, the meaning of *est* as a predicate, *existere* in its wide sense, *existere* in its strict sense, and the relation between *esse-existere* and form-matter. That several of these groups of texts should not give any clear indications of the meaning of *esse* may be itself significant. And even if it is not, the texts have been retained for the sake of giving a more rounded and complete view.

### I. THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

It is clear that the attitude of a thinker toward being will manifest itself in what he asserts to be the object of metaphysics. Let us look at a text on the true work of the metaphysician:

Metaphysicus enim assurgit ad illud esse considerandum in ratione principii omnia originantis, et in hoc convenit cum physico qui origines rerum considerat. Assurgit etiam ad considerandum illud esse in ratione ultimi finis, et in hoc convenit cum morali sive ethico, qui reducit omnia ad unum

<sup>5</sup> *In 1. Sententiarum*, d. 43 (a. unic.), q. 3, concl. (*Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi, 1882-1902: 10 vols.), vol. 1, p. 772. (This edition will be used for all references to the works of St. Bonaventure.)

Cf. "Omnis enim creatura constituitur in esse ab efficiente, conformatur ad exemplar et ordinatur ad finem, ac per hoc est una, vera, bona." *Breviloquium*, p. 2, c. 1, vol. 5, p. 219; and: "Item, esse est actus entis, et vivere viventis; sed nullus actus est, qui non sit a Deo immediate: ergo nullum esse et nullum vivere. Si ergo creatura continue est, et continuatio in esse non est aliud quam duratio, cum esse eius non possit esse nisi a Deo, omnis rei conservatio est

a Deo." *In 2. Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, f. 3, vol. 2, p. 864; or, on "esse et non-esse," cf. *In 2. Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, p. 34-35.

<sup>6</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2; vol. 1, p. 736-737.

<sup>7</sup> *Quaestio Disputata De Scientia Christi*, q. 5, ad 12; vol. 5, p. 31. Cf. *In 1. Sent.*, d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 5; vol. 2, p. 945; *In 1. Sent.*, d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, concl.; vol. 2, p. 815; *In 3. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 3, p. 68; *In 3. Sent.*, d. 34, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, concl., vol. 3, p. 142; *In 2. Sent.*, d. 1, dub. 2; vol. 2, pp. 51-52. Also, a distinction between "esse aliquid" and "esse aliquis" *In 1. Sent.*, d. 7, dub. 3; vol. 1, p. 144.

summum bonum ut ad finem ultimum, considerando felicitatem sive practicam sive speculativam. Sed ut considerat illud esse in ratione omnia exemplantis, cum nullo communicat et verus est metaphysicus.<sup>8</sup>

I think it will be agreed that the consideration of exemplary causality is in fact almost exclusively a consideration of created images of the Trinity, and works along the lines of essence and form. Such a consideration deals with existing things, of course, but in general takes no account of their existence. Another passage states that metaphysics deals with the essences of things:

Omnis philosophia aut est naturalis, aut rationalis, aut moralis. Prima agit de causa essendi, et ideo ducit in potentiam Patris; secunda de ratione intelligendi, et ideo ducit in sapientiam Verbi, tertia de ordine vivendi, et ideo ducit in bonitatem Spiritus Sancti.

Rursus, prima dividitur in metaphysicam, mathematicam, et physicam, et prima est de rerum essentiis, secunda de numeris et figuris, tertia de naturis, virtutibus, et operationibus diffusivis.<sup>9</sup>

This text tells us that metaphysics deals with the essences of things. But the full meaning of essence is not clear. Moreover, it is possible that existence be included within the scope of metaphysics, since our texts tell us that this branch of philosophy deals with *esse*, or *causa essendi*. It may be significant that nothing clearer is said, but we shall have to turn to other considerations before we can be sure what these texts really mean.

## II. ESSE DIVINUM

The problem of the object of metaphysics is of Aristotelian origin. The problem of the name of God is a theological one, arising from *Exodus* iii, 14. Though this very, well known text contains a "sublime truth",<sup>10</sup> it is the center of a real problem. St. Bonaventure has some interesting things to say about it:

Primus [that is, the first of the two remaining stages of contemplation below ecstasy] modus primo .et principaliter defigit aspectum in ipsum esse, dicens, quod *qui est* est primum nomen Dei.

Secundus modus defigit aspectum in ipsum bonum, dicens hoc esse primum nomen Dei. Primum spectat potissime ad vetus testamentum, quod maxime praedicat divinae essentiae unitatem, unde dictum est Moysi: *Ego sum qui sum* . . . . Damascenus igitur sequens Moysen dicit, quod *qui est* est primum nomen Dei; Dionysius, sequens Christum, dicit quod bonum est primum nomen Dei.<sup>11</sup>

In this text two things stand out: the suggestion of the extremely intimate connection between *esse* and unity,<sup>12</sup> and the implication that Goodness is at

<sup>8</sup> In *Hexaemeron*, collatio 1, no. 13; vol. 5, p. 331. Cf. "Metaphysica circa cognitionem omnium entium quae reducit ad unum primum principium, a quo exierunt secundum rationes ideales sive ad Deum in quantum principium, finis, et exemplar." *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, no. 4; vol. 5, p. 321.

<sup>9</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, no. 6; vol. 5, p. 305.

<sup>10</sup> Thus St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes*, 2, c. 22 calls the truth that God is Being. On the accord of Christian thinkers that God is Being, cf. Etienne Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale* (Paris, Vrin), pp. 39-62, and *Le Thomisme* (Paris, Vrin,

1944), pp. 123-133. This last reference brings out the philosophical differences in the interpretation of *Exodus*.

<sup>11</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 5, no. 2; vol. 5, p. 308. Cf. "Unus attendit in nomine [boni] perfectionem, alter [in nomine "Qui est"] absolutionem; uterque tamen proprietatem." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 22, a. 1, q. 3, concl.; vol. 1, p. 395; this is, however, part of a solution which is not wholly approved of.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. "Omnis enim creatura constituitur in esse ab efficiente, conformatur ad exemplar, et ordinatur ad finem, ac per hoc est una, vera, bona." *Breviloquium*, p. 2, c. 1; vol. 5, p. 219; "Item, ab eodem est esse,

least as appropriate a name of God as Being.<sup>13</sup> Another very short text says:

utrum qui est sit nomen essentiae vel personae? Respondeo dicendum, quod illud nomen qui est, et Ego sum qui sum est nomen essentiae propriae: hoc enim est quaedam circumlocutio, significans entitatem in omnimoda perfectione et absolute, et hoc est nomen proprium divinae substantiae.<sup>14</sup>

The "circumlocution" employed by the Sacred Scripture means "entity in every kind of perfection and absoluteness." Obviously, this entity exists, but St. Bonaventure's point concerns essence: the complete perfection and absoluteness (used here in its fundamental meaning of separatedness, independence) of the Divine Essence. It is the supremely perfect and absolute Being Whom St. Bonaventure contemplates in so many beautiful passages;<sup>15</sup> it is this essence which is "proved"<sup>16</sup> in the proofs that God is.<sup>17</sup>

Arrived at the term of these abbreviated proofs, what does the mind say?

Sic igitur, his presuppositis [that is: if there is finite being, then infinite being, if mutable, then immutable, and so forth], intellectus intelligit et dicit, primum esse est, et nulli vere esse convenit nisi primo esse, et ab ipso omnia habent esse, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi primo esse.<sup>18</sup>

*Esse* belongs truly to God alone, and He alone is true being. St. Bonaventure himself has explained precisely what he means by "true being":

Alio modo dicitur verum, secundum quod addit supra esse impermixtionem ad non-esse, quod nullo modo habet potentiam ad illud, et sic dicitur habere verum esse, quod habet esse immutabile, et hoc modo vanum oppositum vero est illud quod est mutabile et transmutabile.<sup>19</sup>

True being, in the Saint's own words, is immutable being, and its opposite is mutable being. This is the language of the theology and philosophy of essence. To adopt the language of a philosophy creates a strong presumption that the philosophy itself is adopted, but it is not of itself a proof.

The texts on *Esse Divinum* do not clearly tell us what *esse* means. They do show that *esse* need not mean the act of existence, but may signify essence.

et esse unum sive distinctum." In 2. Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, f. 3; vol. 2, p. 445; Cf. also: In Hexaameron, coll. 12, no. 10; vol. 5, p. 386.

<sup>13</sup> These stages of contemplation are respectively the fifth and sixth of the "sex gradus throni veri Salomonis." Itinerarium, c. 7, no. 1; vol. 5, p. 312.

<sup>14</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 2, dub. 4; vol. 1, p. 60. Compare: "Et ideo esse dicitur nomen Dei, quia esse in Deo est id quod est Deus," In Hexaameron, coll. 2, no. 25; vol. 5, p. 340, and Boethius, De Hebdomadibus, "Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet," ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 42, as well as De Trinitate, "[f]ormal quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est . . . Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est," ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 8. "Item, omne illud quod est suum esse, est aeternum; esse enim non potest non esse, ergo nec incipere nec desinere, igitur caret principio et fine: si ergo Deus, cum sit simplicissimum, est suum esse, immo simpliciter est esse: ergo est omnino aeternum." Quaestio Disputata de Mysterio Trinitatis, q. 5, a. 1, f. 4, vol. 1, p. 88. Cf. also: "Sicut autem visionis essentialium ipsum esse est principium radicale et nomen, per quod cetera innotescent;

sic contemplationis emanationum ipsum bonum est principalissimum fundamentum." Itinerarium, c. 6, vol. 5, p. 310.

<sup>15</sup> Especially Itinerarium, cc. 3 and 5; vol. 5, pp. 304-6, 308-9, and In Hexaameron, coll. 5, vol. 5, p. 358-359.

<sup>16</sup> Gilson, Le Thomisme, 5<sup>e</sup> ed., pp. 80-81; La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure (Paris, Vrin, 1924), ch. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. "Concedendum est igitur quod tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis qui ignorat, quid est quod per nomen Dei dicitur." In 1. Sent. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 155; and also the entire question. Lists of proofs that God is, each a sentence long, are found in Itinerarium c. 3, no. 3, vol. 5, p. 304; Breviloquium, p. 1, c. 6, vol. 5, p. 215, and In Hexaameron, coll. 5 and 10; vol. 5, pp. 358-9, 379.

<sup>18</sup> In Hexaameron, coll. 5, no. 31, vol. 5, p. 359.

<sup>19</sup> In Ecclesiasten, proem, q. 2, resp., vol. 6, p. 7. " . . . Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse, quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate nihil de non entitate." In 1. Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 1, p. 151.

Since being is said of both creature and God,<sup>20</sup> it may be that a study of creaturely being may reveal St. Bonaventure's mind more clearly. For created being represents the First Being:

Hae igitur speculationes ordinis, originis, et completionis ducunt ad illud esse primum, quod repraesentant omnes creaturae. Hoc enim nomen scriptum est in omnibus rebus.<sup>21</sup>

### III. ESSE CREATURAE AS SUCH

The being of the creature is from God, and consists in the imitation of God. But what marks it precisely as created?

Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus quas ponit, scilicet de veritate, immutabilitate, simplicitate, cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae, quare solum de his tribus agit? Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur esse increatum a creato. Nam creatum, eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile; ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. Increatum vero esse habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam veritas respicit quod est, immutabilitas quo est, simplicitas utrumque. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.<sup>22</sup>

St. Bonaventure agrees with the Master of the Sentences that the Being of God is distinguished from that of the creature by the three conditions of truth, immutability, and simplicity. For the creature, precisely as creature, has a beginning, and therefore has an *esse* that is "empty", mutable, and mixed with possibility.

In the preceding section we saw that that thing has *verum esse* which has *esse immutabile*; here the truth and immutability seem to be separated. This apparent difficulty is cleared up by the explanation that *veritas rerum est indivisio entis ab esse*.<sup>23</sup> For truth concerns the *quod est* in so far as this latter is undivided from its *esse*.

Let us look again at the *vanitas esse creati*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> "Esse nominat ipsum purum actum entis: esse igitur est quod primo cadit in intellectu, et illud esse est quod est actus purus. Sed hoc non est esse particulare quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia, nec esse analogum, quia minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est. Restat igitur, quod illud esse est esse divinum." *Itinerarium*, c. 5, no. 3, vol. 5, p. 309.

This text shows that according to St. Bonaventure man has two ideas of being: one is of mere unspecified being, of being in the least possible sense; the other is of Being which is fully determined in what it is. This second idea is innate: "probat etiam ipsam [divinam veritatem esse] et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam." *In 1. Sent.* d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 155; cf. *In Hexameron*, coll. 5, no. 30, vol. 5, p. 358. For this reason, though St. Bonaventure makes much of analogy, he very logically does not speak of the analogy of being between creature and God; cf. note 4.

There is an interesting text on how the creature can attain true being: "De primo ergo dicit: 'isti sunt,' in quo ipsorum boni-

tas notatur; 'nam bonum et ens convertuntur', et quidquid deficit a bono desinit esse; unde Boethius probat, malos nihil esse, et Augustinus dicit super hoc verbo: *sine ipso factum est nihil*, 'peccatum nihil est, et qui peccat nihil fit' . . . Qui enim per peccatum elongatur a Deo, qui vere solus est, deficit ab ente. Et ideo Apostoli habent verum esse, et de eis dici potest veraciter isti sunt, quia Deo adhaeserunt." *Sermo de SS. Philippo et Iacobo Apostolis*, sermo<sup>2</sup>, vol. 9, p. 531.

<sup>21</sup> *In Hexameron*, coll. 10, no. 18, vol. 5, p. 379. This text continues to make an interesting correction of the *Liber de Causis* which seems to be, however, just incidental: "et sunt hae conditiones entis, super quas fundantur certissimae illationes. Unde dixit ille: 'prima rerum creatarum est esse,' sed ego dico: prima rerum intellectualium est esse primum."

<sup>22</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, dub. 2; vol. 1, p. 162.

<sup>23</sup> *De Donis Sp. Sancti*, coll. 4, no. 7, vol. 5, p. 474.

<sup>24</sup> "Profundum creationis est vanitas esse creati. Creatura enim quanto magis evanescit, tanto magis in profundum tendit." *Proem. in 1. Sent.* vol. 1, p. 3.

Quod obiicitur, quod creaturae non sunt vanae, quia valde bona et in finem ordinatae, solvendum, quia non dicuntur vanae per defectum boni vel ordinis, sed per defectum esse incommutabilis, et sic omnis creatura vana, nec est ita vana, quin habeat veritatem et bonitatem; et ideo scientia et doctrina de ipsa est vera.<sup>25</sup>

St. Bonaventure knows that there may well be other interpretations of the "vanity of created things," but he insists that this really means mutability. But in spite of their radical vanity and mutability, created things are, are true and are good. How this can be we shall see later.

There is another mark of the creature as creature, and that is limitation:

Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potuit [Deus] plenius conferre, hoc non est intelligendum propter immensitatem rei collatae, vel finitatem divinae potentiae, sed propter limitationem potentiae susceptivae, quia, cum sit creata, est capacitatis finitae et non potest nisi finitum suscipere. Et si tu obiicias, quod potuit dare capacitatem maiorem, dicendum, quod necesse est, quod creatura, eo ipso quod creatura est, habeat capacitatem finitam; et rursus, quia creatura est in tali specie vel genere, limitationem habet, ultra quam genus illud vel species se non potest extendere.<sup>26</sup>

The limitation of the creature is inferred directly from its being created, and mediately from its being in a genus or species.

When we are considering the properties of God and creature, we may well wonder whether they can be compared at all, and in what sense? Answering this question, the Lombard had said: *divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est*, and St. Augustine noted that *ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur*.

Respondeo: dupliciter est accipere talem comparisonem. Uno modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis quam si non comparatur. Alio modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proportionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis et nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est, non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem.<sup>27</sup>

This text again brings out the limitation and mutability (*secundum conditionem veritatis*) of created being. There is no equality, nor even proportion, between the being of creatures and the being of God—between the mutable and the immutable Being. And yet creatures, considered in themselves, are. If we abstract from the condition of mutability, does *esse* have the same relation to God as to creature?

St. Bonaventure considers this in connection with the famous saying of St. Hilary: *Esse non est Deo accidens, sed subsistens veritas*:<sup>28</sup>

Item, quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: esse non est Deo accidens, etc., quia nec creaturae est accidens—nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse—quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differe a creatura? Respondeo: Dicendum, quod

<sup>25</sup> In *Ecclesiasten*, proem, q. 2 ad 2; vol. 6, p. 7. Cf. "Et subiungit similitudinem [of men and beasts] quantum ad materiam, et propterea dicit: cuncta subiacent vanitati, scilicet quia ex nihilo facta sunt, ideo vana . . . Non dicit, quod nihil sit materia, sed hoc vult dicere quod non habent materiam increatam, neque essentiam, sed habent materiam creatam, quam intelligit nomine

<sup>26</sup> In 3. *Sent.*, d. 13, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2, vol. 3, p. 280. Cf. "Mensuram limitationis voco. qua unumquodque creatum finitum est in sua substantia et virtute et limitatum." *Comm. in Joannem*, c. 3, no. 63, vol. 6, p. 289.

<sup>27</sup> In 1. *Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, dub. 6, vol. 1, p. 163.

<sup>28</sup> *De Trinitate*, bk. 7, no. 11; PL 10, 208.

accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse, ab alio exire, et ab illo recedere. Accidens enim dicitur quod inest subiecto et ab illo trahit ortum et propterea potest adesse et abesse. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam esse nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente, creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere; ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens, quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo.<sup>29</sup> Nullum enim ens est suum esse nisi summe simplex, sicut nullum agens est suum agere nisi summe simplex. Et propter hoc, quia mendicat suum esse aliunde, dicit Hilarius, quod omnibus creatis accidit esse.<sup>30</sup>

It is important to note in what sense *esse* is not strictly an accident: since it depends on God, it does not depend on Him as on a subject in which it inheres.

These texts on the accidentality of *esse* might be concerned with the relations between essence and existence in God and creatures. But they could equally well be concerned with the *esse* and *quod est* (or *ens*) of Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus*.<sup>31</sup> In this latter case, the accidentality of *esse* with respect to *ens creatum* will have a quite different meaning. But let us leave this point open for the time.<sup>32</sup>

#### IV. ESSE DEPENDENS AND COMPOSITION

The third characteristic of created being is its composition. As far as complete beings are concerned, St. Bonaventure holds that all creatures are composed of substance and accident,<sup>33</sup> and of matter and form.<sup>34</sup> This kind of composition causes no difficulty. As far as principles of being are concerned, they are composite in the sense that they are composed *with* other principles:

Aliter potest dici et brevis, quod simplex dicitur per privationem compositionis. Sed notandum, quod compositio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo alicuius ex aliquibus; alio modo, quo aliquid dicitur componi aliis. Si ergo simplicitas privet compositionem ex aliis, sic convenit etiam creatis, utpote primis principiis, quae non componuntur ex aliis. Si autem privet compositionem cum aliis et ex aliis, sic solius Dei est. Omnis enim creatura aut est ens per se et in se, et ita composita ex aliis; aut est ens cum alio et in alio, et ita alii composita. Et iterum omne creatum est aut principium et ita componibile aliis, aut principiatum, et sic compositum ex aliis, et sic accipitur simplicitas, prout est rei proprietas, videlicet, utriusque compositionis.<sup>35</sup>

Composition usually means for us internal composition, and this means for St. Bonaventure a composition *ex aliis*. The second meaning, *cum aliis*, is still quite easy to identify and understand, though we might be inclined to question

<sup>29</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, dub. 8, vol. 1, p. 164. Cf. "Et ratio huius [conservationis a parte Dei] est necessitas et indigentia ex parte creaturae. Creatura enim omnis ex nihilo est, et aliunde habet esse. Quia ex nihilo est, ideo quodam modo vana est et vanitati subiecta est; quia vero aliunde habet esse, ideo esse est sibi quodam modo accidentale. Contrario modo est in Deo, unde Hilarius . . . Sicut igitur vanum non potest fulciri nisi per verum et stabile; et accidens non potest fulciri nisi per subiectum, sic esse creaturae non potest conservari absque munificentia creatricis essentiae." *In 2. Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, p. 865.  
<sup>30</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 7, dub. 3, concl., vol. 2,

p. 224; cf. *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, f. 4, vol. 1, p. 159.

<sup>31</sup> "Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet." "Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est." Ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 42.

<sup>32</sup> This meaning will be touched on in the "Conclusions" of this paper, and in the section on "Form and Esse."

<sup>33</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, vol. 1, p. 167-169.

<sup>34</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, vol. 1, p. pp. 89-91.

<sup>35</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 168.

the propriety of the usage. But over and above these there is the "composition of dependence". A single text will be enough to show the importance of this notion:

Item, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde; ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex, ergo, etc.<sup>36</sup>

A follower of St. Thomas might well be inclined to say that such a text at least implies a real distinction of essence and existence; that this distinction involves neither essential composition nor that of substance and accident, and so is justly given as a separate kind.

St. Bonaventure himself has given at least a partial explanation of this. The fourth objection against the statement that simplicity is a property of God alone tells us:

Item, omne illud est simplex, in quo stat resolutio. Sed resolutio stat in principiis, quae sunt materia et forma . . . ; ergo cum resolutio stat in creato, aliquid creatum est simplex.

The answer of the author admits internal simplicity. As far as principles are concerned, in their relation to the composite, the composition *cum aliis* is invoked. But over and above these a third composition is mentioned (though it is not called a "third"), which cannot be that of an essence with its act of existence:

Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate puncti et entis et principii, dicendum quod ibi est simplicitas per privationem compositionis ex aliis, non autem prout simplicitas dicit indifferentiam omnimodam. In omnibus enim ut dictum est cadit aliqua differentia et dependentia; quamvis enim non sint composita, tamen eorum esse dependet a composito, sive compositione. Unde bene concedendum est illud quod ultimo dicebatur, quod illud derogat simplicitati rei, quod sit alteri componibilis, in quantum simplicitas privat multiplicitatem et differentiam in re simplici, quamvis non deroget, in quantum privat compositionem ex aliis. Omnis enim dependentia facit ipsum quod dependet a summa simplicitate et indifferentia recedere. Solus autem Deus est independens. Omnia autem alia sunt dependentia, sive comparatione ad principia ex quibus sunt, sive unum principium complicitur ad aliud, sive esse dependens comparatione ad Deum sive ab ipso Deo. Nihil autem, quod dependet, est sua dependentia; ideo nihil tale est summe simplex, quia omne simplicissimum est absolutissimum.<sup>37</sup>

Here is something in addition to the two kinds of composition mentioned in the Conclusion of the question. It is important to advert to the examples: a point, principles like matter and form, being (which is beyond all genera, and so not composed of genus and difference). A "thing" like a point, or matter, or form, certainly has no real composition; and the composition of a point with its "efficient cause" is not even a composition of reason. A text on the composition of relative terms may help to clear this up:

Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod absolutum non dicitur de respectivo; dicendum, quod verum est in creatura, quia respectus ipse verus aut est alius per essentiam, aut in comparatione ad aliud per essentiam, ut materia et forma, quorum neutrum est in divinis; unde respectus in creaturis

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 1, p. 167.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, arg. 4, and ad 2, 3, 4, pp. 167, 169.



ponit dependentiam, et ideo privat summam simplicitatem, et ideo non praedicatur in creaturis.<sup>38</sup>

In creatures, the relation is never the thing related at least in the sense that one can be predicated of the other.<sup>39</sup> Are we to understand a real distinction between matter and its relation to form, or at least a distinction of reason? The language of St. Bonaventure does not seem to require either kind of distinction: *Respectus ipse verus aut est alius per essentiam, aut in comparatione ad aliud per essentiam*. In our case, the second alternative is to be taken: the real relation itself is other (than that which is related) *in comparison to something essentially other* (than the subject). In the case of relatives, their "composition" is of themselves with their correlates.<sup>40</sup>

A very helpful text is found in the *Summa Theologica* ascribed to Alexander of Hales:

. . . si attendatur omnino simplex, oportet accipere secundum omne genus causae; si vero accipiat simplex per extensionem potest dici unitas creata simplex quoad genus causae formalis, sed non simplex quoad genus causae efficientis: dependet enim secundum esse ab efficienti.

Sed adhuc posset obiici loquendo de unitate aut forma secundum se ipsam accepta. Intelligatur enim forma creata non indigens materia: constat quod huiusmodi forma creata esset; aut ergo esset simplex aut composita. Simplex omnino non potest esse, cum hoc soli Deo conveniat . . . sed non est ex aliis constituta, nec cum alio posita ad constituendum tertium; ergo non est composita. Propter hoc addendum est ut compositum etiam dicatur non tantum uno duorum modorum supra dictorum [ex aliis et cum alio], sed cuius esse est dependens ab, ergo et intellectus dependet ab intellectu. Licet alio partes non habeat nec pars alterius sit, nihilominus tamen compositum dicitur propter sui dependentiam in esse et intellectu. Accipiendo ergo compositum aliquo trium modorum, dicetur omnis creatura composita nec alio modo potest intelligi.<sup>41</sup>

With the help of this text the composition of dependence of which St. Bonaventure speaks can be called a composition *with* the thing's efficient cause. The creature depends on God, and since God is essentially distinct from the creature, there is by that very fact a composition "with" its efficient cause. Similar texts which speak of the creature's lack of simplicity because of its dependence on God, need not imply anything more than this kind of "composition".

The being of creature, precisely as and because it is a creature, is "empty", mutable, composite, limited (finite), accidental to it, and dependent on God. This consideration has thrown light on the relations of *esse*. But the central point of interest: the meaning of the term, *esse*, remains almost as obscure as before.

<sup>38</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, ad 3, vol. 1, p. 573. Cf. "Habere respectum ad extrinsecum aliquo modo importat dependentiam, nec permittit illud, circa quod ponitur, esse summe simplex et absolutum." *Quaestio Disputata de Scientia Christi*, q. 3, ad 21, vol. 5, p. 16; and *Q. D. de Mysteriorum Trinitatis*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4, vol. 5, p. 77.

<sup>39</sup> Because the relation includes in its concept something which is other than that which is related.

<sup>40</sup> This interpretation differs from that of P. Robert, *Hylémorphisme et Devenir*, p. 38: "... affirmer son essentielle composition. Car non seulement il ne lui répugne pas de dire que la matière soit composée, cela lui semble nécessaire." However, in neither interpretation is there question of a really distinct act of existence.

<sup>41</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Prima pars secundi libri, no. 59, ed. Quaracchi (3 vols.) vol. 2, p. 75.

V. FORM AND ESSE

A series of texts, concerned with quotations from Boethius or echoes of them, deals with the relations between form and *esse*. Thus, for example, St. Bonaventure asks whether matter can be created without form. It cannot, because:

Item, Boethius: "Omne esse est a forma"; sed omne quod creatur, statim post creationem est: ergo vel est forma vel habet formam.<sup>42</sup>

This doctrine, expressed also as *forma dat esse*, can be found very frequently in his works. And there are very explicit answers as to what is meant by the *esse* which form gives:

Dicendum, quod circumscriptis accidentibus et proprietatibus, quae individuationem non faciunt sed ostendunt, individuatio est a principiis intrinsicis, secundum quod constituunt suppositum, in quo totum esse rei stabilitur. Et quia ex concursu illorum principiorum constituitur individuum, et resultat forma totius, quae est forma specifica; hinc est quemadmodum dicit Boethius quod "species est totum esse individui". In Christo autem anima et caro, sive materia et forma, uniuntur non solum in eo quod constituunt, sed etiam in hypostasi Verbi Aeterni. Et ideo forma specifica non dicit totum esse Christi, ac per hoc Christus, secundum quod homo non habet plenam rationem individui.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, f. 2, vol. 2, p. 293.

The phrase of Boethius is from *De Trinitate*, ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> *In 3. Sent.*, d. 10, a. 1, q. 3, concl., vol. 3, pp. 231-232.

On this notion of supposit, cf.: "suppositum, quod dicitur illud in quo substantificatur totum esse rei," *In 3. Sent.*, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 3, p. 149; on individuation as coming from both matter and form, cf.: *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., vol. 2, pp. 108-110; on the respective roles of matter and form in individuation: "in creatura . . . est differentia ab originali principio. Haec autem non est forma in se quia dicit quid communicabile, nec materia in se, quia dicit quid indistinctum; ergo hoc facit forma, ut adveniens materiae. Quia enim adveniens materiae accipit partem, non totam materiam, hinc est quod ipsam distinguit, et ipsam distinguendo trahitur in partem et limitatur et fit hic et nunc et unum numero et particulare," *In 1. Sent.*, d. 19, p. 2, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, pp. 358-359.

Compare: "Contra. 1. Boethius: 'species est totum esse indivuorum'; sed esse est a forma: ergo individuum supra speciem non addit formam, ergo nec persona supra naturam. Si ergo aliquid addit, aut materiam, aut accidentia; sed per accidentia non potest esse discretio personalis vel individualis: ideo necesse est, quod per materiam . . . rationes illae probent ut patet quod non totaliter sit a forma, quia forma nulla est individuum, nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 3 and ad 3; vol. 2, pp. 108, 110.

This is apparently not an exact quotation of Boethius; the Quaracchi editors suggest: "Homo vero Socratis atque Ciceronis

tota substantia est," *Comment. in Porphyry*, lib. 3, cap. *de specie*, PL 64, 106B, and "Omnis enim species constituit esse," *De Divisione*, PL 64, 88A.

On the notion of "forma totius" the following texts are relevant:

"Homo dicat formam totius sive consequentem totum compositum," *In 3. Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, concl., vol. 3, p. 452.

"Respondeo: Dicendum quod nomen humanitatis consuevit tripliciter accipi: uno modo per humanitatem possunt intelligi principia constituenta hominem; alio modo per humanitatem potest intelligi forma consequens totum compositum; tertio modo nomine humanitatis potest intelligi proprietates consequens ipsum hominem," *In 3. Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 5, concl., vol. 3, p. 141. "Nomine humanae naturae aliquando intelliguntur principia constituenta hominem; aliquando intelligitur forma hominis completa quae dat ipsi supposito complementum et operationem debitam illi speciei, secundum illud quod dicit Boethius: 'Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia' [*De Una Persona et Duabus Naturis*, c. 1, PL 64, 1342B], *In 3. Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, ad 3, vol. 3, p. 453.

"Ex coniunctione animae ad carnem per modum perficientis et informantis resultat forma totius," *In 3. Sent.*, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl., vol. 3, p. 48.

"Forma igitur universalis non est aliud quam forma totius, quae cum de se nata sit esse in multis universalis est; particularizatur autem non per additionem ulterius formae, sed per coniunctionem sui cum materia ex qua coniunctione materia appropriat sibi formam et forma materiam," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, concl., vol. 2, p. 441.

"Forma universalis est nobilior particulari,

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod species dicit formam, et non quamcumque, sed formam totius, hoc est formam complectentem totum esse. Iuxta quod dicit Boethius quod "species est totum esse individuorum," et Avicenna et alii etiam philosophi in hoc concordant.<sup>44</sup>

Illam autem dicunt esse formam totius, quae quidem dat esse toti, et haec dicitur essentia rei, quia totum esse complectitur; et hanc formam considerat metaphysicus. Formam vero partis, quae in genere non habet esse nisi per reductionem, non est dicere proprie universalis . . .

Si igitur non est integra cognitio, nisi totum esse rei cognoscatur; et non est cognitio nisi per formam: necesse est, aliquam formam esse, quae complectatur totum esse; hanc autem dicimus essentiam, et haec est universalis forma ut dicit Avicenna.<sup>45</sup>

In these texts, a series of equivalents is set up: *totum esse rei* is *species* and *forma specifica* and *forma totius* and *essentia* and finally the "form which the metaphysician considers" which we saw to be the essence as resembling the essence of God. If we leave aside the universal form as foundation of universal knowledge, with its reference to Avicenna, the doctrine is clear-cut: *esse* is the specific form, or the essence: the *esse* of man is humanity.

Two more equivalents for *esse* can be found:

Item, Boethius: "In quolibet creato differunt quo est et quod est," sive quid est et esse: ergo similiter, immo fortius, quod potest et quo potest.<sup>46</sup>

Item, ab eodem est esse, et esse unum sive distinctum; sed unumquodque habet esse a sua perfectione; ergo distinctionem.<sup>47</sup>

The meaning of *quo est* as St. Bonaventure understands it can easily be found:

. . . cum in communi in inferioribus inveniatur quod est et quo est, ratione cuius significatur in concrezione et in abstractione, ut dicatur homo et humanitas: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvis non intelligamus in differentia illa duo.<sup>48</sup>

quae est in multis; particularis autem suo modo nobilior universali, quia particularis est in uno non numerata," *In Hexaemeron*, coll. 9, no. 24, vol. 5, p. 376.

<sup>44</sup> *In 3. Sent.*, d. 2, a. 2, q. 3, concl., vol. 3, p. 48. Cf. "Illud autem quod facit rem esse in actu, species est et forma," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, p. 415.

<sup>45</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, concl., vol. 2, p. 441. Cf.: "primo modo essentiale dicitur quod dicit rei essentiam totam, sicut species singularis," *In 1. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad. 1, vol. 1, p. 86.

<sup>46</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 13, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, f. 3, vol. 1, p. 85. Cf. "Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius, differt quo est et quod est, ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate: ergo, etc.," *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, f. 1, vol. 1, p. 167.

These are not Boethius' terms: the Quaracchi editors, *loc. cit.*, suggest Gilbert de la Porrée, *Commentarium in Librum 'Quomodo Substantiae Bonae Sint'*, PL 64, 1321, 1322.

<sup>47</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, f. 3, vol. 2, p. 445. This further equivalent may be added: "substantia est essentia," *In 1. Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 3 et ad 3, vol. 1, p. 117.

<sup>48</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 1, p. 409. Cf. "Sciendum est igitur quod in-

tellektus noster omnem intellectum rei complete resolvit in intellectum eius quo est et quod est, et quando intelligit rem compositam, tunc illam resolutionem ponit circa se et circa rem; quando vero rem simplicem omnino, tunc ponit illam non circa rem, sed circa se, quia aliter non potest intelligere. Unde intellectus noster, cum Deum intelligit, omnino intelligit quod in ipso est omnis simplicitas et nulla compositio, nulla concretio," *Quaestio Disputata de Mysterio Trinitatis*, q. 3, a. 1, vol. 5, p. 71; and in the answer to the second argument in *contrarium*: "Non est ibi concretio, secundum realem inhaerentiam, sed solum secundum nostram intelligentiam . . . Est enim in divinis vere natura et vere suppositum, id est deitas et habens deitatem," *ibid.* Compare also Gilbert de la Porrée, *Commentarium in Librum de Trinitate*, "corporalitas quae est esse corporis in quo est," PL 64, 1266.

Understanding the meaning of "quo est" and "quod est" in this way, St. Bonaventure quite naturally says: "non videtur quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea [scilicet anima rationali] sit tantum compositio ex quo est et quod est, nisi addatur in ea compositio materiae et formae," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, pp. 414-415. For this distinction may be only *circa rem*, the

This interpretation of Boethius is clear and consistent. God is pure, simple, absolute Essence; the creature is not its (particular) essence, but there is in it a difference between the thing, supposit, or what is, and that which it is: man is not his humanity:

Tertia differentia [entis et esse] est in omni creato et concreato, quia omne quod est praeter Deum, accipit esse aliunde, sive principium sit sive principiatum; ideo nihil est suum esse sicut lux non est suum lucere.<sup>49</sup>

In the light of what we have seen of the meanings of these terms, I venture a translation:

The third distinction (or difference) [of being and essence] is present in everything created and concreated, because everything that is, apart from God, receives its essence from outside, whether it be a principle or made up of principles; thus, no thing is its own essence as light is not its own "lucidity" (or "lightness").

It is now possible to understand the accidentality and mutability of being as St. Bonaventure saw it. Every created thing, or being, is more than its essence; it contains matter. The continuous change of sensible things shows us that of themselves such things are constantly losing the perfections they have, they are constantly casting off the forms they have and acquiring new ones. This radical mutability proclaims that things are not "what" they are of themselves, but because of Another. And if they retain their forms, that is, their essences, even long enough for us to know and name them, and say that they are, this is because they are kept in their being by Another Who is identically what He is.

object of which it is predicated cannot be a pure form, because with reference to a pure form, concrete and abstract predication are the same.

Did St. Thomas, while writing his own *Commentary on the Sentences*, have St. Bonaventure's work before him? It is interesting to see what he has to say on the meanings of "quo est" in distinction 8 of book 1 (q. 5, a. 2): "In compositis ex materia et forma, quo est potest dici tripliciter. Potest enim dici quo est ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse materiae. Potest etiam dici quo est ipse actus essentiae, scilicet esse, sicut quo curritur, est actus currendi. Potest etiam dici quo est ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex conjunctione formae cum cum materia, ut humanitas." This third sense is the only way in which St. Bonaventure takes it.

"In 1. Sent., d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 168. Commenting on this text, J. Bittremieux says: "An creaturae non sunt compositae, et non simplices; annon includunt potentialitatem et non sunt purus actus, et hoc precise quia non sunt suum esse, quia earum essentia realiter est ab esse distincta? Addit Seraphicus illustrationis gratia exemplum: 'nihil est suum esse, sicut lux non est suum lucere'; sicuti lucere est actus lucis, a luce distinctus, a pari esse est actus entis, ab essentia distinctus. Juvabit autem hoc exemplum conferre cum his S. Thomae verbis, quibus realis distinctio involvitur: 'Esse est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis,' [3. Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2]"; "Distinctio inter esse et essentiam apud

S. Bonaventuram," p. 304. This is undoubtedly an interesting juxtaposition, but we may well ask by what right similarity of expression is considered a clue to identity of thought. And what would Bittremieux's argument mean for St. Bonaventure?

There is of course a sense in which "essentia" for the Seraphic Doctor does not mean esse. Thus: "Physicus enim non dicit eandem esse materiam nisi in corporalibus, quia numquam venit ad considerandum materiam secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum esse, et absque dubio aliquod esse habet in corporalibus quod non in spiritualibus, et aliquod in corruptibilibus, quod non in incorruptibilibus. — Metaphysicus vero non tantum secundum esse, sed secundum essentiam considerat; et, quia, abstracto omni esse, non est reperire nec etiam fingere diversitatem in materia, ideo dicit esse unam per essentiam," *In 2. Sent., d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, p. 97*. "Essentia" is the widest of all terms; every "esse" is an "essentia", but not every "essentia" is an "esse", for "esse" comes from form. "Essentia materiae" in this text means, in St. Bonaventure's own words, "materia secundum analogiam, scilicet sub ratione potentiae", or "secundum se considerata," as he says *In 1. Sent., d. 19, p. 2, q. 2, ad 3, vol. 2, p. 98*. Thus, in a kind of loose usage, the "essence of a thing" is that thing *sine addito*, considered absolutely in itself. Ordinarily, essence is "that by which a thing is what it is" (and in this sense I have used it in my translation of the text above), and so is a synonym of *esse*.

By studying the kind of being which form gives it has been possible to discover the meaning of *esse*. There is another approach to this same problem, a more direct one: namely, to find out what is meant when it is said that a thing "is".

## VI. GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

Logic tends to define the judgment as that act of the mind by which one concept is predicated of another; and grammar tends to fall in line and define the statement as a sentence in which one term is affirmed or denied of another. Then how are we to fit in the "judgments of existence" of the type: "*x* is"? St. Bonaventure met two difficult propositions: "God is" and "wickedness is". His analyses are so interesting, and confirm so completely our previous conclusions, that we hope to be pardoned for quoting them in full:

Hoc enim verbum "est" aliquando per se praedicatur, aliquando est tertium adiacens. Quando per se dicitur, tunc dicit actum absolutum, quia dicit actum entis ratione essentiae; et tunc oportet quod dicatur absolute et quod dicat quid. Quando vero est tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur Pater est Deus, Pater est Pater, tunc hoc verbum "est" dicit habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum.<sup>30</sup>

Si vero quaeratur de hac: "malitia est", utrum sit concedenda, vel non, dicendum, quod hoc verbum "est", sicut vult Philosophus, dupliciter potest praedicari. Aliquando accipitur ut compositio media inter duo extrema, et sic dicitur tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur: "homo est albus". Aliquando vero sic praedicatur, ut res importata per ipsum sit attributum, sive alterum extremorum. Quando ergo sic dicitur: "malitia est", si hoc verbum "est" accipitur ut praedicatum, sicut accipiuntur alia verba, ut "legit" et huiusmodi; tunc locutio est falsa. Est enim sensus: "malitia est", id est, "malitia est ens", id est, "essentia aliqua"; hoc enim verbum "est" significat essentiam vel substantiam uniuscuiusque.<sup>31</sup>

"To be" is "to be a being", that is, "an essence" or a "what". To prove that *Deus est* is merely to prove that God is an essence or a "what".<sup>32</sup> That is why the "proofs" for the "existence of God" are so sketchy in St. Bonaventure, and why he can hold that the proposition *Deus est* is *per se nota*; it merely means: "God (that is, this essence) is an essence." That is also why St. Bonaventure cannot admit a pure (yet created) form. A pure form, one without matter, is form through and through. If such a form is admitted, it is a necessary being: an essence can not be (an essence):

In substantia autem est altius vestigium, quod repraesentat divinam essentiam. Habet enim omnis creata substantia materiam, formam, compositionem: originale principium seu fundamentum, formale complementum, et glutinum; habet substantiam, virtutem, et operationem.—Et in his repraesentatur mysterium Trinitatis: Pater, origo, Filius, imago, Spiritus Sanctus, compago.

Ratio autem originalis principii a formali complemento habet distinctionem in creatura, non quidem hypostaticam ut est in divinis, nec accidentalem, sed sicut principiorum quorum unum activum, alterum passivum. Et hoc

<sup>30</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, concl., vol. 1. p. 136. Cf. "Item, hoc verbum 'est' est nota identitatis; sed omnis praedicatio est mediante hoc verbo 'est'; ergo omnis praedicatio est signum identitatis," *In 1. Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2,

f. 4, vol. 1, p. 590; and *In 4. Sent.*, d. 11, p. 1, q. 6, arg. 1, vol. 4, p. 251.

<sup>31</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, ad. 3, vol. 2, p. 816.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, pp. 80-81.

tollere a creatura est tollere ab ea repraesentationem Trinitatis: ut dicere, quod creatura sit purus actus et non habeat compositionem.<sup>53</sup>

# VII. EXISTERE IN ITS NON-TECHNICAL SENSE

There remains for our consideration the term *existere*. In classical Latin, this word means: (1) to step out or forth, to come forth, to emerge, appear, come to light; (2) to spring, proceed, arise, become; (3) to be visible or manifest. It can sometimes be almost a synonym for *esse*. Thus, St. Bonaventure asks: what is the meaning of *in rebus corporeis plus sunt duae quam una*, and says:

Praeterea notandum, quod Augustinus non accipit hic "maius" extensive, sed accipit plus quantum ad veritatem existentiae vel essentiae. Cum enim non sit summa veritas in qualibet re, plus est de veritate existentiae in duabus rebus quam in una, quamvis non sit ibi plus de latitudine distantiae sive de extensione magnitudinis vel capacitatis contentivae.<sup>54</sup>

It seems that in this passage *existentia* is meant to be the equivalent of *essentia*; the conjunction *vel* can be used to indicate such equivalence. Or again:

quod dicitur, quod maius lumen absorbet minus, hoc non dicitur quantum ad existentiam, sed quantum ad apparentiam.<sup>55</sup>

There can hardly be any doubt that *existentia* here means "reality".

Of five texts on the three-fold state of things: in the exemplar Ideas, in the created intellect, and in the world or in themselves, one says: *Triplex est existentia rerum*;<sup>56</sup> the others say: *tripliciter habent esse*<sup>57</sup> or similar expressions with *esse*; a sixth very similar text uses successively: *esse, existentia, sunt, existendi*.<sup>58</sup> Again, a distinction is made between the thing in nature, the direct knowledge of it, and second intentions; in one case, *existere* and *existentia* are used of the thing in nature,<sup>59</sup> in another similar text, these words do not appear.<sup>60</sup> Finally, there is a text in which *existentia* could mean either "duration" or "being":

Nam tres sunt mensurae existentiae, scilicet, aeternitas, aeviternitas, et tempus; et similiter, sunt tria esse: aeternum, aeviternum, et temporale; similiter sunt trium differentiarum personae, scilicet personae divinae, angelicae, et humanae . . . Et sicut aevum medium est inter aeternitatem et tempus, sic et existentia angelica medium est inter existentiam divinam et humanam.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>53</sup> In *Hexameron*, Coll. 2. nos. 23-24, vol. 5, p. 340. Cf. "Nulla substantia per se existens, sive corporalis, sive spiritualis, est pure forma nisi solus Deus," In 2. *Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1, concl., vol. 2, p. 317; "Cum enim dicitur: Deus est pure forma, aequivocatur nomen formae, quia non dicitur ibi forma, prout est perfectio materiae; sed forma nominat ibi essentiam, quae habet esse in omnimoda actualitate et completionem," In 2. *Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1 ad 5, vol. 2, p. 294; "Formae enim est inhaerere, et ideo non est hypostasit," In 1. *Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2 ad 3, vol. 1, p. 561.

<sup>54</sup> In 1. *Sent.*, d. 19, dub. 4, sol., vol. 1, p. 366.

<sup>55</sup> In 3. *Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1, ad 4, vol. 3, p. 320.

<sup>56</sup> In 1. *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 625.

<sup>57</sup> In 3. *Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1, concl., vol. 3, p. 320; Q. D. *De Scientia Christi*, q. 2, concl., vol. 5, p. 23; *Comment. in Ecclesiasten*, c. 3, a. 3, vol. 6, p. 34; *Sermo in Dominica 22<sup>a</sup> post Pentec.* 1<sup>a</sup>, vol. 9, p. 442.

<sup>58</sup> In 1. *Sent.*, d. 36, a. 1, q. 2, concl., and ad 1, vol. 1, pp. 621, 622.

<sup>59</sup> In 1. *Sent.*, d. 25, dub. 3, vol. 1, p. 446.

<sup>60</sup> In 2. *Sent.*, d. 37, dub. 1, vol. 2, p. 876.

<sup>61</sup> *Sermones de Sanctis Angelis*, 5<sup>a</sup>, vol. 9, p. 622; cf. "illationis necessitas non venit ab existentia rei in materia, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in anima, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re: venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna," *Itinerarium*, c. 3, no. 3, vol. 5, p. 304.

VIII. EXISTERE IN ITS TECHNICAL SENSE

St. Bonaventure has a clear and definite technical use of *existere* and its derivatives. This usage has apparently not been noted;<sup>62</sup> it is therefore necessary to examine it in some detail:

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi, quamvis sit unita Verbo, non tamen est ubicumque est Verbum, ergo nec cognitio ad omnia quae cognoscit Verbum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia esse hic vel ibi dicit actum existendi; et ideo, si anima Christi esset ubicumque est Verbum, iam esset immensa, et existentia eius adaequaretur existentiae Verbi.<sup>63</sup>

*Esse hic* expresses the act of *existere*; *esse ubique* is the same as *esse immensum*.<sup>64</sup> Necessitas autem existendi Deum in omnibus sumitur tum a parte perfectionis ipsius, tum a parte indigentiae rerum. A parte ipsius propter summam immensitatem et summam potestatem, et utriusque ratio est summa simplicitas.<sup>65</sup>

From these and similar texts it is clear that *existere* means at least *esse alicubi*, and therefore, in a vague and unspecified sense, *esse in loco*.

A second element in the meaning of *existere* is furnished us by another set of texts:

Respondeo: Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis *existere*, unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis *existere*; et ideo si in personis intelligatur quod proprietas insit hypostasi, intelligitur *esse hypostasis*, et similiter, si intelligitur non *inesse*, intelligitur *hypostasis non esse*.<sup>66</sup>

Invertibilitas autem per gratiam inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet ne in nihil cedant; et loquor de creaturis quae dicunt quid completum et per se *existens*.<sup>67</sup>

Persona . . . importat fundamentum totius existentiae naturalis.<sup>68</sup>

Item si materia [in principio mundi] careret omni forma: ergo et omni accidente: ergo nec haberet extendi nec locari nec *esse in motu* nec in

<sup>62</sup> P. Robert, who has an excellent and very thorough analysis of the Bonaventurian notion of matter, translates (or gives as an equivalent of) "stabilitatem per se existendi" by "la stabilité, la subsistance" (p. 18); he comments the phrases: "existentiam et permanentiam," "fundamentum existentiae creatae," "fixa existentia creaturae in se," by the expression: "la matière peut être considérée comme un principe de stabilité ou de permanence dans l'être" (p. 26); nor is there any comment to be found elsewhere in *Hylémorphisme et Devenir*.

<sup>63</sup> In 3. Sent., d. 14, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6, vol. 3, p. 317.

<sup>64</sup> "Esse ubique uno modo importat praesentialitatem divinae immensitatis, per quam est praesens omni ei quod est, sive sibi sive alii, et sic idem est Deum esse ubique quod Deum esse immensum." In 1. Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, vol. 1, pp. 644-645.

<sup>65</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 1, p. 638. Cf. "oportet quod sit unitas in essentia et forma et dignitate et aeternitate

et existentia et incircumscribilitate" *Itinerarium* c. 6, no. 3, vol. 5, p. 311; "existentia" here corresponds to "summa conintimitas" of no. 2 just above; and compare also: "Et ideo dicitur esse potentialiter, praesentialiter, et essentialiter, quia secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, secundum virtutis influentiam, secundum intimitatis existentiam," In 1. Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 641; "Circumloquitur beatus Gregorius perfectionem modorum existendi Deum in omnibus," In 1. Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 647; "Quaedam sunt, in quibus differt esse et factum esse, idem tamen est fieri et esse, ut sunt successiva quorum esse dependet omnino a principio producente existente in sua actualitate," In 1. Sent., d. 9, q. 4, concl., vol. 1, p. 186.

<sup>66</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 7, dub. 4, sol., vol. 1, p. 145.

<sup>67</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, concl., vol. 1, p. 160.

<sup>68</sup> In 3. Sent., d. 10, a. 1, q. 3, concl., vol. 3, p. 230.

quiete; sed nihil tale in rerum natura potest existere: ergo materia non potuit in sui conditione omni forma carere.<sup>69</sup>

In the first of these four texts, *existere* means *esse distinctum* and connotes origin; in the third and fourth it seems to connote *esse per se*. It may thus be said that in this type of usage, *existere* means *esse distinctum*. Are these meanings of *esse distinctum* and *esse in loco* capable of being reconciled? I believe that in St. Bonaventure's mind these meanings are closely connected, and that normally for him *existere* means both. We shall study this with reference to matter and form.

#### IX. EXISTERE AND ESSE, MATTER AND FORM

Matter and form, according to St. Bonaventure, are found in all created things, even in the Angels.<sup>70</sup> These two principles need each other.<sup>71</sup> Form cannot be by itself;<sup>72</sup> a "pure form" is equivocally a form;<sup>73</sup> it should be called a pure essence. Matter, though it is incorruptible,<sup>74</sup> is pure and entire potency;<sup>75</sup> it cannot be by itself.<sup>76</sup> These two principles are both necessary; they differ from each other as act and potency;<sup>77</sup> they must therefore each have a distinctive function in the composite.

Individuum est hoc aliquid. Quod sit hoc, principaliter habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit aliquid habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae.<sup>78</sup>

The functions of form and matter are here neatly summarized. Form gives the *esse*, which is *esse aliquid* or *actus essendi*. Matter gives the *existere*, which is "position in space and time". The famous text on the matter-form composition of the human soul contains the same doctrine:

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens medium inter utrumque [the first holds that the human soul is simple, the second that all souls are composite], scilicet quod anima rationalis cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod habet intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere,

<sup>69</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, f. 5, vol. 2, p. 274.

<sup>70</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, vol. 2, pp. 89-91.

<sup>71</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, f. 4, vol. 2, p. 15.

<sup>72</sup> *In 1. Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2, ad. 3, vol. 1, p. 561.

<sup>73</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad. 5, vol. 2, p. 294.

<sup>74</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, f. 3, vol. 2, p. 197; *ibid.*, d. 15, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 2, p. 374; *ibid.*, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, f. 1, vol. 2, p. 458.

<sup>75</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 2, p. 294; *In 1. Sent.*, d. 30, q. 3, concl., vol. 1, p. 525. Cf. "Materia non propter se facta est, sed propter sustentationem formae, quae eius est actus; quamvis ergo materia non sit Deo actu similis, tamen assimilabilis est per formam. Unde Augustinus dicit, quod ipsa materia, etsi non habeat de se et in se actum formae, ipsa tamen capacitas formae est ei pro forma." *In 2. Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad. 1, vol. 2, p. 17.

<sup>76</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, f. 2, vol. 2,

p. 293; *ibid.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2, f. 1, vol. 2, pp. 33-34.

<sup>77</sup> "Principium secundum quod agit [Angelus] est forma, principium vero, secundum quod patitur, non potest esse nisi materia . . . Impossibile est, plures naturas concurrere ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibili, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia, nihil fit, similiter nec ex duobus entibus in actu." *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ff. 2 and 4, vol. 2, p. 89, 90.

<sup>78</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., vol. 2, pp. 109-110. Cf. "Metaphysicus considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi et hunc dat forma; et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat illud cui innitur forma: hoc est materia." *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, p. 97; "Ipsa enim materia dat formae fixationem, et propter hoc appellatur nomine terrae, quae inter cetera elementa plus habet de stabilitate," *ibid.*, d. 12, dub. 1, vol. 2, p. 307.



et formale, a quo habet esse . . . Cum igitur principium, a quo est fixa existentia creaturae in se sit principium materiale, concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere.<sup>79</sup>

The human soul is *hoc aliquid* and *per se subsistens*; these two phrases are summed up in the term *existentia*. Another very well-known text, that on the matter-form composition of the Angels, throws an interesting light on the *esse hoc* or *esse hic et nunc*:

Item, hoc videtur per rationem individuationis. In Angelis enim est distinctio hypostasum, non per originem. Fiat ergo talis ratio: omnis distinctio secundum numerum venit a principio intrinseco et substantiali, quia, omnibus accidentibus circumscriptis, differentia numero sunt diversa; sed non venit a forma: ergo venit a principio materiali: ergo, etc. . . . Si tu dicas, quod materia vocatur ipsa hypostasis, sive ipsum quod est, ego quaero a te de hypostasi: aut addit aliquid supra essentiam et formam, aut nihil. Si nihil addit, ergo non contrahit: ergo sicut ipsum universale est natum semper esse et ubique, sic ipsa hypostasis, sicut patet in divinis, quia persona non addit supra essentiam, sed est ubique et immensa, sicut essentia. Ergo cum hypostasis Angeli sit finita et arctata et limitata, et ita hic et nunc, necessario oportet, quod ultra formam addat aliquid arctans substantiale sibi; hoc autem non potest esse nisi materia.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, concl., vol. 2, pp. 414-415.

<sup>80</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, f. 3, vol. 2, pp. 89-90.

A very significant text deals with God and particularity: "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est finitum quod est hoc; dicendum, quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur per distinctionem ab eo quod est quale quid, et illud est hic et nunc, quia contractionem habet loci et temporis. Ad individuationem enim rei existentis in genere necessario comitantur accidentales proprietates, quarum collectionem in alio non est reperire. Non sic autem est de divino esse; licet enim divinum esse dicatur hoc propter summam completionem et discretionem ab omni alio esse, ipsum tamen non est in genere; ideo nec dicitur fieri hoc per contractionem sive per additionem vel materiae vel proprietatis accidentalitatis; et ideo sic est hoc quod non contrahitur ad hic et nunc sed est semper et ubique multo excellentius quam aliquid universale, quod ab esse particulari dependet et ratione illius aliquam admittit contractionem. Et ideo, licet esse universale sit finitum, tamen nihil impedit, quin divinum esse sit infinitum." *Q. D. De Mystero Trinitatis*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 11, vol. 5, p. 83.

Compare also: "Contra hoc: 1. obiicitur de universali, quoniam universale est semper et ubique, et tamen non est Deus. . . . — . . . nam Deus dicitur esse ubique ita quod ex parte Dei intelligitur identitas et totalitas, ex parte loci pluralitas et universalitas. Per compositionem identitatis excluditur universale, quod quamvis sit in omnibus singularibus, tamen secundum aliud et aliud suppositum et ita numeratur." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 37, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 1 and concl., vol. 1, pp. 642, 643; "Item, ubi est particulare, ibi est forma vel natura ut hic et nunc, sed divina natura sive in se sive in hypostati-bus non est hic et nunc, sed semper et ubique: ergo nec in se nec in hypostatibus

est ibi particulare." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 19, p. 2, q. 2, f. 3, vol. 1, p. 358; "Cum enim de natura singularis sit esse hic et nunc, tamen alicui dat Deus semper esse, ut Angeli, ergo pari ratione alicui dabit esse ubique." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 37, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4, vol. 1, p. 643, and answered by denial of the parity, because "infinitas sempiternitatis est . . . secundum potentiam;" "Aliqua creatura caret determinato loco et tempore, ut universale quod est semper et ubique." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 3, vol. 1, p. 159, and conceded in the answer; "Ratio . . . abstrahit universale quod est semper et ubique, a particulari quod est hic et nunc." *Sermo 2*, no. 9, vol. 5, p. 541; "Omne individuum est hic et nunc; sed corpus Christi est individuum: ergo est hic et nunc. Sed quod est hic et nunc est in loco definitive . . . — ultra rationem individui habet quod plura in ipsum convertantur in diversis locis." *In 4. Sent.*, d. 10, p. 1, q. 3, arg. 1 et ad 1, vol. 4, pp. 220, 221; "facere commune esse in hoc est ratio appropriandi"; dicendum quod illud habet veritatem, quando commune est appropriabile vel appropriatur per esse in hoc." *In 1. Sent.*, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2, vol. 1, p. 119.

These texts, generally speaking, deal with the notion that particularity involves being here and now. Does being in place involve particularity? Specifically, is matter in place of itself? Here is the way St. Bonaventure envisages this: "Ad oppositum: 1. nihil per se est in loco nisi quod est hic et nunc; et nihil est hic et nunc nisi quod est hoc aliquid; et nihil est hoc aliquid nisi quod est individuum; et omne tale est ens completum; ergo, a primo, nihil est in loco nisi quod est ens completum. Sed materia illa non erat ens completum: ergo in loco non habebat situm . . . —Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil est in loco nisi ens completum: dicendum, quod hoc est falsum si intelli-

The distinction between a universal and a thing is not in terms of "being"; both are. But the universal is "always and everywhere", while the thing is "here and now", and therefore in matter. In other words, the universal "is"; the thing both "is" and "exists".<sup>81</sup>

This doctrine is brought out from another point of view in the consideration of the relation of the Angel to place. An Angel is in place,<sup>82</sup> and indeed, in a corporeal place.<sup>83</sup> Angels of course, are not measured by the place in which they are. This is the sense in which we are to understand the Boethian adage that 'incorporeals are not in place'.<sup>84</sup> Why must the Angels be in some place?

Si enim non haberent aliquid continens, non esset eorum existentia ordinata ad invicem . . . Ratio autem quare continentur loco corporali duplex est: una scilicet limitatio ipsius spiritus creati . . . Quia enim simplicitas eius finita est, ideo est hic et nunc . . . Alia ratio est, quia in solo corpore est distinctio hic et ibi.<sup>85</sup>

Substantia spiritualis angelica . . . cum facta fuit, simul habuit distinctionem et ordinem; sed ordinem existentiae non habuit nisi in aliquo continente.<sup>86</sup> Item ratione videtur. Constat, quod Angeli non sunt creati sine loco, quia tunc unus non haberet ordinem ad alium secundum existentiam: oportuit ergo quod fieret empyreum.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, there are two reasons why the Angels must be in place. Since there are at least several Angels in each species, not all the Angels can be put into an order of essential perfection. Yet they must be ordered and distinct; hence, they must be distinguishable. The order and distinction of created things in so far as they are complete beings and individuals must be intrinsic, as we saw above. But within one species, such distinction cannot take place through form or essence. It must therefore take place through matter, and thus through relation to corporeal place.

The second reason why the Angels must be in place is that they are finite: that is, that they are here and now. But "here and there" are distinct only with reference to corporeal place.

A final and very interesting text on *existere* with respect to God:

Item, videtur quod causa materialis magis competat Deo quam aliquod genus causarum, quia materia in his inferioribus dat existentiam et permanentiam propter sui incorruptionem, unde fundamentum est existentiae creatae: sive ergo Deus sive divina essentia habet existentiam sive permanentiam per fundamentum incorruptibile, videtur quod Deo maxime competat ratio materialis principii, ergo, etc.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est fundamentum existentiae; dicendum, quod modus illius fundamenti Deo non competit, quia est

gatur de completionem perfecta," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 1 et ad 1, vol. 2, pp. 305, 306.

<sup>81</sup> E.g. "Corporalis vero lux non reperitur nisi in creatura, quae ad hoc ut per se existat, indiget sustentante materia," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4, vol. 2, p. 318; "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam, est notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de materia: aut secundum quod existit in natura, aut secundum quod consideratur ab anima . . . Est iterum loqui de materia, secundum quod habet esse in natura; et sic nunquam est praeter locum et tempus, sive praeter quietem et motum; et hoc modo non solummodo non congruit, immo etiam impossibile est, materiam informem existere

per privationem omnis formae," *In 2. Sent.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 2, p. 294; *ibid.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, f. 5, vol. 2, p. 452; *ibid.*, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, f. 6, vol. 2, p. 274. See also the second text, note 43.

<sup>82</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, vol. 2, p. 132; also in time: *ibid.*, d. 7, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl., p. 176; *ibid.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 4, concl., p. 84.

<sup>83</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl., vol. 2, p. 76.

<sup>84</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 1 and ad 1, vol. 2, pp. 76, 77.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, concl., p. 77.

<sup>86</sup> *In 2. Sent.*, d. 2, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., vol. 2, p. 68.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 3, p. 67.

fundamentum esse quod recipit aliunde, scilicet a forma; Deus autem a nullo recipit: ideo non cadit in eo materia.<sup>88</sup>

We can ascribe *existere* to God; this is affirmed in the objection, and not denied in the answer; indeed, it is implicit there. But the mode of *existere* in God is not that of the *existere* given by matter. We may add that God is not only here, but everywhere, and so, immense. But He is distinct from all creatures; even more distinct than a creature which is here and now; hence we can speak of the *existere* of God in place, in things, and so forth. But the Divine Essence is not in itself completely individual, it is communicated to the Three Divine Persons. Of the Divine Persons we can say that each Person is "this" Person. This is why St. Bonaventure says: *relationes dant Personis Divinis existere*.<sup>89</sup>

## X. CONCLUSIONS

*Existere* in its technical sense in St. Bonaventure means *esse hoc*. Since in created things, *esse hoc* involves being here and now, when *existere* is predicated of them, it means *esse hic et nunc, habere positionem in loco et tempore*, and the like. With regard to God, *esse hoc* can be applied in a somewhat loose sense to the Divine Essence, in so far as that Essence is completely distinct from creatures; strictly speaking, only the Divine Persons are "this"; and when predicated of Them, *existere* involves the *oppositio relativa*.

*Esse* in St. Bonaventure means essence, *forma totius*, specific form or species, "universal form", (essential) perfection, and *quo est*. "To be" means to be a being, a "what", an essence.

Neither of these two terms either means or involves existence. *Existere* is merely *esse hoc*, and thus adds to *esse*, not existence, but individuality, subsistence, permanence, and generally a relation to space and time. *Esse* does not mean existence; it means precisely essence. Nor does it involve existence, for universals "are". It is simply neutral to existence. By this I do not mean to say that St. Bonaventure didn't know that things exist, or that he was an idealist. Of course he knew that things exist, as does everybody. But for him the existence of things was no problem; it was taken for granted. His problem was a problem of formation: how things get to be "something", and how they can continue to be something. A beautiful text will sum up for us the Bonaventurian experience of created being:

Ex parte creaturae est necessitas [existendi Deum in omnibus], quia creatura habet in se possibilitatem et vanitatem, et utriusque causa est, quia producta est ex nihilo. Quia enim creatura est et accepit esse ab alio, qui eam fecit esse cum prius non esset, ex hoc non est suum esse, et ideo non est purus actus, sed habet possibilitatem; et ratione huius habet fluxibilitatem et variabilitatem, ideo caret stabilitate, et ideo non potest esse nisi per praesentiam eius qui dedit ei esse. Exemplum huius apertum est in impressione formae sigilli in aqua, quae non conservatur ad momentum, nisi praesente sigillo.—Et iterum, quia creatura de nihilo producta est, ideo habet vanitatem; et quia nihil vanum in se ipso fulcitur, necesse est, quod omnis creatura sustentetur per praesentiam Veritatis.<sup>90</sup>

Incidentally, this text shows us that there is a stability in "being" which comes from God alone, so much so that, as we saw before, "to be" is accidental to

<sup>88</sup> In 2. Sent., d. 19, p. 2, q. 3, arg. 3 and ad 3, vol. 2, pp. 360, 361.

<sup>89</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 7, dub. 4, sol., vol. 1, p.

145, and cf. note 80.

<sup>90</sup> In 1. Sent., d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl., vol. 1, pp. 638-39.

being; the stability which comes from matter is a stability in perseity, duration, distinctness, singularity.

What kind of distinction is to be admitted in the sets of terms we have been discussing? The distinction between matter and form is only indirectly pertinent; hence it is sufficient to say that everyone admits it to be real. The distinction between *esse* and *existere* is a logical distinction: because *existere* is *esse hoc*. The distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* is of itself a distinction of signification<sup>91</sup> and therefore a logical one.

We are now in a position to decide St. Bonaventure's stand on the real distinction of essence and existence. It is clear that he was not a proponent of such a real distinction; the texts alleged<sup>92</sup> require a quite different interpretation. Did he deny the real distinction? I find no evidence for that, either. All the textual evidence goes to show that existence is not a problem for the Seraphic Doctor. His fundamental outlook on being as "formed" involves an implicit denial of the real distinction of essence and existence, and the external historical situation was not yet such as to force him to state his mind. *Esse* for St. Bonaventure is simply an existentially neutral essence.

<sup>91</sup> See *supra*, V. *Form and Esse*, pp. 178-180 and note 48.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. note 3.

# Froissart as Poet

B. J. WHITING

FROISSART'S fame as a chronicler often obscures the fact that he was one of the most considerable poets in his age,<sup>1</sup> if judged only on the convenient basis of quantity. He found time to write very nearly sixty-five thousand lines of poetry, thus exhibiting an industry which may be compared to that of his teacher Guillaume de Machaut, with sixty thousand lines, Eustache Deschamps, with eighty thousand lines, and John Gower, with seventy-six thousand lines. Chaucer, by the by, produced a mere thirty-eight thousand lines.

We must admit at once that Froissart's poetry shows great inequalities of interest and merit, and that some of it is frankly and overwhelmingly dull. Froissart, however, does not deserve for this the censure and obliquy which lovers of his prose often devote to his verse. Without entering into the difference between fourteenth century taste and our own, let us at least remember that Petrarch had his *Africa*, Boccaccio his *De Genealogia Deorum*, and *De Casibus Virorum*, to say nothing of his *Filocolo*, and even Chaucer, in whom there is so little dross, his *Tale of Melibee* and *Parson's Tale*. In reality we ought to be grateful that much of Froissart's poetry can be read without relying solely on antiquarian curiosity or that odd melancholy pride in surmounting dullness which makes literary masochists of many students of mediaeval documents.

Froissart was not an innovator in poetry, and indeed the existence of his *Méliador* proves him, to that extent at least, an arch-conservative. In general he followed the literary current of his day, which was a crystal-clear, limpid stream, flowing with gently splashing melody over bright pebbles and between banks of lawn gay with flowers and festive with the lilting songs of birds. This stream ran, allegorically enough, out of the garden of the *Roman de la Rose*, and much of what Froissart did not owe to that great poem he got from Guillaume de Machaut, himself a disciple of Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun. Machaut's influence, as we shall see,<sup>2</sup> is clear in many of Froissart's poems, but, like Chaucer, and unlike Deschamps, Froissart is resolutely silent concerning the older poet.

The modern reader, if unwarned or unprepared, will sometimes think to find in certain of the poems of Froissart and his contemporaries a masculine attitude towards love at once absurd, mawkish, unmanly, unreal and ridiculously sterile. He may well wonder, half-afraid, if the poetical interpreters of courtly love were a group apart, silly, lacrymose and rabbit-like or if, perhaps, literary love and sexual love were two very different things which met only occasionally and spasmodically. Convention and practice, then as now, were conveniently disparate, and courtly love, of which there were more degrees than we are always aware, was a game which tried to indoctrinate a rough world with gentleness, courtesy, decency, restraint and comparative chastity. It taught respect for women in an age in which women, far more than men, must have suffered greatly from the ordinary circumstances of life. Unfortunately its ludicrous aspects are often more apparent than its worthy motives.

<sup>1</sup> The most recent account of Froissart's verse is in F. S. Shears, *Froissart, Chronicler and Poet* (London, 1930), especially pp. 192 ff.

<sup>2</sup> My references to Machaut are not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive,

and, in most cases, I have made no effort to point out verbal parallels between the two poets. There is a monograph, which I have not seen, by J. Geiselhardt, *Machaut und Froissart*, published, apparently at Jena, in 1914.

Machaut's effect on Froissart is generally beneficent, but there is one point where we are loath to think what might have happened had Froissart fallen under his master's spell. Froissart's original intention was to write his chronicle in rime, but he later changed his mind, perhaps because of the obvious merit of Jean le Bel's prose.<sup>3</sup> At the very time when Froissart was working on the first version of his prose chronicle Machaut produced an historical poem, nearly nine thousand lines in length, *La Prise d'Alexandrie*.<sup>4</sup> This work is a combined chronicle and biography of Peter of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, and its contents are valuable to those readers of Chaucer who remember that the Knight was "At Alisaundre . . . whan it was wonne,"<sup>5</sup> and that the Monk included an account of King Peter's death among his "modern instances."<sup>6</sup> *La Prise* is a readable poem, but often flat and always absurdly partisan, and it is fortunate that Froissart did not let its popularity divert him from his new course. Machaut indicates his principal sources of information and they, and their historical worth, are not without interest. The bulk of the poem deals with events from 1364 to Peter's death in 1369. For the campaigns Machaut depended in general on an account given him by Jean de Reims<sup>7</sup> and here he exhibits an accuracy and understanding far superior to the average chronicler. When, however, he comes to tell of Peter's assassination he relies on the statements of Gautier de Confians,<sup>8</sup> an informant who led him sadly astray. Machaut, followed in varying degrees by Froissart<sup>9</sup> and Chaucer, has Peter slain out of envy and malignity, with the active complicity of his brothers, and even with his mother's knowledge. Better informed local authorities tell a different story, and show that Peter was killed because his arrogance, injustice and stupid cruelty had become unbearable to his nobles.<sup>10</sup> While in this instance, to be sure, Froissart is no better than Machaut, and even worse, since he suggests that Peter's brother was suborned by the Turks and Tatars, his usual method of weighing authorities and verifying partisan accounts appears to advantage.

In the *Joli Buisson de Jonece*, composed not long after November 30, 1373,<sup>11</sup> Froissart lists his previous compositions:

Voirs est q'un livret fis jadis  
Qu'on dist l'Amourous Paradys,  
Et aussi celi de l'Orloge,  
Où grant part de l'art d'amours loge;  
Après, l'Espinette Amoureuse,  
Qui n'est pas a l'oïr ireuse;  
Et puis l'Amoureuse Prison,  
Qu'on pluisours places bien prise on;  
Rondeaus, balades, virelais,  
Grant foison de dis et de lays.<sup>12</sup>

There is no good reason to doubt that Froissart has here arranged his longer works in chronological order, and so we may well begin our discussion with the *Paradys d'Amour*.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In the Prologue to the *Chronicles* Froissart tells us that he took a rimed chronicle to England with him and presented it to Queen Philippa (*Chronicles*, ed. S. Luce, Société de l'Histoire de France [Paris, 1869-], I, 1, 210).

<sup>4</sup> Ed. L. de Mas Latrie, Société de l'Orient Latin (Geneva, 1877).

<sup>5</sup> *Canterbury Tales*, I[A], 51.

<sup>6</sup> VII[B], 2391 ff. [3581 ff.]

<sup>7</sup> P. 180, ll. 5938 ff.

<sup>8</sup> PP. 248, ll. 8018 f.; 254, ll. 8214 f.; 256, ll. 8286 f.; 261, ll. 8434 f.; 273, l. 8826.

<sup>9</sup> *Chronicles*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 25 vols. (Brussels, 1867-77), XI, 231 f.

<sup>10</sup> Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus*, ed. with a translation by R. M. Dawkins, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), I, 239 ff.; II, 137 f.

<sup>11</sup> *Oeuvres de Froissart, Poésies*, ed. A. Scheler, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1870-72), II, 26, ll. 859 f. All references to Froissart's verse, except for the *Méliador*, are to this edition.

<sup>12</sup> II, 14, ll. 443 ff.

<sup>13</sup> I, 1 ff.

The date of the *Paradys d'Amour* is uncertain, but the suggestion is acceptable that it was one of the poems which Froissart composed at the English court, where, as he tells us,<sup>14</sup> he wrote fair poems and amorous pieces as Queen Philippa's clerk. The influence of Machaut appears at once: the title of the poem seems to derive from one of Machaut's lays, *Le Paradis d'Amour*,<sup>15</sup> and the opening passage is indebted to Machaut's *Dit de la Fonteinne Amoureuse*. Then, too, the very first lines carry us from Froissart the imitator to Froissart the imitated, for Geoffrey Chaucer took the opening lines of his *Book of the Duchess* from the beginning of Froissart's poem. Not only that, but the *Book of the Duchess* owes much throughout to Machaut's poems, especially the *Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne* and the *Dit de la Fonteinne Amoureuse*, and one especially pleasing passage to the *Dit dou Lyon*. Nothing could symbolize much more clearly than this the dependence of the young Froissart on Machaut or of the young Chaucer on both Machaut and Froissart. We are, of course, tempted to picture Chaucer and Froissart together at the English court and to conjecture that the slightly older and more experienced youth from Hainault introduced the English boy to Machaut's poetry as well as to his own. Such imaginings are harmless, but beyond objective demonstration.

The poem itself is not a very happy specimen of Froissart's art. After a long bout of insomnia the poet by prayer achieves the blessed boon of sleep. In his inevitable dream he finds himself in a landscape straight out of the *Roman de la Rose*: trees, singing birds, a streamlet, roses, and lilies. He sits down better to hear the nightingales, and, almost without warning, the reader finds him pronouncing a formal and lacrymose complaint against Love in the manner and style of Machaut. This cleansing of his stuff'd bosom brings the dreamer no relief, nor are his feelings improved when two richly dressed and beautiful ladies appear from among the bushes and threaten to beat him for abusing their master in his own orchard. He protests innocence and ignorance of his offence and of their master, and they presently inform him that they are Pleasure and Hope, servants of the God of Love. The dreamer is properly impressed and Pleasure tells him that she, Love's favorite servant, brings lovers together by making them find each other attractive. Her discourse is salted with learned references to lovers of old, Achilles and Polyxena, Neptune and Equoulenta, Hero and Leander, but the dreamer, none the less, is still distressed about his own lady's attitude toward him. Hope now takes a hand, warns him against too much jealousy, urges him to keep her ever in mind, and promises to aid him against his enemies. He asks to be taken to Love, and they agree to conduct him to the god. On the way the ladies ask for a rondeau and get two, so apropos as to be clearly extemporaneous. As they proceed, singing high and clear, they meet various allegorical personages, Fair-appearance, Good-application, Sweet-regard, Free-wish, Desire, Hearing and Memory, accompanied by dogs and all the huntsmen of Love. Now they come to an open space in which is a great green-clad company of ladies, maidens and young men. These, it seems, are a distinguished assembly: Troilus, Paris, Lancelot (laughing at the moment), Tristram, Durmart (Drumas), Percival, Guiron, Lot, Galehaus, Modred, Meliadus, Erbaus (?), Tangis, Camels de Camois, Agravain, Bruns (?), Ywain, and Gawaine; Helen, the chatelaine of Vergi (one of Machaut's favorite heroines), Guenevere, Yseult (who had been listed already with Tristram), Hero, Polyxena, Echo (Equo) and Medea. Among the men a couplet<sup>16</sup> lists Meliador, knight of the Golden Sun, and this, since it

<sup>14</sup> *Chronicles*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, vols. (Paris, 1909), II, 345.  
XIV, 2.

<sup>15</sup> *Poésies Lyriques*, ed. V. Chichmaref, 2

<sup>16</sup> I, 30, II. 985 f.

puts that hero altogether too early, has been held to be a later interpolation.<sup>17</sup> All the other ladies and gentlemen, however, are enjoying themselves hugely in Love's Paradise.

The dreamer and his guides approach Love's pavilion among the trees, and Pleasure casually suggests that the dreamer compose a lay to offer to the god. The dreamer, with a slight show of spirit and creative pride, says that a lay is a long day's work, but admits that he has one already made and tucked away for just such an emergency.

Love receives him graciously, and, before the poet begins his lay, seats him at his own feet. This arrangement prevents the dreamer from observing the effects of his effusion on the god, but Pleasure is affable enough to tell him later that never before had she seen Love so moved. The lay is two hundred and thirty-nine lines long, and exposes once more the woes of the lover wounded by his mistress's beauty and seeking relief from Pity and Love. The richly varied verse form exhibits the metrical virtuosity which was Froissart's heritage as a fourteenth century French poet and, like the rest of the poem, it is adorned with a profusion of literary allusions, probably more learned in appearance than in fact. It must be said to Machaut's credit, that, fond as he was in his longer works of *exempla*, catalogues, and allusions, he could get through a lay the length of this without bringing in Pygmalion, Acteon, Melampus (a dog), Orpheus, Tantalus, Achilles, Narcissus, Eucalion (Deucalion?), Tristram, Paris, Lot, Jason, Hippomenes, and Atlanta.

The god, at least, is pleased with the lay, promises the dreamer a fitting reward, and orders Pleasure and Hope to take him for a walk in the garden. Out in the shadowy wood he recites a virelay and they sing it in unison. They come to a meadow and in it, to his surprise and joy, he finds his lady. After a scene of gay and loving badinage, more pleasing than many such, the lady sits down to make him a chaplet of daisies, which moves the dreamer to recite a ballade to that little flower. This is justly one of Froissart's most admired ballades, and begins:

Sus toutes fleurs tient on la rose à belle,  
Et en après, je croi, la violette;  
La fleur de lys est belle, et la perselle;  
La fleur de gay est plaisans et parfette;  
Et li pluisour aiment moult l'anquellie,  
Le pyone, le muget, la soussie.  
Cascune fleur a par li son merite;  
Mès je vous di, tant que pour ma partie,  
Sus toutes fleurs j'aime la margherite.<sup>18</sup>

Pleasure, who says she never heard the ballade before, praises it, and so does his lady. The latter gives the dreamer the chaplet to kiss, and after kissing it herself, puts it on his head. At this moment Pleasure strikes him and with a start the dreamer wakes, to find himself in his bed and to reflect on his dream.

We have observed that the regular flow of Froissart's octosyllabic couplets is frequently broken by the insertion of lyrics in differing meters. This variation is probably due to the example of Machaut who, although it was nothing really novel, did it most systematically in his *Remede de Fortune* and *Livre de Voir-Dit*.

The *Orloge Amoureux*<sup>19</sup> is a roccoco piece, eleven hundred and seventy-four decasyllabic lines of monstrous allegory, in which the poet compares himself

<sup>17</sup> See p. 214 below.

<sup>18</sup> I, 49, ll. 1627 ff.

<sup>19</sup> I, 53 ff.



to a clock, whose machinery and movements may be equated with the sweet and painful processes of love. In the next century Martin le Franc recommended the poem admiringly in his *Champion des Dames*<sup>20</sup> and it is doubtless of lively interest to students of chronometry and of mediaeval mechanics, but to most others, it is difficult, diffuse, dull and unrewarding.

The *Espinette Amoureuse*<sup>21</sup> is, in a way, highly characteristic of Froissart's verse, for it contains some of the most charming and appealing passages in mediaeval literature alongside typical, conventional and prosy disquisitions on a luckless lover. There are few accounts of childhood, and certainly no other from the Middle Ages, as delightfully detailed as that which appears early in the poem:

Jamès je ne fusse lassés  
A juer aux jus des enfans  
Tels qu'il prenent dessous douse ans.<sup>22</sup>

Mediaeval fondness for cataloguing, satirized gently by Chaucer in *The Tale of Sir Thopas*, is nowhere better illustrated or shown to better advantage than in the list of childish games and *divertissements* which he reels off, some of them, unfortunately, without meaning to us. A piece of tile would serve to dam a rill and make a body of water sufficient to float a small vessel, or again tiles would do to make a mill beside the riverlet. For a change small folk could play at *papelottes* (?), or, a tellingly keen reminiscence, wash their shirts and hoods and undershirts in the stream. A favorite trick was to make a feather float down the wind, and little Jean often sifted dust through his shirt into a nutshell, and was a great fellow at compounding mud balls. He would set himself to make reed pipes, and there was seldom such a butterfly chaser. When he was able to catch any of the diurnal lepidoptera he would tie a thread to them and let them go again to make them fly. He didn't care for such absorbing big games as dice, chess or backgammon, but preferred to make pastries, biscuits, custards and little tarts of mud; four tiles made an oven in which to put these works of art.

Et quant ce venoit au quaresme,  
J'avoie, dessous une escame,  
D'escafottes un grand grenier,  
Dont ne vosisse nul denier.  
Et lors, sus une relevée,  
Avec l'escafotte trauée,  
Juoie avec ceuls de no rue,  
Et tout ensi qu'on hoce et rue,  
Je leur disoie: "Hociés hault,  
Car vraiment cape me fault."  
Et quant la lune estoit serine,  
Moult bien à la prince merine  
Juiens. Aussi, en temps d'esté,  
A tels jus ai je bien esté  
Plus marris au departement  
Que ne fusse au commencement;  
Vis m'estoit qu'on me fasoit tort  
Quant on m'avoit dou ju estort.

<sup>20</sup> Gaston Paris, "Un Poème Inédit de  
Martin Le Franc," *Romania*, XVI (1887),  
409.

<sup>21</sup> I, 87 ff.

<sup>22</sup> I, 91, ll. 148 ff.

Puis juiens à un aultre jeu  
 Qu'on dist à la keuve leu leu;  
 Et aussi au trottot merlot,  
 Et aux pierettes, au havot,  
 Et au piloter, ce me samble.  
 Et quant nous estions ensamble,  
 Aux poires juiens tout courant,  
 Et puis au larron Engerrant,  
 Et aussi à la brimbetelle,  
 Et à deux bastons qu'on restelle.  
 Et s'ai souvent, d'un bastoncel,  
 Fait un cheval nommé Grisel;  
 Et souvent aussi fait avons  
 Hyaumes de nos chaperons;  
 Et moult souvent, devant les filles,  
 Nos bastions de nos kokilles.<sup>23</sup>

And so the games run on, becoming less and less comprehensible to modern ears, until Froissart says:

A tel jus, et à plus assés,  
 Ai je esté moult souvent lassés.<sup>24</sup>

Life was not all mud pies and butterflies, but even school had its charms:

Et quant on me mist à l'escole,  
 Où les ignorans on escole,  
 Il y avoit des pucelletes  
 Qui de mon temps erent jonettes;  
 Et je, qui estoie puceaus,  
 Je les servioie d'espinceaus,  
 Ou d'une pomme, ou d'une poire,  
 Ou d'un seul anelet de voire;  
 Et me sambloit, au voir enquerre,  
 Grant proëce à leur grasce acquerre.<sup>25</sup>

Somewhat later he had to learn Latin and was beaten if he couldn't recite his lessons correctly, and he was whipped again if he fought with other boys and came home with torn clothes. But that did not keep him from playing with his companions, for he hated thoroughly to be alone.<sup>26</sup>

What follows is regrettably less personal. Early one morning in the jolly month of May the poet goes into a lovely little garden, and there, sitting beneath a hawthorn bush and looking into the blue sky, he is drawn into a waking dream. He sees three beautiful ladies accompanied by a youth, and the last, whose name is not Ansel, but Mercury,<sup>27</sup> calls the poet by name, and introduces his companions as Juno, Venus and Pallas, and, almost before he realizes it, the poet has ratified Paris's award of the fatal apple to the goddess of Love. At this all the divine company vanish save Venus, who lingers to

<sup>23</sup> I, 92 f., ll. 185 ff.

<sup>24</sup> I, 94, 247 f.

<sup>25</sup> I, 88, ll. 35 ff.

<sup>26</sup> I, 94, ll. 249 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Trois dames et un jouvencel.  
 On ne l'appelloit pas Ansel,

Ains Mercurius avoit nom (I, 99, ll. 397 ff.). There may be some local reference in the use of *Ansel*, but it seems rather like the mild humor of the Pardoner's "Nat Samuel, but Lamuel, seye I" (*Canterbury Tales*, VI[C], 585).

tell him that for his wisdom he will always have a gay, jolly and amorous heart, and that for at least ten years he will be the servant of a beautiful and noble lady. The poet as he looks back is certain of the reality of his experience because it was not long after that he came upon his Fate as she was reading *Cléomadès* at just six o'clock in the morning.<sup>28</sup> They read aloud to each other and even the marvellous horse, so like the one of which Chaucer's Squire told,<sup>29</sup> cannot keep the poet's heart from being pierced by an arrow from the lady's eye:

Adont laissames nous le lire  
Et entrames en aultres gengles,  
Mès ce furent parolles sengles,  
Ensi que jones gens s'esbatent  
Et qu'en wiseuses il s'embaient  
Pour euls deduire et solacier  
Et pour le temps aval glacier.<sup>30</sup>

Is the poet's protestation due, perhaps, to his memory of a less innocent pair who read a less innocent romance until, kissing in shuddering ecstasy, they read no more that day?

Their conversations, apparently lightly literary, continue, and one day she asks him for a book. He gives her the *Baillieu d'Amours*, otherwise unknown, and is so greatly daring as to tuck between its pages an amorous little ballade sufficiently noncommittal to deceive scandalmongers. This ballade, the first of the many interpolated lyrics in the *Espinette*, he finds still in the book when she returns it. Not too much disheartened he seizes an opportunity to present her with a rose. Her gracious and smiling acceptance sends him into such a state that he dashes back to the rosebush and composes a virelay. At a dance he has the temerity to talk of his love for her, and she puts him off, gently but firmly. Later he becomes jealous because she smiles on others as affably as on him; indeed she laughs and smiles so much that the modern reader is inclined to view it as a nervous habit, perhaps a variety of tic. Now, on the advice of a friendly damsel, he writes her a ballade and when his lady's only comment is "He's asking for a lot!"<sup>31</sup> he becomes very melancholy and goes about in the dumps for two or three days, with his head down and his hat over his eyes, comparing himself to Leander, Achilles and Acteon and mentally committing his body to earth and his soul to God. A glimpse of his lady, however, can cure all this and he leads, on the whole, a happy life.

One sad day he learns that her marriage is being discussed, and he promptly falls into a fever which lasts three months and a half<sup>32</sup> and from which he wellnigh dies. Sick as he is he composes a ballade, in which he says that he'll die like Tristram, in the despair of love. He is especially distressed by thirst and heat and his physician has forbidden him to drink or to get out of bed. In his anguish he thinks of his lady and proceeds to compose a complaint. This lyric outburst is almost eight hundred lines in length, modelled on Machaut's complaint of exactly the same length in the *Fonteinne Amoureuse*.

<sup>28</sup> "Droitement sus l'eure de prime" (I, 107, l. 696).

<sup>29</sup> For the relationship of Adenès li Rois's *Cléomadès* to the *Squire's Tale*, see H. S. V. Jones in W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster, *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales* (Chicago, 1941), pp. 364 ff. Again, there is a great temptation to suggest that Froissart introduced Chaucer to the

*Cléomadès* in the early 1360s and that the magic horse remained safely stabled in the back of Chaucer's memory until he found a place for it in the *Squire's Tale*.

<sup>30</sup> I, 108, ll. 746 ff.

<sup>31</sup> "Ce qu'il demande, c'est grant chose." (I, 124, l. 1296).

<sup>32</sup> I, 156 f., ll. 2366 f.

Machaut describes his sensations after hearing the unknown gentleman recite his complaint:

Et encor moult bien esprouvay  
Qu'il y avoit, dont j'eus merveilles,  
Cent rimes toutes despareilles.<sup>33</sup>

Froissart's last stanza begins:

Dame, cent clauses despareilles,  
Pour vostre amour n'est pas merveilles,  
Ai mis en rime.<sup>34</sup>

The first quarter of the complaint is devoted to the story of Apollo and Daphne, which he twice claims to have taken from Ovid,<sup>35</sup> and the recurrent statement that his woes are as bad or worse furnishes a theme for this long interpolation which acts as an effective break in the continuity of the poem. It is perhaps only fair to Froissart to note here that he did not follow the pretty general example of Machaut<sup>36</sup> by taking his account of Apollo and Daphne from the *Ovide Moralisé*.

The poet determines to travel to regain his health, and his departure is cheered by the gift, relayed to him by the friendly damsel, of a mirror which had reflected his lady's face for three years. He gives us a lively account of his trip to the sea port, where he found many others waiting to take ship. With his companions, who have been conjectured to be some of the many hostages who went to England in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brétigny (October, 1360), he set sail, and at once began to compose rondeaux to his lady. It was not long before the wind rose and a storm fell upon the ship. The sailors cried out, water came into the boat, the sail was lowered, and if the horses in the hold had not served as ballast the company would have been in a bad way. Did Master Froissart help the sailors to pull on the ropes? Not at all. He composed another rondeau which began, appropriately enough:

On doit amer et prisier  
Joieuse merancolie.<sup>37</sup>

The storm goes down at last, however, and they land safely in England, which Froissart, without naming, describes as a land that hates peace more than war, but a place of many pleasures where strangers, especially himself, are well received.<sup>38</sup> The realism of all this is somewhat shaken by its similarity to Machaut's description in the *Fonteinne Amoureuse*<sup>39</sup> of Jean de Berry's trip to the coast and embarkment for England in 1360. Duke Jean also sang a rondeau as soon as he got on shipboard.

Once in England even his friendly reception cannot quiet the pangs of love and he gets a rather gloomy pleasure out of his mirror, wishing that he might see in it the features of his beloved; one night in his sleep he dreams that he sees her in the mirror. At first he thinks that she must be in the room, but after telling himself at some length the story of Papirus and Ydorée, which he ascribes cheerfully to Ovid, he keeps still long enough for her to recite a

<sup>33</sup> *Oeuvres de Guillaume de Machaut*, ed. Ernest Hoepffner, Société des Anciens Textes Français, 3 vols. (Paris, 1908-1921), III, 180, ll. 1050 ff.

<sup>34</sup> I, 156, ll. 2339 ff.

<sup>35</sup> I, 134, l. 1637; 138, l. 1762.

<sup>36</sup> C. de Boer, *Ovide Moralisé*, Verhan-

delingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam. Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, XV (1915), 28 ff.

<sup>37</sup> I, 162, ll. 2526 f.

<sup>38</sup> I, 162, ll. 2540 ff.

<sup>39</sup> III, 242 f., ll. 2789 ff.

lyric of comfort, some two hundred and forty lines in length. The lady, whose appearance at this point owes much to a similar scene in Machaut's *Fonteinne Amoureuse*<sup>40</sup>, makes a very forthright declaration of affection, the practical application of which is tempered by her fear of scandal. She refers to many ancient lovers, Tristram and Iseult, Lancelot and Guenevere, Hero and Leander, Medea and Jason, and she speaks of Phoebus and Daphne<sup>41</sup> in such a way as to suggest that Froissart may have used the *Ovide Moralisé* after all.

The effect of the dream is to make him feel that he must go home again, and so he composes a nostalgic virelay which he gives to "the lady who held him in that country,"<sup>42</sup> Queen Philippa, no doubt, who grants him permission to leave, and also gifts. Home again he does not dare to approach his lady directly, but goes one night to look longingly through a window at a gay scene in the midst of which she is dancing, arrayed in a handsome jacket. He is sure that he wouldn't be wanted inside, and so retires, only to be told next day that he would have been very welcome. He meets her finally and stands in abashed silence, while his eye and heart engage in a lively debate. She breaks the ice by asking him what kind of a trip he had had, and soon we find him reciting a virelay. They meet from time to time, sit idly and happily in fair gardens while maidens pick flowers to throw on them, and the play courtship goes smoothly, if not rapidly, sweetened by an occasional ballade. They have a picnic breakfast, with pastries, ham, wine and venison, seated beneath a bush white with flowers.<sup>43</sup> At long last he brings his faint courage to the point where he dares ask her to let him be her servant, and great is his joy at her acquiescence. But alas! Male Bouche is there, who upbraids the lady for travelling thus with the poet. If Male Bouche could have seen the goings-on that occurred when Machaut and his Peronne went on a pilgrimage in the *Voir-dit*<sup>44</sup> she might well have had something to say, but Froissart, though doubtless with the *Voir-dit* in mind, paints an almost shockingly innocent scene. At all events, the lady is frightened lest she lose her good name and says that they must not see each other for a time. He obeys her at first, but finally he can't help but speak to her, and calls her "sweet friend." Her reply is pointed enough, "no 'friend' for you here,"<sup>45</sup> and to add indignity, in passing she pulls out some of his hair. Little can be said after this although he tries to interpret the gesture as an act of affection,<sup>46</sup> and, following a ballade and a lay, both full of conventional protestations, the poem ends with a coy confession that in it may be found the name of the poet and his lady.<sup>47</sup> Sure enough, if we turn back, as Scheler<sup>48</sup> noted long ago, to lines 3380-3383 we can easily put together Jehan Froissart and Margherite. Anagrams are common in Machaut's poems, but nowhere does the older poet employ so simple a one as this.<sup>49</sup>

There are two puzzling autobiographical passages in the poem. The first<sup>50</sup> (ll. 794-5) states that he had visited Narbonne, gone through France and been

<sup>40</sup> III, 199 ff., ll. 1569 ff., esp. 219 ff., ll. 2145 ff.

<sup>41</sup> I, 171, ll. 2859 f.

<sup>42</sup> I, 179, 3123 f.

<sup>43</sup> I, 195, ll. 3653 ff.

<sup>44</sup> Ed. P. Paris, *Le Livre du Voir-dit* (Paris, 1875).

<sup>45</sup> "Point d'amie ci pour vous" (I, 198, l. 3777).

<sup>46</sup> "There is a note of mockery in the final scene in which the lady dismisses her lover by violently pulling his hair! Are we to

imagine that the poet is as naive as he would appear when he interprets this gesture as a mark of affection?" (F. S. Shears, *Froissart*, p. 205). The poet may not have been too naive.

<sup>47</sup> I, 209, ll. 4141 ff.

<sup>48</sup> I, 388 f.

<sup>49</sup> See E. Hoepffner, "Anagramme und rätselgedichte bei G. de Machaut," *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, XXX (1906), 401 ff.

<sup>50</sup> I, 110, ll. 794-5.

at Avignon. This early trip to Avignon is referred to in the *Chronicles*,<sup>51</sup> and beyond these two references we have no evidence. The statement that his patroness in England gave him leave to return to Hainault gives trouble, and led Kervyn de Lettenhove to assume that he first went to England in 1356, came back to Hainault and returned again to England in 1361. The evidence of the *Chronicles* is against this, and it has been rejected. The passage could be explained if we were to believe that the *Espinette Amoureuse* had been written at and for the English court, and that Froissart made Philippa say what he would like to have her say. This is mere supposition and assuredly makes Froissart guilty of strong hinting, but there are ample parallels in mediaeval poems.

Whatever the place of composition of the *Espinette Amoureuse*, Froissart surely wrote *Le Debat dou Cheval et dou Levrier*,<sup>52</sup> for the amusement of the English court soon after his return from his Scottish expedition in 1365.<sup>53</sup> This most delightful of Froissart's occasional poems is short enough and attractive enough to warrant its quotation in translation:

Froissart was coming back from Scotland on a horse which was grey, and leading a white greyhound. "Alas," said the greyhound, "I'm getting tired. Grisel, when are we going to rest? It's time for us to eat."

"You're tired?" said the horse, "If you had had to carry a man and a bag up hill and down dale you might have some reason to say: 'Wicked was the hour when my mother bore me!'"

The dog said: "It's certain enough, but you are big, fat and square built and you have four shod feet and I'm always barefoot; the pain is much greater for me than it is for you who are both large and strong, for I have only a little body. Indeed people call me a hare-dog (*levrier*), made for people's sport. And you are ordained and made to carry a man and his burden. When we once come to the inn, our master, without thinking of himself, will bring you fodder. If he sees that you are in pain he will throw his cloak over your back, and from then on you can rest, and I have to crouch down there. He never comes to me pleasantly."

"I believe you very well," replied Grisel, "You hold my advantages up to me all right; perhaps I don't count yours! Would God I were a dog as you are by nature! Then I'd have bread and butter in the morning and rich soup! I know well enough what he feeds you on: if he doesn't have but one decent morsel you get your jaws on your part. And you have a good time everywhere: no one dares to hit you or beat you, but when I don't go at a good trot no one says anything to me, but he does strike me with the spurs on his heels enough to make me whinny. If you had to suffer what I do, by Saint Honestatius (*Honestasse*), you certainly might say, 'Tired!'"

Said the dog, "You ought to fuss! As soon as it's time to put out the candle they rub you, scratch and curry you, and cover you up against the distemper and they clean your feet, too. They see to it that you're happy, and slap you on the back and say, 'Get your rest now, Grisel, for you have certainly deserved the fodder you've eaten here.' And then they make a litter for you of clean straw or ferns, and there you are supposed to rest. But I have other things to think about; for people put me behind a door, and often before an entry, and say, 'Now you guard the house.' And if the people inside (*the servants?*) take anything then I get all the blows. For if anyone covers up bread, flesh, butter or milk with a napkin, and the maid or boy eats it by any chance, all the blame falls on me, and they say, 'Who's been here? That dog!' and I hadn't

<sup>51</sup> Ed. Luce (Miroir), XII, 228 f.

<sup>52</sup> II, 216 ff.

<sup>53</sup> *Chronicles*, ed. Luce, I, 269; ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, XIII, 219.

tasted a bit of it! Then am I, without cause, in danger of being beaten. But people don't require a single thing of you except that you make your day's trip."

"But now I beg you to hurry up, for right in front of us I see a town with a great bell-tower; our master will want to eat there, you will have fodder and even I some plain food. So I beg you and encourage you to go at a gallop." Grisel replied, "So I will do, for I have a great desire to eat." Froissart came to the town and their deliberation ceased.

One is a little surprised that the dog's remarks have never been used as a basis for a description of the kind of household Froissart kept in London. We owe this charming poem to Scotland, but we can feel less gratitude to her for having furnished Froissart with place names, which he altered grotesquely, and ideas for the setting of his tedious romance *Méliador*.

The *Prison Amoureuse*<sup>54</sup> is a curious piece, the continuity of which is broken not only by interpolated lyrics but also by an exchange of prose letters between the poet and an "unknown" lover who signs himself Rose. The two correspondents swap poems and it is certain that the unknown is Wenceslas of Brabant and that the *Prison Amoureuse* was written to ease the duke's imprisonment subsequent to the battle of Bastweiler in 1371. Froissart's debt to Machaut is here very great. The idea of poetical comfort for a prisoner was suggested by Machaut's *Confort d'Ami*, written for King Charles of Navarre, imprisoned by the French king between April 1356 and November 1357. The exchange of prose letters and lyrics is modelled closely on Machaut's *Livre du Voir-Dit* (1363-1364) and the very name of the poem was probably borrowed from Machaut. The figure of an amorous prison, that is a prison in which a lover is confined by his affection, usually unreciprocated, for his lady, was painfully common in mediaeval poetry and especially dear to Machaut. The refrain of one of his ballades is "Pris de rechief en prison amoureuse",<sup>55</sup> the phrase occurs in still another ballade,<sup>56</sup> and elsewhere he speaks of a "prison joieuse"<sup>57</sup> and a "prison delitouse".<sup>58</sup>

Froissart's poem begins with kind words for Love, which are followed by a brief but admiring characterization of Alexander's liberality and more extensive praise for king John of Bohemia, whose generosity is lauded, and his heroic death at Crécy described. Here, as in the *Chronicles* and the *Temple d'Onnour*, Froissart persists in naming the king of Bohemia Charles, which is strange, since this very poem is written for the blind king's son. Machaut, incidentally, writes often of King John, whose secretary, almsgiver and court poet he was for many years, but, as it happens, never calls him by his given name.<sup>59</sup>

Froissart continues to hope that Love will be well-disposed to him, lists a few true but hapless lovers, and produces a new virelay about his cruel mistress. The virelay pleases the lady and he attends a dance, which calls to his mind an incident of the journey he had made with Duke Lionel in 1368; they had been entertained magnificently by Count Amé of Savoy, and there had been marvels of beauty, dance and song.<sup>60</sup> Inspired by his memory the poet sings another virelay, but his lady responds with one which hurts his feelings, for she says that she is never so happy as when she sees her lover sad, since sadness fits him so well. After much soul-searching he decides to give up public melancholy and amuses himself very well for a time, but the sorrows of a lover can never be long forgotten or concealed. When his woes become almost unbearable, Love sends him something to take his mind off his

<sup>54</sup> I, 211 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Chichmaref, I, 50.

<sup>56</sup> I, 137, l. 10.

<sup>57</sup> I, 103, l. 9.

<sup>58</sup> I, 127, l. 15.

<sup>59</sup> Hoefnager, *Oeuvres de G. de Machaut*, III, XIX, n. 3.

<sup>60</sup> I, 222, ll. 363 ff.

cares, and he receives out of the blue a letter from someone who signs himself Rose, and who declares that he has taken that name because his lady is sovereign of other ladies as the rose is of other flowers. Rose evidently knows less about Froissart than do the readers of the poem, because he hopes to be told how to succeed in Love. Physician, heal thyself! He encloses a ballade of his own composition.

Froissart's reply to Rose is in a modest vein, but contains counsel, encouragement to continue the correspondence, and a ballade. While awaiting Rose's reply the poet tries to hit on a pseudonym for himself. Shall it be the name of bird, beast, or tree? No, rather that of a flower. Shall he call himself violet? He doesn't know, but it is certainly a sweet little flower. There are so many lovely flowers that he finally adopts the very general Flos,<sup>61</sup> but shows his inevitable partiality by selecting the daisy (*marguerite*) for his signet ring. From Rose's second letter we learn that he has written an epistle, which he quotes, to his lady and sung her a virelay which he encloses. Froissart carries the letters and poems about in his pouch and they bring him a wonderfully exciting and titulating experience. He is one day in the company of his lady and a group of her friends, all equally young, laughing and fun-loving girls. The innocent rogues begin to wonder what he carries so carefully in his wallet and, charmingly free from inhibitions, they soon have it open. When he becomes aware of this he tries to retrieve his property and, words meeting only mocking words in reply, he attempts force. A battle royal ensues from which the poet emerges damaged in person, attire and pride.<sup>62</sup> With pompous and injured dignity he declares that he doesn't care to have his secrets thus exposed. The word "secrets" makes his lady, no doubt apprehensive as to their nature, intervene on his behalf, and he is allowed to ransom his letters by means of Rose's two lyrics. The rest of the day is a genteel paroxysm of fun, frolic and song.

Rose's next letter requests that the poet send him a little amorous ditty. Froissart, nothing loath, complies with the story, six hundred and seventy-two lines long, of Pynoteüs and Neptisphele. Here he is using a device resorted to more than once by Machaut to postpone the awful moment when his *Voir-Dit* would die for lack of substance. Pynoteüs was a poet, who was accustomed to meet his sweetheart Neptisphele in a garden. One day a vagrant lion ate the lady. At Pynoteüs's demand the criminal beast was executed by his fellow animals. Pynoteüs made a statue of his lost love and addressed to Apollo a long prayer, in which he thoughtfully told the god the story of Phaethon, that the statue might come to life. It did.

Froissart twice gives Ovid as his source,<sup>63</sup> but this rifacimento of the story of Pyramus and Thisbe, flavored with Pygmalion and a strong dash of Orpheus, has not been found in the works of the Roman poet.

Rose does not reply for some time; in fact there are nine months of silence, during which the poet composes three ballades which he puts away in a nice little leather box, and begins a lay. The reason for Rose's long neglect becomes all too evident when his letter finally arrives and is accompanied by a ditty telling the story of one of his dreams. Rose's dream runs to very nearly twelve hundred lines and under its lush and amorous allegory lurks the sad story of Duke Wenceslas of Brabant's defeat and capture by the Duke of Gelderland

<sup>61</sup> "Flos en latin, fleur en français" (I, 241, l. 890).

<sup>62</sup> Là fui je boutés et sâciés  
Et detirés et embraciés

Par jambes, par corps et par bras,  
Sans noient espargnier mes draps  
(I, 251, ll. 1133 ff.).

<sup>63</sup> I, 257, l. 1297; 277, l. 1991.



in 1371 and his subsequent imprisonment, and ends with the lively expectation that he will soon be freed by his brother, the Emperor Charles. Froissart, who finds the dream new and pleasant, returns an explanation of it in terms of courtly love and, for good measure, throws in a similar interpretation of the story of Pynoteüs and Neptisphelé. He also forwards the three ballades. Now he turns to his unfinished lay and by the time it is completed he hears once more from Rose who requests that all their letters, ditties, ballades and virelays should be assembled into one volume and given a suitable title. Froissart complies and sends the book, called the *Prison Amoureuse*, off to Rose, with a wish that he may receive some reward for it. We may remember that Machaut's *Voir-Dit* had been put together on the insistence of Peronne.

The *Prison Amoureuse* is far less interesting than its model which, for all its dull passages, contains an amazingly lively picture of Peronne, as shameless a little minx as peeks at us out of the Middle Ages. Her audacious pursuit of Machaut, certainly one eyed, and probably over sixty, is in scandalous, if refreshing, contrast to the coy and breathless fencings of the usual heroine of *l'amour courtois*.

The *Dit dou Bleu Chevalier*,<sup>44</sup> whose title takes us back to a poem by another poet of Hainault, Jean de Condé's *Lays dou Blanc Chevalier*, has the infinite merit of being short, and is otherwise an engaging piece, the broad outline of which was doubtless suggested by Machaut's *Fonteinne Amoureuse*. It used to be thought that Froissart's poem inspired the *Complaint of the Black Knight*, once held to be Chaucer's and now ascribed to Lydgate, but the latter poem seems rather to stem directly from the *Fonteinne Amoureuse*, with a reminiscence from another of Machaut's poems, the *Jugement dou Roy de Behaingne*.

The poet goes for a walk one day late in April and his wandering footsteps carry him into a wood, rich with the song of blackbird and redwing and the sweet nightingale. There he sees approaching a knight clad all in blue, the traditional color of faithfulness in love, and singing a pleasing song in French. The stranger is apparently of a mercurial nature, for now he weeps, now sings again, now sits beneath a hawthorn and laments the woes of a hapless love, and then resolutely rises and goes on, singing gaily once more in despite of Fortune. The poet follows him as he traces a rill to its fountain head, where he washes his face and permits his emotions to carry him through one crisis and into another. When he falls to the earth the watcher fears that death may have taken him and rushes to his side. The poet's comforting words bring the sufferer from his swoon and each recognizes the other, the poet with especial surprise at the high rank of his acquaintance. In the conversation which follows the poet urges the knight to eschew the despair of Pyramus and Leander, a strangely ill assorted pair for his purpose, and to emulate rather the wise Socrates. He must not allow the despair of love to keep him, as it is doing, from chivalrous deeds. Let him remember that Tristram, Iwain, Lancelot, Guiron and Perceval all loved and did bold feats of arms and in the end were recompensed for their devotion and daring. Despite the knight's not unreasonable objection that the heroes of romance had received more initial encouragement than his lady has ever given him, he allows himself to be comforted. Indeed he goes so far as to request the poet to put the whole affair into a poem. The poet tries in vain to learn the lady's name, and then the two part, the knight on his solitary way, and the poet to compose his poem. We may assume that the poem was written for one of Froissart's noble friends or patrons, but there is little likelihood that the blue knight can be identified.

The *Joli Buisson de Jonece*<sup>45</sup> is nearly fifty-five hundred lines long and its

<sup>44</sup> I, 348 ff.

<sup>45</sup> II, 1 ff.

allegorical mass is not quite sufficiently lightened by the autobiographical details, the numerous allusions to heroes of antiquity and romance, or even by the genuine gaiety of some of the twenty odd interpolated lyrics. The body of the poem recounts, with painful particularity, a dream which took place on the night of November 30th, 1373, and we are certainly justified in concluding that the poem was composed during the months following that date. The dream is introduced by some eight hundred lines of an autobiographical nature, parts of which are introspective and difficult of exact interpretation.

Nature, Froissart tells us, had given him an ability to compose pleasing songs and in his youth he followed Nature gladly. Circumstances, however, forced him to suppress his literary talent and devote himself rather to business activities of some sort.<sup>66</sup> His conscience troubled him for his apostasy to poetry and finally Philosophy came and held long discourse with him urging strongly that he take up versification again. At her request the poet gave a recital of an impressive and at times rollicking list of patrons and patronesses, which began with the late queen of England, and her daughter-in-law, Blanche of Lancaster:

La bonne, qui pourist en terre,  
Qui fu roïne d'Engleterre;  
Phelippe ot nom la noble dame,  
Propisces li soit Diex à l'ame!  
J'en sui bien tenus de pryer  
Et ses largheces escriyer,  
Car elle me fist et créa;  
Ne onques voir ne s'effréa,  
Ne ne fu son coer saoulés,  
De donner le sien à tous lés.  
Aussi sa fille de Lancastre—  
Haro! mettés moi une emplastre  
Sus le coer, car, quant m'en souvient,  
Certes souspirer me couvient,  
Tant sui plains de melancolie.  
Elle mourut jone et jolie,  
Environ de vingt et deux ans;  
Gaie, lie, friche, esbatans,  
Douce, simple, d'umblé samblance;  
La bonne dame ot à nom Blanche.<sup>67</sup>

Some of the adjectives applied to Blanche were, no doubt, conventional, and the demand for an *emplastre* is perhaps dangerously close to the Host's demand for "triale" at the conclusion of the *Physician's Tale*,<sup>68</sup> but nonetheless the picture we get of John of Gaunt's lost lady is clear-cut, though not, of course, as detailed and telling as that given by Chaucer in the *Book of the Duchess*. The list goes on with Philippa's daughter Isabel, wife of Enguerrand VII of Couci, himself mentioned a few lines later, Edward III, the earl of Hereford (Humphrey de Bohun), Walter de Manny, the earl of Pembroke (John Hastings), Edward le Despenser; then some fourteen continental personages, among them Charles of France, Albert of Bavaria, and Louis de Bourbon, and finally:

<sup>66</sup> II, 4, 94 ff. This statement, like so many details of Froissart's early life, is extremely obscure.

<sup>67</sup> II, 8, ll. 231 ff.

<sup>68</sup> *Canterbury Tales*, VI (C), 312 ff.

Haro, que fai! je me bescoce;  
 J'ai oublié le roy d'Escoce,  
 Et le bon conte de Duglas,  
 Avec qui j'ai mené grant glas.  
 Bel me reçurent en leur marce  
 Cils de Mare (*Mar*) et cils de la Marce (*March*),  
 Cils de Surlant (*Sutherland*) et cils de Fi (*Fife*).<sup>69</sup>

Philosophy upbraided him once more for deserting his true calling, encouraged him with references to heroes of Arthurian romance, and even holy saints, listened patiently to a list of his works, and when he feared lest the spring of his inspiration be dry, ordered him to remove from his chest a picture of his lady which he had kept there for some ten years. This carries us back to Machaut again, who, in his *Voir-Dit*, tells how he also put away in a chest the picture of Peronne when he came to suspect her of infidelity.

The poet obeys and he has no more than looked at the picture when he composes a virelay and compares his ardor to that of Achilles for Polyxena, whose tragic love he tells in a brief hundred lines or so. Sober second thought reminds him that youth is the time for love and that he is now all of thirty-five.<sup>70</sup> People talk of the Fountain of Youth and the invisible stones, but he has yet to meet anyone who has seen them. At last comes the night of his dream, the beginning of which is marked by the appearance of Venus. She is an old friend of the poet's, and we remember their meeting in the *Espinette Amoureuse*. The poet tactlessly points out to the goddess that her gift of an amorous heart has brought him little save sorrow and inconvenience. This protestation earns him a deserved rebuke for ingratitude and also for laziness: what gentle heart should be in bed when Nature is at work and the dawn breaking? She invites him to go on an outing and tells him the story of Telephus, who knew the language of birds. After a jesting reference to his usual habit of saying a prayer to Saint Marguerite when he gets up, the poet rises, puts on his cloak, with some assistance from the goddess, and out they go. It is a beautiful morning and the poet's delight is great when Venus promises to take him to the Buisson de Jonece, for whose sweet shade he had long yearned. When they reach the bush, which is of unusual size and beauty, the goddess turns the poet over to Youth, a handsome young man, who, strangely enough, resembles the poet in almost every detail.<sup>71</sup> Youth is a walking encyclopedia and story book, and explains much, almost too much, to the poet. Seven branches on the bush stand for the seven planets, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and Youth describes their various influences and powers. He could talk on this subject, he says, three whole days if anyone would listen.<sup>72</sup> The poet, alarmed, says that though he listens, it is without understanding, as the beauty of the spot has too powerful an effect on him. Sometime later an occasion may come when astronomy will interest him, but at the moment he is all for pleasure. Right now he'd rather have a lady give him a garland than possess all the sense in the world. Youth does not insist on his lecture, and the poet recites a virelay instead. We are inevitably reminded of Geoffrey Chaucer's reply to Professor Eagle when that matchless pedagogue volunteered to lecture to him on astronomy.<sup>73</sup>

The dreamer finds his lady in the garden and she is accompanied by a group of damsels, Manner, Temperance, Franchise, Pity, Pleasure, Cognizance, and

<sup>69</sup> II, 11 f., II. 363 ff.

<sup>70</sup> "Si ai je en ce monde arresté  
 Trente cinc ans, peu plus, peu mains"  
 (II, 24, II. 793 f.)

<sup>71</sup> II, 44, II. 1495 ff.

<sup>72</sup> II, 50, II. 1705 ff.

<sup>73</sup> *House of Fame*, II. 994 f.

Humility. These are agreeable companions, but there, too, are the three varlets Refusal, Danger and Denial, who are old opponents of the poet. When we also find Sweet Appearance and Desire in the group we know with certainty and some foreboding what the next few thousand lines will unfold. There is the inevitable shadow-wooing, the inevitable little palpitating successes, the inevitable rebuffs, the inevitable, and after the hundredth time, inevitably tiresome allegorical give-and-take of courtly love. In fairness, however, it must be said that this is a light-hearted poem. There is also Froissart's proud display of learning, with Phoebus, Daphne, Orpheus, Proserpine, Pluto, Leander, Hero, Pygmalion, Cepheus, Tubulus (Tibullus?), Narcissus, Echo, Paris, Priam, Helenus, Cassandra, Helen, Achilles, Polyxena, Tristram, Ovid, Virgil and Aristotle, all playing their roles in two hundred and seventeen lines.<sup>74</sup> Lyrics are numerous and refreshing and we are amused by the games, among them *Roy-qui-ne-ment*,<sup>75</sup> which Froissart had known in his youth and which Machaut, in the *Voir-Dit*,<sup>76</sup> used as a vehicle for advice to King Jean. Toward the end of the poem eight of the company utter wishes, each wish consisting of four stanzas of seven ten syllable lines, each stanza followed by a four syllable line. The poet acts as secretary and praises the verses highly, saying once, with complacent naïveté, that they get better as they come,<sup>77</sup> and he may well be pleased with his facility, as the rime scheme is *aaaaaabaaaaabbbbbbbabbbbbba*. Some of the "wishes" are remarkably pleasant, as for example, Sweet Appearance's, which begins:

Je souhede joie, paix et repos,  
L'esbatement des plains champs et des bos,  
Cours de levriers et des oiseaus beaux vols,  
Et à veoir jardins, vregniers et clos  
Bien ordonnés et rieuléement clos;  
Arbres et fruis, tant menuiers que gros,  
Fussent dedens grant quantité enclos,  
Pour solacier  
Cardeneruels, merles et rosegnols  
Et tous oiseauls amoureux et mignos,  
Et tous les jours en oïsse les mos.<sup>78</sup>

A chaplet had been offered for the best "wish," and they now decide to go to the god of Love and ask him to be judge. This decision pleases the poet very much, for he desires greatly to see the god. He is doomed to disappointment, however, for as he goes along in the midst of the gay band, singing a new motet (probably of Machaut's) which had been sent him from Reims (where Machaut was a canon), and wearing, be it noted, a new pair of laced shoes,<sup>79</sup> someone pushes him and he wakes up. So with the abruptness common to dream-visions, a forty-two hundred line dream comes to an end in seven words.

The poet wakes into a cold and older world but the details of his dream in which he and Youth had been of one size and age are so vivid to him that, and this is one of Froissart's happier strokes, he feels to see if his beard is still there, and finds the only change to be six hours' continued growth.<sup>80</sup> He now begins to think about the inevitable end of his life, feels the need of precautions, and so concludes a poem not hitherto characterized by piety with a three hundred and thirty-five line lay to the Virgin.

<sup>74</sup> II, 94 ff., II. 3154 ff.

<sup>75</sup> II, 131, II. 4427 ff.

<sup>76</sup> Pp. 215 ff.

<sup>77</sup> II, 146, II. 4929 ff.

<sup>78</sup> II, 145 f., II. 4895 ff.

<sup>79</sup> "Parés d'uns noes solers à las" (II, 151, l. 5075).

<sup>80</sup> II, 152, II. 5132 ff.

The *Temple d'Onnour*<sup>81</sup> is called a "Trettié de moralité" and there is nothing in its thousand and seventy-six lines to belie this description. The introduction of the poem contains one of those little touches of realism in which Froissart's poetry abounds. The poet is in a company anxious to hear new things, and he favors them with an account of one of his recent dreams. Unfortunately an interruption occurs before he has narrated more than a third of it<sup>82</sup> and so he accedes to the prayers of the group and writes the whole thing down with his own hand. The dream placed him in an unfamiliar forest and there he meets a man on horseback whom he asks for directions. The stranger invites the dreamer to accompany him to a festival at which Honor is to marry his son Desire to Pleasure, daughter of Courtesy. Awake or asleep, chronicler or poet, this is the sort of thing that Froissart loves and, his dream having obligingly put him on horseback, he rides with the stranger until they come to a beautiful temple situated between two rivers. The interior of the temple is even more magnificent than the exterior, and in it Honor sits on an elevated throne which is reached by seven steps on each of which stand a man and a woman. The men are Counsel, Hardihood, Enterprise, Temperance, Justice, Loyalty and Largess; the women, Manners, Humility, Franchise, Courtesy, Charity, Pity and Faith. Honor now proceeds to explain the functions of the male personifications to the bridegroom and those of the female to the bride. The body of the poem is thus a manual of courtly behaviour and, as such, not wholly without interest.

When the ceremony is over the poet thinks that he recognizes the bridal couple and his companion says that he is right in so thinking. Then the poet wakes up, for it is morning. The poem is evidently an epithalamium composed for an actual wedding, but efforts to identify the happy and edified pair have not been successful.

Froissart's remaining poems are, with one exception, relatively short and contain some of his most satisfactory poetry. The *Joli Mois de May*<sup>83</sup> is dedicated to the praise of that month of lovers, but contains little besides an ecstatic description in various metres of the poet's lady. He is in a lovely garden where the song of the nightingale, like an arrow of love, wounds him to the heart and makes him think of his mistress. He tells the nightingale all about her: she surmounts all others in beauty and wisdom; she has goodness, sense, generosity, humility, counsel, manners and loyalty. In fact she has everything except pity; if she only had that he'd be the happiest man in the world. He praises the song of the nightingale, sings a ballade and begins to picture his lady's beauty. In coloring she surmounts the rose and the lily flower, her grey (*vair*) eyes are simple and pleasant, she has a sweet, laughing little mouth, blond hair, clear forehead, is well spaced between the eyes (*bel entroel*), and has a pretty body. She looks, behaves, and dresses well, and she does her lover's heart good, for love nourishes his heart as the dew nourishes plants. She smells good too, even better than the hawthorn, and sings sweeter than the nightingale. So he sings another ballade in which he compares her to the lovely day and asks for her mercy. He listens to the nightingale again and wishes he could enjoy himself so for twenty-eight or thirty months, but the sun is going down, and he starts off home singing a gay virelay to his lady.

Froissart's fondness for the marguerite or daisy had been shown by his ballade to that flower in the *Paradis d'Amours* and by the daisy seal in the *Prison Amoureuse* and the reference to Saint Marguerite in the *Joli Buisson de*

<sup>81</sup> II, 162 ff.<sup>82</sup> II, 163, ll. 34 ff.<sup>83</sup> II, 194 ff.

Jonece. He also wrote a short "dittié" of *La Flour de la Margherite*<sup>84</sup> in praise of this little white and red flower, so sweet and fine, which follows the sun with loving worship. When we remember that Froissart's transparent anagram in the *Espinette Amoureuse* names his lady Marguerite, we are tempted to believe that the poet really had a flesh and blood love named Marguerite. It is impossible, however, to forget the popularity of the cult of the Daisy, attested to by Machaut's *Dit de la Marguerite* and Deschamps's *Lai de Franchise*, to say nothing of Chaucer's use of these poems as well as of Froissart's in the *Legend of Good Women*. The problem is not a weighty one and may be easily resolved: Marguerite was a common name and it may well have been Froissart's fortune to have lady and cult fall together.

There are few more pleasant or familiar pages in the *Chronicles* than those which tell of Froissart's trip to Béarn in the autumn of 1388 and his visit at Orthez with Gaston Phoebus de Foix. Less well known, but almost equally charming is *Le Dit du Florin*,<sup>85</sup> an highly autobiographical begging poem, after the fashion of Chaucer's "Complaint to his Purse," but nearly twenty times the latter's length. The poet begins by admitting ruefully that no one can rid himself of money better than he; money knows many tongues, and loves particularly nobles, people decked out with cloth of gold, and fortunate merchants. The change is money's paradise, where it rests and is rubbed and polished and washed, weighed on scales, protected by a grill, and taken out in great handfulls by people in the textile business.<sup>86</sup> Money-changers get hold of coins easily, but not as quickly as Froissart can get rid of them, and yet he doesn't quite know how, since he does little or nothing to account for the disappearance of his funds.

This passage has been seized upon by desperate searchers after biographical material and offered as proof that Froissart's father, or even the writer himself, had been a money-changer, on the grounds that it shows a very specialized knowledge of that profession. It is difficult to feel that we have here any very enormous intimacy with the secrets of the counting house, and what it shows suggests the psychology of the poor fellow on the outside of the grating thinking what fun it must be to handle so much money and sadly watching bloated industrialists, textile manufacturers, to be specific, cashing checks much larger than his own.

To return to the poem: money would be a very good messenger for Froissart, if it were only in the habit of coming back as rapidly as it goes away, but that it never does. In twenty-five years, apart from the ecclesiastical living of the large town of Lestines, Froissart has had at least two thousand francs.<sup>87</sup> What has become of them? He finds one last coin lurking in the corner of a little purse and threatens it with dire punishments unless it tells what has become of its fellows. The coin points out that he, at least, has been faithful, though perhaps that was because he was scarred, clipped and damaged and therefore often refused. Froissart has had a good winter in Béarn, so what's the trouble all at once? The poet replies that this is no longer Béarn, now he is in Avignon and in a sad pickle. The coin asks slyly if his master isn't on the way to profit and great wealth, reaching out after benefices.<sup>88</sup> He then consents to tell him what has become of his money.

In the first place he has made books that have cost at least seven hundred pounds:

<sup>84</sup> II, 209 ff.

<sup>85</sup> II, 221 ff.

<sup>86</sup> Cil que se mellent de draper  
En prendent là par grans puignies

(II, 221, ll. 50 f.)

<sup>87</sup> II, 223, ll. 100 ff.

<sup>88</sup> II, 225, 182 ff.

L'argent avés vous mis là bien,  
 Je le prise sus toute rien,  
 Car fait en avés mainte hystore  
 Dont il sera encor memore  
 De vous ens ou temps à venir,  
 Et ferés les gens souvenir  
 De vos sens et de vos doctrines.<sup>89</sup>

And the tavern-keepers of Lestines have had a good five hundred francs, and in addition to those two great items, Froissart should recall his travels. He has been in Scotland, England, Wales, Rome and throughout France. During all these travels he has done well by himself, dressed warmly and had a good horse, and all without incurring too much debt:

Si ne devés le temps plaindre  
 Ne vous soussyer ne complaindre.  
 Vous avés vescu jusqu'à ci;  
 Onques ne vous vi desconfi,  
 Mès plain de confort et d'emprise,  
 Et, c'est un point que moult je prise,  
 Je vous ai vü si joious,  
 Si joli et si amoureux,  
 Que vous viviés de souhedier.<sup>90</sup>

Froissart says that he knows the florin is trying to help but he can't forget the beautiful coins which had so lately left him. The florin remarks that he doesn't know about them at all, and so Froissart tells him. He recounts his way of life at Orthez, where the florin had slept all winter in his purse. He praises the Count of Foix but expresses some slight dissatisfaction with his nightly routine. Gaston Phoebus kept odd hours for the fourteenth century, since he took his principal meal at midnight and remained at table about two hours. Froissart, no matter what the weather, had to leave his comfortable inn and go nightly to the castle where he read aloud, regularly, seven pages<sup>91</sup> of his *Méliador* and when he had finished his stint, the count would give him what wine was left in his golden goblet. This pattern continued until the *Méliador* was finished, and Froissart then left Orthez, bearing with him forty francs, the greater part of a farewell present from the count. These he brought to Avignon, where he bought a three penny purse and put away his money in it. Next Sunday he went to church and when he got back he found that his money had vanished.

The florin, rather callously, says, "Easy come, easy go," but then tries to cheer up his master by reminding him that a number of men whom he lists—the lord de la Rivière, the count of Sancerre, the dauphin of Auvergne, Jean d' Acy—will certainly help him out. When he gets more florins, as he undoubtedly will, he ought to be more careful with them. The poet thanks him for his advice and ends with a rather indelicate though consoling *dicton* which he ascribes to Antoine of Beaujeu:

Aussi a fait Gerars d'Obies,  
 Qui pas n'a jué aux oublies:  
 Autant vaudront au jugement  
 Estront de chien que marq d'argent.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> II, 226, ll. 201 ff.

<sup>90</sup> II, 227, ll. 243 ff.

<sup>91</sup> II, 230, ll. 366 ff.

<sup>92</sup> II, 234, ll. 487 ff.

One may suspect that Froissart did not fail to recover or even better his loss, if loss he had. Professor Shears<sup>93</sup> is unkind enough to point out a discrepancy between poem and *Chronicles*: in the latter Froissart declares<sup>94</sup> that Jeanne de Boulogne, in whose company Froissart was travelling, was in Avignon but from Tuesday to Friday—where then is the Sunday on which the theft occurred? Where indeed? At all events the story is good enough to be true, and if Froissart made it up, we may gladly credit him with the invention of a witty and pleasantly realistic episode.

The *Plaidoirie de La Rose et de la Violette*<sup>95</sup> is an attractive transcript of the pleas made before Imagination by the advocates of the Rose and the Violet in behalf of their respective flowers. We are reminded, more perhaps by the contrast in subject matter than anything else, of the second part of Jean de Condé's *La Messe des Oisiaux et les Plais des Chanonesse et des Grise Nonains*. The older poet's story is amusing enough, but neither seemly nor reverent, while Froissart's is a fresh, deft, telling, and for once unallegorical, appraisal of the two flowers. Imagination finally applies a closure to the debate on the ground of a full docket. The case must be taken to the Court of Appeals, namely the Fleur de Lys, who is the queen of flowers as the Lion is king of beasts and the Eagle of birds. She lives in the noble realm of France and her council consists of the king and his great lords. The Lords are named and a reference to the Duke of Orleans enabled Scheler to date the poem in or after 1392. If this be the case, Froissart wrote the most agreeable of his impersonal poems toward the end of his career as a poet. The poem was long ago suggested as a gentle satire on lawyers, and sometime, perhaps, someone's efforts will identify the master Papins who is named<sup>96</sup> as the Rose's advocate.

Froissart's thirteen *Lays Amoureux*,<sup>97</sup> of which five had appeared in his longer works, his six *Chansons Roiaus Amoureuses*,<sup>98</sup> his forty *Ballades Amoureuses*,<sup>99</sup> of which thirteen had been used before, his thirteen *Virelais Amoureux*,<sup>100</sup> ten of them interpolated in longer poems, and his hundred and seven *Rondelés Amoureux*<sup>101</sup> all present him plainly as a member of the school of Machaut.

Froissart's lays, as we have already had occasion to note, follow his master's manner closely, but there are certain differences, some of which redound to the younger poet's credit. In the first place, although the conventional plight of the lover is seldom totally absent, there is a lighter vein observable on occasion. Froissart is able to say:

Car amours aprent  
L'amoureuse gent  
User leur jouvent  
En esbatement  
Sans melancolie.<sup>102</sup>

Then, too, Froissart is often more concrete in his words and images than is Machaut. Thus we find a more detailed description of his lady,<sup>103</sup> and, what is less commendable, a greater show of learning in a profusion of proper names. We have already noted this quality in a lady in the *Paradys d'Amour*, and elsewhere we find Absalom, Priam, Noah (Noiron), Laomedon, Solomon, Cato, and Plato<sup>104</sup> and Guenevere, Iseult, Helen, Lucrece, and the Chastelaine of

<sup>93</sup> P. 55.

<sup>94</sup> Ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, XIII, 308 ff.

<sup>95</sup> II, 235 ff.

<sup>96</sup> I, 243, l. 254.

<sup>97</sup> II, 246 ff.

<sup>98</sup> II, 353 ff.

<sup>99</sup> II, 366 ff.

<sup>100</sup> II, 391 ff.

<sup>101</sup> II, 396 ff.

<sup>102</sup> II, 247, ll. 28 ff.

<sup>103</sup> II, 251, ll. 144 ff.

<sup>104</sup> II, 266.



Vergi,<sup>105</sup> brought together for the learned poet's greater glory. While Froissart's diction is sufficiently artificial he is less given to the over-use of set phrases than is Machaut. "Simple et coie," which seems to turn up on almost every page of Machaut, is used seldom by Froissart;<sup>106</sup> the phrase, we may note in passing, was not originated by Machaut, and had been used long years before in the *Roman de Renart* to describe Reynard's wife, the vixen Hermeline.<sup>107</sup>

Most of Froissart's lays deal with love, but he followed Machaut when he wrote a lay to the Virgin, and on another occasion he branched out for himself. His eighth lay<sup>108</sup> is an elegy for Queen Philippa, and it is interesting to remember that at the very time when Froissart was putting the lay to a new use Geoffrey Chaucer was showing his originality by utilizing the dream-vision for the same elegiac purpose. It must be confessed that the *Book of the Duchess* is more successful as an elegy than is the lay. Froissart's grief was doubtless genuine but one balks at taking seriously such lines as:

|                        |                                       |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Je certefi             | Je m'en soussi                        |
| Et affi                | Et gramí                              |
| Qu'ennemi              | A par mi,                             |
| Et ami                 | Et maudi                              |
| Ont à li               | Sans detri                            |
| Perdu. Quant g'i vise, | La mort qui l'a prise. <sup>109</sup> |

That, surely, would have aroused the envy of Ambrose Philips!

Among the *Chansons Roiaus Amoureuse*, some of them crowned at Valenciennes, Abbeville, and Tournai, we find one which shows us Froissart working in what was for him a new *genre*. This is a farcical poem<sup>110</sup> in which the poet's mistress has a body as soft as a comb and has lost her teeth, which is lucky for the lover or she'd tear his clothes off altogether. She is to be found sitting on a dung hill and is fittingly compared to a pig. Her virtue may be gauged from her remark when he is jealous: "If you're going to fight with everyone who has spoken to me, you'll find yourself leading a martyr's life."<sup>111</sup> Burlesque love-poems, with their caricatured and loathly ladies, were a natural reaction to poetical woman-worship and, belonging as they do on the outskirts of anti-feminism, are found in profusion from the Middle Ages to the early seventeenth century when Petrarchanism gave them a new reason for being. Froissart, however, was little influenced by anti-feminism, whether of Jean de Meun or anyone else, and even the melting Machaut wrote a *sotte chanson*<sup>112</sup> of a far from decent nature, and satirizes more plainly and at length the mercenary and lustful side of the feminine character. This poem is Froissart's only venture into burlesque or anti-feminism and one doubts very much if even the crown it received at Lille made him unduly satisfied with his effort.

In few comparisons with Machaut does Froissart show to better advantage than in his ballades. Machaut's *Loange des Dames* contains, along with other verse forms, at least two hundred ballades. The ballade, like the sonnet, is a poetical type which requires great skill if the reader is not soon to feel a satiety bordering on nausea. This skill, and that despite consummate metrical ability, Machaut did not have and the artificial puling melancholy and histrionic love-sick whining, the tiresome adulation and namby-pamby praise of his ballades produce a genuine sense of oppression before many pages have been

<sup>105</sup> II, 303.

<sup>106</sup> J. L. Lowes, "Simple and Coy," *Anglia*, XXXIII (1910), 448, 451, n. 2.

<sup>107</sup> *Roman de Renart*, ed. Ernest Martin, 3 vols. (Strassburg, 1882-87), I, 390, l. 13.

<sup>108</sup> II, 285 ff.

<sup>109</sup> II, 290, ll. 176 ff.

<sup>110</sup> II, 359 ff.

<sup>111</sup> II, 360, ll. 40 ff.

<sup>112</sup> Chichmaref, II, 637 ff.

read. Froissart wrote far fewer ballades than did Machaut and yet his forty contain more variety than do Machaut's two hundred.

As in the lays, Froissart's tone in his ballades is lighter than Machaut's and here too he displays his reading with proud lavishness, one ballade even having as its refrain "Candasse, Helainne, Yseut ne Ptholomé."<sup>113</sup> If one wonders what "Ptholomé" is doing in that *galère*, he soon learns that she is a lady who died for love of Nestor of India Major. Froissart often carried this exhibitionism too far, but none the less the use of the story of Achilles and Polyxena<sup>114</sup> or that of Jason and Medea<sup>115</sup> as a vehicle for his own plea is both refreshing and sufficiently original.

Some of the ballades have little or nothing to do with love. In one<sup>116</sup> we read how Diana kept her word to Brutus when she promised him a new home, Albion, which should be held by his descendants, who would be great conquerors, sometimes in a just cause, sometimes not. Again,<sup>117</sup> he lists the things the sight of which renews his spirit. He likes to see valleys and mountains and vineyards, and to hear wine poured out of bottles, to wear new clothes and to be served with fresh new dishes, to see violets and white and red roses in their seasons, and chambers full of candles, and games and dances, and good beds and the claret, Rochelle and spices on retiring which make one sleep better. All these things give him joy, and those who know Froissart find nothing conventional or impersonal in the list.<sup>118</sup> And, for one last example, we learn<sup>119</sup> how much he likes to sleep and how foolish he thinks those who say that sleep is a waste of time. Not only is sleep refreshing but in sleep the kindly Morpheus, to whom there are so many references in Machaut and Froissart, lets him laugh and play with a mistress more merciful than waking day can give.

Froissart's *virelays* are few and conventional and of his hundred and seven *rondeaux* there is little to say except that many of them exhibit a gentle and rather mocking humor.

It has long been recognized that the group of Froissart's poems which show the greatest consistent literary merit, interest and originality are his twenty *Pastourelles*.<sup>120</sup> Here, at least, Froissart is not indebted to Machaut, and here he shows himself capable of rescuing an old and charming kind of poem from the monotonous sterility of convention and, what was worse, neglect.

Whatever its origin, the *pastourelle* had a very definite form. A knight, who tells the story, meets a shepherdess and seeks her favors. The knight may succeed by fair words, gifts or force, or he may not succeed at all. It is easy to see that an occasional variation of this stereotyped situation would occur, and we do find a number of poems in which the knight, instead of offering welcome or unwelcome love to a maiden, comes upon a number of shepherds and shepherdesses and observes their games, songs and dances. From this subdivision Froissart's *pastourelles* spring, for in them there is no hint of seduction or illicit love and the teller takes almost no part in the action. Froissart made an important innovation, and here appears his highest originality as a poet, when he used the *pastourelle* as a vehicle for the occasional poem. Seven of the *pastourelles* deal with historical events and thus we are able to date the poems

<sup>113</sup> II, 371.

<sup>114</sup> II, 386.

<sup>115</sup> II, 386 f.

<sup>116</sup> II, 382 f.

<sup>117</sup> II, 385.

<sup>118</sup> Several of Froissart's pleasant things are curiously akin to Alcinous's words to Odysseus (*Odyssey*, viii, 248 f.): "dear to

us ever is the banquet, and the harp, and the dance, and changes of raiment, and the warm bath, and love, and sleep." (trans. S. H. Butcher and A. Lang, 3d ed. [New York, 1882], p. 123).

<sup>119</sup> II, 384.

<sup>120</sup> II, 306 ff.

with reasonable accuracy, as no occasional poem is ordinarily written long after the event which it commemorates.<sup>121</sup>

The second<sup>122</sup> begins "Between Eltham and Westminster I saw day before yesterday shepherds in a fine meadow. Many a pretty shepherdess was in the company, and they were all dancing to the notes of a pipe. One of the shepherds said, 'Let's hurry up, by Saint Denis, for he who bears the fleur-de-lis ought to pass this way.'"

A second shepherd wants to know if this person carries his lilies in a basket and if he's giving them away or offering them for sale. He is told that it is a king who bears the lily flower, and so the shepherds change to more fitting attire and go out to sing a song of welcome to the unfortunate king Jean of France who, early in 1364, was returning to his English captivity.

In a few months king Jean was dead and one of his successor's first acts was to issue a new coinage; in Froissart's third *pastourelle*<sup>123</sup> we find a description of the new florins and this would seem to date the poem not long after late July, 1364. Perhaps Froissart was on the continent that summer.

A shepherdess in the sixth<sup>124</sup> decides to give a chaplet to her friend Sohelet who has told her that the Duke of Brabant and Luxemburg would soon be home again. Wenceslas's captivity which, as we have seen, had, if not roses to ameliorate its harshness, at least the *Prison Amoreuse*, ended in July, 1372. Another of the maidens says that the Duke has been freed by the power of his brother the Emperor, and all display signs of loyal joy and devotion.

The shepherds in the twelfth *pastourelle*<sup>125</sup> hate war and at the moment place the responsibility for it on the pride of Bruges and Ghent. The only way to get peace is through the corrective power of the fleur-de-lis. The people of Bruges and Ghent ravage the countryside and the shepherds are even thinking of taking to arms themselves, when they learn that many of "our people" have crossed the river and discomforted the Flemish. The French, by means of an ambush laid on the night of November 17, 1382, crossed the Lys and administered an overwhelming defeat to the Flemish. It seems likely, though of course not certain, that the poem was written between November 17 and November 27th, as there is no hint of the great French victory at Roosebeke on the later date when Philip van Artevelde and some twenty thousand Flemings were killed. We note with interest how thoroughly aristocratic the shepherds are in their sympathies.

The thirteenth *pastourelle*<sup>126</sup> is an epithalamium celebrating the wedding of Louis de Chatillon, son of Froissart's current patron, Guy de Blois, to Marie, daughter of Jean de Berry, which took place at Bourges in August, 1386. The *Temple d'Onneur* was held by Kervyn de Lettenhove to be another tribute by Froissart to this bridal.

The eighth *pastourelle*<sup>127</sup> seems to have been written by Froissart on his way to Orthez in 1388 and was probably one of his first presents to Count Gaston. He hears a shepherdess bemoan the fact that her beloved friend is gone on a journey taking with him four greyhounds which she has reared. When asked where he has gone she replies that she hopes he's gone to Béarn to visit Count Gaston. Another shepherdess interrupts to say that she never heard of a shepherd named Gaston, nor has she found the name in the litany. Can he dance as well as her brother Engherent? This ignorant girl is properly reproved,

<sup>121</sup> I have made grateful use of E. Hoepffner's "La Chronologie des 'Pastourelles' de Froissart," in *Mélanges offerts à M. Emile Picot*, II (Paris, 1913), 27 ff. On the form in general, see W. P. Jones, *The Pastourelle* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931).

<sup>122</sup> II, 308 ff.

<sup>123</sup> II, 310 ff.

<sup>124</sup> II, 316 ff.

<sup>125</sup> II, 332 ff.

<sup>126</sup> II, 334 ff.

<sup>127</sup> II, 321 ff.

Gaston's praises are sung, and the poet in the envoy addresses the "belles" and says that he'll soon find out if the Count is all that they claim. The four greyhounds are named Tristram, Hector, Brun, and Roland, and would probably be fitting companions for Achilles, most orderly and chivalrous of dogs, whose epic was written but unfortunately has come down to us only in fragments.<sup>128</sup>

The ninth *pastourelle*<sup>129</sup> discovers a group of shepherds and shepherdesses talking about heraldry, a subject which they have well in hand as the poet hears them mention and discuss France, England, Portugal, Castile (where the castles are), Navarre, Aragon, Bourdeaux, Austria, Brittany, Blois, Bavaria, Flanders, Luxemburg, Brabant, Burgundy, Hainault, Dompierre, Savoy, Sancerre, Riviere, Boulogne, Geneva, Damascus, Champagne, Artois, Cyprus, Bagdad (Baudas), Constantinople, Armenia, Germany, Bar, Hungary, Lancaster, Derby and Mortimer. They always come back, however, to the arms of Béarn and Foix which are described in detail, and the poem was doubtless written during Froissart's visit to Béarn in 1388. One of the shepherds announces that his father, Thomas by name, was an armorial painter, and naturally early biographers, ever alert to snare an elusive fact, assumed that the poet was here speaking through the mouth of his character and that the secret of the paternal vocation was revealed. It is worth mentioning that Kervyn de Lettenhove, himself an unwearied snapper-up of biographical trifles, found it impossible to swallow this piece of evidence.

We have already seen that Froissart was in the company of Jeanne de Boulogne when she went from Béarn to Auvergne to marry Duke Jean de Berry in 1389. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the fourteenth *pastourelle*<sup>130</sup> celebrating her wedding and mentioning among the notable guests some of the very noblemen whom Froissart's florin had assured him would come to his financial aid. The poem, perhaps naturally, does not refer to the marked disparity in age between the bride and groom—he was at least forty-eight and she twelve—but it does have essentially the same refrain as had the earlier epithalamium for Duke Jean's daughter; that reads "La pastourelle de Berri Avec le pastourel de Blois" and this "Pour le pastourel de Berri Et la pastourel de Boulongne."

The following *pastourelle*<sup>131</sup> deals equally with an event of which Froissart had been an eye witness. Robin Hume-Vent tells a company of shepherds and shepherdesses how Queen Isabelle made her triumphant entry into Paris on August 20, 1389. In the *Chronicles* Froissart tells at length of the ceremony and pageantry,<sup>132</sup> but the rustics, oddly enough, are anxious only to hear the names of the noble lords who had accompanied the queen.

None of the other *pastourelles* can be dated accurately but these nine show clearly that Froissart made use of the form at intervals between 1364 and 1389. For the others Hoepffner has suggested plausibly that the place-names with which each *pastourelle* begins indicate Froissart's approximate whereabouts at the time. Thus the first *pastourelle* is located between Aubricourt and Mauni, not far from Valenciennes, and "la pièce pourrait avoir été écrite encore avant le poète n'ait entrepris son vagabondage à travers le monde".<sup>133</sup> Again, *pastourelles* four, five, six, and seven contain place-names in Hainault, all of them reasonably close to Lestines, and thus may safely be relegated to the poet's curacy there.

<sup>128</sup> A. Thomas, "Le Roman du Lévrier Archilès," *Mélanges offerts à M. Emile Picot*, I (Paris, 1913), 481 ff.

<sup>129</sup> II, 324 ff.

<sup>130</sup> II, 337 ff.

<sup>131</sup> II, 339 ff.

<sup>132</sup> Ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, XIV, 8 ff.

<sup>133</sup> II, 39.

The unhistorical *pastourelles* show no uniformity of content. In the first,<sup>134</sup> for example, a shepherd tells his companions that he has seen a man wearing a *houppelande*. One of his friends comments that although he knows a pouch, a skirt, a poke, a legging, a needlecase, a hare, a collar, a greyhound, and how to guard sheep, to bleed them and to keep the distemper from them, he doesn't know what a *houppelande* is. He is told that it is a new fashioned garment, with sleeves before and behind; it is good both summer and winter, one can wrap oneself up in it and even put a basket under it. A third says that shepherds used to wear them but they were of thinner cloth then. A fourth wonders if an ell of material will make one and is told that to double it will take nine ells of Irish cloth. That he thinks will cost too much. The *houppelande*, a long outer garment for both men and women, often worn by priests over their cassocks, apparently became stylish in the second half of the fourteenth century. If this is actually Froissart's first *pastourelle* and written in the early sixties, then the *houppelande* must have been common, at least common enough to be a target for gentle satire, rather earlier than most antiquarians have thought.

The fourth *pastourelle*<sup>135</sup> tells the story of a rustic wooing and the fifth<sup>136</sup> affects to celebrate the marriage of "Poitevin and Gascogne." Inevitably a shepherd, this one with a white beard, misunderstands and wants to know if Poitevin is a good shepherd. It soon becomes evident, even to him, that the wedding symbolizes a mighty mixing of white and red wine with which to wash down a rural banquet of spitted birds, great pasties, beef, mutton, salt hams, good cheese, young apples, and plenty of cakes. The variety and substance of this feast is paralleled in more than one of the English Biblical plays, even though the "barrels and flagons" of wine may be somewhat exaggerated. We find the attire, behavior and refreshments of the countryside on holiday described minutely enough in the seventh *pastourelle*,<sup>137</sup> but when we discover, as in the tenth,<sup>138</sup> a *champêtre* beauty contest with a solemn board of judges, a rose for the fairest, and an unsuccessful weeping beauty in the envoy, we begin to feel some distance from rustic realism, and when in the eleventh<sup>139</sup> we find the shepherds and shepherdesses going off to the fountain of love, of which they doubtless read in Machaut's *Dit de la Fonteinne Amoureuse*, we think to have gone too far. But there is even worse to follow and the educated son of the shepherd and shepherdess in the sixteenth *pastourelle*<sup>140</sup> tells his parents the story of Jason and the Golden Fleece. The shepherds and shepherdesses of the seventeenth<sup>141</sup> celebrate the daisy over all other flowers and know the mythological story of its origin, and in the eighteenth<sup>142</sup> they discourse with some learning on Saint John the Baptist. With the nineteenth<sup>143</sup> we return to a slightly more fitting theme and find the shepherdesses making chaplets of daisies for their swains. Oudinet Verde-Avainne begs Yolent to make one for him but she refuses, being true to Rogiers Triquedondaine. The final *pastourelle*<sup>144</sup> tells how Lore de Saint Venant, she of the neat body and blond locks, was awarded over other shepherdesses the white turtle dove which was to go to the most simple and most fair.

Clearly enough Froissart's *pastourelles* are not very realistic, but little, if any, pastoral poetry has been written by or for shepherds. We must not quarrel

<sup>134</sup> II, 306 ff.<sup>135</sup> II, 312 ff.<sup>136</sup> II, 314 ff.<sup>137</sup> II, 319 ff.<sup>138</sup> II, 326 ff.<sup>139</sup> II, 329 ff.<sup>140</sup> II, 341 ff.<sup>141</sup> II, 343 ff.<sup>142</sup> II, 346 ff.<sup>143</sup> II, 348 ff.<sup>144</sup> II, 351 ff.

with Froissart if he follows literary tradition to some extent. The earlier *pastourelles* were written from a definitely aristocratic level and that even when the knight-narrator is forced to confess, wryly enough, that his evil plans did not come to fruition. Froissart permits, or forces, his rustics to talk about subjects which they would not discuss at all or would discuss very differently. The themes were interesting to the poet and to his audience and are at least as interesting to us as would be detailed descriptions of the diseases of sheep, the need of shifting folds and pastures, the seasons for clipping and the relative thickness and value of wool and woolfells. Those who deplore the lack of realism in pastoral literature have never heard or else easily forgotten the talk, small or otherwise, of the earnest and embattled agriculturist, be his specialty wheat, potatoes, rutabaga, alfalfa, tobacco or sheep. The realism for which we yearn, specific yet gay, strong yet somehow spiritual, and ever smelling of the brave good earth, is far more rare in life than in letters. Much can be said for Froissart's shepherd lads and lasses, their language is simple, their approach usually direct, their attitude not too serious, and among them there is always one to question and often one to protest. They are interested in their clothes, their food and their drink and if all these are too often pictured by smugly urban, even cosmopolitan, eyes, the account is lively and detailed enough for us.

We may joyfully agree with all competent authorities that Froissart wrote neither the *Cour de May*<sup>145</sup> nor the *Trésor Amoureux*<sup>146</sup> and so pass them by to what was certainly the last of Froissart's long works, the *Méliador*,<sup>147</sup> which as we have seen was written before the visit to Gaston de Foix. The most important thing about the *Méliador* is its length. The poem breaks off, incomplete, at its thirty thousand seven hundred and seventy first line. It is almost too easy to say "thirty thousand" and perhaps it may not be amiss to mention a few poems of comparable length. In round numbers, Gower's *Mirour de l'homme* contains thirty thousand lines and his *Confessio Amantis* thirty three thousand; Lydgate's *Pilgrimage of the Soul of Man*, twenty five thousand, his *Troy-Book*, thirty thousand and his *Fall of Princes*, thirty six thousand, the *Fairy Queen*, thirty four thousand, John Fitchett's *King Alfred*, one hundred thirty one thousand, and Doughty's *Dawn in Britain*, thirty thousand lines. On the other hand, the *Iliad* is fifteen thousand five hundred lines, the *Odyssey*, twelve thousand, the *Aeneid*, ten thousand, the *Beowulf*, three thousand, the *Roman de la Rose*, twenty two thousand, the *Divine Comedy*, fourteen thousand, the *Troilus and Cressida*, eight thousand, the verse in the *Canterbury Tales*, seventeen thousand, *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained* together twelve thousand five hundred, and *Don Juan*, fifteen thousand five hundred lines in length.

Froissart not only wrote a thirty thousand line romance but there is clear evidence that he rewrote it and that it is this second version, alongside some fragments of the first, which is preserved in large part. The relations between the two versions and their dates of composition offer certain problems, but it does not seem to me that the suggestions made by Mr. Kittredge<sup>148</sup> have been disproved. The first version was written for Duke Wenceslas and, since it is not mentioned in the *Joli Buisson de Jonece*, was begun after 1373 when that poem was composed. The reference in the *Paradys d'Amours* to *Méliador* and two of his companions may be regarded as an interpolation or revision made at any time before 1393 when the earlier of the two manuscripts of Froissart's poems was written. It was this first version which Froissart took with him to

<sup>145</sup> III, 1 ff.

<sup>146</sup> III, 52 ff.

<sup>147</sup> Ed. Auguste Longnon, Société des

Anciens Textes Français, 3 vols., Paris, 1895-1899.

<sup>148</sup> *Englische Studien*, XXVI (1899), 321 ff.

Orthez in 1388 and read aloud to Count Gaston. Between the time of his visit in Béarn and his death he revised the work and made use in the revision of the sonambulism of Peter de Béarn, a story which he heard at Orthez.<sup>149</sup>

The story of *Méliador* is attached to the Arthurian cycle and, indeed, is often spoken of as the last earnest effort to add to that cycle. There can be little doubt but that the overwhelming bulk of the *Méliador* ("such as it is," to quote Mr. Kittredge<sup>150</sup>), is original with Froissart. That is to say, the principal characters are otherwise unknown to Arthurian romance, but it must be confessed that their deeds show singularly little originality or even variety.

That Froissart should have desired to write at length on an Arthurian theme is by no means surprising. It is evident that he was deeply read in the Matter of Britain and in contrast with his contemporaries, such as Machaut, Deschamps, and Chaucer, he sprinkles his pages with allusions to the names and loves of the knights of the Round Table. The length of the *Méliador* completely swamps its plot. To put it briefly, much more briefly than its editor who devotes thirty-six pages to an analysis of the story,<sup>151</sup> the romance relates how the titular hero, son of the Duke of Cornwall, wins the hand of the princess Hermondine of Scotland, who has made herself the prize of a chivalric competition which is to last for five years and to be brought to an end by a great tournament. There are motivations and complications, secondary affairs of the heart and amorous variations, but all too little to arouse the reader's excitement or curiosity. The leisurely progress of the story can be no better illustrated than by the fact that the hero is first mentioned in line 2466 and first named in line 2526. Between the years 1440 and 1891 the *Méliador* was lost so far as the world of letters is concerned. Then it was brought to light by Auguste Longnon and we need not wonder if the romance of its rediscovery and the reputation of its author led critics to try to find in it things both fascinating and interesting. Beyond doubt there are pleasant incidents in the poem, but they are separated by vast and alkaline wastes which make its reading, *experto crede*, a mortification. Any reader, if he likes, perhaps only to prove that he has read the poem, can pick out suggestive passages. For example, we read of a song sung in Breton, not French,<sup>152</sup> a fairy who produces sleep,<sup>153</sup> the attractions of English ladies,<sup>154</sup> a song composed in sleep,<sup>155</sup> Méliador singing a rondel on shipboard,<sup>156</sup> Méliador, we are solemnly informed, speaking not in Hebrew but in Breton,<sup>157</sup> sickness used as an excuse to bring lovers together,<sup>158</sup> the rude Irish,<sup>159</sup> a knight-errant in a bad bed,<sup>160</sup> another knight who was also an artist,<sup>161</sup> the change in manners between Arthurian times and present day France and Brabant,<sup>162</sup> how the author, for consistency's sake, puts a prose letter into rime,<sup>163</sup> Kay in a familiar and officious role,<sup>164</sup> an enchanted forest,<sup>165</sup> and of a reference to Henry II and his queen Eleanor.<sup>166</sup>

There are, in all truth, duller works than the *Méliador*, such, for example, as the writings of Henry Lovelich, the misguided London skinner, and we are able to explain somewhat the impulse which led Froissart to run on at such repetitious length. In this connection I see no reason not to quote something which I formerly wrote about Froissart's romance:

<sup>149</sup> Kittredge, pp. 332 ff.

<sup>150</sup> P. 331.

<sup>151</sup> I, vii-xlii.

<sup>152</sup> I, 222, l. 7741.

<sup>153</sup> I, 229 ff.

<sup>154</sup> II, 6 f., ll. 9560 ff.

<sup>155</sup> II, 49, ll. 10988 ff.

<sup>156</sup> II, 66 f., ll. 11596 ff.

<sup>157</sup> II, 70, ll. 11725 f.

<sup>158</sup> II, 227 ff., ll. 17050 ff.

<sup>159</sup> II, 278, ll. 18795 f.

<sup>160</sup> II, 306, ll. 19747 ff.

<sup>161</sup> II, 316 ff., ll. 20094 ff., 350 ff., ll. 21249 ff.

<sup>162</sup> III, 18, ll. 22419 ff.

<sup>163</sup> III, 44, ll. 23281 ff.

<sup>164</sup> III, 115 ff., ll. 25665 ff.

<sup>165</sup> III, 194 ff., ll. 28362 ff.

<sup>166</sup> III, 208, ll. 28994 ff.

"The modern reader may well wonder how the strong-minded and irascible Gaston Phoebus de Foix could listen night after night to this interminable poem, with its monotonous series of single combats on or off the jousting field. Here, however, we have precisely the answer to our question. Leaving aside the element of courtly love, which, it must be confessed, reaches very nearly its lowest ebb in the *Méliador*, Froissart's contemporaries had a keen technical interest in these descriptions of tournaments. Consider, beside the *Méliador*, the account in the *Chronicles* of the jousts of St. Inglevert (XIV[K], 105-151), which, it is safe to say, constitute the only unreadable pages in the entire work. All this is unendurable to the modern reader, but we must not fail to see in it the fourteenth-century counterpart of play-by-play accounts of baseball, football, and hockey games, and wrestling matches. These too are monotonous enough, in all conscience, to the non-specialist, but there are many who love them. Other times, other tastes: Lord Berners reduced the account of the jousts of St. Inglevert to a few pages.<sup>167</sup>

Froissart's most appealing verse, and this is above his deft and quietly sophisticated *pastourelles*, is found in his personal poetry, *Le Débat dou Cheval et dou Levrier*, *Le Dit dou Florin* and the autobiographical passages in his longer poems. He introduces himself and his affairs lightly, informally, and attractively and for this he has received due praise. We err, however, if, following some modern critics of his poetry, we find him here an innovator. The humorously autobiographical is found in some mediaeval Latin poems, and if this seems too far afield, we have but to turn back to Machaut. Not only did the older poet make a practice of bringing himself into his longer poems, such as the *Voir-Dit*, but in some of his shorter poems he achieves a striking degree of wry, cranky, self-pitying humor. This quality is found in his ballade on the gout,<sup>168</sup> and in several of his *Complaintes*. There is his pathetic address to his friend Henry,<sup>169</sup> in which he tells of a pending English siege of Reims and the threat that he, even he, Machaut, poet and canon, will have to arm himself and mount the walls. Then, too, he has to pay heavy taxes, and people say that the king of England will come and take what little remains to him. He is sick and poor and even with his one eye can see that a man has to look after himself. Another *complainte*<sup>170</sup> describes his lost horse, a most pestilent beast, which he can well do without; and still another<sup>171</sup> tells coarsely enough of a man who reverses God's miracle and makes wine into water; one of this miscreant's daughters does even worse. Here we must observe that Machaut, who is normally prudish, is on occasion far more coarse than Froissart. Indeed, with the exception of the indelicate *dicton* with which he ended *Le Dit du Florin*, there is nothing in Froissart's verse to which the most straitlaced can take exception. He indulged but once in the anti-feminism, not unknown to Machaut, dear to Deschamps, and used, if only for dramatic purposes, by Chaucer. One may feel, as a matter of fact, that this attitude, admirable as it is from a strictly decorous and moral stand, is somewhat responsible for the lack of firmness and reality in Froissart's verse. When Chaucer wrote the tales of the Miller, Reeve, Shipman, and other "churls," he was being as conservative and reactionary as was Froissart when he wrote the *Méliador*; for no French poet of Chaucer's generation is distinguished by his telling of fabliaux. Yet he would be a sanctimonious knave indeed who deplored Chaucer's reach into the literary past, and he an enduring sufferer who applauded Froissart's.

<sup>167</sup> *Speculum*, X (1935), 294, n. 1.

<sup>168</sup> Chichmaref, I, 222 f.

<sup>169</sup> I, 251 f.

<sup>170</sup> I, 263 ff.

<sup>171</sup> I, 266.



## Cataldus Rachav

### A Study in the Early History of Diocesan Episcopacy in Ireland

JOHN HENNIG

IN my article *St. Albert, Patron of Cashel*,<sup>1</sup> I proposed to study the tradition of Irish archbishop-Saints in mediaeval continental literature as an expression of Irish-continental consciousness of the establishment of the metropolitan system in Ireland. The *Vita sti. Albarti* illustrates the setting up of Cashel as the second metropolitan see, besides Armagh, and the influence exercised by England on the establishment of diocesan episcopacy in Ireland. In the present paper, I propose to show that the tradition of St. Cataldus illustrates two other aspects of the early history of diocesan episcopacy in Ireland, namely the origin of the see of Cashel from a donation made to the Church by the King and the subsequent subdivision of (each of) the (two) archbishopric(s) of Ireland into twelve bishoprics.

With regard to the continental tradition of Irish archbishop-Saints in general,<sup>2</sup> and of St. Cataldus in particular, we have to proceed from the negative criticism of the mediaeval tradition of Irish associations of local patrons on the Continent to a positive appreciation of the significance, indirect though historical, of these associations. The chief obstacle in this undertaking is not so much the absence of reliable sources as the maze of misunderstandings which has grown up since the original meaning of those associations was no longer perceived. Disentangling those misunderstandings and tracing them back to their origin, we may throw some light on the connection between Irish and continental hagiographical traditions and on the development of Ireland's place in continental hagiography.

Geographically speaking, the tradition of St. Cataldus, patron of Taranto, is one of the remotest ramifications of the continental tradition of Irish Saints. The tradition of St. Cataldus is remarkable also for its extraordinary corruption.

In the case of both St. Albartus and St. Cataldus, the influence of 17th century hagiography, both Irish and continental, which so far has been mainly obstructive, must be turned into a beneficial, if provocative, influence. Up to the re-publication, in 1913, of the 12th century *Vita sti. Albarti*, the tradition of this "archbishop of Cashel" could not be traced back beyond the 16th century. In the tradition of St. Cataldus,<sup>3</sup> it still holds good, as Constanzi wrote in 1779,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Mediaeval Studies* VII (1945), 21 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the lives of Saints Livinus (J. F. Kenney, *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland* [New York, 1929] no. 310), Rumold (Kenney, no. 333) and Forannan (Kenney, no. 429; between 1130 and 1145), all quoted in my article on St. Albert.

<sup>3</sup> The bibliography given by Kenney, no. 41 is not very satisfactory (see also below p. 226). Algoritiis' Office contains no account of the life of the Saint. Sirletto's Office (see below p. 219) is not mentioned. The Italian translation of Moroni's work (and Colgan's notes) by Gregorio Costanzi, Oratorian at Rome (Naples, 1779) goes back to the Latin original (Rome, 1614) and is bound together with a valuable survey of the history of St. Cataldus' cultus by Giacomo da Christiano (Naples, 1780).

Ughelli's *Italia Sacra* (1st ed. 1643-1662, 2nd ed. 1717-1722) is unoriginal. Cataldo Agostino Cassinelli, Canon of the Cathedral of Taranto, *Vita e Memoria di S. Cataldo* (Naples, 1717) is not mentioned, nor any of the numerous discussions of the tradition of St. Cataldus by Irish writers since Colgan. If Lo Jodice's *Memorie* was mentioned, Mgr. O'Riordan's *St. Cathal of Lismore* (C.T.S.I., 1905), the only book exclusively dealing with the Saint ever published outside Italy, should have been listed too.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 143. On Petrus see Du Pin, *Histoire des Controverses du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1701), p. 283, and Kirsch in *Catholic Encyclop.* XI, p. 784. J. Grammack (*Dictionary of Christian Biography* I, pp. 421 ff.) calls Petrus' account "the first short life of Cathaldus".

that Petrus de Natalibus was *il primo che abbia disteso con ordine una leggenda del uomo santo*, in so far as the short account of St. Cataldus in Petrus' *Catalogus Sanctorum* (1382) is the earliest account of the life of that Saint hitherto published.<sup>8</sup>

The very nature of Petrus' *Catalogus* is compilatory. How clumsily Petrus used his sources may be seen at that point in the tradition of St. Cataldus which is of special importance to us. He says that Cataldus was granted *ducatum ducis illius defuncti*, though this duke was not mentioned before. Costanzi suggested that Petrus wrote from *sicura memoria* of oral tradition and/or from ancient records, which however have never been produced. Petrus compiled his work for devotional rather than historical purposes. He omitted almost all the proper names and place-names which we find in the later tradition of St. Cataldus. For example in the record of the donation made to Cataldus, Joannes Juvenis, whose account of Cataldus in his *De antiquitate et fortuna Tarentina* (1568)<sup>9</sup> is our next source after Petrus, omits the word *illius*, adding however the sentence: *Erat dux ille Meltridis Dominus*. We shall see, that wherever the later tradition gives definite place-names or proper names, these are not new inventions but go back to the source(s) on which Petrus had drawn and/or to accounts other than Petrus' based on those sources.

Until those sources are produced, it is impossible to say whether Colgan<sup>7</sup> was right in suggesting that, when saying that Cataldus

omnibus recte dispositis in pace quievit (in Ireland) cuius corpus a Drogone Archiepiscopo (in Taranto) repertum (est),

Petrus omitted the story found in the later tradition of Cataldus' pilgrimage to the Holy Land and his becoming, on his return, archbishop of Taranto. This story establishes the link between the account of Cataldus' life in Ireland and his tradition in Taranto. Stories of such pilgrimages were a natural expedient to establish in the biography of a saint a connection between Ireland and some remote part of the Continent, as is obvious in the tradition of Saints Erhard and Albert. With regard to Taranto, the tradition of the Saint's pilgrimage to the Holy Land would have been quite credible, but for the fantastic chronology of St. Cataldus to which I shall refer presently. While there is ample evidence for Irishmen travelling to the Eternal City,<sup>8</sup> the only Irish pilgrim to the Holy Land whose continental tradition seems to be historical, is St. Colman, patron of Lower Austria, a late and curious specimen of Irishmen whose veneration as Saints originated on the Continent.<sup>9</sup>

The ancient idea, peculiar to Irish monasticism, of *peregrinatio pro Christo*,<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> First published 1502. I used the edition Lugdun., 1542, and Colgan's reprint (*Acta Sanctorum Hiberniae* (Louvain, 1645), pp. 542 ff.). *Il primo a scrivere de S. Cataldo fosse archivescovo ed erigesse vescovadi sotto la sua Metropolitana*, Cassinelli says of Petrus (*op. cit.*, p. 43).

<sup>9</sup> Naples; reprinted Frankfurt on Main, 1600, xiii, ii.

<sup>10</sup> Dux ille Moeltulus vocabitur (*Vita sti. Carthagi*, Plummer, *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae* I (Oxford, 1910), p. 172, a parallel of special interest with regard to the numerous other analogies between the traditions of Saints Carthage and Cataldus.

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> Pilgrims from Rome brought the news of St. Endeus' sanctity to Ireland (Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 2).

<sup>9</sup> In 1021, but his cultus and life are products of the 12th century. O'Hanlon, *Lives of Irish Saints* X, pp. 207 ff.; Hogan, *Irish Eccl. Record*, III, xv, 673; MGH, SS IV, pp. 675 ff.; Gougoud, *Les Saints irlandais hors de l'Irlande* (Louvain, 1936), pp. 47 ff., and my article 'Irish Saints in Central Europe', *Irish Eccl. Record* (1942), 186.

<sup>10</sup> See Plummer's edition of Beda's *Historia Ecclesiastica* (Oxford, 1896), II, p. 170 and Kenney, *op. cit.*, p. 483. St. Fridolin, Pirmin and others were regarded as Irish merely from the synonymy of the words *peregrinus* and *Scot(t)us* (Kenney, p. 532). In Italy an interesting illustration for this is the tradition of S. Pellegrino (Margaret Stokes, *Six Months in the Apennines* [London, 1892], pp. 201 ff.)

namely on the wild Continent, produced few bishop-Saints on the Continent. Saints Columbanus, Gall, Fiacre, Fursey and their companions (whose tradition became the historical basis for the continental tradition of *the Island of Saints*) successfully refused promotion to the episcopate. The later Celtic migrant bishops were not only opposed during their lifetime by the Roman episcopal system promoted in Central Europe by St. Boniface,<sup>11</sup> but even long after their death by the later continental tradition, chiefly laid down in the lives of Irish archbishop-Saints, relating to the establishment of that system in Ireland.

Whether Petrus omitted something or whether he represents the older tradition which left it unexplained how Cataldus' body came to Taranto, he certainly shows us that Cataldus' activities in Ireland figured prominently in the tradition on which he drew. In fact, apart from the usual list of miracles, little more is said, even in the later accounts of Cataldus' activities in Taranto, than that he was archbishop there. Though I shall not concern myself in this paper with the accounts and the tradition of St. Cataldus' activities after his departure from Ireland, I must mention that the tradition of his archiepiscopate at Taranto, in conjunction with the fantastic chronology, is expressive of the tendency to give Southern Italy an ecclesiastical tradition comparable to that of other parts of the country. Cataldus was assigned to a period which made it possible to regard this stranger as the first archbishop of Taranto after the direct disciples of the Apostles. Similarly, one of the sources for the misunderstanding by modern Irish writers of the meaning of the account of Cataldus' archiepiscopate in Ireland was Colgan's unwillingness to admit that the diocesan episcopacy and the metropolitan system in Ireland were not set up until the 12th century under Anglo-continental influence.<sup>12</sup>

Petrus de Natalibus said that Cataldus died on May 8th, a mistake for March 8th, his *natale* in Taranto. This mistake permits us to trace a continental tradition of St. Cataldus, based on Petrus rather than on the Taranto sources. In the first literary reference to St. Cataldus outside Italy, the *Martirologe in Englysshe* (1526),<sup>13</sup> we read that May 8th was *in yrelond y<sup>e</sup> feest of saynt Catald a bysshop of many notable myracles*, (then follows a list of his miracles, without reference to place-names). This entry is found among the *addicions* made by the author of the *Martirologe*, many of which were taken from Petrus' *Catalogus*. Also the entries relating to St. Cataldus under May 8th in the *Martyrologium* of St. Peter Canisius (1562)<sup>14</sup> and in the Carthusian Martyrology, quoted by Colgan, are clearly taken from Petrus. None of these entries refers to the tradition of Cataldus' pilgrimage.<sup>15</sup>

When, in the middle of the 16th century, the Breviary of Taranto was *restitutum iuxta ritum Romanae Ecclesiae*, an Office for the feast of the translation of St. Cataldus' relics (May 10th) by Joannes Bapt. de Algoritiis was published.<sup>16</sup> In 1580 Cardinal Sirletto compiled an Office for the *natale* of the Saint on March 8th. The publication, in 1607, of Sirletto's Office prompted Bona-

<sup>11</sup> See below note 119.

<sup>12</sup> Op. cit., pp. 211 and 217 ff., also Hugh Ward, *Acta S. Rumoldi* (Louvain 1662), pp. 151 ff. Fleming [*Collectanea Sacra* (Louvain, 1667) p. 270] at least doubted whether the use of the pallium was known in Ireland before the Synod of Kells.

<sup>13</sup> Henry Bradshaw Society (henceforth abbreviated B.S.) III, p. 71.

<sup>14</sup> Dillingen. Quoted by de Sollier in his edition of *Martyrol. Usuard*, AA SS Boll. June VI (1866) p. 237, and Costanzi, op. cit. p. 187. That St. Peter Canisius had a clearer

historical sense than the Bollandists admitted, is shown by the fact that he is one of the few writers who gave due prominence to the curious tradition of Cataldus' archiepiscopate and the subdivision of his archbishopric into twelve suffragan bishoprics (see my article on 'St. Peter Canisius and Ireland', *The Irish Monthly*, March 1946, 129 ff.).

<sup>15</sup> See below note 27.

<sup>16</sup> Reprinted by the Bollandists AA SS, May II (1866), p. 577.

ventura Moroni to write his *Cataldiadis*, and his brother Bartholomeo to add his *Vita* of St. Cataldus, compiled *ex vetustissimis codicibus Tarentinae Ecclesiae manuscriptis*. Speaking of the tradition of St. Cataldus' archiepiscopate at Taranto, Joannes Juvenis said that

scriptura nulla extat, qua dignoscere possumus, quot annos cum Tarentinis suis vitam duxerit.

He goes on to state that, according to the former Office which used to be read by the clergy, the Saint foretold the circumstances of his own death,—a tradition referred to in Algoritiis' Office which deals only with the life of Cataldus after his departure from Ireland.

It seems that the early tradition of St. Cataldus was first of all concerned with his relics, in consequence of their translation in 1151.<sup>17</sup> The Roman Martyrology commemorates only the translation of St. Cataldus, though in his annotated edition Baronius made a note referring also to his *natale*. Accordingly, the Bollandists dealt with St. Cataldus only under May 10th and confined themselves to records of that translation.

It has never been claimed, in fact it has been implicitly disclaimed, that there was any tradition of St. Cataldus previous to the finding of his relics in 1071. Evidence of his *cultus* is not found prior to the translation of these relics in 1151.<sup>18</sup> During the late 12th century the Benedictines and the Normans spread devotion to St. Cataldus through practically all parts of Central and Southern Italy. Cataldus appears among the Saints painted on the pillars of the Basilica of the Nativity, under Raoul, the Anglo-Norman bishop, at Bethlehem, a fact of some interest with regard to the tradition of the Saint's pilgrimage to the Holy Land. St. Cataldus' picture is found there among those of Saints Bartholomew,<sup>19</sup> Leonard<sup>20</sup> and Olaf, Saints most popular with the Normans, even in Ireland. It has been assumed that St. Cataldus is identical with St. Cartaud or Catas venerated at Sens and Auxerre in France.<sup>21</sup>

The Taranto Office formed the basis for the Office which in 1751 Thomas de Burgo O.P., after his return from Rome, proposed for the feast of St. Cataldus in Ireland, which had been first granted four years before.<sup>22</sup> The decree granting the first liturgical calendar for All Ireland had ruled that the Offices and Masses for the feasts now officially sanctioned should be taken from approved liturgical text-books. As most of the Saints whose names were included in the first liturgical calendar for All Ireland were those who had laboured, whose *cultus* originated and, in many cases, whose Irish associations had been established, on the Continent, the liturgical text-books from which the first *Officia propria Hiberniae* were drawn were all continental. De Burgo's unofficial compilation had to be withdrawn on account of the severe criticism leveled at it by the Irish Colleges on the Continent, who were more experienced than de Burgo in the strict rules laid down during the 17th century for the compilation of new Offices. The historical lessons proposed by de Burgo for the feast of St. Cataldus on March 8th were, as he said, taken from Sirletto's Office, but de Burgo deviated from it in decisive points, thus promoting the

<sup>17</sup> Francis Porter, *Compendium Annalium Regum Hiberniae* (Rome, 1690), p. 195 says even: 1170.

<sup>18</sup> Tommassini, *Irish Saints in Italy* (London, 1932), pp. 401 ff. and 185; adversely reviewed by Fr. Grosjean in *Analecta Bolland. LI* (1933), 420 ff.

<sup>19</sup> St. Bartholomew is the only minor Apostle who has a place in Irish folklore (see S. O Suilleabhain, *A Handbook of*

*Irish Folklore* (Dublin, 1942), p. 343).

<sup>20</sup> See my article on 'St. Leonard in Ireland', in *Louth Archaeological Journal* X, (1945), 297 ff.

<sup>21</sup> See Albers's article on Cat(h)aldus in Buchberger's *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* II (Freiburg, 1931), p. 790.

<sup>22</sup> See the beginning of my article on St. Albert (above note 1) and the literature listed there.

corruption of the historical meaning of the tradition of St. Cataldus' archiepiscopate in Ireland.<sup>23</sup>

After the rejection of de Burgo's *Officia*, in contrast to other feasts, that of St. Cataldus was not given new lessons;—which could have been easily obtained by just undoing de Burgo's deviations from the Taranto Office. Albert and Cataldus were the only Saints reputed to be of Irish descent and introduced from the Continent, whose feasts, though inserted in the liturgical calendar for Ireland during the 18th century, remained without proper texts, in particular, without historical lessons, up to 1903. In the case of St. Albert, this was due to the fact that, only in Ireland owing to his being adopted as patron of Cashel, was he granted a liturgical *cultus* independent of that of his friend (or brother) St. Erhard, patron of Ratisbon. In the case of St. Cataldus, the reason was that the late 18th and 19th century students of Irish church history were not sufficiently sure of the Italian tradition of the Saint. Compiled as they were by or under the influence of John Healy,<sup>24</sup> the historical lessons prescribed in 1903 for the feasts of St. Albert, St. Cataldus and many local Saints of Ireland were based on modern historical deduction rather than on liturgical tradition.

In 1916, the feast of St. Cataldus was united with that of St. Conleth, patron of the diocese of Kildare, and assigned to May 10th. Thus, on the one hand, the feast of St. Cataldus was removed from the season of Lent, in compliance with the tradition then newly enforced, that Lent should be kept as free as possible from feasts of Saints. On the other hand, assigned as it now was to the octave of its traditional date, the feast of St. Conleth clashed no longer with that of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. Moreover, May 10th is also the date of the oldest feast observed in honour of St. Cataldus. Like other double feasts instituted on this occasion in Ireland (or in other parts of the Church, in compliance with the reform of 1913), the feast of Saints Conleth and Catald was given the Office of 'several Bishops and Confessors' (recently approved for such new double feasts) with syncopated historical lessons. The first two of these lessons deal with St. Conleth, the third deals with St. Cataldus. This syncopated lesson is to be regarded as the latest official summary of the tradition of St. Cataldus in Ireland. It marks the complete triumph of speculation over the historical facts.

The earliest Irish writer to mention St. Cataldus was Stephen White,<sup>25</sup> whose reference to *Cataldus episcopus primus in sua patria Ibernica, deinde Tarenti in Italia* seems to be based on the Taranto Office. The spelling *Cataldus* suggests that White wrote this passage before Henry Fitzsimmons,<sup>26</sup> another of the early Irish Jesuit hagiologists, introduced in 1611 the Hibernised spelling *Cathaldus*, when he compiled his *Catalogus Sanctorum Hiberniae* from the manuscript of Richard Fleming S.J. This spelling was adopted by Beare O'Sullivan<sup>27</sup> and

<sup>23</sup> See below pp. 240-241.

<sup>24</sup> John Healy devoted to *S. Cathald* a chapter in his *Insula Sanctorum* (Dublin, 1890), pp. 457-466. It starts with the characteristic statement: *The life of S.C. has been written by the brothers Moroni; Petrus de Natalibus and the whole tradition of Cataldus' archiepiscopate and the subdivision of the archbishopric into twelve bishoprics are neglected.*

<sup>25</sup> White's work was not published until 1849 (Dublin), p. 37.

<sup>26</sup> See Corkery in *Studies* XXXII (1943), 265. An annotated edition of Fitzsimmons' *Catalogue* by Fr. Grosjean is found in *Féil-Sgríbhinn Eoin Mhic Neill* (Dublin, 1940), p. 345. In his *Catholicke Refutation* (Roan,

1608), Fitzsimmons does not mention Cataldus (or Albartus) but Frigidian (see below p. 227) and Hildulph (Albert's reputed brother). Cataldus' name is not found either in the list of Irish patron-Saints on the Continent in the *Panegyricus S. Patricii* by Guillelmus Thyraeus, a Cork priest (Douai, 1617), p. 207.

<sup>27</sup> *Historiae Ibernicae Catholicae Compendium* (Lisbon, 1621), ed. M. Kelly (Dublin, 1851), pp. 47 and 50. The spelling *Cathaldus* is also found in the manuscript martyrology by Hermann Greven who entered the Saint under May 8th (de Sollier, *op. cit.*, p. 233). His entry, like those of the *Martirologe* and of Canisius' *Martyrologium* (above notes 13 ff.), begins with the words *In Hibernia*.

extended also to his own list of Irish patron Saints on the Continent, where he entered *Cathaldus episc. et patron. Tarentin.* under May 5th. Fitzsimons had May 8th, though he added a reference to Petrus de Natalibus l. 4, c. 142; the figure "142" was corrected into "145" by Ussher, which shows that neither O'Sullivan<sup>28</sup> nor Francis Porter,<sup>29</sup> who reprinted Fitzsimons's list, looked up Petrus' *Catalogus*. White wrote in Bavaria, Fitzsimons in France, O'Sullivan in Portugal, Porter in Rome. Other Irish writers on the Continent such as Petrus Redanus,<sup>30</sup> John Colgan,<sup>31</sup> Anthony Bruodin<sup>32</sup> and John Lynch<sup>33</sup> spread the fame of St. Cat(h)aldus still further afield. Ware<sup>34</sup> and Ussher<sup>35</sup> were the first to publish accounts of St. Cathaldus in his reputed native country. The tradition of "reasoning" on the tradition of St. Cathaldus was started by Colgan, continued by Lanigan<sup>36</sup> and O'Hanlon<sup>37</sup> and finally summed up in a popular pamphlet (the only book on St. Cathaldus ever published in Ireland) by the Rev. Michael O'Riordan.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the tradition of St. Cathaldus is a typical cross-section of the history of Irish hagiography.

\* \* \* \* \*

Berlanger of Taranto<sup>39</sup> stated that in 1071 archbishop Drogo of Taranto found among the bodily remains in a marble sarcophagus unearthed at the building of the new cathedral *crucem auream nomen sancti Latinis litteris designantem*. This cross and the inscription CATALDUS have been assigned by a modern archaeologist to the 7th or 8th century, and the existence at Taranto of a clerk of some importance bearing that name at that time is therefore regarded as *a fact more or less certainly established*. Joannes Juvenis says that that cross contained *nomen C. T. Latinis duabus literis significantem*, but the Office added in 1615 to Sirletto's Office for the feast of the invention of the relics of St. Cathaldus<sup>40b</sup> says that on this cross *sancti Praesulis nomen erat descriptum*. I do not know whether it has been investigated if the letters C and T in that inscription are older than the rest.<sup>40</sup> Fitzsimmons's spelling *Cathaldus* was justified by Colgan<sup>41</sup> saying that

Cathaldus Hibernice Cathal vocatur, et hunc juxta vocis etymon. Cathaldus debet scribi non Cataldus.

<sup>28</sup> Grosjean, *loc. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>30</sup> *Commentaria in I Machabaeorum* (Lugd., 1651), Dedicatio §19: Cathaldus.

<sup>31</sup> See above note 5.

<sup>32</sup> *Propugnaculum Veritatis* (Prague, 1669), see below note 74.

<sup>33</sup> *Cambrensis Eversus* (1862) ed. M. Kelly (Dublin, 1848-1852), II, pp. 646 and 650, and *De Praesulibus Hiberniae* (1672) ed. J. F. O'Doherty (Dublin, 1944) II, p. 215.

<sup>34</sup> *De Scriptoribus Hiberniae*, I, i, Harris' ed. of Works I (Dublin, 1739), p. 549.

<sup>35</sup> *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Antiquitates*, XVI = *Whole Works VI* (Dublin, 1869), pp. 300 ff.

<sup>36</sup> *Ecclesiastical History of Ireland III* (Dublin, 1822), pp. 122 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, III (1873), pp. 262 ff. and V, pp. 185 ff.

<sup>38</sup> See above note 3.

<sup>39</sup> *AA SS Boll.* May II, p. 569.

<sup>40b</sup> O'Riordan, *op. cit.*, p. 15 says that the Office of 1580/1607 was used for both the *natale* and the *translatio*, since 1851 also for the new feast of the Patronage of St. Cath-

dus (January 10). In 1892, however, distinct Offices were prescribed for the two ancient feasts, while the old Office was retained only for the *patrocinium*.

The frontispiece of the Office of 1615 is the same as that in Moroni's *Cataldiadis*. One of the scenes depicted in it shows the Saint's departure from Ireland, standing in the rear of the boat and blessing the people on the shore.

<sup>40</sup> O'Riordan says (*op. cit.*, p. 14), that he was informed by the present archbishop of Taranto that this cross bears the inscription *Cathaldus, Famulus Christi, Episcopus Tarentinus*.

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 545 ff. Right from the title of his book, O'Riordan speaks of the Saint as *Cathal*. Colgan did not tell us how to dispose of the ending *-aldus*; Joannes Juvenis says that this ending is frequent in *ea insula, ut Mogaldus, Dualdus, Osaldus, Helbaldus, Haraldus, Arcibaldus*. We shall see that the 12th century writers knew more of Celtic philology than the 17th century writers.

Colgan was so sure of this that, in his reprint of Moroni's *Vita*, he changed the spelling on his own authority. It is curious that among the numerous Cathals mentioned in the Irish Annals<sup>43</sup> between the 8th and 11th centuries there is not one whose name was entered into the Irish lists of "Saints". Colgan boldly adopts the Latinised form *Cathaldus* when he speaks of some of those Cathals,<sup>44</sup> and John Lynch<sup>45</sup> follows him in this usage. Perhaps Colgan's spelling was also influenced by the words *Cathlaido peregrino* in the *Vita Tripartita sti. Patricii* which he rendered by *peregrinum nomine Cathaldum*.<sup>46</sup> In his article *St. Cataldus or Cathaldus*, O'Hanlon<sup>47</sup> went so far as to give even the name of St. Cataldus' reputed birthplace in Ireland the form of *Cathaldum*. In modern literature, Albers headed his article on our Saint *Cat(h)aldus*, while Dr. Kenney adopted the spelling *Cathaldus*.<sup>48</sup>

It appears that at later elevations of the relics of St. Cataldus, the inscription on "his" pectoral cross was further amplified.<sup>49</sup> In the late 11th or early 12th century the letters RA and in the late 12th century the letters CHAV were added. We do not know to whom Moroni refers when he says that

patriam ejus *nonnulli* Rachau fuisse affirmant, in Numeniae partibus quondam non obscuri nominis urbem, moti fortasse quod in multis libris Cataldus Rachau scriptum requiritur.

Moroni himself adhered to the tradition that Catandum was Cataldus' birthplace, Rachau his (archiepiscopal) see. His note makes it clear that he did not see the golden cross, which for some time was attached to a statue of the Saint; apparently he did not even realise that what he found in many books was taken from that cross.

My contention is that there is an internal connection between the inscription of the word *Rachau* and the Irish associations attributed to St. Cathaldus. As the word *Rachau* does not occur in Petrus' account it is hard to say whether the inscription produced those Irish associations or vice versa. With their usual acrimony in matters of Irish Saints, the Bollandists said that those Irish associations were invented

a vago quodam Hiberno praetextu pietatis, dictata ex iis quae passim de Hibernicis narrantur (by the Bollandists) pro genio nationis poetarum suorum fabellis facile credulae.

In the cases of both St. Albert and St. Cataldus it can be shown that even if

<sup>43</sup> See the indices to the *Annals of the Four Masters* (ed. O'Donovan) and the *Annals of Ulster* (ed. Hennessy). Canon P. Power in his *Waterford and Lismore* (Cork, 1937), pp. 5 ff. said that Cataldus' name is found in Irish martyrologies. Did he mean Fitzsimon's, or O'Clery's in which the entry for May 10th *Cataldus epscop, Tairrent i Lethuibh* (Italy) is by a more recent hand (*The Martyrology of Donegal* (Dublin 1864), p. 125)?

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 629 and 298 with regard to the abbot of Kildare and the son of Roderic, whose obits the Four Masters have under A.D. 141 and 1043.

<sup>45</sup> *De Praesulibus*, II, pp. 104 and 305 with regard to Cathail Mairtir airchinneach Corcaighe and Cathal McCormac, the successor of St. Brendan, whose obits the Four Masters have under A.D. 1034 and 961. The earlier Protestant writers (Usher and

Ware) have Cataldus, presumably derived from Dempster, whose attempt to claim our Saint for Scotland need not be discussed.

<sup>46</sup> W. Stokes' ed. (1887), 68 (*Rawlins*, 512) and 356 (*Book of Armagh*) = Colgan, *op. cit.*, pp. 322 and 363, note: Jocelino Cathladius, forte is qui aliis Cathubius vocatur et colitur April 8 (see *Martyrology of Tallaght*, B.S., lxviii, 31; *Annals of the Four Masters*, A.D. 554).

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 185 and 189. Grammack (*Dict. of Christian Biography* I, p. 421) speaks of *Cathaldus, Cathal*.

<sup>48</sup> See above note 3. This spelling was also adopted by the Irish Office of 1916, while the Litany of Irish Saints (approved by the Holy See in 1921) has *Cataldus* (*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, V, xviii (1921), 434)!

<sup>49</sup> G. Blandamura, *Un cimelio del secolo vii esistente nel Duomo de Taranto* (Lecce, 1917), quoted by Tommassini.

an Irishman took a hand in establishing their Irish associations, this was due to the desire for Irish associations, characteristic of 12th century continental hagiography, rather than to Irish megalomania.<sup>49</sup>

When we compare the word *Rachau* with other place-names located in Ireland in the literature contemporary with that inscription such as the tradition of *Artinacha*—*Archamacha*—*Archimomska* in the German *Tundalus*<sup>50</sup> and *Domnachmor* in the *Vita sti. Foranani* (where this place-name is expressly described as characteristic of *barbarica sermocinatio*),<sup>51</sup> we may realise that the guttural sound of *Rachau* is expressive of continental ideas of the sound of the Irish language.<sup>52</sup> According to Petrus de Natalibus and Joannes Juvenis, the names of Cataldus' parents were Eucho and Athena (=Ethne?). Moroni has obviously the older tradition, saying that the names were Echo and Achlena, which were, as Colgan<sup>53</sup> stated, well-known names in ancient Irish hagiography. Moroni also added the name of Dicho,<sup>54</sup> a prophet who educated Cataldus. Each of these proper names contains a guttural, which in the case of Achlena and Echo (Irish: *Eochaidh*) is hard as in *Rachau*.

The Hellenisation of these last two names is expressive of the classical tendency, which can be observed both in Irish literature and in continental

<sup>49</sup> No other Irish Saint, perhaps not even St. Columbanus, is the object of a cult so widespread over Italy as St. Cathald, venerated under the name of San Cataldo as a prodigious wonderworker, throughout the country from Lombardy to Sicily. The historical figure of the man has until recently been wrapt in mist (Tomassini in Cleary's translation, pp. 401 ff.). The tradition of St. Cataldus is a most important chapter in the history of Ireland's place in Italian hagiography (see my article on 'The Literary Tradition of Irish Saints in the Order of Canons Regular of the Lateran' *Comparative Literature Studies* XVII/XVIII (1945), 20 ff. and XIX (1946), 17 ff. Pico della Mirandola wrote verses on him (O'Hanlon, p. 197). Bonaventura Moroni's *Cataldiadis* is an interesting example of late Renaissance poetry. J. G. Kohl, the globe-trotter, in his *Reisen in Irland* (1843), I, p. 390 quoted the line, frequently referred to in the tradition of the Saint: *Gaude, felix Hibernia, de qua proles alma progreditur!*

(auf dem Grab des berühmten Iränders Cataldus, der in Tarent in Italien starb).

The tradition of St. Cataldus was frequently linked up with that of St. Donatus of Lecce (Tomassini, p. 410), who is either described as his father or as his brother (Montalembert, *Les Moines de l'Occident* III (1866), pp. 314 ff.). This Donatus is perhaps identical with his namesake at Fiesole (Kenney, No. 421), as both are commemorated on October 22nd. In Ireland, this is only the feast of the latter; since 1747 St. Donatus' feast has remained without historical lessons, though the tradition of this Saint is exceptionally good.

Warren (*Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church* [1881], p. 26) and Gougaud (*Christianity in Celtic Lands* [1931], p. 159) obviously regarded the tradition of Cataldus' activities in Ireland as negligible; In Gougaud's *Les Saints irlandais*, however, the rich tradition of St. Cataldus in Italy is not referred to.

<sup>50</sup> See my article on St. Albert, note 41.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, note 63b, and above note 2.

<sup>52</sup> As Curtis (*Studies* VIII [1919], 254) noted, Lynch (above note 33) said that Irish equalled if it did not surpass the German itself in inspiring terror. Compare Goethe's description of the *unbändige Lachen* provoked by the barbarian sound of *Hibernisch* at the celebrations of the Epiphany at the Propaganda in Rome (*Briefe*, Weimar edition XXXIV, p. 153). Dietrich Hegewisch, professor in Kiel, the author of the first German history of Ireland (*Uebersicht der irländischen Geschichte* (Altona, 1806) says that one of the reasons why Irish history had been so much neglected on the Continent, was that Irish names were so difficult: Sie sind schwer auszusprechen, schwer zu behalten und beleidigen das Ohr statt es zu bezaubern. Wenn wir in der griechischen Geschichte statt Aristides, Themistokles, Leonidas, Epaminondas, lauter Namen find würden wie Phelim O'Neal, Mac Dermot, Mac Murragh, ich weiss nicht, ob nicht sehr viel von dem Reiz der griechischen Geschichte verschwinden würde...

<sup>53</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 452. For *Eochaidh* see Plummer, *Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae* (Oxford, 1910; henceforth abbreviated V.S.H.), II, p. 357. The story of St. Patrick's baptising King Echo is contained in the 12th century German poem *Patricius* (see my article on 'Early References to Irish Saints in German Literature', to appear soon in *Speculum*). Regarding Achlena, Colgan says that it was the name of the mothers of Saints Fintan and Lugadius; however in V.S.H. II, pp. 96 and 207 and Colgan's *Acta*, p. 452, the mothers of these Saints are given different names; O'Hanlon, p. 185, says that Colgan's statement was derived from Oengus' list of the mothers of Saints.

<sup>54</sup> This name is definitely Irish; a Saint of that name was among St. Patrick's disciples (J. P. Bury, *Life of St. Patrick* (London, 1905), pp. 85 ff. and the index to Stokes' ed. of *Vita Tripartita*).



biographies of Irish Saints at the time of the Othonian renaissance.<sup>55</sup> There is an obvious relationship in the casts between the tradition of St. Cataldus and the *Vita* of St. Livinus,<sup>56</sup> another Irish-continental archbishop-Saint:

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Cataldus          | Livinus                                     |
| Echo or Eucho     | Theagnius                                   |
| Achlena or Athena | Agalinia (or -unia)                         |
| Dicho             | Menalchius (L.'s predecessor as archbishop) |
| Meltridis         | Colomagus (king).                           |

When we add the names of Helimas and Sympronius, *energumeni*, and of *Abdias Scotigena*<sup>57</sup> *paralyticus*, the proper-names in the *Vita sti. Livini* appear to be more thoroughly hellenised than those in the tradition of St. Cataldus. On the other hand, Foillanus and Killianus Livinus' disciples at whose request, Bonifatius says, the *Vita sti. Livini* was written, are Irish, while the names of Cataldus' companions on his pilgrimage, Euprepus and Baronophrius, are Graeco-Italian.<sup>58</sup> The hellenising tendency in the proper-names of the tradition of St. Cataldus may be an explanation of the attempt made by the Bollandists to identify Rachau with Ragusa.

Colgan has offered several suggestions regarding places in Ireland to be identified with Rachau. One of his suggestions was Rathen, now Rahen in South Meath (Co. Offaly). We shall see that the tradition of St. Cataldus' being trained at Lismore induced Colgan to assign him to a period after the life-time of St. Carthagus, the founder of the school of Lismore.<sup>59</sup> Before coming to Lismore, St. Carthagus had been established at Rathen, a place from which he was called *Carthach Raithin*,<sup>60</sup> an expression which bears a striking

<sup>55</sup> E. G. Cox, 'The Classical Tendencies in Mediaeval Irish Literature', *Philological Quarterly*, III (1924), 267 ff. This tendency is a derivation from the synchronisation of Irish and Greek history since the 8th century (McNeill in *Proc. of the Royal Irish Academy* 1910, C, 147). Compare, for contrast, the list of proper names in the *Vita sti. Fursaei* (Kenney, No. 296). The Hellenisation of proper-names in 12th (and later) century Irish and Irish-continental hagiography was confined to the Latin texts.

<sup>56</sup> See above note 2, and my article on St. Albert, 35 ff.

<sup>57</sup> Where the Taranto Office of 1580 says that *Galli, Angli, Scotti et Theutones* were among Cataldus' disciples at Lismore, Joannes Juvenis speaks of *Francigenae, Angli, Theutonisci et Scotigenae*. For *Anglicus* see my article on St. Albert note 23b. For *Theutones* see below p. 229 and note 78.

<sup>58</sup> Colgan, p. 556.

<sup>59</sup> The later writers took full advantage of this statement. According to Lynch (see above note 33) and Butler (see below note 68) Cataldus was the immediate successor of Carthagus (see above note 44). Margaret Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 202 discovered that "Cathaldus was born in Waterford about the year 617". It is futile to list all the speculations on the chronology of St. Cataldus; one only wonders whether one should describe them as brazen or naïve.

<sup>60</sup> Not only in the *Vita sti. Carthagi* (V.S.H. I, pp. 170 ff.) but already in *Féilire Oengusso* (B.S. XIX, p. 124) the manuscripts have *raithin*, *rathin*, *rathian* and *rothain*. Manuscript F's margin note (*ibid.*, p. 132)

to the word *Carthaig*: *i. Mocuta Lissmoir* is apparently based on the entry in the *Martyrology of Tallaght* (B.S. LXVIII, 42): *Carthagi i. Mochutu Lis Moir*. In the (later) Gaelic version of the *Vita (Irish Text Soc. XVI (1914), p. 91)* we have *Mocuda Raithin*. In the tradition of St. Colmain mac Luachain (see below note 110) Carthagus is called *Mochuta Lis Moir* (Kuno Meyer's ed., p. 20). The parallel between this close connection between Lismore and Rathen in the tradition of St. Carthagus and the association between Lismore and Rachau in the tradition of St. Cataldus is striking. However right from the name of the Saint, this parallel is based on the Latin tradition (see below pp. 229 and 234).

Carthagus completely eclipsed the ancient founder of Raithen, St. Camelacus (Kenney, no. 88 and pp. 451 ff.; O'Clery's *Martyrology of Donegal* has *Caomlach O Raithin*).

*Féilire Oengusso* commemorates on March 11th (*ed. cit.*, p. 81) *Constantin ri Rathin*. Manuscript R<sup>2</sup> has a long note on him (*ibid.*, p. 93 ff.) saying that this *comarba* (in this case really: first successor) *Mocuta Rathain a nDelbna Ethra i Midi* was a king of Britain who came on a pilgrimage to Rathen at the time of Mochutu. He sold the goodness of the earth for pilgrimage in order to gain heaven. He gave himself to manual labor like any monk a-serving God, and 'tis he that marked out (*doroinn*) *chill i. Raithin*, and dug its dyke and bettered *ceapach Cusantin* south of Rathen. (See below pp. 230-231 the tradition of St. Cataldus' building the church of Rachau).

resemblance to the inscription of the cross in Taranto, especially when we assume with the Office prescribed in 1903 for St. Carthagus' feast that Rathen should be spelt *Rachan*.<sup>61</sup> O'Hanlon<sup>62</sup> had prepared the way for the assimilation of Rachau with Rathen when *suggesting* (in order to make Colgan's surmise more acceptable) that 'for Rachau we should read *Rachen*'. Indeed there is a parallel to this in the change from the ancient place-name of *Rachlinn* to the modern form of *Rathlinn*.<sup>63</sup> The most important point in Colgan's suggestion was that, if it was accepted, *Cataldus* might be regarded as a monastic bishop of Lismore and that the tradition of his subdividing the *archiepiscopatus Rachau* into twelve suffragan bishoprics might be interpreted as a corrupted version of the ordination under "Cathal" at Raithin of twelve other bishops.

The official tradition, however, has adopted another suggestion of Colgan's according to which *Rachau* is *Shanrahan* or *Old-Raghan*, a townland in South Tipperary, just outside the borders of the dioceses of Waterford and Cork. O'Riordan<sup>64</sup> has suggested that *Shanrahan* was an old diocese which was later absorbed as e.g. the diocese of *Kilmacduagh* was absorbed by *Galway*. O'Hanlon gave greater weight to Colgan's suggestion by adding to his article on St. *Cataldus* an illustration of the ruins of *Shanrahan*!<sup>65</sup> *Shanrahan* has the advantage of being not so far from Lismore as *Rahen*; the Irish students of the tradition of St. *Cataldus* invariably assumed that the statement made by Moroni that *Catandum* was not far from Lismore, should be applied automatically to *Rachau*.<sup>66</sup> The Office of 1903 definitely speaks of his episcopal see *in loco hodie Shanrahan nuncupato* and the synopated lesson of 1916 raises *Shanrahan* to the rank of a diocese. When in 1931 an Irish bishop published *The Roman Missal* with the supplement for Ireland, he stated that *St. Cathald for some time ruled the Church in the ancient diocese of Shanrahan*. Unfortunately, Dr. Kenney's summary of the tradition of St. *Cathaldus* has done but little to clear up this maze of misunderstandings.<sup>67</sup>

Of his existence, as bishop of Tarentum in the 7th century, there can be little doubt, but the circumstantial account of his career in late sources, which makes him an Irishman, a monk at Lismore<sup>68</sup> . . . is manifestly fictitious.

<sup>61</sup> For the transition from Rathen to *Rachen* compare the transition from *Athena* to *Achlens*, also from *Arthimacha* to *Archamacha* (above p. 224).

<sup>62</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 195. Lanigan has occasionally *Raschau*, a misprint?

<sup>63</sup> *Irische Texte*, IV, 1 (Leipzig, 1900), p. 371. DeBurgio speaks of diocesis *Rathaensis*, while Ughelli and Lynch have *Rachnensis*.

<sup>64</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 7 ff.

<sup>65</sup> In *Waterford Archaeological Journal* XI (1905), 53, the foundations of St. Cathal's church at *Shanrahan* are referred to.

<sup>66</sup> According to Healy this is "quite evident from the Saint's Life" (see above note 24). Healy reasoned himself out of the association between Meath and Munster by saying that after Carthage's expulsion from Meath, "it could not have been tolerated that a Munster prince (!) should be appointed to any part of Meath (*op. cit.*, p. 462). Lynch (*De Praesulibus*, II, p. 125) said that *Cathaldus* was bishop *non (ut ego quidem existimo) in Rachnensi diocesi nullus enim locus nomen illud ferens in Hibernia existit, in regione quidem Desiorum in qua Lismoria collocatur, pagus est Rathen*

*dictus, sed tam obscurus ut episcopi titulum numquam tulisse traditur*. Carthagus was a non-resident bishop of Lismore. (Lynch, like Healy, refers only to Moroni). The corruption of the tradition may be seen from O'Riordan's statement: "When Lismore was in its glory, it is said, that *Raghan* was a place of importance, but it passed through its decline and has become the name of a townland" (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>67</sup> One of the most popular accounts of St. *Cataldus* is that in Alban Butler's *Lives of Saints*. Thurston's note (in the London, 1936 edition, V, p. 122) says that this is another case where we know next to nothing of the life of the Saint, but have long accounts of the veneration paid to what were believed to be his relics" (sources: Bollandists and Ughelli!) A portion of these relics is owned by St. Isidore's, the Irish Franciscan College at Rome (Gregory Cleary, *Luke Wedding* (Rome, 1925), p. 223).

<sup>68</sup> Already Montalembert stated: "Il avait présidé à la grande école monastique de Lismore. Grâce à son zèle et à son succès cette école était devenue une sorte d'uni-

Except for saying that Cataldus was *ex partibus Hiberniae oppido quod dicitur Cataldum*, Petrus de Natalibus mentions no Irish place-names. Joannes Juvenis uses the same expression but apart from giving the name of the town as Catandum, adds that it was *Numeniae*. Moroni in his list of *errata* corrected *Numenia* into *Mononia*, a correction which was adopted by the Roman reprint of Sirletto's Office in 1615. Colgan corrected *Mononia* into *Momonia*. The spelling *Mumenia* is quite common in 12th century Irish hagiographical literature,<sup>69</sup> and the misspelling *Numenia* may be compared with the misspelling of *Artinacha* for *Artimacha*, which was of great importance for the tradition of St. Albert. The identification of *Numenia* with Munster is obvious from the only place-name mentioned in the tradition of St. Cataldus, the identification of which offers no difficulties, namely that of Lismore.

That Moroni was the first to mention *Lesmoría* as the place where young Cataldus *studiorum causa degebat*, is another sign of his drawing from the sources. Outside the tradition of St. Cataldus, the first works of continental literature to mention the name of Lismore are St. Bernard's *Life of St. Malachy*<sup>70</sup> and the *Vita sti. Albarti*.<sup>71</sup> The introduction on a large scale of Irish place-names is a characteristic of 12th century works of continental literature whose scene is laid in Ireland. As the most interesting parallel in this respect to the tradition of St. Cataldus, I mention the earliest *Vita* of St. Fridianus of Lucca, where we hear that after being educated in *Candida* (Whiterne) in England this son of the king of *Ulaid* went back in *Hiberniam et in loco qui vocatur Machili habitum religionis sumpsit*. Colgan's suggestion that Fridianus of Lucca is identical with Finnian of Moville is chiefly based on his remark that

mendose in exemplari quo usus sum, legebatur Machili pro Machile, cum nullo in Hibernia Ecclesia Machili dicta.<sup>72</sup>

While it is not the purpose of this paper to examine this suggestion, it may be noted that *Machili* is another Irish place-name with a hard guttural. The earliest *Vita* of St. Fridianus is posterior to 1171, that is the same period when the *Vita sti. Albarti* originated.

Prior to Colgan's suggestion that, on account of the reference to Lismore, Cataldus should be assigned to the 7th century, Antonius Carraciolus, an early 17th century Neapolitan historian, had pointed out that the tradition of Cataldus' pilgrimage to the Holy Land made it clear that the Saint could not have lived before the Gothic invasions.<sup>73</sup> Nevertheless the tradition assigning

---

versité". (*loc. cit.*). Butler, *loc. cit.* said that he was "a learned Irish monk who for some time was regent of (Thurston changed: presided over) the great school of Lismore after the death of its founder St. Carthach".

It is hardly necessary to refute the Bollandists' suggestion that Rachau is identical with Raphoe (*op. cit.*, p. 576). The Bollandists add the despondent remark that before the Synod of Kells the subdivision of dioceses in Ireland was so obscure that the only thing one might reasonably assume is that when leaving Ireland, Cataldus was *episcopus in aliquo loco*.

<sup>69</sup> V.S.H. II, p. 336. Of particular interest is the phrase in *partibus Muminensium quas iam fide Christiana repleverat* in *Vita IV S. Patricii* (Esposito in *Hermathena* No. 50 1937), p. 140). See below pp. 228-229. The

reference most widely spread on the Continent to *regio Muminensium* (12th cent. Leipzig manuscript: *Muminensium*, Jubinal: *Mimensium*) is found in the beginning of the *Navigatio S. Brendani* (Kenney, No. 203, NBI). The Italian version replaces the mysterious reference to *Stagnili* in that district by a locality in Northern Italy.

<sup>70</sup> See the list of place-names prefacing Lawlor's edition (New York, 1920).

<sup>71</sup> See my article on St. Albert, p. 26 and note 36d.

<sup>72</sup> Kenney, no. 40, that is, the chapter just preceding that on St. Cataldus.

<sup>73</sup> Thurston, *loc. cit.*, suggested that the tradition of Cataldus' bringing the faith to Taranto (in reality, the tradition expressly states that Cataldus is told by an angel that Taranto has already been Christianised by

Cataldus to the middle of the second century survived in Italy and among the Irish writers. Of Joannes Juvenis' statement that Cataldus lived at the time of Adrian, it has been suggested that the first Pope of that name rather than the Roman Emperor might be meant. Of Moroni's statement that Cataldus lived in CLXVI, the Bollandists suggested it might be a misreading for DLXVI. Anthony Bruodin synchronised Cathaldus's episcopate at Taranto with the reign of *Carolus Magnus* (*Cathoir Mór*) in Ireland (A.D. 119-125).<sup>74</sup> All this is sheer speculation, which shows merely the gradual fading out of the significance which the chronological data had in the original tradition.

In the Irish tradition of St. Cataldus, the misunderstanding of the account given in the sources of the Saint's archiepiscopate in Rachau started with Colgan. To Petrus' statement that Cataldus *totam insulam convertit*, Colgan noted: *Rectius in Officio ejus lect. V. legitur: universam provinciam Rachau. Rectius*, because whether Cataldus lived in the 2nd or 7th century, no Irishman would credit him with more than promoting Christianity in a part of Ireland. However, in the 12th century *Vita sti. Albei*,<sup>75</sup> we read that this *Mummensium preses*

circumbat totam Hiberniam . . . et multos ibi convertit ad fidem, sed non omnes quia voluit Dominus ut beatus Patricius episcopus qui post Albeum in Hiberniam venit, converteret omnes ad fidem Hibernenses.<sup>76</sup>

The *Vita sti. Albei* like the *Vita sti. Albarti* illustrates the tendency of Munstermen during the 12th century to elevate the archiepiscopal see of Munster at the expense of Armagh. Both works speak of Armagh as an episcopal see, while they lay great stress on the archiepiscopal rank of the see in Munster. The *Vita sti. Albei* points out that the see in Munster has an older tradition than Armagh can claim and that it was only by voluntary submission to Divine dispensation that Albeus left to Patrick the rank of Apostle of Ireland; in fact, the (later) manuscript S of the *Vita sti. Albei* called Patrick

St. Mark) means that he brought there the Roman rite. We shall see that this explanation could be applied rather to the tradition of St. Cataldus' archiepiscopate in Ireland. It is amusing to see how Irish and Italian authors have exchanged their arguments in reinforcing their speculations on Cataldus' place in the 7th century, without regard to the sources.

A typical example on the Irish side is J. H. Todd's *St. Patrick* (Dublin, 1864), pp. 196 ff.: Cathaldus of Taranto has undoubtedly claim to be considered an Irishman . . . The ancient manuscript of his Life (note: published by Colgan) preserved in the archives of the Church of Taranto, tells us that he was just born before the death of the emperor Trajan . . . The truth, however, leaks out in the Life just referred to, where we read that Cathaldus, before he left Ireland, was a teacher in the school of Lismore. Therefore Cathaldus cannot have left Ireland much before the middle of the 7th century. He belonged to the second order of Saints . . .

In his paper 'On Ancient Literary Frauds and Forgeries in Spain and Italy and their Bearing on Events Recorded in Irish and other Celtic Annals' (*Proc. R. Irish Academy*, VIII [1863], 363), R. R. Madden discussed the prediction connected with the discovery

of the relics of *S. Cataldus* or *Cathaldus*, bishop of Ratheney (the church of Raheny, Co. Dublin, which however bears the ancient and unique dedication to one St. Assan. J. H.) according to the *Geniales Dies* III, p. 15 by Alexander ab Alexandris. Alexander died in 1529, his work was printed in Frankfurt 1591; I used the edition Leiden, 1673, where the passage in question is found in I, p. 734. Alexander says implicitly that Cataldus lived in the second century.

<sup>74</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 879.

<sup>75</sup> *V.S.H.* I, pp. 54 ff.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* on St. Patrick's meeting the king in civitate regali Casel. *Ibi vero accepit Patricius magistrum suum (Albe; the Irish text says: as his confessor), quia erat valde humilis. Tunc Rex Engus et Patricius (see below pp. 233 ff.) ordinauerunt ut in civitate et cathedra sancti Albei esset archiepiscopi omnium Memonenium semper. Ms. S: Tunc Patricius obtulit Albeo omnes viros Muminensium, ut esset eorum pater, et regem Engussum in manum Albei. Ms. R: Tradidit potestatem suam Helueo super Momonenses, sicut ipse receperat a papa super omnes Hibernenses (compare *Vita sti. Declani*, *V.S.H.* II, p. 45). On this oblatio see below pp. 235 ff.*

*totius Hiberniae insulae secundus patronus*. In view of the fact that he was writing for people who knew next to nothing of Irish church history, the author of the tradition of St. Cataldus could afford to represent the Saint as the one who converted all Ireland, to suppress the mention of any other archiepiscopal see in Ireland besides that established by him, and to trace back the tradition of that see to the second century, induced, certainly, by the desire of the people for whom he wrote, to establish an ancient tradition for the see of Taranto.

Joannes Juvenis said that Cataldus' fame spread among the nations outside Ireland. This is almost a stock phrase in Irish hagiography;<sup>77</sup> the relationship with the *Vita sti. Carthagi* seems to be the most obvious:

Fama ejus totam Hiberniam et Britanniam insulam implevit et multa e diversis provinciis ad eum venerunt . . . viri religiosi ex omni parte Hiberniae et non solum, sed ex Anglia et Britannia.<sup>78</sup>

I mention parenthetically, that a comparative study of the Latin and Irish lives of Irish Saints would show that the former were written for foreign consumption rather than for Ireland, and the spreading of the manuscripts of those lives as far as Austria and Italy shows that the writers succeeded in their aim. The reference to Ireland as an island, which we find also in Petrus' account of Cataldus, always betrays the continental view-point.<sup>79</sup> The reference to the foreign nations induced Colgan to assume that Cataldus could not have lived before the school of St. Carthage had attained an international reputation, a considerable time after its foundation.<sup>80</sup> In reality, the tradition of St. Cataldus seems to be an attempt to trace the tradition of Lismore further back than the time of St. Carthage. While in tracing the tradition of the archiepiscopal see of Munster the names of St. Patrick or Armagh were not mentioned, in tracing the tradition of Lismore St. Carthage's name is not mentioned, though in this case it is not suggested that Cataldus was the founder.<sup>80</sup>

Of the references made by Joannes Juvenis to foreigners attending Cataldus' school, that to *Theutones* is the most remarkable. However, even with regard to this reference we may trace a parallel. In the *Vita sti. Boecii* (Buíte) we read: *Fama ejus . . . divulgata iunxerunt se ei quidam viri sancti de Germania . . .*<sup>81</sup> I assume that these references to Germans studying in ancient Ireland were made in order to strengthen the position of the congregation of Irish monasteries at that time established in Central Europe under the leadership of St. James' Ratisbon.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>77</sup> *Vita sti. Fursaei* (Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 77): *Religiosis undique viris ad eum confluentibus*. *Vita sti. Berachi* (V.S.H. I, p. 86): *Fama sanctitatis ejus per provinciam (!) Hibernie diffusa, ecce ad eum ex diversis terre partibus conflunt*.

<sup>78</sup> See above note 57; V.S.H. I, pp. 178 and 197, also in the (later) Gaelic version, ed. Power in *Early Irish Text Soc.* XVI (1914), p. 93. Compare: *Non solum Scotica gens, verum quoque Britanni et Hibernienses populi et circumquaque regionum finitimi cum suis principibus admirabantur ejus laudis praeconia* (*Vita sti. Livini*, PL 87, 338). The reference to the international reputation of Cataldus is almost the only link which the present-day Irish Office for May 10th still has with the Taranto tradition.

<sup>79</sup> See e.g. the beginning of Moroni's

*Cataldiedi* (above p. 220): *Oceani, Divum Hesperii, Phoebique cadenti, Immortale decus, nulli pietate secunda Glacialis Ibernica*.

<sup>80</sup> See above note 59.

<sup>81</sup> Just as in the tradition of St. Albert it was implied that he was not the first archbishop of Cashel. And as in the tradition of St. Albert no mention is made of St. Ailbe, so in the tradition of St. Cataldus no reference is made to Carthagus (the equation *Albeus: Albartus = Carthagus: Cataldus* is striking). In both traditions it is implied that the scene is laid in very ancient times, up to then not yet treated by historians.

<sup>82</sup> V.S.H. I, p. 88; Kenney, no. 163.

<sup>83</sup> See my article on 'Irish Monastic Activities in Eastern Europe', *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* VI, lxx (1945), 394-400.

The *Vita sti. Carthagi* was written at Lismore in the early 12th century and is an early specimen of the numerous Latin lives of Irish Saints which contain valuable material for the ecclesiastical history and topography of the 12th century rather than the earlier period of which they (pretend to) treat. It is in particular by comparison with the contemporary continental lives of Saints reputed to be of Irish descent that it appears that those lives are a valuable source of 12th century Irish history. Apart from the Irish and Latin lives of St. Carthage there exist some smaller Irish texts of the same period relating to this Saint.<sup>53</sup> One of these emphasizes the duties of the laity towards the local church, another one traces the history of Rathen down to 1156, a third describes St. Carthage's expulsion from Rathen, which in 12th century proverbs was commemorated as one of the meanest things ever done in Munster history<sup>54</sup> and as one of the 'three worst counsels that were done through the counsels of saints'.<sup>55</sup>

The date 1156 is remarkable. St. Bernard's *Life of St. Malachy* and the *Visio Tundali*<sup>56</sup> were written shortly before the middle of the 12th century. The tradition of St. Cataldus starts with the translation of his relics in 1151. The *Vita sti. Albarti* is dependent on the *Visio Tundali* and was written probably during the sixties of the 12th century. The tradition of St. Livinus illustrates the early history of the archbishopric of Dublin, a topical subject at that period in connection with the events leading to the Synod of Kells.

To appreciate the position held amidst these works by the tradition of St. Cataldus we will have to study two points in it: (1) the grant made to Cataldus by the king of Ireland of a vacant duchy; (2) the erection of an archbishopric and the establishment of twelve suffragan bishoprics. The first point seems to connect the tradition of St. Cataldus with the 12th century tradition of St. Carthage and to be a reflection of the Synod of Cashel in 1101. The second point seems to connect the tradition of St. Cataldus with the *Visio Tundali* and the *Vita sti. Albarti* and to be a reflection of the development of diocesan episcopacy in Ireland between the Synods of Rathbrassail (1111) and Kells.<sup>57</sup>

In the tradition of St. Cataldus the accounts relating to these two points are attached to the story of miracles wrought by the Saint. One of these miracles, the raising from the dead of a boy, was connected with a church built by Cataldus. Regarding this church, Petrus de Natalibus said that Cataldus *conceives suos ad fabricandam ecclesiam provocavit*. According to the Office and Moroni, however, the Saint built this church with his own hands, and the miracle on the boy was worked *dum in limo erat fundamenti Ecclesiae, quae fabricabatur*. Joannes Juvenis simply speaks of *ecclesia quae tunc erigebatur* and Ughelli<sup>58</sup> says that *ecclesiae construendae praeceperat*. The version given by the Office and Moroni may reflect the fact that in the ancient Irish Church the title of *noemh* (usually translated by *Saint*) was given practically to every cleric who per-

<sup>53</sup> Kenney, no. 234 ff. All these are examples of the mercenary spirit in 12th century Irish hagiography (see Felim O Briain, in *Measgra i gCúimhe Mhíchil uí Chléirigh* [Dublin, 1944] p. 130), in this case coupled with dissatisfaction with the new diocesan system.

<sup>54</sup> *Bethada naem nErenn I* (Oxford, 1922), ed. Plummer (henceforth abbreviated B.N.E.), p. 305.

<sup>55</sup> In the 15th century Ms. F of *Féilire Oengusso*, B.S. XXIX, p. 204. A little noticed parallel to the expulsion of St. Carthagus from Rathen is found in the *Vita S. Tiger-*

*naci* (Kenney, no. 179, V.S.H. II, p. 266): *Rex Eochodus sancti episcopi Maenchatimi dignitatem ac sedem Clochorensem scilicet monasterium eidem optulit* (see above note 76) *seque praefatum episcopum a suis finibus expulsum* (almost literally the expression employed by Petrus de Natalibus with regard to Cataldus, see below page 239) *promisit*.

<sup>56</sup> Kenney, nos. 652 and 619.

<sup>57</sup> Kenney, no. 653, and Orpen and Seymour in *History of the Church of Ireland*, ed. Philips (London, 1934), ii.

<sup>58</sup> See above note 3.

petuated his memory by building a church.<sup>80</sup> In fact, of many Irish "Saints" listed in the Irish "martyrologies", we know nothing but that there existed a church bearing their name. Discussing the possibilities of identifying Catandum, Cataldus' reputed birth-place, Colgan pointed to some places in Ireland whose name enshrines the word Cathal. Cill Cathail is mentioned in an account of St. Brendan's request for "three estates in Desmond to serve my successors after me".<sup>80</sup>

A "Saint" was often reputed to have not only founded but actually built the church bearing his name. Indeed, of many Irish Saints we know that they were craftsmen, and the size of some of the monastic "cells" makes it not unlikely that they were built by one person. The expression *in limo fundamenti* may suggest a more elaborate structure, the more so as, according to Petrus de Natalibus, it was in the church built by him that Cataldus was elected archbishop. The Office of 1607 says that the boy, whom Cataldus raised from the dead, had been killed *in aedificatione*; this suggests that Cataldus employed workmen in the building of his church, a suggestion which is rather curious, since in the same connection Moroni describes Cataldus as *sanctus iuuenis* who was only a deacon. The Office and Moroni, moreover, add that Cataldus built this church in honour of the Blessed Virgin. The Celtic Church did not know votive dedications and certainly not dedications of churches, as a modern Irish author put it, "to over-sea Saints such as St. Mary".<sup>81</sup> Dedications to the Blessed Virgin, St. Michael, the Holy Cross, an Evangelist or Apostle are generally expressive of Norman or continental influence in Ireland.

Moroni seems to assume that that church built by Cataldus was at Lismore, for he says that the news of the miracle attracted to Lismore a great multitude of people. All the sources agree that also the King of Ireland (Petrus: *rex insule*) heard of it and that he attributed it to magic art either on his own authority or, as Moroni says, at the intimation of a *Dux Meltridis qui regis animum contra innocentissimum virum saepe numero concitaverat*. At any rate the ruler(s) of the country reacted to the Saint unfavourably in contrast to their people.

The king came by ship, to Lismore (Moroni), to expel the Saint *de suis finibus* (Petrus).<sup>82</sup> According to the Office and Moroni, he ordered the Saint to be put in chains and prison. At the intimation of an Angel, however, and at the death of Meltridis *Ducatum illius* (Joannes: *ducis provinciam*) *in perpetuo concessit* to the church built by Cataldus. Petrus says that in that church

Cataldus post breve tempus archiepiscopus electus est qui laudabiliter vivens duodecim sibi suffraganeos episcopos constituit: et totam insulam (convertit).

Joannes Juvenis however says that by distributing the province into twelve bishoprics, Cataldus raised his episcopate (how he obtained this episcopate, Joannes does not say) to the rank of an archiepiscopate and that he was named *Rachau archiepiscopus*. Algoritiis' Office starts with a reference to Cataldus' *praesulatus dignitas in provincia Rachau*.

Moroni has a more elaborate account of these happenings. When receiving the Angel's intimation that, instead of persecuting Cataldus, he should appoint him successor to Duke Meltridis, the king was greatly troubled and convoked

<sup>80</sup> See my article on 'A feast of All the Saints of Europe', *Speculum* XXI (1946), 47-62.

<sup>80</sup> B.N.E., I, p. 13.

<sup>81</sup> C. P. Curran, St. Laurence O'Toole in *The Irish Way* (London, 1932), p. 127.

<sup>82</sup> See above note 85.

his *senatores et reliquos principes civitatis*.<sup>93</sup> At that convocation he received the message of Meltridis' sudden death and of the desire of the whole province that the king should appoint a successor. Thus the king *designavit*<sup>94</sup> Cataldus duke in the place of the deceased Meltridis, but, as the Saint did not wish to change the service of God for the royal insignia, he was elected bishop, though then still a deacon.<sup>95</sup> The king approved of this election wholeheartedly and

ducatum Meltridis in perpetuo Ecclesiae concessit: quem duodecim episcopis Cataldus distribuens, episcopalem suam sedem in archiepiscopalem evexit.

According to Moroni, Cataldus, before departing from Ireland, convoked these twelve bishops and entrusted them with the care of his flock. The Office has a shorter version of this account. It says that the king asked Cataldus to accept the *episcopatus Rachau* and gave him the duchy of Meltridis. Instead of *everit*,<sup>96</sup> the Office says *fecit*. The Offices of both 1555 and 1580 conclude with a reference to Cataldus' converting *universam Rachau provinciam*.

My contention is that Petrus has the oldest account according to which the grant made to Cataldus, his elevation to the archiepiscopate and the appointment of twelve suffragan bishops were three different acts and that the later accounts are merely attempts to explain the internal relationship between them. Joannes Juvenis wondered how Cataldus could immediately attain to the archiepiscopal dignity, so he made him a bishop first, and inverting the historical order of the last two acts, suggests that the distribution of the grant made to bishop Cataldus among twelve bishops automatically produced the elevation to the archiepiscopal rank. The Office explains how Cataldus became a bishop, saying that he received the episcopate Rachau and Meltridis' duchy at the same time. Moroni finally explains how that could be done, since we did not hear of the episcopate's being vacant as well. He was raised to the rank of a bishop, so as to permit him to join his ecclesiastical life with his new secular power.

It is hard to say whether there are any historical reminiscences in these later suggestions, whether, perhaps, they enshrine something of the older tradition that Petrus did not record. Joannes' association between the episcopate and ducal dignity may, e.g., enshrine some memory of the union frequently found in ancient Ireland between the royal and the episcopal dignity. The Office omits the reference made in the other sources to an election of Cataldus; this may be a reflection of the pre-reform conditions when canonical election in Ireland was rare. Of particular interest is the reference made by Moroni to the part played by the *senatores* and *principes civitatis* and by the people of the province. We may compare the *Vita sti. Livini*.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>93</sup> The reference to *senatores* is another illustration of the classical tendency (see above note 55). *Senatores* are mentioned—as the most common adversaries of bishops—in the Hibernensis (Wasserschleben, *Die irische Kanonensammlung* (Leipzig, 1885), p. 225). The expression *senatores et reliquos principes civitatis* seems to be the exact equivalent to the *landbarüne* and *des landes cumpantjeine* in the description of the court of the king at Wexford in Gottfried von Strassburg's *Tristan*, 9704 and 9765 ff. For *principes* see below note 124, for *civitas* (= German land) see notes 97 and 132.

<sup>94</sup> Compare the reference to the king's part in the ordination of St. Ailbe above note 76.

<sup>95</sup> I cannot imagine that Moroni invented this point. It is interesting that Cataldus

built a church while still being a deacon. The long interval between the last two major orders is a characteristic feature in the lives of Irish Saints. Livinus, e.g., was apparently trained in Ireland only up to his deaconate; for his final training he goes for several years to England. In 1121 the people of Dublin requested the archbishop of Canterbury to consecrate their bishop-elect, who was merely a subdeacon (Kenney, no. 647).

<sup>96</sup> See below notes 102 and 144.

<sup>97</sup> PL 87, 335. Comparing this reference to the acclamative part played by the people in the making of an archbishop and the reference made by Moroni to the far more decisive part taken by the people in the appointment of a new duke, I feel it is obvious that Moroni must have had a good



palatinorum choro cum subaulicis totiusque regionis illius conclamante Rex beatum in cathedra archiepiscopatus debito honore collocavit.

The *Vita sti. Albarti*,<sup>98</sup> the earliest life of an Irish Saint to refer to the bi-metropolitan system, attributes a more active part to the people:

Incole civitatis (Casselensis) sanctum Albartum unanimo voto sibi metropolitanum exceperunt. Ipse vero Albartus fuit archiepiscopus.

Similarly St. Hildegard's *Vita sti. Disibodi*<sup>99</sup> speaks of an episcopal election by *conventus populi tam minorum quam majorum secundum consuetudinem*. The custom referred to in this instance and in the expression *debito honore* in the *Vita sti. Livini* is obviously not the *consuetudo sacrosanctae ecclesiae* of the *itaque*-formula of the canons of the Synod of Cashel.<sup>100</sup> The adoption by the Irish Church of the Roman *consuetudo* is more clearly referred to by the *Vita sti. Wironis*<sup>101</sup> when after speaking of the Saint's "designation to the pastoral office" it says:

Moris erat apud incolas ejusdem insulae, primo pastorem inter eos eligere, tum electum Roman dirigere, Apostolicis manibus ordinandum.<sup>102</sup>

None of our sources says who elected Cataldus (*archi*)episcopus. The most interesting parallel to the account of Cataldus' election is found in the *Vita sti. Forannani* by Robert of Waulsort:<sup>103</sup>

A populorum caterva electus in civitate Domnachmor quae est metropolis totius Hiberniae et in basilica Gentricis Dei quam propriis ex redditibus possessionibus fundaverat, sublimiter in Pontificali collocatus est cathedra.

We have seen that the later tradition of St. Cataldus said that he had dedicated the church built by him to the Blessed Virgin and that by endowing his see he raised it to the archiepiscopal rank.

The prominence given to *senatores*, *palatini*, *subaulici*, *proceres*, *milites*, *comites* and *duces* is a characteristic of 12th century (and later) Irish hagiography.<sup>104</sup> We shall see presently what a prominent part *duces* and *principes* play in the *Vita sti. Carthagi*, which is the more remarkable as there is nothing corresponding to those references in the Irish version. The introduction of those terms is expressive not only of the classical tendency but also of the desire

source for his statement. In contrast to the tradition of the king's disposing of a vacant duchy (see below p. 237), this is not a feature which could be derived from continental feudalism. As for the relationship between *civitas* (=German *land*), *regio* and *provincia* see below notes 122 and 132.

<sup>98</sup> MGH SS Rer. Merov. VI, p. 21.

<sup>99</sup> Kenney, no. 318, AA SS Boll. July II, p. 589.

<sup>100</sup> A.D. 1171, see J. F. O'Doherty, Laurence O'Toole (Diss., München, 1933), pp. 14 ff.

<sup>101</sup> Kenney, no. 311, i, AA SS Boll. May II, p. 313. On Irish episcopal elections in the 12th century see J. McCaffrey in his introduction to *The Black Book of Limerick* (Dublin, 1907), p. xxiii.

<sup>102</sup> With regard to my notes 12 and 76, the fewness of references to the Pope in the Irish and Irish-continental accounts of (arch)-bishops is remarkable. From the Patrician tradition (see also below note 144) it appears that the later decay of the

archiepiscopal dignity to a mere nominal honour was chiefly due to the absence of Papal sanction. In the late tradition of St. Sezný concocted by Albert Le Grand (Kenney, nos. 33, 14) we read that it was by order of the Pope that the Saint's monastery was raised to an episcopal see (see above note 85, Plummer, V.S.H. I, p. cxiii, note 1 said that the reference in the *Vita sti. Tigernaci* was the only one speaking of a monastery's being *sedes episcopi*). Le Grand's words *qui eius monasterium in sedem episcopalem evexit* are of interest as the word *evexit* occurs also in the tradition of St. Cataldus (see above note 96). That, writing in Italy, the author of the tradition of St. Cataldus could pass in silence over the necessity of consulting the Pope in the establishment of a new archiepiscopate, is indeed curious (see note 135).

<sup>103</sup> See above note 2; AA SS Boll. April III, p. 818B.

<sup>104</sup> See below note 124.

to describe the social order in Ireland as parallel to that on the Continent. This idea was most clearly expressed in Gilbert's *De Statu Ecclesiae*<sup>105</sup> where the principles of ecclesiastical reform are illustrated by a parallelism between the ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies. While the Pope is compared to the Emperor and the Primate to the King, the duke, *comes* and *miles* are compared to archbishop, bishop and priest. The parallelism between archbishop and duke is also found in the tradition of St. Maedoc.<sup>106</sup> It may be mentioned that outside the hagiographical literature the first reference to a definite *dux* in Irish history is that to *Dermeth dux frater regis Hiberniae* in a letter written in 1096 by the people of Waterford to Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, an important document in the early history of the reform in Ireland.<sup>107</sup> Of that *rex Hiberniae* we shall hear more presently.

Whether the writers of the continental lives of Irish archbishop-Saints were Irish or continental, they naturally introduced into their accounts of conditions in Ireland ideas familiar to the public for whom they wrote. I assume that the idea that the king of Ireland could make a grant of a duchy or a subordinate kingdom simply because it was vacant is purely feudal,<sup>108</sup> and yet it seems to enshrine a memory of an important event in early 12th century Irish church history. In the *Annals of the Four Masters* for 1101 we read

A meeting of Leath Mogha was held at Cashel by Muirheartach Ua Briain with the chiefs of the laity, and Ua Dunian, noble bishop and chief senior of Ireland, with the chiefs of the clergy, and on this occasion Muirheartach made a grant such as no king had ever made before, namely, he presented Cashel of the kings to religious without any claim of laymen or clergymen upon it, but the religious (*craibhdich*) of Ireland in general.

The extraordinary and new feature in this grant was neither its extent nor its freedom from any claim. The numerous land grants which, according to the *Vita sti. Carthagi*, were made to the Saint by kings, princes and dukes in both Meath and Munster were hardly less extensive. One of these grants enabled Carthage to provide twelve of his faithful disciples with land to support them in their old age. When granting to Carthage the field, in which he had founded his church, the *dux Melochtric* expressly says that *hic magnus locus* (the church = *domnach mor*) *non potest esse in angusto loco*; this grant led to the foundation of Lismore.<sup>109</sup> Of grants "free from tax of chiefs and tribes" we hear repeatedly in the Life of St. Colmán mac Lúacháin, another 12th century life of a 7th century Saint.<sup>110</sup> Such grants were usually the material basis for a monastic community. The distinctive point in the grant made at the meeting at Cashel was that it was not made to a particular monastic *familia* or its founder-Saint, but to the Church in general. This grant was an important step in the reform of the organisation of the Irish church. The 12th century lives of Irish Saints, especially those written in Irish, still reflect the local structure of the Irish Church under the monastic system. Just about the time of the Synod of

<sup>105</sup> PL 159, 999; Kenney, no. 651.

<sup>106</sup> V.S.H. II, p. 251.

<sup>107</sup> Kenney, no. 640.

<sup>108</sup> For this point I am indebted to the advice and the article on 'Papal Legates in Ireland', *Irish Eccles. Record* LXIII (1945), 365 by the Rev. Aubrey Gwynn S. J. See also John Ryan S.J., 'The O'Briens in Munster after Clontarf', *North Munster Antiquarian Journal* (1942), 16.

<sup>109</sup> Plummer's ed. in V.S.H. I, §xxxiv, xxxix, and lxii ff. I refer to the paragraphs

as they are shorter than the pages.

<sup>110</sup> Kenney, no. 238; Kuno Meyer's ed., pp. 34 ff., 38, 40 and 45. See above note 83. O'Donovan's notes to the entry of the Four Masters show that he did not see the significance of the grant made at Cashel (1) with regard to the establishment of the Church, (2) with regard to the elevation of Cashel to the metropolitan rank. For O'Donovan's reference to the royal grant of Kells see below note 143.

Cashel, the *comarb* of St. Patrick tried, by means of circuits through All Ireland, to re-assert his primatial rank in a more real way than had been done during the previous centuries. The royal grant for the first time recognised the Church of Ireland as a legal unit, capable of receiving such a grant.<sup>111</sup>

The grant made to the church built by St. Cataldus, however, was still in the ancient monastic tradition. According to the tradition, its outstanding characteristics were its perpetuity and its extent. Outside the tradition of St. Cataldus, expressions denoting perpetuity occur mostly in Irish accounts of land-grants when connected with oblations, by which princes, tribes and monastic communities adopted the patronage of a Saint. Carthagus senior offered himself with his church and his *parochia Deo et tibi* (Carthagus junior), and induced by this example

Dux Moeltulus se ipsum cum genere suo post se semper Mochutae (the Irish name of Carthage) obtulit.<sup>112</sup>

After young Barre's saintliness had become famous the king surrendered (*dorath*) himself and his seed to him for ever (*tré bithe*).<sup>113</sup> A particularly interesting account of such an offering connected with a land-grant is found in the *Vita ste. Ite*:<sup>114</sup>

Gens Huaconail cum suo duce omnem agrum qui erat in circuitu cella S. Ithae sibi et Deo<sup>115</sup> in aeternum donavit. Famula autem Domini nolens curiosa esse in secularibus curis (as St. Cataldus), quatuor juga in usu hortorum accepit.

This is one of the rare cases where the actual measurements of a monastic land-grant are given.<sup>116</sup> After Ita's death

tota gens Huaconail S. Itam in matronam suam hic et in futurum accepit. Sancta virgo eandem gentem et terram suam multis benedictionibus benedixit.

We may compare the strictly spiritual character of this latter patronage with

<sup>111</sup> We shall see that the reference made to Cataldus' converting *totam insulam* is expressive of the idea that the mono-metropolitan system was the most suitable for Ireland. St. Forannan (above note 103) is described as metropolitan *totius Hiberniae*. The *Chronicon Scotorum* (ed. Hennessy, 1866) describes sub A.D. 1148 St. Malachy as *archiepiscopus, caput religionis totius Hiberniae*. The earliest reference to metropolitan *insulae Hiberniae* is found in the letter of the people of Dublin to Lanfranc A.D. 1074 (Kenney, no. 635), after the death of Duman, whom the *Annals of Ulster* call "archbishop of the foreigners".

<sup>112</sup> §xiif; compare the oblation of Munster to Ailbe by St. Patrick (*Ms. S*, in contrast to the tradition of Ailbe's formal ordination, above note 76).

<sup>113</sup> B.N.E., I, p. 17.

<sup>114</sup> Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 677.

<sup>115</sup> The expression *Deo et Sancto N.* which occurs frequently in descriptions of such patronage-oblations, is also found in early church "dedications" in Ireland (see above note 90). The chief difference between such dedications in Ireland and the continental votive dedications of churches is that in Ireland (1) the term "Saint" was applied to

a person already during his life-time, namely chiefly in virtue of his having founded a church (e.g. *S. Cuannachus patronus et abbas loci*: Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 250) and (2) that this dedication rested on a material basis, the Saint having also obtained the land on which the church was built.

<sup>116</sup> *Melochtrig dux na n-Desi* gave (§lxii) to Carthagus *illum locum cum agro propinquo ubi est hodie magna villa quae dicitur Aird Finayn cum maxima parochia in circuito in honore sancti* (i.e. as an acknowledgement of the fact that he was a Saint). *Brehon Law Tracts V* (1901), p. 266, say that as a compensation for the loss incurred through his expulsion from Raithen, Carthagus was granted "everything which the co-arb of Mochuta (that is the Irish name for Carthagus) could find upon the road of Adamar, the day he assumed the abbotship of Lismore, because his right, and it was so perpetually". In *Brehon Law Tracts IV* (1879), p. 229 the "precincts of a saint, bishop, hermit or pilgrim" are determined as "one thousand paces if it be in a plain, and two thousand paces for the precincts of every noble cathedral (*do gach cathair ataigh uais*).

the merely spiritual supremacy exercised by the primatial see of Armagh in the pre-reform organisation of the Irish Church. In both respects the tradition of St. Cataldus shows a definite advance towards the more realistic attitude of the reform. One of the few cases where I could trace an expression denoting perpetuity with a grant as such is in the *Vita sti. Fechini*<sup>117</sup> where we hear of a lake, into which the Saint had thrust a monster, being offered to him *in perpetuum*.

Two grants mentioned in the *Vita sti. Carthagi* are of special interest with regard to the tradition of St. Cataldus: (1) Honoured by kings, princes and dukes with land and other offerings, Carthagus *a multis sanctis episcopus consecratus est, et visitabat aliquando parochiam suam*.<sup>118</sup> This is an illustration of the loose usage of the word *sanctus* in the ancient Irish church; in this instance the word clearly means not more than our word: Reverend. The clerics who consecrated Carthagus bishop were not necessarily bishops themselves, and of his election there is no mention whatsoever. One of the reasons for his being chosen to be the bearer of the episcopal dignity in the monastic community was obviously the preference shown to him by secular rulers. As a bishop, Carthagus did not reside in his *parochia*, a point of some importance for the interpretation of Cataldus' *archiepiscopatus Rachau*.<sup>119</sup> (2) *Rex arcem suam . . .* (and several other places) *Deo et sancto Carthago obtulit in aeternum*. This grant enabled Carthagus to establish a monastery for three of his disciples and twelve brothers.<sup>120</sup> These were three of the twelve disciples which Carthagus had in his monastery at Raithen. Eventually he set up for all the twelve of them *cellas* that they might have some comfort in their old age.<sup>120</sup> While this is not the place to follow up the significance of this system of monastic pensioning, I may mention here that the number of Carthagus' brothers and disciples is of interest in regard to the number of suffragan bishops set up by Cataldus.

The extent of the grant made to Cataldus is clearly expressed by the terms *ducatus* and *provincia*. Since, according to Gilbert of Limerick, *rex* corresponds to *primatus* and *dux* to *archiepiscopus*, we may assume that *ducatus* in this case is an under-kingdom. Apart from Gilbert's parallelism between *comes* and *episcopus*,<sup>121</sup> we do not hear of "counts" in 12th century Irish literature but it is curious that the territory corresponding to a *dux* should be *provincia*,<sup>122</sup> which naturally suggests that the territory corresponding to a *comes* should be a county.<sup>123</sup> What territories correspond to the *magnati*, *procere*s and *principes* is not clear; the word *princeps* seems to be in the older Latin-Irish literature the equivalent for what the 12th century literature rather described as *dux*.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>117</sup> Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>118</sup> §xx.

<sup>119</sup> Though some Irish authors, like Lynch, described Cataldus as a non-resident bishop, of the ancient monastic type, known on the Continent as vagrant bishops (above pp. 218-219), the tradition (Healy etc.) held that Rachau must have been near Lismore.

<sup>120b</sup> §ix.

<sup>120</sup> Above note 109.

<sup>121</sup> Above note 105.

<sup>122</sup> See above note 77 for the use of the word *provincia* with regard to the whole of Ireland. Joannes applies this word to the *ducatus*, the Offices of 1555 and 1580 to the *archiepiscopatus Rachau*. The connection between the secular and ecclesiastical use of the word *provincia* is of special interest in Ireland, see below pp. 239 f. and 242. The

Rule of St. Patrick prescribed that one *primescop* should be for every chief state (*prim tuath*) of Ireland. See below note 146.

The word *provincia* sometimes appears as synonymous with *regio*. (see below note 132). At his expulsion from Rathen, Carthagus was told: *De hac civitate et de ista regione vade et quere tibi locum in alia provincia* (*Vita* §liii). The more definite secular use of the word *provincia* is referred to in §lxi where *provinciae aquilonis* are distinguished from *septentrionis provinciae*. See below p. 242.

<sup>123</sup> The expression *barony* is foreshadowed by Gottfried's speaking of the *landbarüne* of Ireland (see above note 93).

<sup>124</sup> *Magnati*, *primati* and *duces* occur in the *Vita sti. Fursaei*; *duces* and *procere*s attending the *rex Hiberniae* in the *Vita sti*.

It was a curious point in the grant made by Muirchertach that it was made out of the patrimony of his adversaries the MacCarthy, rather than out of his own, the O'Briain possessions.<sup>125</sup> Whether the MacCarthy gave their consent to this transfer (as the building in the next generation of Cormac's chapel at Cashel by a MacCarthy king would suggest) or whether this was an act of usurpation by Muirchertach O'Briain,<sup>126</sup> it must have puzzled the contemporaries.

The significance of the grant of Cashel is clearly expressed by the Four Masters' saying that, given as it was to the religious of Ireland in general, no laymen or clergymen had any claim upon it. The tradition of St. Carthage's expulsion from Raithen offered a striking illustration of laymen and clergy conspiring together to obtain possession of land granted to a certain monastic community.<sup>127</sup> The grant of Cashel aimed first of all at giving the Church that material security which was the basis of reform. It merely set an example which was to be followed up by the superseding of monastic episcopacy by diocesan episcopacy under a definite metropolitan system. May we assume that the MacCarthy family consented to Muirchertach's action in the interest of the reform?

The tradition of St. Cataldus, I suggest, illustrates the speculations evoked by the grant of Cashel. If we assume that it was compiled by an Irishman, who having been away from home for some time suddenly heard the news of that grant, it seems quite credible that he should explain this transfer of a "duchy" to the Church in terms of continental feudalism. The king, he suggests, was entitled to dispose of (vacant) duchies and he had the sanction of heaven in doing so, as the disposal was made to the advantage of the Church. The distance of the writer from home may explain the fact that the grant of Cashel had assumed for him the dimensions of a whole province. He had apparently not a very lofty opinion of the High-king of Ireland, representing him as a persecutor of Saints, but this picture supplied him with a credible explanation of the grant.<sup>128</sup> The king had to compensate the Saint for the injuries he had inflicted upon him.<sup>129</sup> The writer of the tradition of St. Cataldus gives colour to his account by making the king arrive at Lismore "by boat". Exact descriptions of the situation of Lismore as *civitas super ripam australem fluminis Nem*,<sup>130</sup> *ubi abann mor* (a big river) *in mare exiit*<sup>131</sup> are found in the tradition of St. Carthagus. Incidentally the description of Lismore as *egregia et*

*Fechini*; *proceres* also in the *Vita sti. Moedoci*; *principes* in *Vita sti. Molaggi*. A fight between two *duces* is mentioned in the *Vita stae. Itae* (Colgan, *op. cit.*, pp. 137, 245, 421, 146 and V.S.H. II, 121). For *principatus* see below note 132. Gwynn (*Ir. Eccl. Record*, V, lxvi [1945], 86) suggested that *principes* was the Latin word for *airchinnech* (ruler of a monastery). The First Synod of Cashel provided that laymen should no longer hold this office. In the Irish Annals, Gwynn states, the word *princeps* disappears after the 9th century.

<sup>125</sup> Compare the offer made by king Eochodus to St. Tigernach (above note 85), also the oblation to St. Ailbe of Munster by St. Patrick (above note 76). Similarly the tradition of St. Cataldus seems to imply that made as it was to the Church, the grant overruled other legal rights of possession.

<sup>126</sup> See above note 108.

<sup>127</sup> See above notes 83 and 85. See the expression "a church in seemly possession" in the *Expulsion of St. Carthage* (B.N.E. II,

p. 299 = I, p. 308).

<sup>128</sup> A wicked king of Connaught figures in the *Vita sti. Albei*. He planned to kill *quemdam vincum*. Ailbe sent to him a messenger to obtain his release (Irish version: a bishop of his retinue). The king tried to crucify Ailbe's messenger. The king's son died. Ailbe was called to the king. *Dedit ei rex hominem illum* (oblations extended to human beings) *et agrum ut aedificarentur ibi ecclesie Deo*. Ailbe restored the king's son to life (V.S.H. I, p. 59).

<sup>129</sup> Was this perhaps a figure of speech characteristic of the ideas of the reform? A king who would not endow the Church as the reform demanded, was regarded as sacrilegious.

<sup>130</sup> Plummer's ed. §lxv. Compare also: *Inter ipsos* (the people of Melochtrig) *et locum erat fluvius quidam impetuosus, qui cum vicini maris aestu redundaret, nullus sine ratibus transitus erat* (*Vita III*, AA SS Boll. May II, 376E).

<sup>131</sup> Margin note in *Félire Oengusso*, ed. *cit.*, p. 54.

*sancta civitas* in the *Vita sti. Carthagi* may be compared with the account of the international reputation of Lismore in the tradition of St. Cataldus.<sup>132</sup>

Colgan already tried to establish a relationship between *dux Melochtric* who gave Carthagus the site of Lismore and *dux Meltridis* whom Cataldus succeeds,<sup>133</sup> but he abandoned this parallel because the former is depicted as a friend of the Saint, the latter as the instigator of persecution against Cataldus. Colgan overlooked the fact that it is only in the later tradition that Meltridis appears in this unfavourable light; I suggest that this was an addition to explain the sudden death of the duke.<sup>134</sup> Meltridis' duchy obviously did not include Lismore, otherwise the archbishopric into which it was transformed would have been called Lismore rather than Rachau, and there would have been no necessity of sending a messenger to the king to inform him of Meltridis' death, but the duke would have attended the meeting between the king and the Saint.

According to Petrus de Natalibus, who mentions neither Lismore nor Rachau, there was no direct connection between the grant of Meltridis' duchy and the elevation to the archiepiscopate. Of the place-names we can be certain that they are not later insertions. The name of Rachau, we know, was connected with the inscription on the pectoral cross, and the name of Lismore appears in 12th century continental literature on Ireland on account of the prominent part played by Lismore in the reform movement, which in itself established a new and strong link between Ireland and the Continent. May we go so far as to connect the author of the story of St. Cataldus with the companions of St. Malachy on his unsuccessful errand to Rome to obtain *pallia* for the metropolitans (then two) of Ireland?<sup>135</sup> Malachy had been for several years, "for the sake of studies", as the tradition says of St. Cataldus, at Lismore.

The identification, officially recognized by the Offices for Ireland of 1903 and 1916, of Rachau and Shanrahan was due to the assumption that Rachau must be near Lismore, an assumption which in turn is based on the adoption of the later tradition according to which the giving of the grant of the duchy and the elevation of Cataldus to the archiepiscopal dignity were events closely inter-linked or even practically identical. In the old tradition represented by Petrus de Natalibus there is no foundation for this assumption. It implies rather than

<sup>132</sup> Above note 57, and Plummer §iii. Raithen is *civitas posita in medio Hiberniae* (see below note 141) in *regione Midi clara, sed clarior est secunda et major, et magnum principatum tenebit* (see above note 124) *quae vocabitur Leas Mor*. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the meanings of *civitas, urbs, oppidum* (Cataldus, see above pp. 223 and 227) and *villa* (above note 116) in 12th century Irish and Irish-continental hagiography. The frequent use of these words points to the fact that in contrast to the tribal-monastic episcopacy, diocesan episcopacy was fundamentally urban, a point little noticed in the history of the spreading of diocesan episcopacy from the Danish settlements to the rest of Ireland. As on the Continent, the urban basis of diocesan episcopacy made possible a certain democratic influence on episcopal elections (see above pp. 232-233).

<sup>133</sup> With regard to the passage quoted above note 116, this relationship induced Healy (*op. cit.*, p. 457) and O'Riordan (*op. cit.*, p. 7) to describe Meltridis as Prince of the Desii, again guided by the assumption that Rachau must be near Lismore. Moeltulus, on the other hand (see above p. 234),

was *dux regni Chiaraigi* (§viii ff.) Was his duchy part of that kingdom or was his territory *regnum*?

<sup>134</sup> The Life of St. Colman Mac Luachlainn, Carthagus' pupil, gives as the reason for Carthagus' expulsion from Raithen his adoption of the Roman view in the Paschal controversies (Plummer, *V.S.H.* I, xlvi; Kenney, no. 238), another illustration of the influence of the reform of the 12th century tradition of St. Carthagus.

When finally expelled, Carthagus cursed his adversary saying: I will expel thee from the seat in which thou art, and I will rob thee of heaven and earth, so that neither king nor crown-prince (*righ na righ-damhna*) shall be from thee (*Expulsion*: also margin note in *Ms. R<sup>2</sup> in Féilire Oengusso* (see above note 60). Is this a parallel to the dying out of the house of Meltridis and the assumption of his dukedom by Cataldus?

<sup>135</sup> This would be another explanation of the omission of all references to the Pope in the description of the establishment of the *archiepiscopatus Rachau* (see above note 102).

excludes the possibility that Rachau was far away from Lismore. If we adopt Colgan's suggestion that Rachau was identical with Raithen, the numerous parallels which we established between the traditions of St. Carthage and St. Cataldus would gain in significance and the tradition of the archiepiscopate of Rachau could be interpreted as an attempt to claim for Meath, as the fifth province of Ireland a metropolitan see, as was granted by the Synod of Kells to the other four provinces. This was done by an inversion of the tradition of the successful expulsion of Carthage from Raithen which led to the setting up of Lismore. The attempt to expel (Petrus: *propellere*) Cataldus from Lismore failed, but led to the establishment of the *archiepiscopatus Rachau*. In the ecclesiastical subdivision of Ireland, Meath held a peculiar position, owing to its situation right on the border between the archdioceses of Armagh and Cashel.<sup>138</sup> To this day, Meath is one of the very few dioceses of Ireland the very name of which recalls the fact that the diocesan organisation of Ireland was originally based on the tribes rather than on towns.

The association with Meath may have been suggested also through the fact that Maol Muirú O Dúnáin was from Meath. In the account of the Synod of Cashel he appears as *uasal epscop agus aird shenóir Ereann*, the unofficial representative of the Primate or perhaps, as Fr. Aubrey Gwynn suggested, the first Papal Legate in Ireland. It is curious that while in the ecclesiastical subdivision of Ireland by the Synod of Rathbrassail Meath was assigned to Armagh, O Dúnáin is frequently described as archbishop of (or in) Munster.<sup>137</sup> During the years 1101 to 1111 he appears as an advocate of the reform.<sup>138</sup> During these years he had the support of Muirchertach who was both king of Munster and of all Ireland, though in the North his influence was less pronounced. Similarly, O Dúnáin's jurisdiction was practically confined to Munster, but the Four Masters describe him as something like the ecclesiastical counterpart to the High-King. In the oldest tradition of St. Cataldus it is stated that the Saint exercised influence over the whole island and the king is described as *rex insule*.<sup>139</sup>

It has been suggested that the grant of Cashel to the Church was made with the intention of obtaining the elevation of that *urbs Hybernica regalis* (as the *Vita sti. Albarti* says) to the rank of a metropolitan see. That Malchus of Waterford<sup>140</sup> rather than O Dúnáin was appointed first archbishop of Cashel was an event no less puzzling than the grant of Cashel to the Church. The tradition of St. Cataldus seems to infer that it would have been fitting that O Dúnáin should have been made archbishop of a metropolitan see in the heart of Ireland.<sup>141</sup> The setting up of Cashel as a metropolitan see had been expressive of the political situation of the period when the king of Munster was High-king.

<sup>138</sup> See the pun *medio—Midi* in *Vita sti. Carthagi*, above note 132. *Vade ad Hyberniam ante me, et adi fontem in medio Hybernicae in confinio australium et septentrionalium Hybernensium* (see above note 122), St. Patrick said to St. Ciarán of Saighir (V.S.H. I, p. 218). On the central position of Uisneagh in Meath see below note 141.

<sup>137</sup> The *Annals of Tigernach* (A.D. 1111) and the *Annals of Boyle* (in the obit A.D. 1117) as well as Keating in his entry on the Synod of Cashel (see below) call him *airdescop* or *archiepiscopus* of Munster or in Munster. For the relationship between Meath and Munster the *Life of St. Aed* (Kenney, no. 185) offers an illustration of special interest with regard to the tradition of St. Cataldus: *S. Aedus ordinatus est episcopus in Midia et aliquando in Mumonia adhuc conservabatur et cellas. Monasteria in*

*utraque parte aedificavit*. This *Vita* also mentions a *dux*.

<sup>139</sup> In the letter from the people of Waterford to Anselm of Canterbury (Kenney, no. 640) he is spoken of as *Idunán episcopus Midiae*.

<sup>140</sup> To this day, the archbishop of Armagh is Primate of All Ireland, while the archbishop of Dublin is Primate of Ireland (see the literature listed by Kenney, p. 319). Dublin in this respect has taken the place of Cashel, a fact most clearly expressed by the fact that since 1839 in the (Protestant) Church of Ireland Cashel has been a mere bishopric under Dublin.

<sup>141</sup> Kenney, p. 765.

<sup>141</sup> John Brady, 'The Anglo-Norman Organization of the Diocese of Meath', *Irish Eccl. Rec.*, April 1946, 233 ff.: After O Dúnáin we know of no other bishop of Meath until

Establishing the parallel between *rex* and *primatus*, Gilbert, a Munsterman, advocated a stricter co-ordination between High-king and Primate. He wrote shortly before the Synod of Rathbrassail set up the bi-metropolitan system, a compromise between tradition (according to which Armagh was the metropolitan see of Ireland) and the political necessities of the time (which demanded that the Primate should be locally connected with the Kingship). After the Synod of Rathbrassail, Munstermen did not give up the claim that Cashel of the Kings should have a higher rank than Armagh. The *Vita sti. Albarti* tried to assert this claim by describing Cashel as an archiepiscopal. Armagh merely as an episcopal see. Being still freer from criticism by persons who knew something of actual conditions in Ireland, the author of the tradition of St. Cataldus gave a picture of what to his mind would have been a more satisfactory compromise than that made by the Synod of Rathbrassail. *Archiepiscopus Rachau*, or Rathen, would have left Ireland a mono-metropolitan system,<sup>142</sup> centralised, politically neutral and with a noble tradition,<sup>143</sup> which, whether it was that of St. Carthage or that of St. Cataldus, reminded later generations of the evils of the pre-reform age.

Later writers were dissatisfied with the tradition that Cataldus was immediately elevated to the archiepiscopate;<sup>144</sup> this shows that they no longer perceived that the tradition was a reflection of the setting up of Cashel, the only see in Ireland which was, from the first, given metropolitan rank. Had Rathen been made the metropolitan see of Ireland, it too would have been dealt with in the same fashion. That the author of the tradition of St. Cataldus knew the further development of Irish church organisation through the Synod of Rathbrassail is clear from his account of the subdivision of the *archiepiscopus* into twelve suffragan bishoprics. The complete misunderstanding of this tradition by modern Irish authors was summed up by Lanigan:

In the Saint's Life . . . it is ridiculously stated, that, having obtained this wonderful grant of a whole principality, he divided it into twelve bishoprics and raised Rachau to the rank of an archiepiscopal see. Burke (i.e. Thomas de Burgo), perceiving the absurdity of this fable, has, in his

1173, though on the Synod of Rathbrassail Meath was given two bishoprics (see below note 158). Does the tradition of St. Cataldus claim twelve bishoprics for Meath, the fifth province of Ireland? Meath acquired special prominence through the Synod held, perhaps also in 1111, at Uisneagh (Hennesy in his edition of *Chronicon Scotorum* pp. xxxviii, 1 and 314 ff.), where each of the four (!) provinces of Ireland meet (see Todd's note in *The Martyrology of Donegal*, p. xxxiv).

<sup>142</sup> See above note 111.

<sup>143</sup> The choice of Kells in Meath for the Synod in 1152, which completed the introduction of the metropolitan system in Ireland, was perhaps due to its being the heir of the glorious tradition of Iona (Kenney, pp. 753 ff.). The grant of *Disert* of Columkille at Kells in 1084 was made to the religious for ever (Kenney, no. 629). In the *Vita sti. Fechini*, Naza is called *regale oppidum* (see above note 132) in Leinster (Colgan, *op. cit.*, p. 136), *regale* on account of its association with the Tara-tradition. In the *Book of Rights* the expression "kings of Tara" is equivalent to that of kings of Meath (Paul Walsh in *Essays and Studies* for Eoin McNeill, p. 508).

<sup>144</sup> Tunc sanctus Patricius non erat episcopus, set postea a Celestino papa ordinatus est archiepiscopus (*Vita sti. Ciarani*, V.S.H., I, p. 215, see above note 102). Compare also the use of the word *evexit* in the traditions of St. Cataldus and St. Sezný. De Burgo's complete misunderstanding of the historical significance of this point is clearly expressed by his saying that Cataldus Meltridis' duchy in *episcopatum reduxit*. Lanigan says: The king assigned to him some land for endowing the church of Rachau, of which place Cataldus was immediately appointed bishop. Bellesheim (*Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Irland* (1896) I, p. 176) sums up his picture of the tradition of St. Cataldus as follows: Vom Landesfürsten mit ausgedehnten Besitzungen beschenkt, baute er eine Kirche, empfing die bischöfliche Weihe, und unternahm eine Wallfahrt nach Jerusalem. So far as I am aware none of the critics of the tradition of St. Cataldus has seen that the individual facts reported in it can be accepted and that their historical significance appears in its full light, if the traditional order in which those facts were presented is preserved and fully appreciated.



edition of the Office, changed the bishoprics into parishes, and the archiepiscopate into a simple bishopric.

I do not know whether, in reducing the bishoprics to parishes, de Burgo was guided by some memory of the monastic term *parochia*.<sup>145</sup> The reduction of the *archiepiscopatus Rachau* to a mere bishopric was adopted by the Office of 1903 speaking of Shanrahan as *sedes episcopalis*. At this point, the parallel between the traditions of St. Albert and St. Cataldus is most obvious. In the former the failure to understand the significance of the connection between Cashel and *Artinacha* led to regarding Erhard as *Bishop of Ardagh*; in the latter the failure to see the historical significance of the connection between the *archiepiscopatus Rachau* and its subdivision into twelve bishoprics led to regarding Cataldus as *Bishop of Shanrahan*.

The reform of the episcopal system in Ireland went much deeper than similar reforms on the Continent. It was not concerned merely with the enforcement of canonical elections free from secular interference, but primarily with the raising of the episcopate from a mere monastic or tribal dignity<sup>146</sup> to an independent and leading rank in the hierarchy, and giving it a material foundation by assigning to bishops dioceses with fixed boundaries, fixed sees and a definite legal status. The Irish Litany of Jesus had adopted Amalarius' teaching that in analogy to the nine orders of the Church in heaven (*noi ngrada na heclaise nemdha*) there were nine orders in the church on earth, from the psalmistate to the episcopate (*co hesscubaide*).<sup>147</sup> Dismissing this teaching, Gilbert of Limerick listed bishops and archbishops together with patriarchs and prophets among the *generalis Ecclesiae gradus*.<sup>148</sup> As for the material foundation of diocesan episcopacy in Ireland, the leaders of the Church and of the State co-operated in opposition, if we may say so, to what was believed to be the national tradition. The tendency found in both Irish and continental biographies of Irish Saints of the 12th century of describing Saints of the Golden Age as archbishops aims at establishing an Irish tradition of the continental usage, which, as the Canons of the Synod of Cashel stated, Ireland adopted in imitation of England. At this point again, hagiographical tendencies in Southern Italy and Ireland coincided.<sup>149</sup> By assigning Cataldus to the second century, his tradition testified to the antiquity of an archiepiscopate in both Taranto and Ireland.

The parallelism of the reform in Ireland and England was most clearly expressed in the only detailed account of the rulings of the Synod of Rathbrassail which Keating preserved from the Annals of Clonenagh. While other references to this synod merely say that it gave "rules and good morals for all both laity and clergy"<sup>150</sup> (words possibly reflected by Petrus' statement that

<sup>145</sup> E.g. in the *Dublin Annals of Innisfallen* with regard to the Synod of Meath in 1111. See Plummer's notes in his edition of Bede's *Hist. Eccl.* (Oxford, 1896), II, pp. 204 and 212).

<sup>146</sup> O'Donovan (*Miscellany of the Celtic Society* (Dublin 1849), I, p. 141, n.) speaks of the coexistence between diocese and tribal land. The tribal boundaries became the boundaries of dioceses, a fact most clearly illustrated by Cataldus' duchy becoming a bishopric, the expression *provincia* being used in this case in both the secular and ecclesiastical sense (see above note 122).

<sup>147</sup> B.S. LXII, p. 30. See also my articles 'De officio psalmistatus' in *Liturgy XI* (1942), 49 ff. and 'The Office of Lector' in *Clergy Review*, 1946.

<sup>148</sup> PL 159, 997.

<sup>149</sup> In this respect the fantastic chronology of St. Cataldus may be compared with that of St. Lucius (see my article in *The Tablet* December 4, 1943).

<sup>150</sup> *Irish Text Society*, III, pp. 298 ff. The Annals of the Four Masters and of Loch Cé refer sub A.D. 1111 to a Synod (Kenney, p. 768) at which 50 bishops (most of whom had no diocese) *vel paulo plus* together with Muirchertach attended by his *maith* imposed rules and good customs to all. Regarding these rules and good customs we may also refer to the description given in the *Chronicon Scotorum* (above note 111) of Malachy's restoring monastic and canonical rules of the Church of Ireland (*manchine ocus canonach riagulla hecailsi*, all imported words).

*laudabiliter vivens* Cataldus established twelve suffragan bishops), this account says:

Just as twelve bishops were fixed under Canterbury in the South of England, and twelve bishops in the North under York, a similar arrangement was made at the Synod of Rathbrassail in Ireland, to wit, twelve bishops in Leath Mogha and twelve bishops in Leath Cuinn and also two in Meath (*is fós dá easpog san Midhe*). It was at this synod that the churches of Ireland were given up entirely to the bishops free for ever from the authority and rent of the lay princes.<sup>150a</sup> It was there also that were regulated the sees or dioceses of the bishops of Ireland . . . Cashel held the archbishop of Leath Mogha with the bishoprics of Lioss Mor, Corcach, Raith Maighe Deisceirt etc. In Leath Cuinn six in the province of Ulster (*i gCúigeadh Uladh*), including the primate of all the bishops of Ireland, five in Connaught and in Meath Daimhliag and Cluain Ioraird, this gives twelve bishops in Leath Cuinn, excluding the primate,<sup>151</sup> and twelve in Leath Mogha . . .

As Lawlor<sup>151b</sup> pointed out

neither in 1110 (or 1111) nor in any other year of its history had the Church of England twelve sees under Canterbury and twelve under York. These numbers were taken from Pope Gregory's letter to St. Augustine of Canterbury (Bede, *Hist. Eccl.* I, 29; the consecration of twelve suffragans was the condition for Augustine's promotion to the metropolitan dignity. J.H.). The Synod of Rathbrassail adopted the curious principle that what the wisdom of Pope Gregory held to be good for England, would suit Ireland too.

The tradition of St. Cataldus illustrates the fact that it was not so much the strict parallelism with the bi-metropolitan structure of England as the establishment of twelve suffragan bishoprics that was regarded as ideal. The number of twelve may have been derived from Gilbert's *De Statu Ecclesiae*, where it had been stated that an archbishop should have at least three and at the most twenty suffragans; twelve is the arithmetical mean. It is hardly necessary to say that St. Gregory suggested the number twelve with reference to the number of tribes of Juda and of Apostles. The Stowe diptychs<sup>152</sup> and the Litany of Jesus<sup>153</sup> pointed to the parallelism existing between the number of Apostles and of minor prophets. St. Columba had twelve companions, St. Carthage twelve favorite disciples for whom he built twelve cells. St. Barre built twelve churches (*da cill décc*) before he came to Cork.<sup>154</sup> Twelve Colmans, twelve Coemgens and twelve Fintans accompanied St. Ailbe to Rome.<sup>155</sup> In the 12th century Preface to the *Amra* of St. Columba we read that twelve bishops and twelve kings came to the convention of Druim Ceat (A.D. 575), and at that convention it was ruled that the *ollam* should have in future only twenty-four instead of thirty and the *ánruth* (ranks in the intellectual hierarchy of Ireland) only twelve instead of fifteen followers.<sup>156</sup> The most intellectual

<sup>150a</sup> Also the first Synod of Cashel ruled that neither to king nor to chief for ever should the Church pay either rent nor tribute (Gwynn, *op. cit.* above, note 124, p. 83).

<sup>151</sup> *Life of St. Malachy*, pp. xxxix ff.

<sup>151b</sup> See below note 158.

<sup>152</sup> B.S. XXXII, p. 15, by comparison with the Litany of St. Amand (Delisle, *Mémoire*

*sur d'anciens sacramentaires* [Paris, 1891], p. 362).

<sup>153</sup> See above note 147.

<sup>154</sup> B.N.E. I, p. 16.

<sup>155</sup> V.S.H. I, p. 51.

<sup>156</sup> John Ryan S.J. in *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquities of Ireland*, LXXVI (1946), 13.

reference to the number twelve and, in my opinion, like the tradition of St. Cataldus an illustration of the ecclesiastical organisation established at Rathbrassail, is found in Hugo of Saltrey's account of his descent into St. Patrick's Purgatory. At the beginning of his vision he was received by *duo-infusi sacris tanquam archipraesules*, who took him to a hall where he saw a splendid gathering of clergy. Now all the manuscripts of his account say that there were *quindecim viri* in religious garb, the Bamberg manuscript alone, the only one of German origin, says there where *duodecim*, for which reason Mall suggested that this was the oldest manuscript.<sup>157</sup> None of the students of this account has ever mentioned the possibility that the reference to two archbishops and twelve bishops might be an illustration of early 12th century Irish church history. These twelve men had one spokesman, the Bamberg manuscript says *qui aliis praeesse videbatur*; the other manuscripts say *qui tanquam prior et eorum dux videbatur*. Is the use of the word *dux* in this instance reminiscent of the parallelism between archbishops and dukes established through Gilbert of Limerick and the tradition of St. Cataldus?

From the introduction to the *Visio Tundali*, a work closely related to that of Hugo of Saltrey (the heroes in both works are called *miles*, like the father of the boy whom Cataldus raised from the dead), we know that by 1148 the number of suffragan bishoprics under the bi-metropolitan system in Ireland had risen to thirty-four.<sup>158</sup> The ecclesiastical conditions to which the early tradition of St. Cataldus refers are, therefore, those between the Synod of Rathbrassail and the time in which this increase in bishoprics took place. This does not mean that this tradition was actually compiled in the first half of the 12th century. I suggest that the Bollandists were right in assuming that it was the work of a *vagus Hibernus* such as Muiredach Mac Robartaig, the founder of St. James' Ratisbon, the authors of the lives of St. Albert and of St. Silao and Frediano of Lucca. Like the contemporary lives of Saints produced in Ireland, the 12th century continental lives of Irish Saints tell us more of their writers' ideas on Irish history of that time than of their notions of the periods of which they treated. Such indirect sources are always of interest, the more so in a period of which we have but few direct sources. The author of the tradition of St. Cataldus shows definite knowledge of Munster and seems to display interest in Meath. He was thoroughly imbued with the ideas of contemporary Irish hagiology, especially the Munster lives of St. Ailbe and Carthage. He left Ireland apparently in the forties of the 12th century, and wrote before the news of the great change in Irish church organisation by the Synod of Kells had reached him. As his work is probably the result of the elevation and translation of St. Cataldus' relics in 1151, we may assume that it was written in 1151/1152. Reports of the Synod of Kells must have reached Italy fairly quickly, as this Synod was attended by an Italian Papal Legate.

I am fully aware of the fact that my interpretation of the tradition of St. Cataldus rests chiefly on suggestions and analogies. However, I feel that these suggestions are sounder than the speculations to which the tradition of

<sup>157</sup> V. d. Zanden, in *Neophilologus* X (1925), 243 ff.

<sup>158</sup> See my article on St. Albert, p. 28. On the question whether the Synod of Rathbrassail prescribed 24 or 26 (namely 2 for Meath) bishoprics for Ireland see Bruodin, *op. cit.*, p. 932; Hubert Th. Knox, *Notes on the Early History of the Diocese of Tuam* (Dublin, 1904), p. 73 and above all McErlean in *Archiv. Hibernic.* III, 12 and Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 34. In the *Appendix Theatri Abrah.*

*Ortelii et Atlantis Gerard. Mercatoris* (Antw., 1631) the statement made by Cluverius in his *Introductio ad Universalem Geographiam* (1625) that Armagh is the first, Dublin the second capital of Ireland and that Cashel is the third archiepiscopal see in the country, is amplified by a note saying that *his sunt suppositi episcopi xii*, an illustration of the way in which, even in later centuries and in countries much nearer to Ireland, truth and fiction were mixed up.

#### MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

St. Cataldus has been subjected for more than five hundred years. That my interpretation is absolutely wrong, could be proved only through the production of the sources on which Petrus de Natalibus and the later writers drew. I should be only too glad if this article would prompt an investigator at Taranto to produce those sources if they are still extant.

# Tractatus Magistri Guillelmi Alvernensis

## *De Bono Et Malo*

J. REGINALD O'DONNELL C.S.B.

### I. THE MANUSCRIPTS

A—Oxford, Balliol College, Ms. 287, ff. 2r-28v.

B—Oxford, Balliol College, Ms. 207, ff. 200r-216v.

There are but two known manuscripts of the *De Bono et Malo* of William of Auvergne. These are both in the library of Balliol College, Oxford. A is written in one column to the half folio, averaging 40 lines a column. B has been copied in two columns to the half folio of approximately 59 lines.

Both manuscripts are copied in a clear gothic script; A appears to me to be somewhat earlier than B. I judge the former to be a late 13th century manuscript. I have had to rely on photostats for the edition of the text, as well as for details for dating the manuscripts.

A is the better manuscript and has been corrected frequently with marginal notes; I have, therefore, used it as the basic text for the edition. I have not hesitated, however, to introduce variant readings from B, when the latter presented a more acceptable reading. Such instances are carefully noted in the critical apparatus. The manuscripts are closely related as the common faults of various kinds will readily attest. B abounds in homoeoteleuta.

The present order of binding in A is incorrect; I have followed the order of B which is correct.

Manuscript 287 bears the following notice: *Liber domus de Balliolo in Oxoniense ex dono Magistri Ricardi Bole, archidiaconi Eliensis, quondam socii dicte domus*. A Richard Bole is listed as archdeacon of Ely for the 12th of February 1466 in J. LeNeve, *Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae* III, (Oxford, 1854), 351. I have no such information regarding Manuscript 207.

### II. THE EDITION

The text of the *De Bono et Malo* has been copied in the manuscripts without a single indication of chapter divisions. Hence I have thought it an advantage to the reader to introduce some sort of headings. This has been done with Roman numerals placed in the text wherever a change of topic is more or less evident. There is however this difficulty: often when treating a particular subject William inserts an aside, frequently quite long, and then finally returns again to the problem under consideration. Hence any attempt at chapter division must be somewhat arbitrary. However, it seems possible to discern the following divisions: (I) Prologue, (II) Truth, (III) Goodness, (IV) Potentiality, (V) Grades of Perfection, (VI) Essential Good, (VII) Evil, (VIII) Formation, (IX) Grace and Liberty, (XII) Parts of the Soul, (XIII) Chaste Intellect, (XIV) Faith, (XV) Summary.

There are evident corruptions in the text. Since quite often there are no variant readings, it has seemed best to introduce emendations based on the context and palaeographical considerations. In each case of emendation I have asked myself: What did the author mean? What did the scribe see which could possibly explain such a corrupt passage? In many cases the emendation was evident; where none could be made without rewriting the text of the author,

I have copied the text as it appears in the manuscripts and have added a cross to indicate the corruption. Square brackets around a word indicates that I consider the word should be suppressed; pointed brackets on an italicized word indicate an addition of the editor. All other changes have been carefully noted in the apparatus criticus.

Each new heading begins a new series of numbering of the notes.

### III. THE TREATISE

The text of William of Auvergne's *De Bono et Malo* has never heretofore been edited nor is it contained in any printed edition of his works. This, perhaps, explains why, in the rather extensive literature on the life, thought and works of the celebrated Chancellor of the University of Paris,<sup>1</sup> little or nothing has been written on his conception of good and evil. William himself does not discuss this problem explicitly in any of his later works but, when occasion arises, simply refers to his own treatise on the subject, the present work, *De Bono et Malo*, or dismisses the problem with the admonition that he had already dealt with the question in a special treatise.<sup>2</sup> Evidently he regarded it as a definitive work embodying his final and considered views on the subject.

The date of the *De Bono et Malo* has been assigned to the period between 1223 and 1228.<sup>3</sup> It was in 1228 that William became Bishop of Paris. His treatise *De Trinitate*, which is generally considered to be his first work, is quoted in the *De Bono et Malo*,<sup>4</sup> although he does not refer to it by name.

The structure of William of Auvergne's thought is such that nearly every problem with which he deals is in some way reducible to his doctrine of being. This is particularly true in his teaching on good and evil. The good is defined as being; evil as the lack or privation of being. Again the truly true and the truly good are identified, a not surprising fact in an essentialist like William, as I have interpreted him to be. A full solution of the problems raised in the *De Bono et Malo* can only be realized when studied within the framework of being, and a theory of knowledge. It is necessary, in order to fulfil this task, to seek the solution in the *De Trinitate* and the *De Anima* as well as the *De Universo*; likewise for a full understanding of many of the discussions concerning the virtues we must turn to his treatise on the virtues properly.

From the footnotes it can be gathered that the chief sources of William of Auvergne are: St. Augustine, Boethius, Avicenna and the School of Chartres. Likewise he has, I think, strongly influenced Nicholas of Cusa, who in turn has been influential upon German Idealism. To treat such a problem in any adequate way is beyond the scope of the present article and must be referred to a following number of *Mediaeval Studies*.

<sup>1</sup>For a bibliography on William of Auvergne consult F. Überweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Patristisch-Scholastische Zeit II, ed. B. Geyer, (Berlin, 1928), pp. 730-1; also *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* X (Freiburg i/B. 1938), p. 891. E. Gilson, 'La Notion d'Existence chez Guillaume d'Auvergne', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* XV (1946), 1 ff.

The present edition of the *De Bono et Malo* is a portion of a doctoral dissertation for the University of Toronto. I wish to take this opportunity of thanking my professors of the University of Toronto; also Professor Dodds regius professor of Greek at the University of Oxford; likewise Fr. Daniel Callus O.P. and Mr. J. N. Bryson,

fellow librarian of Balliol College, who have all been very kind.

<sup>2</sup>Jam autem audivisti intentionem meam de bono et malo et declarationes meas de utriusque intentionibus in tractatu singulari de eis; William of Auvergne, *De Universo* IIaIIae, ch. 1, (Orléans, 1674-5), p. 344a. Cf. also N. Valois, *Guillaume d'Auvergne* (Paris, 1880), p. 179.

<sup>3</sup>For the dates of the various works of William of Auvergne consult J. Kramp, 'Wilhelm von Auvergne: Magisterium Divinale', *Gregorianum* II (Rome, 1920), 78 and 186. Some of the works listed by Kramp are not authentic; consult *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. p. 254, ch. VI, ca. finem.

## I

QUONIAM in nono decimo Matthaei<sup>1</sup> et octavo decimo Lucae<sup>2</sup> dicit et ipsa Veritas: *Unus est bonus Deus et nemo bonus nisi solus Deus*, necesse est boni nomen et rationem de solo Deo dici secundum aliquam ex rationibus ejus quod est bonum, licet amplius innuat ipsa increpatio Veritatis, qua increpuit interrogantem pro eo quod ipsum bonum vocasset; sed hoc fecisse videtur ne laudem illam bonitatis acceptasse videretur. Ideoque statim *manus excussit a munere laudis illius*,<sup>4</sup> ut nobis exsuffocandae statim adulationis exemplum relinqueret et nomen et laudem bonitatis soli Deo rectissima verissimaque praedicatione tribuendam<sup>5</sup> doceret.

Redeamus autem et dicamus quod, revera quadam ex acceptionibus ejus, quod est bonum, revera solus Deus bonus est; et est substantia participatione, sicut leges in *libro de Hebdomadibus Boethii*.<sup>6</sup> Nos autem intentionem ejus quod est bonum et ejus quod est verum ex mutua comparatione et per vias alias inquiremus secundum omnem acceptionem utriusque ipsorum.

## II

In septimo igitur et octavo Joannis<sup>1</sup> dicit Veritas: *Verus est qui misit me et est verax qui misit me*. Hinc igitur qui prophetantium nomine digniores visi sunt Deum primum verum et primum bonum et puram bonitatem et veritatem, sicut dicit Aristoteles et sequaces ejus,<sup>2</sup> Plato<sup>3</sup> vero optimum in libris suis, vocasse leguntur; simul autem et verum bonum, non solum singillatim verum et bonum.

In quarto decimo vero<sup>4</sup> Joannis,<sup>5</sup> ut totum lucidissime se manifestaret, Christus Dominus dicit: *Ego sum via et veritas et vita*. Quod est ac si diceret: utile lucidum sive verum et bonum. Est enim utile<sup>6</sup> deducens de malo in bonum secundum rationem philosophorum veritas; veritas vero et vita simul verum et bonum et<sup>7</sup> verum bonum.<sup>7</sup> Nomen autem veri intellectus noster imposuit cuicumque impositum sit; nomen autem boni imposuit affectus noster. Est enim verum idem quod lucidum intellectum; bonum vero<sup>8</sup> sapidum, ut<sup>9</sup> ita dicatur affectum.

Et hoc faciemus sciri quoniam verum proprie est illuminativum intellectus; bonum vero motivum et attractivum affectus. Et verum est quod habet assimilare sibi intellectum et facere exemplum suum in effectum; bonum vero quod habet sibi conjungere affectum ut in ipso quiescat affectus. Bonum enim vocamus cujus conjunctionem quaerit vis nostra motiva; conjunctionem intellige large ut etiam adeptio conjunctio intelligatur. Motiva namque virtus nostra movet ad adipiscendum id quod est motus ejus. Propter hoc dixit Aristoteles quod qui destruit<sup>10</sup> finem destruit<sup>10</sup> bonum, eo quod omnium motionum finis est bonum.<sup>11</sup> Eo enim ipso quod bonum amari se et quaeri et desiderari facit,

<sup>1</sup> Matthew xix, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Luke xviii, 19.

<sup>3</sup> et A.

<sup>4</sup> Isaias xxxiii, 15.

<sup>5</sup> tribuenda B.

<sup>6</sup> 145; PL 64, 1312A ff. Cf. William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, ch. 1.

<sup>7</sup> John vii, 28.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Liber de Causis*, ed. Otto Bardenhewer, *Die Pseudo-Aristotelische Schrift ueber das Reine Gut, bekannt unter den Namen Liber de Causis* (Freiburg i./B., 1882), pp. 172-9.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 30A, especially *Translation*

of Chalcidius XIV, 10, ed. G. A. Mullachius, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum II* (Paris, 1867), p. 158.

<sup>4</sup> Om. A.

<sup>5</sup> John xiv, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.* V, 6 (Venice, 1508), fol. 94r.

<sup>7</sup> Om. et—bonum B.

<sup>8</sup> vero bonum B.

<sup>9</sup> et B.

<sup>10</sup> destruxit A.

<sup>11</sup> I have not found this statement in Aristotle; cf. Avicenna, *Meta.* V, 6, fol. 94r.

et inde est amabile et desiderabile et<sup>12</sup> quaeribile motu spiritali, de quo suo loco dicemus, seu corporali. Haec unde omnia, prout rebus congruunt, accipimus. Ponderosa namque quaerere locum medium naturae seu mundi et amare et desiderare dicimus, sed intentione, quae eis congruit in acceptione, qua utuntur philosophantes.<sup>13</sup>

Revertamur ad id<sup>14</sup> in quo eramus de vero et bono et veritate et bonitate et dicamus quia solum verum cognoscibile est et omne in quantum verum. Cognitionem autem large accipimus ut cognitio certa acceptio seu apprehensio et, quam<sup>15</sup> falli impossibile sit, intelligatur undecumque sit ei firmitas aut certitudo. Dico igitur quod veritas est dispositio, qua posita, ponitur cognoscibilitas universaliter et, qua remota, removetur (2<sup>a</sup>) necessario consequenter. A definitione igitur causae veritas causa est cognoscibilitatis; causa enim est propter quod consequenter aliud est.

Amplius nec omnino a nobis est ut aliquid sit cognoscibile nec etiam ex nobis. Non enim possumus id quod in se non est cognoscibile facere cognoscibile, aut in parte igitur, aut in toto, ab aliqua dispositione rerum et quod ipsae sunt cognoscibiles. Manifestum autem<sup>16</sup> est quia, remota veritate ab ipsis intellecta,<sup>17</sup> est reperire aut etiam fingere dispositionem quae hoc efficiat; posita autem veritate rerum nullam est reperire vel fingere quae hoc prohibeat aut prohibere sufficiat. Ipsa igitur veritas causa est cui debetur cognoscibilitas<sup>18</sup> et hoc est cui<sup>19</sup> nullus intellectus omnino contradicit. Statim autem ut verum natum audit et possibile cognosci, quantum in ipso est, advertit; non enim prohibent hic dispositiones quae apud nos sunt. Nec enim lippitudo oculorum tuorum sufficit inficere<sup>20</sup> solem minus visibilem quantum in ipso est, neque corruptio palati tui seu gustus ciborum suavitatem minuit nec surditas aurium cantilenarum seu cantionum concentum aut melodiam. Ad hunc modum nulla omnino ex dispositionibus aut facit aut prohibet quominus aliquid cognoscibile sit. Propterea<sup>21</sup> igitur necesse est aliquam esse ex dispositionibus rerum cui cognoscibilitas ipsa debeatur; et hanc esse veritatem ex eis, quae dicta sunt, intelligunt.

Liquido demonstravimus quare veritas ad intellectum nostrum seu vim cognoscitivam nostram ut lux visibilis ad visum et ut lucidum ad visum, sic verum ad intellectum. Ut enim lucidum per hoc ipsum quod lucidum est visibile, sic verum per hoc ipsum quod verum est cognoscibile; et ut luci debetur visibilitas, sic veritati cognoscibilitas. Quare verum lucidum intelligibile est, et veritas lux intelligibilis. Quare quod maxime verum, maxime cognoscibile est, et maxime lucidum intellectui, quantum in ipso est, quemadmodum quod maxime lucidum, maxime visibile quantum in ipso est.

### III

Est igitur veritas lux et dux intellectus nostri. Procul dubio intellectus autem noster dux est et lux affectus nostri. Quod autem bonitas seu bonum fons sit affectionumstrarum omnium ipsarum affectionum testimonio certum (200<sup>a</sup>) est. Quicquid enim quaerunt nostra desideria aut bonitas est aut bonum. Quod si dixerit quis, immo quandoque apparens bonum,<sup>1</sup> dicimus enim ei quia bonum apparens non propter apparentiam quaeritur, quoniam illa non quaeritur, sed propter bonitatem quae utique quaesitor deceptus intendit. Quare ipsa bonitas

<sup>12</sup> Om. et quaeribile A.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, 28; FL 41, 342.

<sup>14</sup> Om. B.

<sup>15</sup> quod B.

<sup>16</sup> Om. B.

<sup>17</sup> intelligentiam B.

<sup>18</sup> Amplius sublata veritate a quocumque sublata est et cognitio et scibilitas ab eo. *De Anima* VII, 7.

<sup>19</sup> cujus B.

<sup>20</sup> Om. B.

<sup>21</sup> pp A.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aristotle 1013 b 33 ff.



quaeritur quam<sup>2</sup> creditur habere quaesitum propter illam, et apparens bonum per accidens quaeritur, non propter apparentiam finaliter, et si per illam, inductive et suasorie. Bonum autem hic intelligimus generaliter.

Quia igitur nullo desiderio quaeritur finaliter et propter se et per se nisi quod amatur, non amatur<sup>3</sup> autem per<sup>4</sup> se et propter<sup>4</sup> se nisi bonitas, et illa vel certa vel credita, manifestum est nullo desiderio nostro quaeri a nobis nisi bonum aut bonitatem; quaeri, inquam, propter se et per se finaliter. Indifferens enim per se et propter se impossibile est quaeri; eo enim acquisito, necessario cessaret motus qui esset in illud. Quare in indifferenti secundum quod indifferentis per se et propter se quiescet affectus. Quies autem affectus, desiderii scilicet et amoris, delectatio est. Quare indifferentis in<sup>5</sup> quantum indifferentis esset delectabile. Delectabile autem<sup>6</sup> in quantum delectabile non est indifferentis, quoniam habet in se causam per se et proprie motivam affectus et desiderii nostri. Quare simul oporteret ipsum poni <in> indifferenti, et bonum secundum quod adhuc intendimus de bono, hoc est generaliter; nondum enim determinavimus acceptiones et intentiones (5') ejus quod est bonum, sed confuse eo usi sumus.

Quoniam autem omnis<sup>7</sup> motus in aliquem finem est, qui est ei finis ultimus,<sup>8</sup> fines vero motuum nostrorum spiritualium quattuor inveniuntur.<sup>9</sup> Quorum primus est necessitas qua occurritur destructioni ipsius esse aut laesioni. Et vocant hunc motum appropriata appellatione appetitum naturalem; unde et vim appetitivam nominant in qua hujusmodi motus efficitur. Hic igitur motus in cibum est et nutrimentum et vestimentum et<sup>10</sup> in munimentum et in lumen, in quantum lumen est necessarium, et tegendo corpori et custodiendo. Hic igitur motus naturalis et necessarius est.

Secundus finis est voluptas et haec est quies motus nostri in ipso delectabili. Delectabile igitur natum est movere vim concupiscibilem nostram ad se seu conjunctionem suam et quietare eam in se sive in conjunctione sua. Et haec proprie est delectare, quietare scilicet desiderativam virtutem in se.

Tertius finis est utilitas seu commoditas. Et haec est secundum intentionem philosophorum via alia ducens<sup>11</sup> [est] de malo in bonum aut de bono in majus bonum. Et hic est finis motivus virtutis rationabilis nostrae, non tamen quietans ipsam, quia non quiescitur in utili seu comodo in quantum ipsum est utile aut commodum, sed quaeritur ipsum ut sit via perveniendi ad aliud quod per ipsum quaeritur. Cujus exemplum est medicina et exercitatio quae propter sanitatem quaeruntur et ad acquisitionem eorum non cessat motus nec medicantis nec aegroti.

Quartus finis est magnificentia seu claritudo. Et hic motivus virtutis nostrae irascibilis. Quaerentes igitur hoc non quaerimus quiescere in illo, sed dilatari et magnificari, vel vero in nobis, et hoc est vera claritudo, quare vel in opinione hominum deceptorum, qui superficie tenus videntes derisionibus magis quam laudibus, vanos derisionibus dico quia vana et falsa laus simpliciter derisio est. Et si inops sui<sup>12</sup> effectus aliquis seipsum non censeat,<sup>13</sup> vere nihilo pascitur qui mendacio gaudet.

Nonnulli enim motibus spiritualibus tres tantum fines assignavere,<sup>14</sup> scilicet quod decet, et hoc est quod nos vocavimus claritudinem et magnificentiam;

<sup>2</sup> quoniam B.

<sup>3</sup> Om. non amatur B.

<sup>4</sup> Interchanged B.

<sup>5</sup> Om. B.

<sup>6</sup> Om. B.

<sup>7</sup> omnes B.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Aristotle 1094 a 1 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, 2, 4, ed. A. Fortescue (London, 1925), pp. 52 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Om. B.

<sup>11</sup> est ducens B.

<sup>12</sup> imposui A.

<sup>13</sup> senceat AB.

<sup>14</sup> assignare B.

quod expedit, et hoc est commune duobus, necessario videlicet et utili; quod delectat, hoc est in quo manifeste convenient nobiscum.<sup>15</sup>

Generale autem in omni motu quod ipse est exitus et fuga quaedam potentialitatis et insecutio actus sive perfectionis, in quantum scilicet actus et in quantum perfectio et omni quod movetur est imperfectio et potentialitas et carentia quam ipso motu contendit excutere. Ipsi vero in quod est motus est perfectio aliqua quam in ipso motu nititur adipisci, et propter illam est motus in illam, et quae maxime et ultimo quaeritur ab ipso quod movetur. Si illud, dico, tale est quod eo acquisito debeat cessare motus, hoc autem quod finaliter et principaliter quaeritur, necessario est bonitas aliqua ex bonitatibus ipsi moto aut intentione sua aut ex comparatione aliqua.

Cum enim consideraverimus ea, scilicet, quae in rebus sunt, inveniemus duas dispositiones motivas in eis, quarum altera attractiva est, et vocatur bonitas, et altera fugitiva et nominatur malitia, et tertia est indifferentia, medium istarum per abnegationem utriusque. Harum ergo comparationes et (5<sup>a</sup>) similitudines est reperire in lapidibus magnetibus, quorum alter attrahit et movet ad se ferrum, alter vero repellit; tertius est qui ex altera parte attrahit et ex altera repellit. Cujus comparisonem habent ad desideria nostra praesentia bona quae in quantum demulcent nos suavitate sua<sup>16</sup> exterius et superficie tenus et quasi a parte anteriori trahunt desideria nostra; a parte vero posteriori, fine videlicet, et in quantum laqueos mortis ea cognoscimus, nos repellunt. Vicem vero et comparisonem indifferentium ad desideria nostra ceteri lapides obtinent ad ferrum.

#### IV

Jam igitur claruit nobis ex his considerationibus quod id quod est in rebus repulsivum desideriorum nostrorum et desideriorum etiam naturae quibus ipsa vegetabilia nutrimentum desiderare (201<sup>a</sup>) dicuntur et desideriorum quibus ponderosa locum medium desiderare dicuntur, et desideriorum, quibus ferrum lapidem magnetem desiderare vel amare dicuntur, hoc in quantum repulsivum desiderii, immo ipsius rei a se, malitia nominatur, et quod est motivum ad se et attractivum bonitas. Quia igitur nihil movetur nisi ad id quod est ei perfectio comparatione alicujus ex potentialitatibus suis aut omnium, si tamen tanta aliqua perfectio in aliquo ex finibus invenitur, manifestum est bonitatem non aliud vocari in rebus, in quantum fines sunt, nisi perfectionem seu actum seu actualitatem et universalem totius potentialitatis ejus, quod movetur, et particularem alicujus ex potentialitatibus suis. Et quoniam omni motu fugitur potentialitas ipsa et petitur aut quaeritur actualitas, potentialitas sola est quod malum vocatur, aut quod in potentialitatem reducit. Et haec est intentio philosophorum in hoc.<sup>1</sup>

Si enim potentialitatem in imaginatione ab aliquo abstraxeris et actualitatem universaliter in illo posueris, intelligentiam mali prorsus ab eo exclusisti, et optimum necessario intelligis a quo et actu et intellectu potentialitas seorsum est. Hominem vero in tantum malum dicimus, in quantum est in potentialitate et carentia suae perfectionis, et in quantum major est potentialitas aut carentia et elongatio, in tantum pejor est. Sed hoc velut passive de eo ad seipsum dicimus; in quantum vero alios in similem potentialitatem inducit, malum velut active vocamus.

Est igitur malus vel in habendo potentialitatem istam vel in efficiendo, et hoc est in se et sibi vel alii et ad aliud. Bonus igitur absolute et pure et vere, cui

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* II, 8, 31 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Om. A.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.* IX, 6, fol. 106r.

nihil est ex parte potentialitatis, sed totum est ei actualitas, et hoc est solus Deus, ut ipse supra de se testatur; bonus vero ut nunc homo qui est in perfectione ut nunc, et hoc est perfectio viae. Unde et melior tanto dicitur quanto minus est in potentialitate sua ad perfectionem suam ultimam; tanto autem minus est in illa quanto in eis est dispositionibus, quae illi perfectioni ultimae viciniore et similiores sunt. De quibus in sequentibus aliquid loquemur. In tantum vero deterior aut pejor, in quantum est in dispositionibus ab illa ultima perfectione remotioribus.

Jam igitur manifestum est tibi quod omne quod quaeritur perfectius est in quantum quaeritur et omne quaerens indigens et imperfectum est in quantum quaerit et omne quod fugitur potentialitas est aut imperfectio; quod dico quaeritur aut fugitur per se et propter se; et quoniam bonitas absoluta est perfectio quae potentialitatem universaliter et totaliter excludit ab obtinente seu obtentore suo et quod ipsa est perfectio absoluta obtentorum suorum in qua necessario quiescunt motus omnes et desideria, et quod perfectio (3<sup>r</sup>) particularis est bonitas particularis, quae potentialitatem non excludit ex toto. Potentialitatem dico moventis ad cuius completionem et perfectionem seu evasionem natum est et quod potentialitas sola aut quod est via ad illam, malum aut malitia nominatur, quia nihil aliud est a quo sit motus fugae et cuius evasio quaeratur. Sed revera quorundam erroneorum distorti sunt unam ex potentialitatibus et imperfectionibus fugientes et unam ex bonitatibus particularibus insequentes in maiorem imperfectionem et potentialitatem incidunt, exorbitantes a via perfectionis ultimae, non advertentes quod, dum minora amplectuntur, maiora dimittuntur, et dum viae adhaerent, ad finem non veniunt, et educentes se in tantam potentialitatem, ut etiam conari ad actum suae perfectionis, tandem non possint.

Quod quidem facile est uno exemplo videre. Retrocedunt quidem ab alto honoris sui in brutalem animalitatem, deinde et insensibiles et fere lapidei fiunt, dum nec flagellis terri nec timore ullo a voluptatibus avelli possunt, sed nec etiam timere aut sperare aut amare aut misereri. In tantum igitur vides eos in potentialitatem retrocessisse, ut potentialitas totum sibi vendicat in eis, actus nihil obtineat, quemadmodum, si lapis ad hoc deveniat, ut nec impulsu nec violentia aliqua moveri possit; vides igitur tandem emortuum potentiam, ut nec etiam adjuncta quamlibet conari possit utcumque ad actum.

Nota igitur potentia in quantum potentia velut praegnans est et gravis operationum atque perfectionis. Potentialitas vero et suffocatio partus est; habitus vero maturi partus et liberae editionis. Potentia igitur omnis ingemescit et<sup>2</sup> parturit, quantum in ea est, suum actum aut perfectionem, et omnis creatura in hoc est in parturitione suae perfectionis. Sed in quibusdam potentialitas est velut obclusio uteri; in quibusdam immaturitas partus; in quibusdam suffocatio; in quibusdam sterilitas; in quibusdam mortificatio uteri. Eodem modo potentia in quantum potentia velut alveus fontalis<sup>3</sup> est in quo est principium essendi<sup>4</sup> aquam originaliter. Habitus vero fontalis alveus<sup>3</sup> plenus libere exuberans atque redundans. Potentialitas vero quandoque imperfectio est plenitudinis et propter hoc prohibetur exuberantia et redundatio, quia scilicet fons unus habet a pleno, aliquando est vacuitas, tertio ariditas,<sup>4</sup> quarto velut opilatio meatuum prohibens perpetuo impletionem fontis aut aquam etiam a fonte.

Hujus autem exemplum est in potentia una intellectiva quae primum vacua est et est velut alveus fontalis in quo debet esse aqua; deinde impletur paulatim et habet primum minus a pleno, tandem plenus atque redundans efficitur; cum

<sup>2</sup> Om. B.

<sup>3</sup> Homoeoteleuton B. Fontaliter autem intelligo non ab alio ullo modo, *De Trini-*

*tate*, 14. For essendi read effluendi?

<sup>4</sup> aviditas B.

est formatus atque perfectus habitus. Arescit ex dissuetudine studendi, vel aegritudine vel passionibus vitiorum emoritur, tandem sicut ex melancho- (201<sup>v</sup>) lia incurabili aut ex obduratione in aliquo ex vitiis quod, quando inhaeserit et obduratum fuerit, totum sibi vendicat cor et obcludit omni alii sollicitudini et passioni cor. Solus ergo qui *percussit petram et fluxerunt aquae et torrentes inundavere*<sup>5</sup> potest fontem redundantem hujusmodi<sup>6</sup> intellectum facere ad hunc modum circa affectiones se habet. Et in vitiosis quidem major est nobis et copiosior familiaritas exemplorum; quae tamen hic pertransimus ex industria eo quod cuivis<sup>7</sup> se offerunt sponte.

Jam igitur motus omnes atque mutationes participant esse aut partus ingemescentium sub potentialitatis tenebris. Potentia liquido est et motum esse liberationem potentiarum a potentialitatis defectu et tenebris et in hoc notas esse potentias omnes (3<sup>v</sup>) ut in lucem suarum perfectionum erumpant, et paupertate cum qua nascuntur excussas in divitias suarum perfectionum ingredientur. Hoc vinculum paupertatis hujus et istas tenebras abicere atque fugare divitiis et luce suarum perfectionum supervenientibus iratae sunt, quasi dicat Deus<sup>8</sup> his qui vincti sunt: *Exite, et qui in tenebris: Revelamini*.

Bonum igitur et malum ut paupertas et divitiae et tenebrae et lux ut privatio et habitus, secundum hanc comparisonem sunt in omni motu, scilicet et inquisitione seu acquisitione et<sup>9</sup> velut nuditas et vestimentum et abortus et partus et infirmitas et decor et vacuitas et plenitudo. Ex quo necesse est ut bonum dicatur aut et simpliciter et secundum quid et absolute et ad aliquid et particulariter et universaliter; aliquid enim est alicui plenitudo suae vacuitatis et non alii, et aliquid est alicui perfectio et non alii.

V

Iterum aliquid est alicui totaliter perfectio et plenitudo totaliter implens atque perficiens et ditans illud et non aliud. Similiter autem et malum necessario se habebit et non erunt contraria immediata, eo quod aliquid quod nec est perfectio nec defectio nec ejus impletivum nec ejus evacuativum nec ejus vacuitas, sed neutrum est quantum ad ipsum. Malum igitur alicui duobus modis dicitur aut sicut nocivum aut sicut nocumentum ipsum quod est sicut ipsa vacuitas aut sicut evacuatum. Sequitur ergo ea quae diximus; quod bonum enim perfectio est illi aut perfectivum aliquod ex modis quos determinavimus, et quod malum defectio est aut defectivum, et quod bonum et bonitas perfectivum sunt atque perfectio, et malum et malitia defectivum atque defectio et per modum conjugatorum accepta fuerunt. Sed haec defectio apparet jam esse defectio a perfectione et hoc in omni genere malorum sciri faciemus.

Quoniam igitur perfectionum alia est ipsius esse, alia in bene se habere, quod est post esse in his quae post esse perfectibilia meliorabilia sunt.

Alia est enim perfectio quae facit esse ipsum susceptibile et perficiunt ipsum in his ex quibus est susceptibile suae perfectionis ultimae, quae est velut gloria ipsius, et vocatur perfectio prima, perfectio naturae.

Ultima ergo perfectio est gloriae. Quoniam autem susceptibile per hoc quod est susceptibile praecise non venit in suam perfectionem<sup>1</sup> ultimam, quoniam per hoc habet ipsam in<sup>2</sup> potentia, non est necesse quod habeat ipsam in<sup>2</sup> effectum. Necesse ut adjuvetur et recipiat supra potentialitatem suam aliquid quod sit ei via et adiutorium ad acquirendum suam perfectionem ultimam. Ad quod

<sup>5</sup> Psalm lxxvii, 20.

<sup>6</sup> hujus B.

<sup>7</sup> cum vis B.

<sup>8</sup> Deus dicat B.

<sup>9</sup> Om. B.

<sup>1</sup> perfectionem suam B.

<sup>2</sup> Homoeoteleuton B.

quidem si natura sola sufficeret, pari ratione sufficeret ad tertium quod est perfectio gloriae ultima; quod nisi erroneus et imbecillis nemo dixerit.

Tantum quippe distare videtur medium hujus ab altero extremorum quantum ab altero, tantum excellere primo, quantum ultimum medio et sicut primum potentia est ad medium, sic medium ad tertium. Quia igitur in postremum non potest natura per se nec in medium potest, quare datur ei aliunde necessario hujusmodi<sup>3</sup> medium, et hoc est quod dicitur gratia, quod scilicet sublevat naturam et approximatur ad perfectionem suam ultimam. Quod ideo gratia dicitur quod viribus naturae acquiri non potest, etsi aliqua ex mediis acquirantur; quod suo loco palam faciemus. Ideo inquam gratia, quia gratis ab ipso naturae conditore, provectore et perfectore datur, non meritis naturae redditur, ut infra docebitur, nec viribus acquiritur illius.

Triplex igitur perfectio, naturae scilicet, gratiae et gloriae, nec est excogitare quartam. Et est prima generalior quae congruit universo. Secunda minus generalis. Tertia augustior quae non nisi Paradisum implet et eo limitatur; ea vero quae gratiae est et habitationem nostram illustrat. Necesse igitur bonum aliud esse naturae, aliud gratiae, aliud gloriae. Et (4<sup>r</sup>) primum est materiale quoddammodo et possibile secundi et tertii. Secundum vero materiale et possibile tertii et causam, sed hoc velut tertium meritum.

Est enim meritum quaedam causa praemii, sed revera rectissima causa est larga benignitas seu justitia datoris; meritum igitur causa est sine quo non fieret; et videtur habere operationem dispositionum et habilitantium materiam ad suscipiendam formam agentis. Sic enim praeparant et idoneum et aptum efficiunt ad suscipiendas operationes largitatis et hae operationes largitates sunt. Ad hunc modum de malis meritis se habebit, ut vere dicatur de eis, quod ipsa praeparant materiam, quodammodo ad susceptionem contrariam. Unde ab una et eadem justitia contraria recipiunt bonus et malus quemadmodum lutum et cera ab eodem calore solis<sup>4</sup> (202<sup>r</sup>) contraria recipiunt pro varietate dispositionum suas materias passionibus habilitantium; lutum quippe induratur ab eodem calore solis et<sup>4</sup> cera emollitur.

Totum autem hoc ideo induximus ut apud justitiam merita et demerita operationum quodammodo materialium dispositionum ad agentem innotesceret obtinere, et hoc quidem in genere et coordinatione sua. Causae enim materiales unicuique scientiarum et ceterae causae similiter et dispositiones ipsarum pro modo suo aptandae sunt, unoquoque artifice utente nominibus et rationibus ad congruentiam facultatis suae. Sicut<sup>5</sup> igitur virtus agens in naturalibus ad habilitatem materiae obviantis seu actionum accipientis, sic justitia ad merita et demerita operantis subditi, quod utique habilitas aut inhabilitas materiae ad virtutem agentem in naturalibus, hoc est dignitas vel indignitas operantis ad justitiam praesidentem in moralibus, et quod ibi virtus agens hoc, hic justitia praesidens.

## VI

Nunc autem prosequentes de bono et malo, dicamus quod bonum absolute plenum aut perfectum absolute intelligendum est, et bonitas plenitudo atque perfectio ex qua bonum, ex eo quod<sup>6</sup> bonum, natum aut potens est exuberare in aliud aliquam scilicet ex perfectionibus quas jam nominavimus, hoc est aliquid suavitatis aut commoditatis aut dilatationis spiritualis aut necessitatis, hoc est necessarii subsidii vel praesidii. Bonum igitur nihil aliud est dicere quam

<sup>3</sup> hujus B.

<sup>4</sup> Vergil *Eclogues* VIII, 80; homoeoteleuton

<sup>5</sup> sunt AB.

<sup>6</sup> Om. B.

plenum et redundans seu exuberans aliquam ex hujus perfectionibus; malum vero contrarium. Bonitas vero ipsa exuberantia aliqua scilicet ex hujusmodi<sup>2</sup> perfectionibus. Bonum igitur aut exuberans ipsum aut exuberantia ipsa dicitur. Similiter malum aut privans ipsum hujusmodi perfectione aut ipsa privatio; quod superius diximus nocivum et nocumentum ipsum. Quoniam autem alia sunt quae de essentiali plenitudine sua exuberant, alia quae de participata et acquisita necessario dicitur, bonum aliud quidem substantia et aliud participatione, et bonum quidem substantia unum numero esse necesse est; non enim aliter essentialiter plenum atque perfectum esset nisi ex omnibus modis suis hoc esset.<sup>3</sup> Essentialis enim<sup>4</sup> plenitudo atque perfectio nullam secum patitur imperfectionem, sicut essentialis luminositas nullum genus tenebrarum et essentialis calor nullum genus frigiditatis et generaliter nulla essentia contrarium sui ipsius aut alicujus essentialium suorum.

Item quandoque unum esse fontem essentiali plenitudine sua implentem omnia jam dubium non est, unum esse bonum essentialiter dubitari non debet. Essentiale quippe bonum vocamus cui essentialis est esse bonum, non (4<sup>a</sup>) cujus essentia bona est, quoniam fortasse talia sunt omnia quae sunt, sed cui esse est esse bonum et cujus bonitas est ei esse quod est et esse quo est.<sup>5</sup> Quia igitur primum esse omnibus infusum est et omnia sunt in illo, hoc est participatione illius in habendo, scilicet illud per modum quo eis congruit habere illud quantum ad esse.

Alius enim modus congruit eis in habendo ipsum quo ad bene se habere seu ad beate esse, quoniam in quantum ita est, manifestum debet esse qualiter omnia alia dicuntur bona esse. Participatione enim inde exuberant bonitates quas nominavimus quia ipsum fontem bonorum in se habent omnes substantiae.<sup>6</sup> Sunt igitur omnes substantiae velut alvei fluentum ex fonte primo bonitatum et velut fenestrae radiantissimae primae lucis bonitates suas et dona velut quosdam radios dispergentes. Qualiter ergo omnes substantiae, in eo quod sunt, bonae sunt,<sup>7</sup> ex his jam claret, quoniam,<sup>8</sup> in eo quod sunt, fontalem bonitatem participant quae est esse quo sunt et omnia et singula; nihil tamen est eorum quia ejusdem participatione sunt; participant autem ut fenestrae lumen quod ulterius transfundunt ut alvei decurrentem aquam quam utique ulterius transvehunt.

Quia igitur bonum hoc interpretati sumus plenum usque ad redundantiam vel exuberantiam alicujus ex bonitatibus quatuor quas jam nominavimus; certum autem est quia redundantia non est nata de propria plenitudine, sed potius de curiositate<sup>9</sup> fontis universalis qui in eis est et qui est<sup>10</sup> eis esse quo sunt, non quod sunt—: palam est omnes substantias bonas esse in eo quod sunt—, hoc est enim dicere in eo quod habent esse primum per participationem, quod est in eo quod habent in se fontem exuberantissimum bonitatum, sine quo vacua in se et arida, quoad alia essent et tenebrosa, ut alveus praeter decurrentem aquam et fenestra praeter lumen. Quod autem esse primum bonum et maximum sit, ipsa universitas testatur et clamat, ut alibi certum fecimus.<sup>11</sup> Omne enim quod est, quicquid habet, negligit propter esse et totum abicit, si discrimen amittendi ipsum esse ei imminet.<sup>12</sup> Et nos palam faciemus in sequentibus quod omne

<sup>2</sup> hujus B.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* VIII, 4, PL 41, 228; Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, (Oxford, 1933), prop. 5 and 8; *Liber de Causis*, ed. Bardenheuer, p. 182.

<sup>4</sup> Om. B.

<sup>5</sup> For the history of the distinction of *quod est* and *quo est* cf. P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde* V, (Paris, 1916), pp. 294 ff. For *quod est* meaning *ens* consult Priscian,

*Gramm.* III, 239, 8 and Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* II, 14, 2 and VIII, 33, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate* 6: Omnia quodammodo vestiunt primum esse.

<sup>7</sup> Om. B.

<sup>8</sup> Om. B.

<sup>9</sup> curiositata B.

<sup>10</sup> cum AB.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *De Trin.* 1, 5 and 6.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *De Trin.* 13.

malum respectu ejus, eo quod ipsum est privatio alicujus ex perfectionibus, quae sunt ipsius esse, et est<sup>13</sup> omne malum aut destructio ipsius esse aut laesio aut turbatio aut oppressio. Hoc igitur debet esse bonum naturae quod vel de essentiali et propria plenitudine sua exuberat bonitates, et hoc vocant bonum substantia; aut quod participatione fontis hujus exuberat aliquam earum, et hoc est quod vocant bonum participatione.

## VII

Bonitas vero ipsum quod inde exuberat et idem est ei esse bonitatem quod esse perfectionem vel plenitudinem. Malum igitur simpliciter et absolute nihil esse huic facile elucescit, malum, dico, oppositum bono secundum quod nos intendimus de bono naturae. Si enim contrarium ponatur bono essentiali, palam est illud nihil esse, cum bono primo non posset esse contrarium. Si vero privatio ponatur, tunc manifestius est hujusmodi malum nihil esse, cum de privatione, utrum sit, an non sit, dubitatio (202<sup>r</sup>) esse non debeat. Si vero bonum consideraverimus participatione, inveniemus illi nihil contrarium absolute quod debeat (7<sup>r</sup>) dici malum. Hujusmodi quippe bonum substantia est, ut jam diximus, cui sive aliquid sit contrarium sive non, contrarium tamen malum esse non poterit. In naturis enim nisi bonum bono contrarium esse non poterit, ut albedo nigredini, quarum utraque bona, et calor frigiditati, et sic multa hujusmodi, nisi quis fortasse dicat generationi<sup>1</sup> corruptionem esse contrariam, sed tamen corruptio, in eo quod corruptio, aut nihil est, aut malum absolute non est, sed malum cui. Si enim ipsa formae desitio vocatur corruptio, manifestum est ipsam nihil esse. Si vero actio ipsa corruptentis, hoc quidem malum est cui et non simpliciter et absolute, et est generatio dispositionum praeparantium et habilitantium materiam ad susceptionem formae ipsius agentis, secundum scilicet quod agit. Unde re et veritate generatio est, sed accidit ei esse corruptio et vocari propter desitionem formae ipsius corrupti. Quare cum intus in essentia sua magna et parva considerata fuerit, ipsa actio corruptionis invenietur bonum; non autem ita esse, ut diximus, faciemus sciri.

Primum dico quod omne quod est malum aut est malum ex essentia aut ex accidente; aut enim necessario ex essentia est malum aut ex aliquo quod est praeter essentiam. Omne etiam quod dicitur de aliquo aut essentielle est illi aut accidit, hoc est praeter essentiam; de illo dicitur praeter essentiam. Est vero quod nec essentia illius est nec pars essentiae; palam igitur est quia omne quod est malum aut est malum ex essentia aut ex accidente. Si autem nihil est malum ex essentia, necessario nihil est malum ex accidente. Non enim in infinitum ibit ut sit scilicet *a* malum ex accidente sibi *b* et *b* ex accidente *c*, et hoc finem non habeat; hoc enim alias suam habet destructionem infinitas scilicet causarum et circulus. Non igitur *a* malum ex *b* et *e* converso. Quare necesse est aliquid esse malum ex essentia, si aliquid est malum ex accidente.<sup>2</sup>

Nobis autem facile est monstrare nihil esse malum essentialiter nisi quis dixerit privationem esse malam essentialiter, quia scilicet ipsa malitia essentia illius est sicut congruit dicere privationem habere essentiam. Quod si ponatur aliquod malum essentialiter et non esse privationem, ut diximus, facilis est hujusmodi destructio. Quod enim essentialiter malum est, necessario non patitur aliquid boni in se;<sup>3</sup> quod enim essentialiter calidum aut frigidum est, contrarium pati non potest; contrarium dico suae essentiae. Quod igitur essentialiter malum ponitur, necessario caret omni bono, multo fortius igitur ipso optimo, hoc autem

<sup>13</sup> aut esse B.<sup>1</sup> generationem B.<sup>2</sup> Cf. *De Trin.* 2.<sup>3</sup> Om. A.

est ipsum esse. Quare necesse est ipsum non habere esse et ita est non ens et nihil.

Amplius, malum essenziale et bonum essenziale necessario erunt contraria, si alterutrum eorum debet habere contrarium. Quare sicut essentialiter bonum nec actu nec potentia susceptibile est mali, sic necessario essentialiter malum nec actu nec potentia erit susceptibile boni cujuscumque. Ipsum autem esse quoddam bonum est sine dubio, immo omnium bonorum maximum, ut alias ostendimus, et omnium bonorum bonum. Quare malum essenziale nec actu nec potentia habet esse.<sup>4</sup>

Amplius, huic malo aut deest aliqua ex perfectionibus suis aut habet omnes in effectū. Quod si habet omnes in effectū, est igitur perfectum omnino in gradu suo et ordine et ut debet, cum nulla suarum perfectionum desit esse. Quare bene est et perfectum est et ordinatum. Perfectio vero et ordinatio in se essentialiter mala esse nullatenus possunt, immo in se bona sunt. Si enim in se mala essent essentialiter, in maxime (7<sup>a</sup>) bonis minime aut minima essent. Sunt autem in eis et maxime et maxima. Malum igitur essentialiter in se patitur omnium bonorum maximam perfectionem, scilicet in effectū, immo ipsam bonitatem; perfectio enim bonitas est quoniam imperfectio malitia.

Item malum essentialiter habet totam essentiam suam malam necessario; sed hoc impossibile quoniam sive<sup>5</sup> sit substantia, sive accidens, ad minus habet ea quae communicat cum bonis; non malam esse enim substantiam in se non est malum. Similiter nec esse accidens quoniam, si hoc esset, omnis substantia esset mala essentialiter et omne accidens similiter. Quicquid enim essenziale est generis, essenziale est omnium eorum, quae sub genere sunt. Quare si malitia essentialiter inesset ipsi generi substantiarum et accidentium, omnibus substantiis aut accidentibus esset essentialis. Quia igitur essentielle mutari non potest, necessario omnis substantia erit immutabiliter mala, aut omne accidens, ita impossibile erit aliquam fieri bonam quacumque via vel modo. Similiter et de accidentibus oportebit. Si vero genera ista in se essentialiter bona sunt, accidit eadem via omnia inferiora essentialiter bona esse, et ita nihil esse essentialiter malum, eo quod essentialiter bonum et essentialiter malum sese invicem oppugnent.

Si vero dicta genera indifferentia sunt, aut indifferentia est medium per abnegationem, aut medium positivum. Quod fuerit medium positivum necessario accidet eidem<sup>6</sup> idem quod de bonitate et malitia. Erit enim indifferentiis omnibus, quae sunt, essentialis quia nihil eorum, quae sunt, erit receptibile bonitatis aut malitiae, quemadmodum si medius color alicui esset substantialis, impossibile esset illud de cetero recipere albedinem aut nigredinem. Si vero indifferens medium est tantum per (203<sup>a</sup>) abnegationem extremorum, tunc quantum ad genus ipsum nihil erit malum essentialiter, nihil erit etiam, cujus tota essentia mala sit in se, quoniam multa genera et multae differentiae sunt in essentia uniuscujusque, quorum nullum est malum.

Item maximo bono maximum malum opponitur. Si primum bonum est omnium bonorum maximum, quoniam ipsum est fons omnium bonorum, quare primo bono est maximum malum oppositum. Primum autem bonum est esse in seipso et ex omnibus modis suis, quare ipsi quod est esse in se, esse scilicet essenziale, non acquisitum aut participatum ullo modo, illi, inquam, est maximum malum oppositum. Esse autem nihil habet oppositum nisi non esse, nec ens nisi non ens. Non esse vero et non ens aut privatio est aut privativum et nihil omnino est.

<sup>4</sup>This discussion is based on St. Augustine. Cf. R. Jolivet, *Le Problème du Mal* (Paris, 1936); in this work the texts concerning this problem are collected; cf. especially *De Mor. Manichaeorum* II, 2; PL

32, 1345 ff. and *De Natura Boni* I, 3; PL 42, 553.

<sup>5</sup>Add. hoc B.

<sup>6</sup>Om. A.



Quare maximum malum omnino nihil est. Manifestum igitur debet esse de aliis. Quia enim maxime malum minime est necessario, minus mala necessario ad esse accedant. Ex hoc igitur colligere possumus quoniam maxime malum maximo est oppositum, et minora mala minoribus, et quia eo maximum malum quod maxime ei, quod est maxime esse, oppositum, inde erunt mala minora quia minus ipsi esse opposita; quare malum omne, ideo malum, quia ipsi esse oppositum quocumque modo. Nihil autem oppositum est ipsi esse directe nisi privatio ipsius aut privativum.

Privativum vero videtur malum quia privativum propter privationem, scilicet ipsius esse. Quare omne malum aut est defectio ipsius esse aut ex ipsa defectione malum essentialiter. Igitur malum nihil est nisi privatio ipsius esse, quoniam illa in se mala et omne aliud malum propter illam dicitur malum ex comparatione aliqua, (8<sup>a</sup>) scilicet ad illam, in quantum scilicet inducit in<sup>8</sup> illam. Si enim in maximo bono et maximo malo, sic est necessario proportionaliter se habet in consequentibus bonis, scilicet et malis, quae post illa duo ordinata sunt. Quare quia illa prima et suprema sicut esse et non esse se habent necessario et consequentia proportionaliter sumptis esse et non esse.

Hoc autem manifestum erit, dico, quoniam nulla ex rebus habet totum suum esse in effectu nisi cum fuerit in perfectionibus suis ultimis. Totum esse, dico absolute, et si habeat esse suum ut nunc, videlicet totam actualitatem, quae ei congruit, ut nunc, non autem totam, quae ei congruit absolute. Quare si recte et diligenter locutionem examines, non dices ipsam adhuc esse, sed esse velut in motu in acquisitione essendi. Quodam igitur modo verum est quod nondum sumus, sed simus magis dum ad perfectionem et plenitudinem nostram paulatim perducamur et possibilitas nostra paulatim impletur. Unde profectus<sup>9</sup> noster quo in praesenti vita proficimus<sup>10</sup> initium et ortus Dei et viri sancti aurora<sup>11</sup> nominantur consideratione praesentis imperfectionis suae; consideratione vero futurae plenitudinis et perfectionis dies vocantur *Prov. IV.<sup>12</sup> Semita iustorum quasi lux splendens procedit et ens est his ad perfectam diem*. Semita haec angusta via est per quam incedunt. Via quippe cuiusque vita ejus est quae incipit a diluculo fidei et igniculo caritatis et consummatur in meridie pleni luminis cognitionis, scilicet et in caminum dilectionis. Hi igitur tota praesenti vita fiunt et incipiunt. Unde et dixi, nunc coepi, nunc, id est in praesenti vita tantum coepi, in futura consummandus. Propter hoc interior homo noster de die in diem renovari dicitur *Cor.:<sup>13</sup> Nos revelata facie gloriam Dei contemplantes transformamur a claritate in claritatem*. Et ejusdem *IV:<sup>14</sup> Is qui intus est renovatur de die in diem*. Item ad *Cor. XIII:<sup>15</sup> Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Item ascensiones in corde suo disposuit;<sup>16</sup> gradus etiam et aetates spirituales distinguimus*.

## VIII

Ex quibus omnibus manifestum est nos adhuc quodammodo fieri, nondum autem plene esse. Malorum vero vita defectio et defectus ut ipsi de se testantur *Sap. IV:<sup>1</sup> Sic et nos nati continuo desivimus esse*. Videamus autem, et hoc planius, quoniam quidem omne malum aut destructio aut laesio aut turbatio

<sup>7</sup> Om. B.

<sup>8</sup> Om. B.

<sup>9</sup> perfectus AB.

<sup>10</sup> perficimus B.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. St. Gregory the Great: *Sancti Gregorii Romani Pontificis Libri sive Expositio in Librum Beati Job* 29, 2; PL 76, 478B: Quid itaque in hac vita omnes qui veritatem sequimur nisi aurora vel dilu-

culum sumus?

<sup>12</sup> *Proverbs* iv, 8: *Iustorum autem semita quasi lux splendens procedit et crescit usque ad perfectam diem*.

<sup>13</sup> *II Corinthians* iii, 18.

<sup>14</sup> *II Cor.* iv, 16.

<sup>15</sup> *I Cor.* xiii, 20.

<sup>16</sup> *Psalms* lxxxiii, 6.

<sup>1</sup> *Wisdom* iv, 13.

aut oppressio ipsius esse; si enim ipsum esse salvum, sanum seu illaesum, item quietum et liberum, consideratione tua posueris, nihil<sup>2</sup> in eo mali relinqueris, sed totum necessario bene se habet et bene est ei. Laesionem autem vocamus infirmitates et vulnera et quae horum habent comparationes; quod propter spirituales aegritudines et vulnera dicimus. Turbationem et inquietudinem vocamus tristitiam et metum et omnia quae ipsum esse quatiunt et inquietant, oppressionem, vincula, carceres, servitutem et omnia impedimenta libertatis quaecumque, sed coartant et coangustant ipsum.

Est enim esse velut lux radios virtutum et operationum suarum late spargere semper quaerens. Inde ergo angustatio haec et compressio est ei malum; angustatio, inquam, et oppressio quae prohibet dilatationem ejus et expositionem radorum ejus velut concludens luminositatem ipsius. Vides igitur quia omne malum ad minus poenale aut destructio aut laesio aut turbatio seu inquietatio est aut oppressio ipsius esse. Omnium autem istorum maximum (8<sup>o</sup>) malum est destructio ipsius esse, scilicet laesio, turbatio et inquietatio; minimum vero oppressio, verumtamen nullum istorum est malum nisi propter non esse, in quantum scilicet ducit ad ipsum et approximat; laesio quidem aliquid de plenitudine essendi detrahit. Unde ejus augmentum imminutio et detrimentum est ipsius esse. Inquietatio vero cum invaluerit, ab ipso esse avellit, et in avulsionem et distractionem crescit, et ita in (203<sup>o</sup>) destructionem. Oppressio vero in extinctionem et suffocationem ipsius esse crescit. Vides igitur quia unuscujusque istorum in eo in quo est malum poenale, perfectio et consummatio est non esse et in tantum crescit malitia eorum, in quantum imminuunt ipsum. Quare propter ipsum non esse ad quod sua consummatione perducent et sua essentia approximant, sine ulla dubitatione unumquodque istorum malum est. Si enim ad ipsum nullatenus ducerent, dubium nullatenus esset nullum eorum<sup>3</sup> malum esse. Non esse igitur est, immo propter quod solum unumquodque eorum malum est; ipsum vero non esse malum est secundum se solum. Igitur non esse est malum propter se et proprie et ipsum est malum indubitanter omnis mali, et illud est quod solum fugiunt omnia et propter quod fugiunt esse quod fugiunt.

Ex quo relinquitur solum esse esse bonum propter se et illud solum quaeri ab omnibus. Omnia siquidem quaerunt quiescere in illo; unde nec debent dici esse nisi cum quiescunt in illo; hoc autem non est nisi in fine omnium motionum nostrarum, qui est beatitudo. Interim enim in propectu et motu sumus ad ipsum esse, et paulatim de tenebris istorum trium defectuum erumpentes proficimus. Manifestum igitur est quae sit philosophorum intentio<sup>4</sup> de eo quod dixerunt quod malus homo non est, cum ipse nec sit in quiete essendi nec in propectu seu motu ad illud, immo in recessione est ab ipso esse.

Quod igitur quatuor illa, quae nominavimus supra bonitates, dicuntur propter esse, est aut quia salvant et sustinent ut nomina,<sup>5</sup> aut quia sonant<sup>6</sup> aut liberant ut utilia, aut quia quietant et pacant ut delectabilia, aut quia dilatant et magnificant et ornant ut ea quorum inquisitor est vis nostra irascibilis; qualia sunt victoria et laus et honor et libertatis amplitudo. Omne igitur bonum praeter esse appendet ipsi esse et ex comparatione illud dicitur bonum, eo scilicet quod quaedam circumstantia illius sit. Bonum igitur principale et maximum est esse et hujus plena et quieta seu pacifica et libera beatitudo est. Nemo autem dubitat quin plena et perfecta et segura et quieta et libera possessio ejus, quod est esse, beatitudo sit. Si enim plena et perfecta ejus est possessio exclusa est mortalitas, quae est velut mortis et vitae et essendi et non essendi litigium,

<sup>2</sup> in eo nihil B.

<sup>3</sup> ullum B.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Boethius, *De Consolatione Philoso-*

*phiae* IV, 2, 23; ed. Fortescue, p. 108.

<sup>5</sup> read necessaria?

<sup>6</sup> read sanant?

immo participium, non solum ipsum quippe praeteritum et futurum ipsum non esse possidet, sed alterum perpetuo et pacifice; reliquum vero non de jure, ipsum vero praesens est, eo quod est, esse dividit. Non est igitur plena et perfecta ejus quod est esse possessio ubi mortalitas est, sed amborum participium.

Item morta- (6<sup>r</sup>) litas vita fluens aut fuga verius ipsius vitae est sive ipsius esse. Qualiter perfecte possidetur quae semper fugit? Qualiter plene quam totam mors ipsa fere possidet? Et qualiter quiete quae tota in fluxu et fuga est? Item qualiter libere quae invite et eripitur et labitur? Est necessario siquidem et cum laesionibus nec perfecta nec plena est ejus possessio, sed in certamine laesionum et ipsius esse est qui laesionem quamcumque sustinet ejus quod est esse. Natura enim et laesio bello inexorabili se oppugnant. Semper exclusa est igitur omnis laesio a plena et perfecta possessione ejus, quod est esse, et a quiete omnis defectus desiderabilium et omnis carentia. Si enim quietas est, praeter omnem motum est; non est autem praeter motum nisi in plena obtentione omnium perfectionum suarum et plena evasione omnium laesionum et<sup>7</sup> inquietudinum et miseriarum suarum.

Fuga quippe miseriarum non minus innata est quam insecutio felicitatum. Citra autem impossibile naturam quiescere; nihil enim quiescere potest nisi in gradu suo et ordine. Unde lapis, etsi cessit a motu suo, cum tenetur in alto, non quiescere ibi dicendus est, sed magis violentia detineri, quod indicat inclinatio ejus, et conatur in motum qui tactu sensibilis est; toto enim<sup>8</sup> pondere etiam<sup>9</sup> obnitur contrarium detinentem et sustinentem ipsum. Naturam dico natam evadere universaliter miseras et obtinere felicitatem perfectam et puram, cui non adjuncta nec admixta sit ullo modo miseria. Eodem modo et debilitate se habet, quoniam cum oppressione quacumque aut conturbatione non est perfecta his quaecumque ipsius esse vel vitae possessio.

Cum igitur omnia quae diximus diligenter attenderis, nihil invenies esse beatitudinem nisi obtentionem ipsius esse, sed illam perfectam et quietam et liberam. Beatitudo vero non est nisi summi boni adeptio seu participatio seu obtentio, sed qualem quidem determinavimus. Hoc autem indicant omnes motiones sive spirituales sint<sup>10</sup> sive corporales, quia omne quod movetur necessario movetur aut fuga aut desiderio; large accipe fugam et desiderium ut supra diximus. Omni autem fuga fugitur, aut non esse ipsum, aut propter ipsum laesivum scilicet ipsius, aut turbativum aut oppressivum ipsius esse aliquo modo. Quod si nec laesivum nec turbativum nec oppressivum fuerit ipsius esse aliquo modo, nulla erit in eo<sup>11</sup> causa qua fugiendum est ab eo; nihil enim fugit natura nisi nocumentum aliquod aut detrimentum sui esse aut suae quietis aut suae amplitudinis et libertatis. Quare ubi nihil horum fuerit, impossibile erit esse fugam. Quod inde palam est quoniam, ablatis istis, necesse est ipsum esse esse salvum, sanum et liberum et quietum ab omni (204<sup>r</sup>) perturbatione et inquietudine. His autem positis, nihil est quod impellat naturam ad fugam. Quare manifestum est quod nihil fugitur nisi non esse ipsum aut propter non esse. Non esse autem maxime fugitur; non autem fugitur nisi quia malum. Non esse igitur est omnium malorum et summum et summa, quoniam in ipsum excrescunt omnia mala et ultra ipsum nihil habent.

Si autem ad motus insecutionis<sup>12</sup> considera- (6<sup>r</sup>) tionem verteris, nihil invenies quaeri omni motu et motione nisi aut esse ipsum aut salutem ejus aut<sup>13</sup> sanitatem aut quietem aut libertatem et amplitudinem, et propter hoc omnibus motionibus

<sup>7</sup> Om. B.  
<sup>8</sup> etiam B.

<sup>9</sup> Om. B.  
<sup>10</sup> sive sint B.

<sup>11</sup> ea B.  
<sup>12</sup> insecuti nos AB.  
<sup>13</sup> aut ejus B.

solum esse quaeritur, ut scilicet perfecte habeatur quod est integre et quiete et libere. Modus enim habendi ubique quaeritur propter ipsum quod habetur.<sup>14</sup> Quare ipsum quod habetur, necessario maxime quaeritur et maxime amatur. Quare ipsum est maxime bonum quod omnis natura universis motionibus acquirere, salvare, quiete et libere obtinere contendit, et hoc propter hoc ipsum solum; cetera vero propter ipsum.

Vides igitur quod esse est illud bonum quod universa natura summo amore amplectitur, summo conatu quaerit, omni modo studio salvat, tota sollicitudine quietat et liberat ab omni perturbatione<sup>15</sup> et oppressione, sola participatione ipsius beatam se reputat, universa natura dum in ejus obtentionem et amplexum totam omnino se confert, totam effundit, omnia alia propter illud negligens et abiiciens. Qualiter igitur nominata utilitas et voluptas et libertas bonitates sint jam lucidum est; etenim quaedam perfectiones habendi ipsum esse, dum ipsis aut saluum aut sanum aut quietum aut liberum obtinetur ipsum esse, quae quanto ista perfectius efficient, tanto majores bonitates et veriores erunt. Quod quippe magis salvat aut sanat aut quietat aut liberat ipsum esse, hoc sine dubio majus bonum aut major bonitas necessario est. Unde et salus animarum nostrarum major bonitas est quam salus corporum et sanitas animarum quam corporum et voluptates spirituales quam corporales et spirituales libertates quam corporales. Majora bona sunt quia magis ipsius esse sunt, eo quod esse nostrum magis in animabus quam in corporibus consistit. Magis quippe salvat esse nostrum salus animarum quam corporum et magis liberat libertas et sanat sanitas; minus enim de esse nostro corpus nostrum quam anima nostra est.<sup>16</sup> Unde incessanter fluente corpore et consumpto per labores et sudores et vigilias quasi nihil nobis deperire putamus.

## IX

Jam igitur claruit ex his quae praecesserunt malum essentialiter omnino nihil esse nisi non esse ipsum et hoc nihil esse; malum vero cui et effective quod scilicet prohibens est ab illo aliquam ex his perfectionibus aut destruens ipsum esse; ens hoc quidem esse et non posse nisi bonum in se, et hoc non posse nisi ex bonitate sua. Quod unico exemplo manifestum erit. Certum est quoniam ignis, etsi sit bonum quoddam in se, malum tamen est ligno quod comburit, quoniam destructivum est esse ipsius ligni. Hoc autem non potest aut<sup>1</sup> facit nisi ex bonitate sua ex calore, scilicet qui est bonitas et perfectio ignis. Ex illo enim exuberat super lignum, nec intentio ignis ut destruat ullo modo nec ut aliquid auferat, sed magis ut det suum. Ablatio autem et destructio accidunt ibi praeter intentionem operantis ignis ex contrarietate qua non patiuntur se quod intendit dare ignis et quod habet in se lignum. Verum igitur est quod ex bonitate sua, perfectione scilicet et plenitudine caloris exuberando et quod suum est largiendo, et hoc est bonum faciendo, malum accidit ipsum facere sicut et largienti sive danti accidit auferre. Ex bono igitur per viam accidentis est malum sicut ex largitione ablatio et ex generatione, quae sine<sup>2</sup> (9<sup>r</sup>) dubio sola intenditur, et per se corruptionem accidit esse hoc modo; bono igitur in se accidit malum esse, sed cui quemadmodum et generationi accidit corruptionem et largitioni ablationem, quia revera actio ignis in lignum per se et propria nominatione et ex intentione ignis generatione; ab accidenti vero corruptio est.

Destructivum autem aut laesivum aut turbativum aut oppressivum ipsius

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Aristotle 15 b 17 ff.

<sup>15</sup> turbatione B.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* XII, 21; PL 63, 1250B; also H. J. Brosch, *Der Seinsbegriff bei*

Boethius (Innsbruck, 1931), pp. 24-7.

<sup>1</sup> et B.

<sup>2</sup> Add. quae B.

esse non potest esse nisi bonum, quoniam non potest agere aliquid in aliud nisi exuberando aliquid de plenitudine sua in illud. Quicquid autem sit, quod fluit ab altero<sup>3</sup> in alterum per se de intentione, scilicet plenitudinis ipsius agentis, necessario est bonum, quoniam de plenitudine bona per se exuberat sive illud sit minus bonum sive majus sive contrarium aut expulsivum quocumque modo ejus boni quod invenit in patiente.

Nocivum igitur, id est nocumenti alicujus inductivum, non potest esse nisi bonum; active intellige, id est quia per actionem suam est<sup>4</sup> illativum nocumenti. Similiter receptibile nocumenti non potest esse nisi bonum; necessario enim, si nocetur, aliquod ei boni adimitur sicut dicit beatus Augustinus.<sup>5</sup> Si enim nihil ei boni adimeretur, in nullo ei noceretur. Non autem adimitur bonum nisi habenti. Quare necessario receptibile nocumenti est bonum. Vides igitur qualiter avaritia malum sit avaro quia, licet sit bonum quoddam in se, quod probant exuberantiae ejus multae necessitatum et commoditatum et voluptatum et libertatum, quae omnes de amore pecuniae exuberant, multa quidem voluptas est avaro ex amore pecuniae dum eam habet et multae utilitates dum amore pecuniae a multis malis abstinere, et ad hunc modum de aliis. Has autem bonitates nullatenus exuberaret avaritia nisi quoddam bonum esset. Similiter et de luxuria de qua dubium non est quin multas bonitates exuberet, primum voluptatum, (204<sup>6</sup>) deinde donationum et expensarum et multorum aliorum, quae omnia fons unius luxuriae, licet perturbate et inordinate, dispergit. Quod si superbiam, quae in vitiis extremum malitiae locum et supremum obtinet, diligentius perscruteris, tot ex ea invenies disciplinarum perscruteris, tot ex ea invenies disciplinarum et virtutum studia redundare. Vilipendi quippe et aspernari fugiens ea, quae sunt honoris et gloriae, ardentissima aviditate amplectitur, et quasi contra contemptus et vituperationes quaerens praesidia, quibus se protegat aut saltem operiat vestem peregrinam ex hujusmodi contextit, qua turpitudinem vilitatis obnubat, istas velut divitias, quibus a detractorum morsibus se redundat, congregat.

Inde autem est quod avaritiam malam dicimus sicut et revera est licet quoddam quodammodo bonum sit quia incomparabiliter majora detrimenta ingerit; quoniam sunt bonitates seu commoditates illae, quas diximus, ad comparisonem quippe aeternorum nihil sunt temporalia. Ad veritatem nihil est mendacium; et apparentia ad comparisonem meritorum verae laudis et gloriae nihil est, nihil est adulantium vanitatis. Quod autem bona, quae vitia adimunt,<sup>6</sup> ad ea, quae auferunt, sic se habeant, quemadmodum similitudines istae<sup>7</sup> et exempla sequentia<sup>8</sup> docebunt, vitia etiam bona quae exuberant ut mulier per accidens et occasionem; quae vero ex se seu de propria plenitudine modica sunt. Virtutes vero fontes redundantissimi et affluentissimi sunt per seipsas exuberantissimae bonorum. Avaritia quippe declinat mala peccatorum ut minora mala declinet quae sunt damna bonorum temporalium. Ideo quippe declinat luxuriae opera ut declinet<sup>9</sup> expensas plerumque,<sup>10</sup> et hoc est avaritiae in hoc perversitas et caecitas, quod minora mala, damna scilicet bonorum temporalium, majoribus praefert, id est damnis bonorum seu divitiarum spiritualium, dum hoc<sup>11</sup> propter illa sola declinat.

<sup>3</sup> altro or altrum is the almost constant spelling in B when written out in full.

<sup>4</sup> et B.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *De Moribus Manichaeorum* II, 5; PL 32, 1347; Nam si nullum bonum adimit, nihil prorsus nocet; cf. also *De Natura Boni* 6; PL 42, 554.

<sup>6</sup> adimunit A.

<sup>7</sup> Om. B.

<sup>8</sup> Om. B.

<sup>9</sup> declinat B.

<sup>10</sup> pleraque B.

<sup>11</sup> haec B.

Virtutes vero ordinatae sunt nihil habentes in posterum, nihil perturbatum. Unde et Augustinus<sup>1</sup> in definitione virtutis dixit: qua nemo male utitur. Impossibile quippe est virtute<sup>2</sup> quemquam abuti aut male uti; nullatenus enim de fonte virtutis est elicere aut malum aut male. A Deo quippe ordinata est et bona ut in ea, quae ejus sunt, nullo modo ingerere se potest malitia nec ordinem pervertere nec fontem ipsius virtutis turbare ut turbida inde exeat<sup>3</sup> operatio. Virtutes vero bonae sunt omni genere oppositionis ipsis vitiis.

Prima exuberantia earum libertas est a servitute durissima proprii sensus et propriae voluntatis. De qua servitute loquemur inferius. Haec est fornax ferrea Aegypti,<sup>4</sup> id est fornax tenebrosa ardore concupiscentiarum et propriae voluntatis; fornax Aegyptia vero, id est tenebrosa tenebris proprii sensus; haec sunt tyrannides violentissimae et pressurae angariosissimae quibus premuntur et affliguntur vehementissime filii Israel, et illusionibus quibus ad amaritudinem perducitur vita illorum sicut legitur *Exod.* I.<sup>5</sup> Deinde exuberant virtutes sanitatem et robur virium nostrarum expedites et roborantes eas.

Exuberant etiam motus et operationes, quae sunt profectus et subjectio animarum nostrarum in centrum quietationis earum. Unde et pennae animarum nostrarum virtutes vocantur in Scriptura,<sup>6</sup> eo quod eas, velut quodam pennarum remigio, subveniant in locum suae quietis et ipsi centro suo ad quod moveri, in quo solo quiescere natae sunt immediate, et proximo jungantur. Est etiam ex eis decor mirificus et pulchritudo gratiosa, quae si, ut ait Plato,<sup>7</sup> oculis conspiceretur miros sapientiae excitaret amores, hujus pulchritudinis admirationem et efficaciam et ad inflammandum castum illum et sanctum amorem legis *Canticorum*<sup>8</sup> fere per totum hanc admiratur ille, cujus pulchritudinem sol et luna mirantur. Hic etiam quid laetitiae spiritualis, quid honoris et claritudinis auferunt ipsi norunt quibus eis gaudere coelitus concessum est.

Jam igitur clarere debet ex his quod vitia ipsa<sup>9</sup> quaedam et quodammodo bona sunt, simpliciter autem mala, quoniam revera quaedam et quodammodo bona exuberant. Simpliciter autem a summo bono et fonte bonorum et ab eis quibus ad ipsum venit, prohibent et avertunt affligentes<sup>10</sup> nos et alligantes minimis bonis velut vincula quaedam et compedes et velut tyranni violentissimae oppressionis et velut aegritudines, immo revera aegritudines, quae nos et impotes et impotentes nostri nos efficiunt. Estque verum quod bonum bono contrarium, sed non ex parte bonitatis simpliciter, sed ex parte quae excedit limites et ordinem subjecti sui, quemadmodum et calor naturalis et calor innaturalis revera contrarii sunt, id est se mutuo oppugnantes, sed non ex parte caloris absolute et simpliciter, sed ex parte excessus et limitationis et ordinis et perturbationis.

Quod in omnibus et vitiis et virtutibus perscrutantibus videre facile est. Non enim amor temporalium bonorum in quantum amor et in quantum bonorum largitati contrarius est, sed in quantum excedit limites positos ipsi subjecto et ordinem ipsius, in quantum scilicet nimius<sup>11</sup> et<sup>12</sup> in quantum praeposterus. Non enim amanda sunt ista bona quantum (10') avarus ea diligit nec eo ordine, non enim primo amanda sunt, sed ultimo, sed tanquam adjutoria quaedam adipiscendi boni quod primo amandum est. Avarus autem amat ea ut primum bonum

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 19; PL 32, 1268.

<sup>2</sup> vire AB.

<sup>3</sup> exeat inde B.

<sup>4</sup> *Deuteronomy* iv, 20.

<sup>5</sup> *Exodus* i, 14.

<sup>6</sup> Not in Sacred Scripture.

<sup>7</sup> *Phaedrus* 250C.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Cantic of Canticles* ix, 6.

<sup>9</sup> ipsa vitia B.

<sup>10</sup> affligentes B.

<sup>11</sup> nitentem B.

<sup>12</sup> Om. A.

amandum est, toto acilicet amore, et amat ea primo, cetera autem post illa et propter illa. Vides igitur quam perversa est in se avaritia, in eo scilicet quod avaritia. Attende quam nociva sit quae et omnem viam ad fontem bonorum obcludit et renitentem (205<sup>v</sup>) quantum in ipsa est et ambulare intentem immo currentem ad fontem bonorum naturam nostram avertit, et<sup>13</sup> his bonorum velut umbris affigit pensa damna et patebunt nocumenta.

Quid autem vocamus in ipsa avaritia malitiam jam clarum est. Non enim vocamus in ipsa malitiam aliquid quod essentialiter malum sit, quia nihil habet ipsa quod essentialiter malum sit, sed quod in seipso essentialiter bonum est, tamen prohibitum est et oppugnativum alterius boni majoris, et hoc utique non est nisi ex bonitate propria. Quod ostendemus exemplo divitiarum quae utique bona quaedam sunt inpermixta malitiae omnino. Hac ergo bonitate adurunt cor aridum ab humore gratiae qui debebat esse praesidium contra cupiditatis incendium. Sic ergo cor suum arefecit avarus avertens illud a torrentibus aureis et rivis mellis, ut legitur *Job*.<sup>14</sup> Aut si sufflantibus et ignem cupiditatis immitentibus divitiis et per illas daemonibus sufflantibus ignem incendere molientibus non occurrit, aut aqua lacrimarum aut confessionis aut gratiae, merito cor aridum et indefensum amore suo adurunt. Sic et speciositas muliebris bonum quoddam esse a nullo sani capitis dubitatur. Verum arida concupiscentia facile ab ea aduritur, quemadmodum ignis bonus. Et bonum est certissime, cum tamen habuerit ligna arida obviantia et aliam materiam adustibilem, statim autem ea adurit, et hoc malum lignis aridis irrogat, non utique ex malitia quae in eo sit absolute, sed ex bonitate propria. Bonitas quippe in igne et<sup>15</sup> vehementia et fortitudo caloris ipsius est. Verum igitur est quod ignis est<sup>16</sup> bonus et bonum in se malus est lignis aridis et omni adustibili, cui admotus aut obvians fuerit. Quod siquidem congruit dicere in ipso igne malitiam a qua utique non malus aut malum simpliciter, sed malus ipsis lignis dicitur ipsa ejus bonitas, quae per se considerata bonitas est et dicitur, malitia illa rectissime dicitur.

Nec mirum videri debet idem dici bonitatem et malitiam sicut nulli venit in admirationem idem bonum et malum dici, cum hoc non secundum intentiones oppositas dici posse manifestum sit, et alterum absolute et simpliciter, alterum vero ad aliquid dicatur. Qui modi contrarietatem et oppositionem prohibent inter ea necessario; ei quippe quod est ad aliquid non est oppositum nisi ad aliquid, et ei quod est absolutum nisi absolutum oppositum esse non potest. Quare non est possibile bonum et malum per duas intentiones, quarum altera absoluta est, altera ad aliquid opposita esse.

Malitiam autem intelligimus hic principium nocendi, licet non per se nisi secundum intentionem, sed magis ex accidenti. Non enim intendit ignis nocere ei quod adurit, sed magis aut ampliationem suae speciei aut suae bonitatis et largitatis effluentiam aut primo largitatis obedientiam. Quod enim unaquaeque<sup>17</sup> res compellitur dare seipsam sive effluere bonitates plenitudinis suae aut vehementia cogit fontis primi et (10<sup>v</sup>) universalis inundantis et profunditis ac penetrantis universum et impetus bonitatum se instar fluentium undarum impellentium, donec impleta sit possibilitas, quae, ut alias diximus,<sup>18</sup> est velut alveus et<sup>19</sup> concavitas excipiens torrentem et exuberantiam primi fontis universalis aut obedientia insita et conditio, qua bonitates ipsae ab universali primo datore recipiuntur. Haec est autem conditio,<sup>20</sup> quemadmodum gratis recipiunt et largiuntur. Ex quo lucidum est avaritiam exclusam esse et expulsam ab universo ipso pactione et conditione prima naturarum omnium.

<sup>13</sup> ex B.<sup>14</sup> *Job* xx, 17.<sup>15</sup> Om. B.<sup>16</sup> et AB.<sup>17</sup> unaquaque B.<sup>18</sup> Cf. p. 254.<sup>19</sup> Add. velut B.<sup>20</sup> Add. ut A.

Redeamus autem et dicamus quia revera intentio omnis nocendi et destruendi ab universo prohibita et exclusa est. Quare nocumentum et destructio accidunt in ipso et non sunt in ipso ex per se incidentibus causis. Quare principium nocumenti et destructionis esse accidit rebus et earum dispositionibus. Hoc igitur modo et intentione, quae scilicet secundum accidens nihil est,<sup>21</sup> prohibet, quod<sup>22</sup> in se est principium largiendi quod suum est, esse principium auferendi aliis, quod illius est, et hoc per viam accidentis, non intentionis, quemadmodum supra jam diximus. Eo enim<sup>23</sup> quod contingit intendentem largiri, quod suum est, auferre, quod erat recipientis, quia prohibebatur et impediabatur largitio per id quod erat in receptorem. Malitiam autem jam vocavimus secundum intentionem istam quod in se quidem bonitas erat, hoc est per intentionem quidditatis et essentiae suae, sed accidit ei nocere dum prodesse intendit.

Malum vero quod irrogatur jam declaravimus, quoniam illud est necessario unum ex quatuor, quae jam determinavimus,<sup>24</sup> et in quatuor illa malum poenae divisimus; malum autem poenae complectitur etiam malum damni; damnum quippe omne poena est. Unde et non esse malum poenae est, non quia molestia aut afflictio sit, sed quia tanti boni quantum est esse. Ablatio poena autem est ei, cui ablatum<sup>25</sup> est. Eis vero, quae nondum ipsum esse habuerunt, non esse nondum poena est nisi fortasse esse prohibeantur. Prohibitio quippe habendi ablatio vulgariter dicitur.

Ex his igitur manifestum est vitia ipsa mala esse poenaliter, cum divitias virtutum auferant et voluptates seu gaudia, quae ab ipsis virtutibus procedunt, prohibeant, moles- (205') tias etiam et ignominias suas inferunt. Quid enim molestiae habeat invidia experientia sensus ipsius docuit invidum. Quid molestiae habeat luxuria fere sentimus omnes. Quid jugis cruceatus habeat avaritia, quae spinae nominantur in VI *Lucae*,<sup>26</sup> et de ceteris apud poetas<sup>27</sup> et alios gentium philosophos<sup>28</sup> certum est. Quid autem habeat ignominiae insultantes daemones noverunt, novit etiam Socrates, qui cum ei diceretur quod homines eum deriderent, respondit ipsi me derident, inquit, et eos asini.<sup>29</sup> Ludibrium quippe asinorum sunt qui de nobilitate ac generositate humanae naturae, quae ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei creata est, in brutalem stoliditatem ac vesaniam seipsos dejecerunt. Propter quod dictum est in *Psalmo*:<sup>30</sup> *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus, id est adaequatus, est jumentis insipientibus, qui sapientia praecellere debebat eis, et similis factus est illis.* Similitudinem turpitudinis eorum induit, deleta in se divinae speciositatis similitudine.

Quoniam igitur poena omnis aut molestia est aut contumelia aut damnum quod vocamus defectum seu carentiam boni, quod ablatum aut prohibitum est, manifestum est omne vitium poenale (11') malum esse, cum omne vitium molestias innumerabiles ingerat et contumelias ignominiosissimas et damna impretiabilia. Quis enim aestimet damna virtutum et praemiorum quae virtutibus debentur et haec omnia non quidem ex<sup>31</sup> essentiae suae intentione irrogant, nec per se, sed dum ad bona temporalia non inclinant et intorquent et, ut ita loquar, illis nos<sup>32</sup> affigunt ab ipsis virtutibus et quae post virtutes sive supra virtutes sunt bonis nos avertunt. Unde et aversiones nostrae sunt non de intentione

<sup>21</sup> esse B.

<sup>22</sup> qui B.

<sup>23</sup> Om. B.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. p. 249.

<sup>25</sup> Add. tum AB.

<sup>26</sup> II *Lucae* B. No such text in Scripture; cf. *Luke* viii, 14?

<sup>27</sup> Examples to be found in Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, 3, 11; ed. Fortescue, p. 67.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* II, 17, 57; I, 1, 8; examples can be found in John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1909), p. 338.

<sup>29</sup> The source of this anecdote seems to be a garbled form of Diogenes Laertius II, 42.

<sup>30</sup> *Psalms* xlviii, 13.

<sup>31</sup> et B.

<sup>32</sup> Om. B.



essentiae suae, sed ex consequentia. Non enim est intentio<sup>33</sup> aut quidditas essentiae amoris temporalium aversio aut prohibitio nostra ab amore aeternorum. Intentio quippe amoris est conjungere et jucundare nos temporalibus, non avertere ab aeternis; sed revera hoc accidit ex amore consequenter. Species namque muliebris non hoc intendit<sup>34</sup> ut adurat spectatorem et imitorem sui, et ut illaqueet ipsum et compediat, quominus ad fontem bonorum currere valeat, sed magis jucundare intendit ut ad fontem bonorum affluentissimum invitet, a quo ipsa velut modica<sup>35</sup> et pertenuis distillatio defluxit, illuminare<sup>36</sup> intendebat,<sup>37</sup> non quidem intentione imaginationis, sed naturae calefacere te intendebat calore suavi et mulcebre, tu propius accedens incendium pertulisti.<sup>38</sup> Illuminatio haec est ostensio primae sapientiae et primae bonitatis, quae quidem quantum in ipsa est, ostendit omnis visibilis speciositas muliebris. Calor est amor ipsius fontis bonorum omnium, quoniam accendere in nobis intendit omnis creaturarum placor atque suavitas.

Attende igitur quod cum nominavimus<sup>39</sup> avaritiam, nominamus eam secundum tritam et celeberrimam intentionem nominis, in quantum ipsa est principium nostrae aversionis a bonis spiritualibus et aeternis et in quantum ipsa est affigens nos<sup>40</sup> temporalibus bonis. Unde ratio ejus in quantum est avaritia, non simpliciter et praecise amor temporalium bonorum, sed amor alligans nos et affigens temporalibus, amor scilicet amantissimus temporalium, praeposterus scilicet et nimis adustus et velut incendium nostrae virtutis concupiscibilis, amor scilicet flamminosus cujus flammabundi sunt et motus et passiones internae et desideria, verba<sup>41</sup> et opera,<sup>42</sup> taetro scilicet igne non lucido et candido. Avaritia quippe, ut ait Tullius,<sup>43</sup> nullum vitium taetrius est. Tenebrosi quippe inter vitiosos avari sunt. Unde et sibi et rebus, quas falso suas opinantur, latebras semper quaerunt.<sup>44</sup> Quod igitur intelligimus per intentionem quisque<sup>45</sup> amor temporalium essentia avaritia est, id est subjectum nudum *Sapientiae XIV*:<sup>46</sup> *Creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animae hominum et muscipulam pedibus insipientium*. Cetera omnia sequela ejus sunt et non de essentia ipsius.

Quod inde palam est quia inde tanto amore temporalium spiritualibus et aeternis bonis avertimur et prohibemur quod debiles sumus tantum amorem sustinere absque adustione nostra. Hic autem non mirabitur qui intentionem nostram interiorius perscrutabitur. Scimus quippe quaedam tanto calore aduri quanto<sup>47</sup> alia quaedam vix calefierent et quaedam adeo modico frigore congelari ut, si in aliis inveniretur frigus illud, vix frigida dicerentur sicut contingit in oleo olivarum quod fere insensibili frigore congelatur,<sup>48</sup> et flores modico calore aduruntur, (11<sup>v</sup>) quo tamen multa alia vix calefierent.

Hoc igitur est quod his exemplis patefacere intendimus, quod pro<sup>49</sup> temperantia<sup>50</sup> subjecti quidam calor adustus est et quaedam frigiditas congelatio. Ad hunc modum quidam amor temporalium ex debilitate nostra est nobis adustio, eo quod extinguit<sup>51</sup> in nobis vitalem suavissimum et mulcebrum divinae dilectionis calorem. Quod si ea esset fortitudo animarum nostrarum, ut ex tanto amore temporalium amare possemus et Deum sicut amandus est, ut scilicet amor temporalium illum amorem aut non absorberet aut non laederet, nullo modo malus esset amor temporalium.

<sup>33</sup> intentio est B.

<sup>34</sup> intendit hoc B.

<sup>35</sup> motione B.

<sup>36</sup> illumare A.

<sup>37</sup> intendebat A.

<sup>38</sup> protulisti A.

<sup>39</sup> nominamus A.

<sup>40</sup> Add. a B.

<sup>41</sup> verbo B.

<sup>42</sup> opere B.

<sup>43</sup> *De Officiis* II, 6, 22.

<sup>44</sup> Add. ad B.

<sup>45</sup> quaeque AB.

<sup>46</sup> *Wisdom* xiv, 11.

<sup>47</sup> quanta B.

<sup>48</sup> coagulator B.

<sup>49</sup> per B.

<sup>50</sup> temperantia B.

<sup>51</sup> extingit B.

Quia igitur hanc positionem posse recipere videtur intellectus noster, manifestum videtur amorem (206<sup>o</sup>) quem vocamus avaritiam in se essentialiter malum non esse eo quod essentialia et actu et ratione etiam separabilia sunt ab eo qui essentialia sunt. Quod si quis voluerit diversitatem secundum speciem amorem temporalium propter se et amorem temporalium propter aliud quasi amor viae ut via et finis ut finis, necessario diversarum sunt specierum, ponere cogetur dilectionem Dei et dilectionem proximi diversarum esse specierum, licet ab una caritatis radice procedere non dubitentur. Videntur autem sic se habere ad invicem amor temporalium propter aliud et amor temporalium propter se ut sitis naturalis et sitis ex hydropisi; has autem nemo diceret diversarum esse specierum, quoniam unius et ejusdem sunt. Non videtur autem aqua, quia immergit quempiam, alterius esse speciei ab omni aqua quae non sufficeret eundem immergere; magnitudo quidem differentiam essentialem et specificam facere non potest. Sic est ratiocinari et de igne quoniam ignis, qui vehementia caloris sui sufficit adurere naturam aliquam obviantem ei, non est differens specie ab eo cuius fortitudo caloris non sufficit ad idem. Propter hoc, inquam, non est necesse eosdem esse diversarum specierum, quoniam alter vehementior est in calore altero.

Ad hunc modum quem abruit et immersit gula non habet alterius speciei desiderium et delectationem ab eo qui modeste et temperate se habet circa cibos. Si enim gustus utriusque in sua specie salvatus et saporis in ipsis cibis idem manent, necessario et gustationes earum unius erunt speciei; nullam quippe est ibi reperire diversitatem in causis et mediis operationum quae fiunt circa gustus amborum. Unde igitur emersisset inter ipsas gustationes essentialiter et specifica diversitas? Hoc autem non oportet certificari amplius. Ipsi enim ex testimonio sensus sui istud confitentur. Sicut autem est in gula quae est excessus et nimietas in his, quae sunt gustus, sic est in avaritia et frugalitate in his, quae sunt divitiarum. Quare manifestum est frugalitatem, quae quidem est habitus acquisitus ex naturalibus et per consuetudinem, non differre ab avaritia secundum speciem, quae species sit veri nominis species, hoc est essentialis, totum esse essentielle suorum individuorum.<sup>52</sup> Si autem non differunt specie, necesse utramque esse essentialiter malam aut utramque essentialiter bonam. Bonum quippe et malum essentialiter speciem essentialem communicare impossibile est.

Item quoniam amor temporalium in se et bonum est et bonorum, ergo major amor et majorum bonorum erit magis vel majus bonum. Augmentum quippe boni, in quantum bonum, necesse est esse bonum; nihil autem est quo abundet in avaritia essentia sua, qua est amor temporalium nisi intentio seu majoritas seu<sup>53</sup> excessus seu nimietas. Intentio autem postquam non est nisi augmentum boni in quantum bonum, nec malum est essentialiter (12<sup>o</sup>), nec adventu suo facit aliquid malum essentialiter. Nimietas autem et excessus ad aliquid sunt in tantum mala in quantum ad aliquid non in essentia ipsius nimii et ipsius ad aliquid absoluta. Quare manifestum est<sup>54</sup> amorem ipsum, qui est avaritia in tantum solummodo malum esse in quantum nimius est; hoc vero ad aliquid est et non<sup>55</sup> secundum essentiam. In tantum autem nimius in quantum cor humanum totum occupat, et ideo se Deo dignum amorem in eodem corde non sinit.

Similiter in tantum malus est in quantum in corde humano locum divinae dilectionis non patitur. Totum autem hoc est de bonitate sua, et bonitate sua, cum in tantum creverit, cor humanum totum sibi vendicat. Quare bonitate sua

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate* I, 26; PL 64, 1249D: nam tres homines neque genere neque specie, sed suis accidentibus distant.

<sup>53</sup> sive B.

<sup>54</sup> *Om. A.*

<sup>55</sup> et non quod B.

incomparabiliter majus bonum quam ipsa sit a nobis prohibet et avertit, et hoc est quod vocamus in ipsa malitia bonitatem, scilicet ejus majorem bonitatem excludentem aut prohibentem. Hoc autem in eo timore quem servilem dicimus, nemo sic se habere dubitat quem quidem bonum esse omnes clamant, licet nimietate sua caritatem excludit totum cor occupans. Unde recte Augustinus<sup>60</sup> dicit ipsum esse bonum, quo nemo bene utitur, quia procul dubio inde est quod<sup>61</sup> divinam dilectionem omnis ejus usus a toto corde excludit et in poenae evasionem totam intentionem et totum cor inclinat et intorquet, non<sup>62</sup> sinens timentem cogitare praemia, sed ante oculos ejus sola praetendit supplicia. Eadem autem diligenter considerantibus bonitas, etsi non tanta invenietur in genere suo in<sup>63</sup> avaritia, multa quippe mala declinare facit<sup>64</sup> avaritia, sed intorta et obliqua intentione. Similiter multa bona fieri facit sinistra et perversa tamen intentione, etsi perversiori quam avaritia.

In hoc igitur excellit timor servilis quoad bonitatem, quoniam revera timeri facit quod timendum est et resilire a peccato, quia peccatum est propter poenae obligationem, et est visus ipse timor et oculus,<sup>61</sup> licet posteriora sola videat, sed tamen interna et quae multos ex mundi sapientibus lateant. Avaritia vero tota fere caeca est et puerilis et quam umbrae et picturae praesentium bonorum deterrent et demulcent, non ipsa veritas futurorum malorum aut bonorum. Timor autem, ut diximus, ipsa vera mala, saltem videt, fugit; ad quae videnda et fugienda<sup>65</sup> nisi divino munere adjutus nemo sufficit. Mala igitur declinat avaritia ob minimas et pueriles, ut diximus, causas; veras vero et quae summopere attendendae<sup>66</sup> sunt non considerat. Haec igitur perversitas prohibet et avaritiam dici et esse bonam et usum timoris bonum, licet per multum accedit<sup>64</sup> usus timoris ad hoc ut bonus sit comparatione avaritiae. In hoc tamen convenit quod non per intentionem suae necessitatis aut quidditatis excludit et prohibet caritatem. Hoc enim solum intendit poenam evadere et quod in illam inducit declinare, non intendit ullatenus caritatem excludere, licet istud consequenter (206<sup>r</sup>) efficiat. Sic nec avaritia quamcumque virtutum aut gratiarum, sed totum cor in terrena velut pondus trahens a coelestibus ipsum consequenter avocatur et abducit, licet nec avocare nec abducere nata sit, sed ex consequentia ejus et nostra infirmitate simul qua pectora nostra duas non sunt admittentia curas.

His igitur modis et his de causis est avaritia<sup>65</sup> malum poenale sive malum poenae, consequentia scilicet sua et effective ab accidentibus et hoc non intendit quidditas essentiae suae per seipsam, immo bona tantum intendit subjecto suo, licet (12<sup>r</sup>) modica, et quae<sup>66</sup> debent esse et revera sunt puerilium annorum spectacula et velut miracula. Soli quippe pueriles anni<sup>67</sup> ista mirantur quos ea delectant aut deterrent picturae et umbrae ut ipsa veritas; hoc autem puerorum insensatorum et propter quod dicitur in libro *Sapientiae*:<sup>68</sup> Puerorum *insensatorum more viventium* de malis. Vides igitur quam poenalia mala sunt vitia quae tot bonis nos spoliunt. Primum spoliunt nos veste illa polymita<sup>69</sup> pretiosa et speciosa quae velut opere plumario de tota virtutum<sup>70</sup> omnium varietate contexta est. Deinde praemiis<sup>71</sup> illis, quae nec oculis vidit nec auris audivit quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Deinde quibus molestiis nos affligant, quo ardore adurent, quibus punctionibus stimulent, quibus laboribus premant,

<sup>60</sup> An interpretative quotation? Cf. *De Moribus Manichaeorum* 8; PL 32, 1349.

<sup>61</sup> Add. ad B.

<sup>62</sup> novi? B.

<sup>63</sup> Om. B.

<sup>64</sup> facit declinare B.

<sup>65</sup> occultis B.

<sup>66</sup> fugienda et videnda B.

<sup>67</sup> attendenda B.

<sup>64</sup> accedit B.

<sup>65</sup> avaria A.

<sup>66</sup> Add. bene B.

<sup>67</sup> anni A.

<sup>68</sup> Wisdom xii, 24.

<sup>69</sup> Exodus xxviii, 15; xxxv, 35.

<sup>70</sup> virtute B.

<sup>71</sup> I Cor. ii, 9.

quibus laqueis nos<sup>72</sup> decipiant, quibus perplexitatibus involvant, quibus doloribus vulnerent, quibus ludibriis et ignominiis abiciant licet corda mortua non sentiant<sup>73</sup> et obtenebrata non videant. Pia vero et vera fides ea elucida et captivatus in obsequium Christo Domino<sup>74</sup> intellectus sic omnia haec se habere lucidissime per se videt. Qualiter autem sint mala culpa inde locus erit post haec disserere.

Id ergo malum culpa vocari consuevit quod est culpabile, vituperabile, turpe, inhonestum. Id autem turpe dicimus de turpitudine, quam per se respuit et abominatur mens nostra et visum interiorum nostrum suo offendit spectaculo. Quemadmodum enim pulchrum visu dicimus<sup>75</sup> quod natum est per se ipsum placere spectantibus et delectare secundum visum, sic et pulchrum interius quod intuentium animos delectat et ad amorem sui allicit; unde et laudabile et bonum per se ipsum vocatur et laudabiles facit ipsos habentes. Haec pulchritudo decor dierum ab eo quod decet, sicut recte dicit Tullius,<sup>76</sup> et decor ab hac<sup>77</sup> sive decencia sive pulchritudine dicitur. Turpe vero quod indecens, quod inhonestum, quod scilicet dehonestat habentem, deturpat et vituperabilem reddit, quod honorem ejus aut aufert aut imminuit. Inde namque inhonestum dicitur quod honestatem auferat aut<sup>78</sup> minuit. Honestas autem honoris dignitas est. Ista autem omnia ipso experimento sensus nota fiunt. Quid est, inquit, Augustinus,<sup>79</sup> quod in justo<sup>80</sup> strumoso ac deformi diligimus? Ipsa justitia procul dubio quam non oculis exterioribus, sed interioribus, intuemur. Haec est utique quae per seipsam placet per se ipsam decora. Et ad hunc modum se habet de aliis.

In hujus explanatione non immerabimur quoniam ipse interior visus testis est nobis interioris et intelligibilis pulchritudinis sicut exterior visus est exterioris.<sup>81</sup> Volentes quippe pulchritudinem visibilem agnoscere visum exteriorum consultimus; eodem itaque de pulchritudine interiori visum interiorum consulere nos oportet et ejus testimonio credere. Et de turpitudine similiter se habet. Si quis autem quaerat qualiter avaritia, cum sit bonum in se, deturpet animam in qua est aut malam efficiat malitia culpa, respondemus ei quoniam non inconueniens id quod est in seipso pulchritudo etiam deturpet subjectum in quo est, verbi gratia, oculus in se speciosus et pulcher est et<sup>82</sup> est<sup>83</sup> decorans faciem humanam pulchritudine sua, hoc autem cum situs est in loco competenti sibi et debito, verum si esset ubi auri ipsa est aut in media facie, in loco scilicet non congruenti sibi, ipsam faciem deturparet. Similiter rubor speciosus est in se et pulchritudo est, si tamen esset in ea parte oculi (13<sup>r</sup>) deturparet.

Ad hunc modum se habet et in eis quae sunt in anima, quoniam, etiam si posuerimus vitia quaedam quodammodo bona esse prima intentione ejus quod est bonum, mala tamen sunt subjecto suo effective, quoniam prohibent ab illo majora bona. Similiter si posuerimus ea esse etiam per se pulchra, tamen quoniam ibi sunt ubi majores pulchritudines esse debent, scilicet ipsae virtutes, deturpant ipsum subjectum et viros naturales in quibus sunt viri speciosus est per se et visui delectabilis, tamen si in facie humana ipsum posueris, turpitudine ibi erit et ipsam faciem deturpabit. Sic et amor libidinosus et turpis in brutis animalibus decens est, in nobis vero turpissimus est et hoc est quoniam indecens. Nihil enim decet quod in nobis sit, etsi quam partem ex nobis deceret, non deceret utique nisi inferiorem animalem, scilicet quam cum brutis communicare videmur; superiori autem quam indecens sit monstrari non oportet. Nos autem quod nec etiam inferiorem deceat palam faciemus.

<sup>72</sup> Om. A.

<sup>73</sup> senseat A; senceat B.

<sup>74</sup> II Cor. x, 5.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Aristotle 146 a 24.

<sup>76</sup> De Officiis I, 8, 27.

<sup>77</sup> Om. B.

<sup>78</sup> et B.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Enn. in Psalmum LXIV, 6; PL 36, 777.

<sup>80</sup> isto B.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Plato, Rep. VI, 508C ff.

<sup>82</sup> Om. B.

Inde autem est tota indecentia ista quoniam nata est anima humana nobiles et sublimes perfectiones recipere, et propter hoc non decent eam<sup>83</sup> viles, quemadmodum imaginem, quae nata est decorari nobilibus coloribus et inaurari, viles et ceteri colores minime decent.<sup>84</sup> Et domum quae nata est esse palatium regale non decet porcorum inhabitatio aut sordium repositio, sicut vasa quae unguenta pretiosa recipere et servare nata sunt non decent sordes, sicut scrinia pretiosis thesauris deputata non decent vilia ferrea, scilicet aut plumbea, sicut speciosam mulierem non decent vestimenta vilia aut sordida, quoniam nata est hujus potius (207<sup>r</sup>) depurpurari<sup>85</sup> quam ornari.

Liquido igitur ex his quae sit causa turpitudinis vitiorum et propter quam causam deturpent vitiosos. Id enim quod in se est bonum et pulchrum in subjecto indecenti turpitudine est, sicut viridis color, cum in se speciosus sit, in subjecto tamen cui non congruit turpitudine.

Si quis autem quaesierit de indecentia ipsa et de turpitudine quid est, respondemus sicut de malitia superius respondimus, quoniam ipse decor est turpitudine ad aliquid, non absolute, sicut ipsum quod est in se decorum est turpe ad aliquid aut cum alio aut in alio. Sequuntur<sup>86</sup> aut ea, quae jam diximus, quod omnia, in eo quod sunt, bona sunt bonitate, quae est ipsum esse, quoniam, si esset bonitas ista aliquid, quod esset post esse, non esset verum quod, in eo quod sunt, bona, quoniam nullum inferiorum praedicatur per modum istum de superioribus; non enim verum est dicere in eo quod animal est animal rationale.<sup>87</sup> Ad hunc modum si bonitas esset aliquid additum ipsi et sequens ipsum, indubitanter non esset verum quod omnia, in eo quod sunt, bona sunt.

Deinde postquam res sunt in esse suo specifico et completo quaedam ex illis sunt bonae in illo, quaedam malae, quaedam indifferentes. Et hanc bonitatem vocamus pulchritudinem seu decorem quam approbat et in qua complacet sibi visus noster seu aspectus interior. Nominavimus eam pulchritudinem et decorem ex comparatione exterioris et visibilis pulchritudinis, et haec eadem honestas et laudabilitas creberrime nominatur; per oppositionem autem ejus turpitudinem diximus. Et hoc est secundum duos modos, vel ex habendo quod non decet, aut sicut non decet, vel secundum privationem tantum.

Turpem quidem dicimus si quis haberet tres (13<sup>r</sup>) oculos, et turpem nihilominus monoculum; sed illum in habendo quod dedecet, istum in non habendo quod decet ipsum habere.

Indifferens vero per abnegationem utriusque extremorum dicimus, quod scilicet nec placet per se visui seu aspectui nostro interiori, nec displicet; quod nec laudem parere nec vituperium natum est; quale est sedere secundum se aut commedere.

## XI

Tertia vero<sup>1</sup> bonitas, quae est etiam<sup>2</sup> post secundam, vocatur bonitas meritoria, cui velut merces redditur felicitas aeterna. Haec autem est, quae gratia vocatur, quoniam et gratis datur a Patre luminum et gratos nos eidem facit et grata facit ei nostra obsequia. Si quis autem quaerat de secunda, quam pulchritudinem et honestatem nominavimus, utrum sit essentialis, hoc est tota essentia ejus quod dicimus pulchrum aut pars essentiae ejusdem, an<sup>3</sup> accidentalis, hoc est post completam essentiam eidem adveniens, respondemus quoniam honorare

<sup>83</sup> eas B.

<sup>84</sup> decet B.

<sup>85</sup> depurpari A.

<sup>86</sup> sequitur AB.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Boethii in Porphyrium*

*Dialogus* I: PL 64, 39B-A.

<sup>1</sup> etiam B.

<sup>2</sup> Om. B.

<sup>3</sup> aut B.

parentes indubitanter essentialiter pulchrum est et decorum et ejus essentia et quidditas ejus est pulchritudo. Hoc est autem natum placere aspectui nostro interiori, et hoc ex essentia sua absque additione quacumque, verumtamen pulchritudo nominatur essentia illa, et intentio, quae dicitur per vocem istam, honorare parentes, relatione et comparatione aspectus nostri interioris sicut pulchritudo visibilis exterior pulchritudo dicitur ad aspectum nostrum exteriorem cum in se aut figura aut<sup>4</sup> positio sit aut color aut ambo illorum aut alterum in comparatione ad alterum. Sicut igitur ab ipso colore non est separabile actu vel ratione hoc ipsum quod est visibile, et hoc est quoniam visibilitas ejus essentia ejus est, licet relatione differat, quasi si diceremus in se ipso color color est. Ad visum autem nostrum exteriorem visibilitas sit essentia ejus. Quod est honorare parentes ad aspectum autem nostrum interiorem pulchritudo, pulchritudo et honestas. Non enim oportet ei quicquam addi ad hoc ut aspectum nostrum interiorem delectet, sed seipso delectat; sed ipse mere absque ulla positione placet<sup>5</sup> eidem.

Quia igitur ipsum sui placoris principium, hoc est placoris, quo placet visui nostro interiori, ipsum necessario per se est pulchritudo ad aspectum nostrum interiorem. Quare hujusmodi pulchritudo sic essentialis est ei, quod est honorare parentes,<sup>6</sup> ut albedini visibilitas. Quod si quis obiciat igitur, quemadmodum igitur albedini auferri non potest sua visibilitas nec actu nec ratione, sic nec isti sua pulchritudo; et ita id quod est honorare parentes non erit ullo modo depravabile seu deturpabile. Et<sup>7</sup> hoc videtur plane falsum quoniam ei quod est honorare parentes potest finis incongruus imponi. Turpissimum enim est indubitanter propter inanem gloriam aut cupiditatem honorare parentes. Dic ergo quod id quod est honorare parentes totam retinet pulchritudinem suam, et cum opposita fuerit ei turpitudine finis super pulchritudinem suam, totale tamen, quod ipsum est finis turpitudinis continet, turpe est, sicut modica macula pulchritudini superposita, licet pulchritudinem residui non auferat, totum tamen facit turpe. Quemadmodum si quis vesti speciosae<sup>8</sup> limbum aut fimbriam turpitudinis asserat, vestem totalem deturpat, licet residuo pulchritudinem suam non auferat. Ad hunc modum id quod est honorare parentes pulchritudinem suam absque ulla diminutione seu laesione retinet, verum totum quod ex ipso etiam fine turpitudinis eidem assuto, quodammodo<sup>9</sup> conjungitur, turpe est et ipsa etiam pulchritudo partis facit ad deturpationem totius, sicut pulchritudo aut ordinis aut litteraturae, cum adjuncta fuerit ei turpitudine vitae seu conversationis auget deturpationem subjecti.

Bonum igitur primum est quod scilicet est ipsum ens, non genus est sicut nec ens, sed est transcendens genera. Secundo vero modo bonum et malum non in genere esse (14<sup>r</sup>) dicuntur ab Aristotele,<sup>10</sup> sed esse genera aliorum. Sed genera qualia in *Rethoricis* inveniuntur sicut furtum<sup>11</sup> genus dicitur peccati et sacrilegium<sup>12</sup> genus aut species furti; non enim recte, inquit, ea praedicari (207<sup>v</sup>) dixerimus. Honestum quippe et turpe magis quale quam quid determinant sicut pulchrum et turpe. Unde et genus facti apud rethores et oratores facti ipsius qualitas nominatur. Et quoad hoc Porretanorum sententiam<sup>13</sup> non improbamus, qui tria genera praedicamentorum distinxerunt.

Merito autem quaerendum videtur quid malitia vocanda sit aut turpitudine in eis quae nihil in se turpitudinis habent; sed hoc solo mala sunt, quia scilicet

<sup>4</sup> et A.

<sup>5</sup> palcet B.

<sup>6</sup> perennes A.

<sup>7</sup> sed B.

<sup>8</sup> sponse B.

<sup>9</sup> quemadmodum B.

<sup>10</sup> No authority for this statement in Aris-

totle; cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1923), p. 156; cf. however 1096 a 23-8.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aristotle 1107 a 11.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Aristotle 1364 b 33.

<sup>13</sup> In *Librum de Trinitate Boethii*; PL 64, 1285B-C.

prohibita, quale fuit comedere de ligno scientiae boni et mali,<sup>14</sup> quod in se quidem nihil habet turpitudinis, sed tamen prohibitum ab eo cui in omnibus et per omnia parendum non dubitamus. Numquid ex prohibitione aliquid ei turpitudinis<sup>15</sup> accrevit? Non enim quia inhibita est via aliqua mihi ne per eam transeam? Ideo aliquid accrevit viae quoniam etiam, quod non est, potest esse prohibitum; actus quippe ille comedendi nondum erat cum prohibebatur. Prohibitio igitur nihil ponit in actu. Malus igitur est actus, non ex aliquo quod in eo sit, sed magis ad aliquid ad legem divinae scilicet prohibitionis relatus, in quantum scilicet circa legem illam, quae nonnisi justa et bona esse potest. Et inde proprie dicitur peccatum pedis, scilicet casus quo gradiendum est in via morum. Casus dico a rectitudine iustitiae, quae est in nobis oboedientia. Et hoc palam est per definitionem qua definitur ab Augustino<sup>16</sup> peccatum. Ait quippe peccatum est dictum vel factum vel cupitum contra legem Dei; et hoc est dicere pedis casus a rectitudine oboedientiae, casus dico gradientis per viam morum. Apparet igitur ex his et honestos ac bonos vocari quosdam et honesta ac bona opera eorum; malos vero et turpes alios et opera quaedam eorum mala ac turpia, et hoc non eodem modo neque intentione aut ratione una.

Manifestum autem est quoniam quae natura tantum aut violentia fiunt nec turpia nec bona nec mala nec laudabilia nec vituperabilia vocamus, et omnino nihil laudabile aut vituperabile nisi voluntarium dicimus. Unde in furioso nihil eorum, quae ex furore facit, vituperabile aut laudabile dicimus, eo quod nihil voluntate facit. Voluntate autem id solum fieri dicimus quod aut voluntas fieri imperavit aut quod fieri permisit, cum haberet in potestate illud prohibere et avertere. Hujus autem exemplum est in his quae se paulatim aut subito ingerunt, et velut negligens voluntas non prohibet nec avertit. Quales sunt multae passiones exterius se ingerentes ut ira aut tristitia, qua nemo filiis imperat. Sed cum voluntate irascimur, non quidem irascimur in irascibili imperante, sed permittente et non occurrente, et tritari dicimus voluntate eadem de causa, non quod tristari velimus plerumque, sed quod tristitiam, cum possumus, non repellimus. Aufer igitur voluntatem utroque modorum istorum et honestatem pariter et turpitudinem ab operante removisti. Posita autem voluntate in effectum, necessario adest aut turpitudi aut honestas aut earum medium per abnegationem, quod supra vocavimus indifferens. Ex quo relinquitur voluntatem ipsam principium aut causam aut subjectum per se esse honestatis et turpitudinis. Per se enim est, quo posito, ponitur et, quo remoto, removetur. Honestia quippe et turpia (14<sup>a</sup>) opera sola sunt quae voluntaria, ut diximus, sunt. Quod si ipsa voluntas immunis omnino sit a turpitudine, impossibile est aliquid turpitudinis esse in opere, quod ex illa voluntate procedit. Hoc enim palam est, si enim vult quod debet et ut debet et quando et cum operatur ut vult, alioquin non de voluntate operaretur, nisi operaretur quod vult et quomodo vult. Quare manifestum est opus quod de voluntate usquequaque honesta procedit, nihil omnino posse habere turpitudinis, in quantum dico ex hujusmodi voluntate procedit. Si quid autem habet turpitudinis opus voluntarium, id est quod voluntas imperavit, necesse est prius deturpatam esse voluntatem, hoc est vel obtenebratam ignorantia, qua prohibita fuit advertere turpitudinem operis quod imperabat, aut negligentia qua usquequaque opus suum circumspicere et metiri postposuit<sup>17</sup> aut fuit in se malitia depravata voluntas, quae turpitudinem quam in suo cernebat, opere scienter incurrit, dum eam noluit declinare.

Ex quo manifestum est<sup>18</sup> duas esse turpitudines, et operantium et operationum; alii<sup>19</sup> quippe sicut tenebrae alia sicut foeditas et infectio. Omnis enim operatio

<sup>14</sup> Genesis iii, 3.

<sup>15</sup> turpitudinis ei B.

<sup>16</sup> Contra Faustum XXII, 27; PL 42, 418.

<sup>17</sup> postponit B.

<sup>18</sup> Om. A.

<sup>19</sup> read alia?

turpis et<sup>20</sup> omnis turpiter operans aut turpis est secundum intellectum, et hoc quoad tenebras ignorantiae, quae sunt turpitudine proprii intellectus, aut turpis est secundum affectum, et haec turpitudine, cujus primum subjectum est affectus, vocatur infectio ipsius et foeditas et pravitas. Hoc autem manifestum est, quoniam amotis tenebris ignorantiae ab intellectu, amota omni foeditate ab affectu, impossibile est aliquid turpitudinis remanere in operibus. Si enim non errat operator ullo modo, sed ad perfectum videt quid ei operandum et qualiter, si perfecte vult, id est, ut debet et cum, necesse est lucidam et mundam esse operationem. Si enim est turpitudine in opere, necesse est ut advertat eam ipse operator aut non advertat. Quod si non advertit, ecce tenebrae ignorantiae aut defectus negligentiae! Si autem advertit, aut vult et potest prohibere operator istam turpitudinem, aut non; si sic, prohibet igitur eam et non permittit eam esse in opere; si vero vult, sed non potest, non est igitur opus usquequaque voluntarium; si vero non vult cum possit prohibere eam, igitur vult eam esse in opere suo, et ita depravata aut deturpata est voluntas ipsa. Quare (208<sup>r</sup>) manifestum est opus omnino nihil posse habere turpitudinis, cum ab omni turpitudine voluntas immunis fuerit. Omnem autem turpitudinem aut<sup>21</sup> tenebras ignorantiae aut defectum negligentiae, qui ad tenebras necessario pertinet, aut infectionem voluntatis esse jam clarum est.

Redeamus autem et dicamus, quoniam jam<sup>22</sup> manifestum quamdam pulchritudinem intelligibilem esse, in qua<sup>23</sup> complacet sibi noster aspectus interior; et quamdam turpitudinem, quae scilicet offendit aspectum nostrum interiolem. Et sicut quaedam sunt illuminantia per se intellectum nostrum sive per se lucentia intellectui nostro, quae primae impressiones et principia cognitionum nostrarum disciplinarum vocantur,<sup>24</sup> sic sunt quaedam per se et primo moventia affectum nostrum vel in fugam sui et declinationem vel in acquisitionem et debeant esse seminantia et principia affectionum nostrarum et motionum spiritualium sicut illa cognitionum nostrarum. Sicut autem per se impressae sunt nobis primae impressiones, sic et innatae sunt nobis seminare affectiones sicutque innatum est ipsi intellectui nostro illuminari per se et primo et non per medium a quibusdam, sic et natus est moveri amore et odio, hoc est in secutione et fuga spirituali, (15<sup>r</sup>) a quibusdam affectus noster. Sicut igitur notio veri nobis impressa est, sic et amor boni, et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in *libro de Libero Arbitrio*.<sup>25</sup> Hoc autem est<sup>26</sup> monstrare, quoniam, si nihil per se et primo esset motivum affectus nostri, impossibile esset ipsum moveri.

Item quoniam in omni motu necesse est aliquid esse primum movens, alioquin esset infinitas motorum sive moventium, ubicumque aliquid moveretur.<sup>27</sup> Haec igitur habent eandem certitudinem quam et principia scientiarum propter quod immorari his supersedemus. Manifestum autem est quoniam omne amatum aut viam aut finem amoris esse, necesse est quoniam eo motu insecutionis spiritualis, quem amorem supra diximus, aut in ipsum tenditur ut in eo quaeratur quies, et eo acquisito, cesset motus, aut per ipsum in aliud. Quod si in ipsum, ipsum erit finis motus et primus motor sive movens. Si vero in aliud per ipsum aut ibit hoc in infinitum aut stabitur<sup>28</sup> in aliquo. Quod si stabitur in aliquo, illud indubitanter erit finis motus, cum illud secundum se quaeratur et non aliud per illud. Si vero ibitur in infinitum, tunc tota sua infinitas via est. Quare in illam secundum se et propter se non est motus, quoniam in viam, in quantum via est, non est motus propter ipsam, sed neque in illam propter aliud,

<sup>20</sup> aut B.

<sup>21</sup> et B.

<sup>22</sup> Om. B.

<sup>23</sup> quo B.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Aristotle 100 b 3 ff.

<sup>25</sup> De Libero Arbitrio II, 9; PL 32, 1254.

<sup>26</sup> Add. non B.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Aristotle 258 b 13 ff.

<sup>28</sup> stabilitur B.



cum ultra illam nihil quaeratur. Igitur nullo modo est motus in ipsam, quoniam nec ipsum est quaerere in se et propter se, nec propter aliud.

Jam igitur clarum est omnem motum amoris finem habere et esse terminatum, et eadem ratio de odio et spirituali fuga, et quod quaedam ex moventibus affectum nostrum nata sunt movere ea primo et ut finis; quaedam vero nonnisi ut via ad finem aliquem. Motum autem affectionum nostrarum jam vocavimus bona et mala. In malis vero nonnisi aut poena, quam in quatuor divisimus, aut culpa, quam turpitudinem et indecentiam vocamus, nihil reperiri potest. Quare in bonis nisi opposita non reperiuntur.<sup>20</sup> Omni enim modo bonum et malum opposita esse necesse est. Quare quotiens alterum dicitur, et alterum dici necesse est.

In bonis igitur nisi quod contrarium aut altero modo oppositum sit malo poenae impossibile est, et ita quatuor, quae jam nominavimus, bonitates motivae sunt affectionum nostrarum. In bono vero honestatis et laudis, quod et decorum et pulchrum supra vocavimus, pulchritudinem intelligibilem, qua illustres et decore esse habent animae nostrae, quamque sequitur velut exuberantia et redundantia ejus pulchritudo exterioris conversationis et vitae nostrae, esse necesse est. Haec autem pulchritudo amatorum et miratores suos habet, quemadmodum exterior visibilis quae est erroneorum et imbecillium laqueus. Et in operibus quidem quid hanc pulchritudinem vocemus jam determinavimus. Quid autem sit in animabus nostris pulchritudo et decor honestatis inquirendum erit post haec.

Et nos quidem jam exclusimus ab hac pulchritudine violentiam et naturam quoniam quae violentiae tantum<sup>21</sup> sunt nec laudem habent aut<sup>22</sup> pariunt, nec vituperium ipsi qui violentiam patitur. Quis enim laudet quemquam pro eo faciendo quod coactus facit, cum operatio violenta non coacti sit, sed cogentis, et ipse qui cogitur ipsi qui cogit quominus fiat ipsa operatio totis viribus obnitatur? Non est dubitandum si laus illa pro operatione hujus cuiquam debetur, ipsi cogenti debentur; eo enim ipso quod invitatus operatur, non tam<sup>23</sup> operari dicendus est quam pati operationem ipsam et hoc ipsum (15<sup>v</sup>) etiam invitatus et obnitens. Solus igitur coactor ibi et effector est, ejus igitur est laus operis, si qua tamen est.

Eadem autem est ratio in his quae natura fiunt; natura enim operatur ad modum servientis necessitate, licet bene et laudabiliter; sed laus ista est regentis et moderantis ipsam, non illius ullo modorum. Et pulchritudo vel laudabilitas non intenditur ab ipsa natura, in quantum ipsa est pulchritudo aut laudabilitas, sed revera intendit eam naturae ipsius gubernator et rector. Sed etsi quis casu vel ignorans pulchrum et laudabile aliquid operatus fuerit, non imputabitur ei ad laudem vel honestatem, vel laus ista operis est per seipsam, non autem in quantum est ab operante, quoniam non intendit eam operator. Generaliter autem verum est quod si ignoranter aut casu aut natura tantum aut violentia operetur quis, licet honestum per se sit idipsum quod operatur, non ideo honestus aut honeste (208<sup>v</sup>) operans erit, quoniam non est principium operationis laudabilis et honestae in quantum laudabilis aut honesta est. Honestas igitur est principium laudabilium operum per se, et honestatem vocamus in eo primum per se<sup>23</sup> principium laudabilium operationum, et hoc est id quo ipse neque est principium in nobis spiritualium et corporalium operationum, necesse est esse in animabus nostris, eo quod nihil corporale potest esse principium utrarumque operationum.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aristotle 13 b 37 ff.

<sup>21</sup> tantum violentiae B.

<sup>22</sup> nec B.

<sup>23</sup> tamen B.

<sup>24</sup> per se primum B.

XII

Manifestum autem est in anima humana tria esse et sola, primum scilicet potentias, deinde passiones, tertio habitus. Honestas etiam et probitas seu morum et vitae decor, seu quolibet alio nomine vocetur, non nobis innatus est, sed acquiritur nobis usu et consuetudine aut aliter et aliunde advenit nobis.

Item quoniam contingit fieri in nobis alterationem secundum honestatem et turpitudinem, secundum potentias autem naturales nostras non contingit ullo modo, manifestum est igitur eas esse de ipsis quae sunt post ipsas potentias. Omnino autem in nobis non fiunt ullae permutationes nisi secundum habitus aut passiones. Quare ista necessario in habitibus aut passionibus erunt. Facit et ad hoc ratio illa Aristotelis in *Ethicis*,<sup>1</sup> quoniam secundum potentias nec laudamur nec vituperamur, quoniam ad utrumlibet se habent ipsae potentiae secundum se, hoc est ad laudem et vituperium; aequae enim potentes sumus bene ut male operari. Quare si ex hoc esset nobis laus aut vituperium, eodem essemus laudabiles et vituperabiles, et idem esset in nobis honestas et turpitudine et essemus simul boni et mali eodem secundum se.

Quod autem in animabus nostris nihil omnino<sup>2</sup> sit praeter potentias et habitus et passiones, inde manifestum est quoniam nihil est ibi praeter potentias, quae sunt primi fontes et primae radices et prima principia operationum et passionum nostrarum aut ea, quae sunt ex potentiis sive in potentiis. Omne autem, quod est in potentiis aut habet in eis fixum et mansivum esse, et hoc vocatur habitus,<sup>3</sup> aut transitorium et facilis mobilitatis, et hoc vocatur passio.<sup>4</sup>

Item omne, quod advenit animabus nostris, aut tale est quod eo sumus exuberantes et velut redundantes frequentiam operum alicujus ex maneriis operum sive spiritualium sive exteriorum, et hoc vocatur habitus, aut tale est quod non efficit nos exuberantes et redundantes aliquam ex maneriis operum, et hoc vocamus passionem, qualis est passio amoris, quae, si haberet esse fixum et mansivum in anima, necessario faceret eam exuberantem et redundantem earum operationum quae sunt favens, et esset tunc digna vocari habitus.

Ex his clarum (16') igitur est animam humanam creari velut imaginem, quae solam figuram et sculpturam suae pulchritudinis et perfectionis adhuc recepit, sed apta nata picturari et decorari speciosa varietate colorum.<sup>5</sup> Si enim animam humanam in statu actionis suae consideraveris, imaginem eam divinae pulchritudinis invenies et habere eam instar imaginis sculptae<sup>6</sup> et figuratae vice membrorum et linamentorum ipsius imaginis, vires naturales suas natas quidem aptas recipere perfectionem suae pulchritudinis, immo pulchritudinum suarum, quia, quemadmodum membra ipsa statuatae adhuc solummodo figuratae non antea nata sunt recipere pulchritudinem nec unam expectant, sed unumquodque illorum sibi congruentem et sibi debitam desiderat plenitudinem, sic et vires animarum nostrarum.

Necesse igitur habemus ipsam animam humanam velut per partes ac membra describere ut singularium partium pulchritudinem lucidius disseramus. Dico igitur quoniam, cum anima humana de se philosophari voluerit et inquirere de se ipsa inquisitione perscrutata, cum diligenter seipsam de se interrogaverit, respondebit ei ipsa essentia sua, et hoc per voces aut signa,<sup>7</sup> sed ipsa praesentia veritatis primum in ea esse virtutem vitalem et esse eam velut truncum<sup>8</sup> in corpore humano quod totam<sup>9</sup> habet membrorum suorum affixam et adhaerentem sibi elongantiam, sic ceterae vires affixae sunt ipsi vitali et ex ea pendentes;

<sup>1</sup> 1223 a 6 ff.

<sup>2</sup> omnino nihil B.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aristotle 8 b 26 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem 9 b 28 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Wm. of Auvergne, *De Anima* VII,

6, II, 211a.

<sup>6</sup> sculpe A.

<sup>7</sup> See note 5.

<sup>8</sup> truncum A.

<sup>9</sup> totum B.

deinde vicem capitis gerentem et obtinentem sentiet superiorem ceteris apprehensivam sive cognoscitivam quae et plures spargit radios et ramos plures de se exuberat eo quod cognoscibilium multae sint et variae differentiae. Qui multitudinem tantam seu radiorum seu ramorum exegerunt, ob hanc causam caput humanum sedem habere non immerito videtur quoniam ipsum caput in tota membrorum universitate et immensiori organorum varietate apparet et velut fenestra est; singulis quippe radiis apprehensivae virtutis singulas fenestras et organa subministrat.<sup>10</sup> Unde et propter hanc radiositatem et apprehensionum varietatem ipsum caput animalis animal esse secundum veritatem et essentiam nonnulli philosophantur arbitrati sunt dicentes residuum corporis non esse de essentia aut veritate animalis, sed ad honorem et decorem capitis ipsius ad gestandum ipsum in sublimi.<sup>11</sup> Haec igitur apprehensiones partim a foris et hae dicuntur sensibiles, quae<sup>12</sup> quidem particularium sunt assimilantium sibi organa sensibilia imprimentes eis passiones suarum virtutum et quasi sigillantes seu imprimentes ea similitudinibus suis, hoc enim est sentire per passionem seu sigillationem agens particulare apprehendere seu percipere.

Sensuum autem quinque species notissimae sunt. (209') Abintus vero quae fiunt<sup>13</sup> apprehensiones aut sensibilibus sunt; quod si fuerint sensibilibus, aut cum tempore erunt praeterito, et hae memorativae, aut sine praeteritione temporis, et hae imaginariae vocantur; et virtus in qua et per quam fieri habent imaginativa et sensus communis et phantasia vocatur; sed sensus communis ab eo quod in<sup>14</sup> ipso communicant particulares et ad ipsum apprehensionum suarum quodammodo iudicia referunt. Et huius ligatio proprie somnus est. Particulares quippe in quibusdam dormientibus solutos quandoque esse non dubitamus. Hi autem sunt qui de nocte dormientes sunt, in hoc fiunt somnia de reliquiis apparitionum quae relictas sunt in eo sicut in speculis recentibus et tersioribus fieri solet, quod remanet in eis nonnullum praecedentis apparitionis vestigium. Quoniam enim (16') huiusmodi somnia a foris in ipso somniant non fiunt cum clausa sint, tunc in ipso organo<sup>15</sup> particularium sensuum necesse ut fiant abintus aut jam facta ibi et recepta sunt. Abintus vero fieri possunt a fumis ex<sup>16</sup> cibis resolutis; recepto vero non possunt esse nisi a sensibilibus agentibus extrinsecus in organa particularia sensuum exteriorum et per illa demum in organo illo communi. Memoriam vero non oportet esse novam aliquam vim aliam a sensu isto communi, aliam dico secundum essentiam neque secundum rationem quoniam sensus communis est vis retinendi impressiones exteriorum sensibilibus. Quare propter retinere non est necesse novam aliam habere animalia.

Nos vero ista narranto transimus ad propositum per hoc manifestantes. Similiter autem vires quae vulgariter vocantur ratio et intellectus, et sunt apprehensivae universalium et immaterialium<sup>17</sup> spoliatorum abintus negotiantur et fiunt apprehensiones earum abintus universalium quidem quibus subsunt sensibilia per formas sensibilibus intus receptas, sed spoliatas conditionibus et circumvestitionibus<sup>18</sup> particularibus. Hoc autem est considerare per similitudinem picturae leonis vel alterius animalis, quae adeo circumvestiri potest conditionibus particularibus, quod erit signum et imago alicujus ex leonibus et illius solius ut spoliari potest illis conditionibus et aliis particularibus, et tunc erit imago leonis absolute communis, quoniam jam amovimus ab eo conditiones particulares

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Abelard, 'Glossae super Peri ermenias', ed. B. Geyer, *Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, 21, p. 313; cf. also St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum*, II, 8; PL 32, 310B. For simplicity of soul cf. *De Anima* III, 1.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Apuleius, *De Platone*, I, 13; ed. P. Thomas (Leipzig, 1921), p. 97.

<sup>12</sup> qui B.

<sup>13</sup> sunt B.

<sup>14</sup> cum B.

<sup>15</sup> organa AB.

<sup>16</sup> et B.

<sup>17</sup> materialium B; cf. *De Anima* VII, 6, p. 211b; 7, p. 213a.

<sup>18</sup> circumvestitionibus B; cf. *De Universo* Iallae, 13, p. 821; *De Anima*, VII, 6, p. 211a.

quibus ad leonem aliquem designandum arbitratur. Ad hunc modum se habet in formis quibus pingitur vis illa communis sensibilis, quoniam rationi et intellectui deserviunt ad apprehendenda universalis, quibus subsunt singularia sensibilia, verum essentias spoliatas. Et quae sunt in saeculo altiori, quod est saeculum et mundus spiritualium, non per illuminationem est apprehendere, quae sit ex parte sensibilium et deorsum, sed magis illuminatione, quae desursum est defluens, scilicet a parte saeculi altioris. Hae igitur sunt virtutes apprehensivae.

Vis autem aestimativa sensus ipse est communis, sed aestimatio duas habet operationes, quarum altera sensus est, et est sensus apprehensio ibi sensati ipsius per se; altera vero est apprehensio ipsius aestimati, sed hoc per accidens; non enim ex proprio signo, sed per aliud. Motivae autem vires velut brachia ipsi corpori, ipsi vitali virtuti affixae sunt. Sunt tamen motivae quae vel motum imperant vel motum imperatum exsequuntur et efficiunt. Hae autem necesse habent moveri prius; motae vero imperari motum. Hoc autem manifestum est per hoc quoniam quandoque quiescunt ab imperio motus, quandoque vero imperant ipsum. Harum autem motiva secundum se non nisi quatuor, delectabile scilicet et decens sive praeclarum sive magnificum, deinde necessarium et utile, de quibus supra locuti sumus;<sup>19</sup> nihilominus autem movent et horum contraria, sed motu contrario. Haec enim movent a se; illa autem ad se; illa quidem attrahunt, ista repellunt. Generaliter autem omnis hujus modus, scilicet spiritualis, aut fuga est aut insecutio sive hiatus et obtusio.

Motivas autem vires, id est, quae motum imperant, in irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividunt. Proprie autem et per se motivum concupiscibile est delectabile, cui quaerit conjungi et in illo quiescere in conjunctione scilicet illius, et est motus ejus, (17<sup>a</sup>) scilicet desiderium velut hiatus et apertio ad recipiendum desideratum.

Irascibilis vero motus est dilatatio et magnificatio in se velut effulget et effluit ista dilatatio et magnificatio interior exteriorem. Quod apparet in excessibus ut in jactantia. Est enim jactantia<sup>20</sup> nimium se extendentis<sup>21</sup> virtutis irascibilis motus. Contraria autem istorum motuum in eisdem virtutibus esse debent, utile vero et necessarium. Utrum movere debeant has ipsas vires, an sint aliae, quae moveri ab his natae sunt, dubitationem habet. Videtur autem et unus esse motus in viam et finem. Si igitur utile in quantum utile via est, ut delectabile, aut ad praeclarum sive magnificum, non oportet igitur esse utile tertiam vim.

Necessarium vero quod propter ipsum esse quaeritur, quod vel adjuvat vel conservat, amatur propter ipsum esse, quod jam monstravimus finem esse motionum omnium et desideriorum. Quare inter delectabilia jucundissimum et inter omnia clara praeclarissimum necessarium secundum quod via est ad ipsum<sup>22</sup> esse, et utramque praenominatam virtutem movebit, et postquam animae humanae per similitudinem corporis, cui prassidet et imperat utcumque notificavimus, quamquam non in effectu ex partibus coacervatum, sed magis potentialiter ipsam esse oporteat ex ejusdem corporis similitudine pulchritudinem ejus facile monstrabimus. (209<sup>a</sup>) Maxime autem ex faciei venustate et elegantia decor; ergo, quoniam ut se habet in oculis splendor atque luciditas, sic in ratione et intellectu ad decorem ipsius animae refulgeat scientiarum habitus velut lumina in ipsis oculis spiritualibus ejusdem, et sicut maculae in oculis aut albugo sive turbiditas, sic in eisdem hebetudo et tarditas aut habitus erroneus, qui tantis oculis velut praeoccupans et obcludens lucem veritatis ab ipsa mentis acie repellit aut ut obsistit quo aut omnino non intret aut minus

<sup>19</sup> Cf. p. 249.

<sup>20</sup> jactura B.

<sup>21</sup> extendens B.

<sup>22</sup> ipsam B.

debite. Sicut autem ipsas genas humanae faciei rubor simul et candor adornant atque decorant, sic amor honestatis et iracundiae<sup>23</sup> vim concupiscibilem et irascibilem egregiant et illustrant. Sicut nasus prominens et indecenter obtensus faciem dehonestat, sic arrogantia vim irascibilem, ut labia prominentia et oris hiatus indecens deturpant faciem, sic loquacitas et sermonis saevitas, turpitudine mentem sordidant et deformant. Et haec de his exempla sufficere debent.

Redeunt autem patefacere tentemus quae sit ipsa pulchritudo capitalis virtutis quam consuevimus vocare intellectum seu rationem. Dico igitur quoniam omne quod decet ipsum, sive quod est in eo decor, aut est decor ejus ultimus, quoniam et gloriam vocamus ejusdem, aut via est ad decorem illum ultimum, et hoc est quoniam omne quod illum ultimum, et hoc est quoniam omne quod illum decet aut perfectio ejus est ultima<sup>24</sup> aut via est ad illum. Quod si neutrum horum fuerit, superfluum est necessario in illo aut nocivum et suae perfectionis impeditivum et elongativum; omne autem superfluum turpe et omne quod elongat a pulchritudine<sup>25</sup> similiter. Quare omne tale est turpitudine in intellectu nostro. Et hoc ipsum est monstrare eadem via de aliis virtutibus.

Sequitur autem ex his quod saeculares scientiae in quantum non sunt viae ad eam scientiam, quae est ultima perfectio et gloria intellectus nostri, in tantum turpitudine ejus sunt. Et est haec turpitudine comparabilis ei turpitudini oculorum quae strabonitas aut recurvitas dicitur in illis qui nisi in obliquum aut in deor- (17") sum videre vel aspicere non possunt. Inter scientias autem non solum quae viae sunt ad illam perfectivam intellectus nostri ultimam pulchriores sunt et magis decent ipsum quae ultimae similiores aut viciniore sunt, et quae velut quaedam umbrae et praegustationes illius, ut ita dicam, sunt. Quare divinae scientiae maxime inter omnes decent eum, quae nec maxime decent illum et maxime decorant eundem; quare maxime decorant ipsum divinae scientiae.

Videtur quod quemadmodum amores et desideria sensibilibus deturpant et sordidant virtutes nostras motivas, sic et cognitio temporalium, in quantum dico non via est ad illam ultimam, ad quam natus est intellectus. Sicut pulchritudo autem amoris est, ut ametur unumquodque ut amandum<sup>26</sup> est et quantum amandum est, id scilicet quod finis ut finis et propter illud alia, id vero quod via est ut via et propter finem, sic et in apprehensionibus se habere merito quis arbitretur. Sicut igitur solus omnium desideriorum finis amandus est et desiderandus est propter se, cetera autem si amanda sunt nonnisi propter ipsum, sic ultimae veritati soli propter se credendum, ceteris autem propter ipsam; non enim plus veritatis a prima veritate quam bonitatis a prima bonitate recepisce videntur. Quare sicut bonitas ad amorem ut veritas ad fidem, sicut decet ea amari, sic et eis convenit credi.

Item si quantum debet primae bonitatis affectus noster, tantum debet primae veritati intellectus noster; sola autem prima bonitas et primo ei amanda est; sola igitur prima veritas et prima intellectui nostro credenda est.

Item si non est fas amori nostro sistere in aliquo ex his, quae citra finem suum ultimum sunt, sed omnis amor sistens citra finem turpis est, eo ipso quod viam facit finem, qualiter et unde licebit intellectui nostro sistere in aliquo eorum quae sunt citra primam veritatem?

Item quis dubitat intellectum nostrum velut sponsum veritatis esse primae et affectum nostrum sponsum esse bonitatis primae? Et hoc ipso amoris nobis innati testimonio clarum est. Totum quippe quod quaerimus, quod amamus et ab initio diximus, aut veritas aut bonitas est.

<sup>23</sup> Perhaps a scribal error for verecundiae?

<sup>24</sup> *Add. est A.*

<sup>25</sup> turpitudine B.

<sup>26</sup> amandus AB.

XIII

Sed castus et sanctus intellectus fidem servat primae veritati et nulli alii conjungi seu misceri fas judicans, sic et castus aut sanctus amor nulli alii commisceri se patitur. Hoc autem in traductione nuptiali in illo conventu manifestum erit, cum scilicet ei soli adhaerebit uterque, scilicet uterque sponsae suae. Quod si ita erit, cum impleta fuerit utriusque possibilitas et ad suam perfectionem deductus fuit, quod nefas erit ei alii aut conjungi per modum quem diximus aut adhaerere. Manifestum igitur erit tunc utrumque natum esse ad illam solam, quare non licet ex lege ipsius nocivi, ut ita dicam, matrimonii alicui alii commisceri, sed sicut viae, quam conjunctionem non intelligimus violationem hujus matrimonii, tunc enim solum violatur indubitanter matrimonium cum alii impenditur quod soli debebatur uxori. Hujusmodi mediam conjunctionem non debet intellectus noster primae veritati, ut scilicet ei conjugatur per modum<sup>1</sup> viae.

Item omnis virtus et omnis<sup>2</sup> potentia expeditior est et fortior ad actum ad quem essentialiter et per se et propter se quam ad aliquem alium; visus ad videndum et auditus ad audiendum. Ad videndum autem auditus ineptus omnino et impotentia. Quare manifestum est virtutem (210°) appre- (18°) hensivam nostram superiorem, quam iterum vocavimus intellectum expeditiorem et promptiorem esse ad cognitionem primae veritatis quantum in ipsa ejus essentia est<sup>3</sup> quam<sup>4</sup> ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum.

Item certum est omnem virtutem et omnem potentiam confortari et invalescere debito exercitio suo, absque exercitio vero suae operationis debito recto et moderato fatiscere languor suae operationis fatiscit et exstinguitur in seipso sicut apparet in illis qui diu fuerunt obclusi carcere aliquo tenebroso et in diu remanentibus virtutem appetitivam cibi et potus emori et deficere.

Similiter experimento cognoscimus ad hunc modum et de intellectu nostro se habet; invalescit quippe intellectus noster et melioratur exercitio operationum suarum. Unde studentes et disputantes acutiores fiunt tanquam tusionibus et elimationibus acuatur velut ingeniorum nostrorum ferrum; desistentes autem ab hujusmodi exercitiis et velut otio torpentes obtundimur et rubiginamur.

Eadem via palam est vim et omnem potentiam abusione sua et intorsione in usum indebitum et incongruentem sibi debilitari et deteriori et deturpari, quemadmodum si quis pedibus ambulare assueverit ad opera manibus debita necessario manus ineptiores habebit, et si quis jumentorum cibis vesci consueverit, ad humanos horrebit. Quoniam autem exercitio indebito et incongruenti acquiritur unicuique virtuti et potentiae perfectio quae nata est acquiri per illud, manifestum est quoniam per omnem usum operationum quae non congruunt ipsi potentiae, acquiritur ei perfectio quae non congruit ipsi; quod autem non congruit, indecens et indecorum est. Quare omni abusione et intorsione cujusque potentiae acquiritur illi sua turpitudine.

Ex omni igitur abusione hujusmodi deturpari necesse est et debilitari omnem potentiam et virtutem. Solo igitur usu<sup>5</sup> et<sup>6</sup> exercitio suo legitimo et sibi congruenti intellectivam virtutem nostram honestari ac decorari necesse est. Hoc autem est quoniam operationes suae proprie sunt ei via ad decorem suum ultimum. Quare ipsum sic, hoc est sibi congruenter operari, est quodammodo ad pulchritudinem suam incedere per singulas operationes veluti per quosdam suae viationis passus, finali suae pulchritudini proximior fieri. Quare perfectiorem et pulchriorem cum pedetentim fieri manifestum est. Approximari quippe ad

<sup>1</sup> medium B.

<sup>2</sup> Om. B.

<sup>3</sup> Om. B.

<sup>4</sup> Om. B.

<sup>5</sup> Om. B.

<sup>6</sup> Om. B.

pulchritudinis ultimum sive summum pulchritudinis indubitanter est augmentum.

Jam igitur ad hoc te deduximus ut manifestum sit tibi pulchritudinem virtutis nostrae intellectivae, quam quidem citra decorem gloriae suae ultimae habere nata est in his solis esse, quae nata sunt esse via perveniendi<sup>7</sup> ad illam ultimam, et quae nata sunt acquiri legitimo et congruo exercitio ipsius, quoniam per eam turpitudinem ei acquiri necesse est. Hoc autem exemplo virtutis concupiscibilis nostrae lucidius fiet, cum attenderis non decere eam aliter se habere circa temporalia, quoniam vel odorare in ipsis abyssum divinae suavitatis ut nec odore tantae suavitatis fame et desiderio accendatur, cujus quicquid suavitatis habet omne creaturarum decus est velut odoris pertenuis et permodici vestigium ad comparisonem abyssi, quae totam implet et velut inundat et mergit amplitudinem saeculi altioris aut ut agnoscat ipsa beneficia esse divinae largitatis nos ad amorem sui invitantis et provocare quodammodo studentis. Recte quidem quidam<sup>8</sup> creaturas vocavit quosdam divinae bonitatis nutus et judicia, quos velut distillationes permodicas pluit incessanter fontalis divinae bonitatis largitas.<sup>9</sup> Hic igitur, qua universum perfusum est, suavitas est velut cennae, quod de tactu pomi plerumque remanet odoris vestigium, sic universum penetrans et implens (18<sup>o</sup>) abyssalis illa fontis universalis singula perfundit velut quodam<sup>10</sup> suavitatis vestigio, ut in odore ad refectionem plenissimam curramus, non odore ipso impleri et refici quaeramus, quibus tamen opulenta parata est et ad quam tanto odore invitamur refectio.

Ad hunc modum lux illa praefulgura et radiantissima primae veritatis per universum velut quosdam suae luminositatis spargit radios et quasi per nubam universi illucescentem conspiciamus, licet a longe obtenebratis quodammodo radiis per densissimam universitatis nubem ad nos venientibus, quibus tamen et nos ipsi non<sup>11</sup> nihil tenebrarum adjicimus. Per carnis quippe molem qua longe est vita illa per metas et phantasiarum tenebras quibus oculorum consuetudo nos obvolvitur ad intellectum nostrum penetrant. Per tot igitur opaca et caliginosa transeuntes a nativae lucis fulgore per multum eos degenerare necesse est; haec sunt percennita<sup>12</sup> et vix notabilia vestigia, signa scilicet suae potestatis et sapientiae et bonitatis. Prima vis quibus velut radiis se quaerentibus noluit illudere; congruit autem intelligentiae nostrae procul dubio his uti signis atque vestigiis.

Ex quo manifestum est intellectum per viam rectitudinis incedentem universum velut librum habere cujus auctor et scriptor est, ut alias<sup>13</sup> docuimus; singulas autem creaturas velut libri qui ei legendus et inspiciendus ac intelligendus proponitur. Singula verba libri vero totius mentem atque sententiam ipsum esse ejusdem libri scriptorem Deum et auctorem. Singulae igitur creaturae singula verba sunt domini nobis signantia, ipse mundus cum omnibus mirabilibus suis unum verbum est exterius cujus sententia et intellectus in corde Dei patris clauditur. Sed de hoc alias latius et copiosius.<sup>14</sup>

Quoniam igitur in hoc sunt creaturae ut signa sint et verba quaedam intelligentibus (210<sup>o</sup>), signis autem utendum significative non materialiter,<sup>15</sup> manifestum debet esse hunc esse legitimum et rectum usum creaturarum et hanc esse congruam operationem intelligentiae nostrae ut verba ista quibus

<sup>7</sup>proveniendi B.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 43; PL 32, 1264.

<sup>9</sup>largitus B.

<sup>10</sup>quoddam B.

<sup>11</sup>Om. B.

<sup>12</sup>per te mica? AB.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. *De Trinitate* 9, also *De Anima* VII, 6; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, 15; PL

42, 1052.

<sup>14</sup>*De Universo* I-II, 27.

<sup>15</sup>For the meaning of the terms cf. Wm. of Sherwood, 'Die Introductiones in Logica des Wilhelm von Shyreswood,' ed. M. Grabmann, *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Abteilung* (Munich, 1937), p. 76.

potestatem et sapientiam et bonitatem suam clamat Deus secundum intentionem Dei loquentis accipiat. Qui igitur rebus ipsis materialiter utitur, indubitanter eis abutitur. Palam igitur est quia mundani philosophantes syllabarum et dictionum numeratores et ponderatores dicendi sunt, nullatenus autem sapientes aut intelligentes, his tamen exceptis qui secundum modum istum creaturis uti studuerunt.

Jam igitur elucere inceptit tibi intorsionem et abusionem virtutis nostrae intellectivae esse omnem aliam creaturarum<sup>16</sup> considerationem, quam scilicet significativam, nisi fortasse sit aliqua consideratio quae ad istam valeat. Omni igitur alia acquiritur ipsi intellectui nostro turpitudine et debilitas et obtenebratio. Quales igitur dicemus coelorum mensuratores et alios qui pulchritudinem hujus libri mensurare et mirari student? Intellectum vero libri nullatenus quaerunt. Legunt quidem multi librum istum, sed non intelligunt legentes exterius et quodammodo judaizantes in cortice<sup>17</sup> libri hujus dum significata non advertunt, figuras creaturarum et mirificentiam<sup>18</sup> exterius admirantes. Videtur autem quodammodo ad donum intellectus spectare cognitio creatoris et eorum quae ejus sunt, haec, inquam, cognitio quae tanquam per rerum quodammodo lectionem acquiritur. Unde Apostolus ad Romanos I: *19 Invisibilia Dei per ea visibilia quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*. Quasi per ipsa visibilia intellecta, id est cum ipsa visibilia non solum exterius legentur ad modum Judaicae caecitatis conspiciuntur visibilia Dei. Scientia (19<sup>a</sup>) autem sic legendi donum Dei est, non naturae acquisitio. Unde Apostolus post pauca: *20 Hic enim et. 21 Deus illis revelavit*.

Huic igitur lumen suae cognitionis quod ipse creator per creaturas radians se quaerentibus infundit, quaedam quodammodo pulchritudo est intelligentiae nostrae sed fortasse inferiori. Superior enim desuper illuminabilis tantum ex parte primae lucis, aliquibus non improbabiler<sup>22</sup> visum est, qui quidem animam humanam speculum posuerunt intelligibile duarum facierum intelligibilium, quarum alteram obversam dicunt<sup>23</sup> inferius ad sensibilia, et est ab eis illuminabilis ad modum speculi et sigillabilis ad modum cerae et inscriptibilis aut pingibilis ad modum tabulae quae ad scripturas et picturas<sup>24</sup> recipiendas praeparata est. Superior igitur facies descendendum a primo fonte universali luminis et aliorum donorum receptibilis est et sola prima lux lux est cum eis quae intersunt inter ipsam et primam lucem; si qua tamen intersunt. Nonnullis quippe nihil interesse visum est nisi forte dona quibus adjuvatur ab illuminatore suo suae perfectionis ad adoptionem. Quicquid autem est ei deorsum, hoc est infra se, tenebrae eidem est. Intelligit quippe se velut in horizonte luminis et tenebrarum ordinatam esse et in medio aeternitatis et temporis. Est enim ejus essentia certissime permanentiae perennis. Perennitas autem media est aeterni-

<sup>16</sup> creaturam AB.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. St. Bede, *Praefatio in Esdram et Nehemiam Prophetas*; PL 91, 807B.

<sup>18</sup> munificentias B.

<sup>19</sup> Romans 1, 20.

<sup>20</sup> Such an expression occurs neither in Sacred Scripture nor in any of the common Glosses.

<sup>21</sup> est B.

<sup>22</sup> incomparabiliter B.

<sup>23</sup> dent with a stroke over the 'n', AB. Secundum autem doctrinam Christianorum quam necesse est per omnia et in omnibus esse verissimam et ab omni falsitate et errore depuratissimam ponendum est animam humanam, velut in horizonte duorum mundorum naturaliter esse constitutam et ordinatam. Et alter mundorum est

ei mundus sensibilibus cui conjunctissima est per corpus; alter vero Creator ipse est in semetipso ut exemplar et speculum universalis ac lucidissimae apparitionis universalis primorum intelligibilium. *De Anima* VII, 6; cf. also *De Universo* IIIaIIae, 21. Cf. J. T. Muckle, 'The Treatise *De Anima* of Gundisalvus', *Mediaeval Studies* II (1940), 85; also J. T. Muckle, 'The Doctrine of St. Gregory of Nyssa on Man as the Image of God', *Mediaeval Studies* VII (1945), 68. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio* 18; PG 44, 192C-D. For the later history of the soul as on the horizon of two worlds cf. A. Combes, *Essai sur la Critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson* (Paris, 1945), p. 645d.

<sup>24</sup> picturas et scripturas B.



tatis et temporis, communicat namque initium cum tempore communisque est ei cum aeternitate interminabilitas.

Quia igitur infra ipsam est,<sup>25</sup> est illi hemispherium inferius et velut pars et regio tenebrarum. Quod vero supra se habet luminositas atque felicitas est saeculi altioris. Quoniam autem a minori quam ipsa sit magnificari nec ab imperfectiori perfici nec a minus lucido illuminari nec a turpiori decorari nec ab inferiori exaltari nec a pauperiori ditari et omnino a tenebris illuminari illuminatione, quae nobilitatem et generositatem ejus decorat, eam impossibile esse manifestum est. Necesse est omnem ejus illustrationem et exornationem et illuminationem et, ut ita dicam, picturationem ex parte saeculi altioris descendere. Necesse est a parte vero tenebrarum, quae infra ipsam est, nihil eam posse recipere quod non deturpat ejus essentiam; nihil decet eam de his quae infra ipsam sicut cum magis nata sit dare sic ea, quae post ipsam ordinata sunt, quam recipere ab ipsis. Si enim ascendendum est animae humanae per gradus perfectionum suarum donec ad summum et ultimum suae perfectionis perveniat, omni autem gradu suae ascensionis necesse est omne ascendens ascendere supra se et fieri successive superius et in altari se elevare. Necesse igitur est eam elongari ab eis non solum quae inferiora ipso sunt, sed etiam ab eis quae erant sui ordinis; descendendo autem eam elevare impossibile est. Neque igitur descendendo per apprehensionem ad inferiora mundi sensibiliter neque per amorem eam elevare ad altum suae perfectionis possibile est. Et hoc inde manifestum est quoniam quanto amplius descendit motiva virtus animarum nostrarum ad inferiora se per amorem, tanto magis elongatur a suis perfectionibus nobilibus, tandem autem degenerat in brutales turpitudines. Si igitur necesse habet vis motiva elongari ab eis quae infra ipsam sunt et elevare ad altiora, nisi praecesserit eam apprehensiva, quoniam apprehensiones necessario praecedunt affectiones ut causa earum, (19<sup>v</sup>) necessario igitur elevanda est apprehensiva ad sublimiora. Quare necesse habet semper apprehendere altiora se aut illa eadem altius et perfectius dum proficit in perfectionem et fit (211<sup>v</sup>) ei paulatim proximior.

Item si non est via animabus nostris ad suam perfectionem ultimam nisi per virtutes, (singulae autem ex viribus animarum nostrarum ad suas perfectiones natae sunt); singulae igitur quae, cum virtutum capaces sunt, natae sunt, per viam virtutum ad suas perfectiones ultimas venire necesse habent. Quare apprehensiva superior vel virtutis capax non est vel per virtutes ad suam perfectionem<sup>26</sup> ultimam venire necesse habet.<sup>27</sup> Inde autem eam capacem esse virtutum, quoniam et majorum capacem esse manifestum est, ✠ an non est majorum incredulitas et nimia credulitas et levitas opinandi et suspiciositas qua quis leviter alium suspectum habet et male<sup>28</sup> de ipso leviter suspicatur aut opinatur, sed et de sensu proprio plus justo opinari et praesumere, non quia non moveri est apprehensivae.<sup>29</sup> Quod autem est, quae, obstinacitas in errore nisi intellectus quaedam curiositas<sup>30</sup> et obdurata obliquitas?

Quoniam autem ad quamdam scientiam ultimam nata est vis nostra intellectiva jam dubium non est. Ad hanc autem aut est pervenire per viam inquisitionis aut per viam meriti. Quod si per viam inquisitionis, ipsa igitur erit posterior et ignobilior cognitione principiorum ex quibus et per quae acquiritur. Quare non erit omnium maxima et lucidissima et nobilissima.<sup>31</sup> Quod tamen necesse est alioquin essent praecedentes cognitiones propter minus et vilius seipsis; quod finalis causae dignitas prohibet. Quod si per viam merendi est

<sup>25</sup> *Om. B.*, superscript *A.*

<sup>26</sup> perfectionem suam *B.*

<sup>27</sup> habent *AB.*

<sup>28</sup> valde *B.*

<sup>29</sup> Beginning with the cross this passage

is not clear; I have not been able to suggest any correction palaeographically plausible.

<sup>30</sup> cernicositas *B.*

<sup>31</sup> *Om. B.*

ad eam pervenire, hic igitur erit per obsequia grata et accepta largitori illius, cui bonitas hujusmodi obsequentes dignos reputat hujus remuneratione. Non autem possunt ei esse<sup>32</sup> grata obsequia nisi quae de fontibus virtutum processerint, quoniam turpia, et quae indifferentia sunt, etiam apud homines accepta non sunt, immo reproba et quae spectantes pariter et audientes offendant.

Item omnis cognitio nostra aut sensibilis est quam communicamus cum brutis et ad hanc indubitanter non est nata anima humana, nec illa nata est perficere aut decorare superiorem vim nostram apprehensivam; aut intellectiva est, et haec autem ordinata est et tunc incipit aperiri secundum naturam; unde descendunt ad causam posteriora et inferiora fitque descensu imperfectior et vilior. Nobilior quippe est cognitio principio, et omni cognitione, quae post ipsam est, eo quod unaquaeque sequentium nobilior, quae est ei proximior et pro elongatione sua ad ipsam ignobilior et obscurior magisque vergens in partem tenebrarum propter elongationem suam a luminositate principiorum.<sup>33</sup> Quanto ergo proficit vis nostra apprehensiva per viam demonstrationis, tanto magis appropinquat tenebris et elongatur ab ipsa luce principiorum, qui sibi ipsis et aliis vicem lucis agebant dum se et alia offendebant. Hoc enim lucis est proprium se scilicet et alia ostendere. Acquiritur igitur ei philosophando semper imperfectior et minus luminosa cognitio. Quare per viam illam non acquiritur ei perfectio<sup>34</sup> veri nominis quoniam omnis cognitio quae media est inter cognitionem primitivam virtutis nostrae apprehensivae et finalem cognitionem ultimam ad quam nata est necessario perfectior quam primitiva et minus perfecta finali<sup>35</sup> perfectionis ultimae. (20<sup>r</sup>)

Sic igitur philosophando non est<sup>36</sup> in<sup>37</sup> via, quae debet ei acquiri sua perfectio completa finalis, quoniam in via suae perfectionis necesse est eam ascendendo perficere et de approximatione ad lucem primam purissimam per singulos suae viationis gradus luminosiores eam ac puriorem fieri plurimumque posse tenebrarum relinquere et modicum luminis et minus tenebrarum habere ante se, donec ei illucescat velut meridies pleni luminis. Si vero non incipit a<sup>38</sup> primis, sed velut illa cognitio, quae acquiritur per sillogismos, quia qui sunt sillogismi praeposteri, tunc necessario minus proficiet quam per viam priorem, quia cognitiones quia et praeposteras ignobiliores et imperfectiores sunt ordinatis cognitionibus, quas acquirimus per sillogismos propter aliquid et per causas superiores et principia conclusionum.

Jam igitur debet clarere tibi quod via ista philosophandi non est via acquirendi perfectionem virtutis nostrae superioris apprehensivae. Quod si ita est nec philosophandi via est, sed error et nimium et obtenebratio magis dum a luce aut elongat aut detorquet et divertit per viam istam<sup>39</sup> processus. Quod autem error est et mutum, necessario turpitudine est et imperfectio et obtenebratio. Necessario igitur a parte saeculi altioris illuminabilis est vis apprehensiva nostra superior et desursum fluere habent<sup>40</sup> super ipsam perfectiones et adjumenta media, quibus elevetur ad altitudinem suae perfectionis nobilissimae.

Quoniam autem palam est ipsam animam humanam ordinatam esse inter saeculum altius et saeculum sensibile et corporale, neutrius autem istorum innata est ei cognitio, cum ipsa tamen ad utriusque cognitionem nata est. Nihil autem habet cognoscere extra nisi per assimilationem ad illud, immo hoc ipsum est ei cognoscere assimilari, scilicet cognitio, quaecumque et cognoscit in mundo inferiori, cognoscit per receptionem similitudinum, quas recipit ab agentibus in

<sup>32</sup> esse ei B.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Aristotle, the opening chapter of the *Physics*.

<sup>34</sup> protectio AB.

<sup>35</sup> finalis B.

<sup>36</sup> non est bis B.

<sup>37</sup> Om. B.

<sup>38</sup> in B.

<sup>39</sup> ista B.

<sup>40</sup> habent fluere B.

organa sensuum primo, deinde penetrat illuminatio ista in organa virium interiorum, donec in illis et (211<sup>v</sup>) circa illa illuminentur ratio et intellectus, sicque fit ut cognitionem suam<sup>41</sup> infundant per fenestras sensuum velut radios quosdam et lumina et signa et quibus se ostendunt per fenestras et organa sensuum.

Quia igitur non est ei alia via ad cognoscendum ea quae extra ipsam sunt nisi sigillatio quaedam et inscriptio ab eisdem, necessarium est per eundem modum acquiri ei cognitionem eorum, quae sunt saeculi altioris, dum adhuc est citra suam perfectionem et gloriam suam ultimam, a parte igitur saeculi altioris descendere radios hujus illuminationis; quicumque radii a parte saeculi inferioris ad eam veniunt, eorum tantum a quibus velut communicant lumen auferunt cognitionis. Quare ad seipsam<sup>42</sup> vim intellectivam inclinant et deprimunt eam ab altitudine suae ordinationis, cum ipsa sint ordine inferiora quam ipsa vis intellectiva nostra. Sola igitur quae desursum in ipsam descendunt cognitionum et affectionum lumina ipsam inaltant et elevant et approximant ad altitudinem gloriae et perfectionis suae ultimae aut sunt ei per (20<sup>v</sup>) modum inquisitionis aut per modum in quo cognoscuntur extrema<sup>43</sup> prima, scilicet et infima quae sunt universalis principia et singularia sensibilia. Quod si fuerint per modum inquisitionis, erit per<sup>44</sup> descensum et diminutionem cognitio et a majori et a lucidiori et nobiliori cognitione principiorum erit in minorem et in minus lucidam et ignobiliorem cognitionem descensus. Haec autem via non est perfectionis et inaltationis nec ea tenditur ad altiora, immo ad inferiora quoniam ad causata principiorum, ut praediximus, aut saltem in posteriores et<sup>45</sup> minus lucidas cognitiones.

Si vero non per viam inquisitionis, erunt igitur, ut diximus, nota non per alia ea quorum cognitione desuper<sup>45</sup> vis nostra illustratur apprehensiva superior dum est in corpore et in via suae perfectionis ultimae. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi secundum duos modos, quorum alter est ut sua luciditate eidem illucescant, quemadmodum disciplinalia principia aut sensibilia, quae se gratis nobis ostendunt, aut sicut credita ei ex oboedientia, scilicet eo quod scilicet iussa sit ab illo imperatore universali credere illa. Primum autem impossibile est, ut scilicet aliqua ex his, quae sunt saeculi altioris, adeo nobis manifesta sint ut principia disciplinalia vel extrema sensibilia. Quare manifestum est ea quorum cognitione adjuvatur vis nostra superior apprehensiva ad processum suum in altitudine suae perfectionis ultimae credita esse ex oboedientia sola, et haec sine dubio est virtus intelligentiae nostrae.

## XIV

Quaeramus autem utrum intelligentia nostra sit debitorum oboedientiae, an non. Quam absurdum autem sit omnino intelligentiam nostram non debere subjectam esse creatori suo, quemadmodum et voluntatem, ipsa intelligentia edocta est per semetipsam. Quae enim ratio est cur voluntas nostra domino Deo subjecta esse teneatur et non intelligentia, cum aequae creator, aequae largitor ambarum non dubitetur an non? Inde debemus voluntatem nostram creatori nostro, quia creator et largitor ejus est. Eodem igitur jure et intelligentiam nostram nos ei debere necesse est. Unde videri posset absolutus intellectus a lege oboedientiae? An fortasse quia oboedire non poterat, nulla lex ei a creatore suo ponenda erat, an non curavit creator de eruditione et gubernatione illius, ut legem poneret, quae eum erudiret et dirigeret? Quod si dixerit

<sup>41</sup> *Om. B.*<sup>42</sup> *seipsa A.*<sup>43</sup> *ad B.*<sup>44</sup> *aut B.*<sup>45</sup> *Om. B.*

quis intellectum ab omni lege oboedientiae absolutum, nullus igitur error culpabilis aut damnabilis; eis enim quae sine lege sunt contra legem facere nec culpabile nec damnabile est.<sup>1</sup> Si vero praeter libertatem sui est intellectus noster ut vel necessitate trahatur ad credenda vel scienda vel aestimanda quae suadentur eidem vel impossibilitate prohibitus sit absque suasionem credere nullum problema poenae indigere necesse est.

Item aut intellectus noster debet Deo fidem aut non. Quod si debet ei fidem, utique possibile est ut adhibeat ei fidem aut non. Aut igitur sine suasionem et probationem credet ei, quod quidem est gratis, quemadmodum sine suasionem et probationem, et haec est fides quam quaerimus. Si vero non aliter possibile est ut credit ei intellectus noster ut suasus sicut dicit Aristoteles,<sup>2</sup> quia credere sequitur suasum esse, tunc necessario non credit ei, sed suasionem sive probationem. Qui enim sine pignore aut cautionem alia non credit, indubitanter debitori non credit, sed cautionem. Ad hunc modum non credit (21') intellectus noster Deo, velut cautionem seu suasionem aut probationem ab eo exigit, sed magis ipsi suasionem vel cautionem probationem. Vide enim quanta sit ista perversitas ut intellectus; quicumque autem praeferre audeat Deo in eis, quae ad ipsum spectant!

De motiva quidem in nostra certum est, quod, si in amore quicumque Deo praeferre, perversa esset<sup>3</sup> et subversa nullatenus dubitari posset. Intellectus autem<sup>4</sup> noster audebit quicumque Deo praeferre<sup>5</sup> in fide, necesse est igitur ipsum esse subversum et inordinatum qui aliquid fide dignius Deo iudicavit et aliquid Deo in fide praetulit.<sup>6</sup> Quod si suasio quaeritur aut evidentia veritatis, palam est omnia principia disciplinarum minoris evidentiae esse et (212') minoris necessitatis quam<sup>7</sup> sit<sup>8</sup> hoc, primam scilicet veritatem esse veridicam. Apud omnem quippe intellectum concessum est possibilis esse omnia principia disciplinarum falsa esse quam primam veritatem mentiri. Quare istud, primam scilicet veritatem esse veridicam<sup>9</sup> sive eloquia primae veritatis vera esse maioris evidentiae et certitudinis, est apud omnem intellectum quam sint<sup>10</sup> principia quaecumque disciplinarum. Si igitur est intellectus humane burgundio<sup>11</sup> es incredulus, non aliter credere volens Deo nisi sub pignore aut evidentiae aut probationem aut suasionem.<sup>12</sup> Ecce cavit tibi! Deus securiorem cautionem dedit tibi quam sufficiant dare quaecumque disciplinarum quae utique per sua principia cavent intellectui nostro et quasi assecurant ipsum, hoc est principium quo ostenduntur omnia illa quorum fidem exigit a te Deus, id est articulorum. Omnes quippe articulos<sup>13</sup> eloquia esse primae veritatis ipsa<sup>14</sup> prima veritas miraculorum indeficientium testimonio, immo totam Scripturam eloquia sua esse ostendit, dum apud illos solos qui hac Scriptura se tegunt et ei fidem adhibent ab eo tempore, quo credita est miraculorum coruscantia velut quaedam primae veritatis, quo errores suos tueri possunt, reperire potuit.

Vides igitur quomodo<sup>15</sup> te deduximus quippe usque te jam deduximus ut jam tibi evidentius ostendi possint piae ac veridicae fidei articuli, immo jam ostensi sunt, exterioribus et evidentioribus quam sint principia disciplinarum. Sed numquid fides ista Deo grata aut Deo digna esse potest cum ipsa non gratis ei impendatur, sed magis invincibili evidentia et necessitate extorqueatur? Quaero autem utrum Deo sic credideris. Quod si Deo sic non credidisti, fides igitur haec non est Deo exhibita seu impensa, sed magis argumentis, quae illam potius extorserunt.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Romans* v, 13.

<sup>2</sup> 428 a 23.

<sup>3</sup> esse A.

<sup>4</sup> Om. B.

<sup>5</sup> praeferre Deo B.

<sup>6</sup> praetulit in fide B.

<sup>7</sup> quoniam B.

<sup>8</sup> si B.

<sup>9</sup> veridica B.

<sup>10</sup> sunt B.

<sup>11</sup> Allusion not found.

<sup>12</sup> suasionem aut probationem B.

<sup>13</sup> articuli AB.

<sup>14</sup> immo B.

<sup>15</sup> quo A.

Item intellectus tuus ipsi probationi innititur plus in ea confidens quam in Deo; Deo igitur injuriosus est cum major esset intellectui in Deo securitas quam in ipsa probatione; majorem igitur securitatem quae ei in Deo erat minori postposuit.

Item iste intellectus credit testimonio principiorum et testimonio Dei non credit propter se; praefert ergo testimonium aliud Dei testimonio. Quare manifestum ipsum esse praeposterum et Deo<sup>16</sup> injuriosum. Quod si dixeris<sup>17</sup> scilicet quia hoc credit intellectus tuus primae scilicet veritatis eloquia vera esse Dei testimonio et credis Deum esse veridicum in omnibus et in hoc credis Deo, non aliae probationi, dic, quaero, an ideo credis Deo, quia scis ipsum non posse ulla ratione mentiri, an alia de causa. Si ideo quia scis ipsum non posse aut nolle mentiri, hanc credulitatem extorsit ista scientia, qua scis Deum posse nullo (21<sup>r</sup>) modo mentiri. Si enim scires eum posse mentiri, non crederes. Quare non gratis nec primo, sed eo modo quo crederes testimonio ejus, qui non posset aut nesciret de facto aliquo loqui nisi alteram partem et veram. Quare ex impotentia mentiendi credis ei, qui hoc solum loqui novit, quod verum est vel sicut credis testimonio ejus, quem scis adeo corruptum ab altera parte; quae tamen justa est ut non possit ulla ratione quicquam testari contra eum. Hoc autem non est credere cujusquam testimonio seu<sup>18</sup> verbo. Quare non utique Deo credis qui ideo credis quia<sup>19</sup> scis<sup>20</sup> ipsum mentiri non posse.

Item non potest esse dubium quin Deo ut Deo credendum sit et quin ei<sup>21</sup> debeatur fides eo digna. Nulla autem fides eo digna est quae injusta est aut ei injuriosa. Injusta autem et si injuriosa est quae ei non gratis impenditur, cum gratis ei credendum sit. Quis enim dubitet intellectum injuriosum et contumeliosum esse Deo, qui negat ei fidem nisi pignus probationis prius ab eo receperit quales erant Judaei et Graeci quandoque quorum hi quidem signa petebant, illi vero sapientiam ut dicit Apostolus.<sup>22</sup> Ecce velut satisfactionem a Deo exigebant! Incredulus autem non dubitatur esse creditor qui semper pignori quaerit incumbere et non alias cuiquam credit nisi prius ab eo cautionem securitatis receperit. Numquid non<sup>23</sup> iste intellectus trepidat timore ubi timor non est?<sup>24</sup> Numquid non de Deo<sup>25</sup> diffidit et imbecilliori inniti quaerit? An dubitas non esse fidendum de Deo et non esse sperandum in ipso quasi quicquam Deo possit esse aut securius aut fortius?

Item non habet Deum ut Deum qui majus eo quicquam aut fortitudine habet aut securitate.

Item potestne Deus exigere ab intellectu humano hanc fidem negari, nec sit nostrae libertatis aut potestatis? Quod si intellectus ad illa sola tenetur, quae declinare non potest, tenetur igitur ad necessaria inevitabilia sibi per naturam. De quibus manifestum est nullam omnino esse legem aut obligationem; super-vacue quippe facere juberetur ea quae non facere ei impossibile est. Fides autem quae Deo ex necessitate impeditur nec gratiam nec meritum habet aut apud ipsum aut apud homines. Quare hujuscemodi fides Deo digna non est; debetur autem ei fides eo digna. Nulla igitur quae suasa sit ei debetur, sed magis grata et insuasa omnino; et haec est quam quaerimus. Haec autem fides non est qualis est illa quae principiorum disciplinalium est; illa enim vehementissimam habet rationem, suasionem, evidentiam scilicet ipsius veritatis cui contraire non<sup>26</sup> potest intellectus.

Item intellectus noster aut (212<sup>r</sup>) necessitate affixus est principiis et proba-

<sup>16</sup> ideo B.

<sup>17</sup> dixerit B.

<sup>18</sup> Moysen B.

<sup>19</sup> quis B.

<sup>20</sup> scis B.

<sup>21</sup> Om. B.

<sup>22</sup> I Cor. i, 22.

<sup>23</sup> Om. B.

<sup>24</sup> non est timor B.

<sup>25</sup> de Deo non B.

<sup>26</sup> non contraire B.

tionibus rationalibus aut non. Quod si necessitate, igitur nihil voluntate nec alio modo potest averti ab eis. Non igitur est ei voluntarium credere nec voluntati subjectum. Motiva igitur vis eadem necessitate affixa erit voluptatibus nec voluntate nec alio ullo averti poterit ab eis nec erit ei voluntarium amare aut velle; quare nec laudabile; quod alias destruemus,<sup>27</sup> licet manifestam habeat falsitatem.

Hic autem ostendemus quoniam ipsum credere voluntarium est et voluntati subjectum. Si enim non est voluntati subjectum, igitur possibile erit aliquem aliquid credere omnino (22<sup>a</sup>) invitum; hoc igitur posito, nullum accidit impossibile. Qui igitur credit aliquid omnino invitus et renitens, aut id, quod credit, videtur ei esse credendum omnino, aut non; si non videtur ei esse credendum, ergo nec esse verum; omne namque verum credendum est et dignum fide in se. Non dico quod in Deo teneamur credere omne verum; aliud quippe est dicere hoc esse dignum fide in se, aliud me debere ei fidem. Si autem videtur ei credendum, hoc est dignum fide in se, ipse tamen omnino invitus<sup>28</sup> credit illud. Aliqua igitur de causa displicet ei credulitas<sup>29</sup> sua de hoc; haec autem causa aut videtur ei rationabilis et justa, aut non. Quod si sic, igitur<sup>30</sup> illud non videtur ei dignum fide, cum ex causa justa displiceat ei sua fides de hoc. Quare non videtur ei verum. Si vero non videtur ei causa illa justa et rationabilis ad amovendum eum et avertendum a fide seu credulitate illius, igitur propter illam causam omnino invitus credit.

Item omnis, qui credit aliquid, credit se<sup>31</sup> recte et vere credere illud; credit igitur aestimationem sive<sup>32</sup> credulitatem suam rectam et veram esse. Vult autem omnis homo omnem secundum animum aestimationem suam rectam et veram esse. Errorem<sup>33</sup> vero et deceptionem naturaliter fugimus sicut certitudinem et veritatem naturali amore et desiderio amplectimur. Ille igitur qui credit hoc, cum credit aestimationem suam rectam et veram esse de hoc, vult eam esse de hoc. Quare vult credere hoc. Si enim vult aestimationem suam semper esse [super esse] super id quod est verum et avertit eam fuga naturali ab eo, quod est falsum, sine dubio igitur vult se credere hoc cum credat hoc esse verum.

Item numquid non potest iste suadere sibi contrarium cum contrarium rationes habeat suae credulitatis? Cogitatio autem contrariorum rationum necessario fidem inducet contrarii. Cum igitur in voluntate sua sit vertere aciem animi sui ad rationes contrarii, in voluntate sua erit dissuadere sibi hic et suadere<sup>34</sup> contrarium sibi, aut saltem cogitare non omni rationi credendum et ad multa falsa fortiores esse rationes quam istud habeat.

Item jugi meditatione aliorum delere potest in se, saltem per oblivionem huiusmodi habitum vel per alias occupationes et sollicitudines. Quare omnino invitum credere impossibile est, quoniam nec cogitabat nec cogitare se patietur omnino invitus, credens de eo quod invitus credit. Si autem voluntati nostrae subditum est credere, voluntati autem lex posita esse non dubitatur. Per mediam igitur voluntatem ipse intellectus sub lege erit; igitur debitor oboedientiae.

Oboedientia autem nostrae voluntatis sibi solum vera est ubi nihil habet suum nostra voluntas, sed totum sibi vindicat voluntas iubentis. Si enim voluntatem suam explere quaerit<sup>35</sup> qui iussus operatur, non oboedit nisi ex oboedientia operatur et scilicet ex parte vel modo aliquo voluntatem suam explere quaerit<sup>35</sup> in tantum non oboedit in<sup>36</sup> quantum propria voluntas se ingessit. Cum igitur oboedientia alienae voluntatis pura et mera subjectio; perfecta autem oboedientia

<sup>27</sup> Cf. pp. 295 ff.

<sup>28</sup> invitus omnino B.

<sup>29</sup> credulita B.

<sup>30</sup> Om. B.

<sup>31</sup> sese A.

<sup>32</sup> seu B.

<sup>33</sup> error B.

<sup>34</sup> saundere B.

<sup>35</sup> Homoloteleuton B.

<sup>36</sup> Om. B.

perfecta totius hominis alienae voluntati subjectio. Haec igitur est abdicatio sui totius et traditio atque commissio alienae voluntati, et hoc est seipsum quodammodo deponere vel exuere vel excutere et alium induere. Perfecta igitur oboedientia est alterius quaedam assumptio seu induitio, sui ipsius quaedam negatio, alterius omnimoda confessio.

Quod autem istius subjectionis debitores sumus (22<sup>r</sup>) Deo dubitare non potest, nisi qui Deum fortasse dominum universorum dubitare potest. Si enim plenissimae jure dominationis dominus est universorum, si universa plenissimo jure sua sint, quis dubitare possit omnia esse debere ei subjecta? Quis dubitare possit omnia se tota debere ei voluntati et beneplacito, qua sunt totum et habent quicquid habent totum. Quia igitur omnia ejus sunt jure plenissimo justissimae dominationis, quid justius quam ut in omnibus voluntas ejus expleatur, quae utique nisi justissima esse non potest? Nihil autem contra voluntatem ejus in omnibus aut de omnibus fieri. Quod si contra voluntatem ejus aliquid in aliqua ex creaturis aut de aliqua sit, quis dubitet furtum esse et rapinam istam alienae rei usurpationem contra voluntatem domini? Quia igitur iniquitas et injustitia esse non dubitatur alienae rei sibi vindicare dominium et auctoritatem, quicquid in ea aut de ea faciendi contra voluntatem domini, palam est omnem usum creaturarum sive vires sive membra nostra sunt sive nos ipsi sive nostra praeter nos in voluntatem et beneplacitum Creatoris universaliter et singulariter dominantis convertendum.

Item si dubitari non potest nobis recte vivendum esse, vitam nostram totam rectam esse debere certum est. Rectum autem est quod a rectitudine regulae non discrepat; rectissima autem regula rectitudinis (213<sup>r</sup>) voluntas<sup>37</sup> divina est. Quare vita nostra in nullo discrepare debet a rectitudine divinae voluntatis. Ad ejus igitur rectitudinem dirigenda est seu corrigenda tota vita nostra. Quare divinae voluntati soli tota vita nostra subjienda est; tota igitur per oboedientiam regenda.

Item rectum est cujus media non exeunt ab extremis; extrema autem vitae nostrae sunt Deus, ejusdem principium et ejusdem finis.<sup>38</sup> Quare cum rectam oportet esse totam vitam nostram, in nullo debet exire ab extremis. Sicut igitur tota Deum habet principium, sic tota Deum debet habere finem. Quare sicut totum ab ipso vivimus, sic totum ad ipsum vivere debemus et totum ipsi. Ad ipsum autem non est via perveniendi nisi per viam ei placitam et gratam, quoniam non est ipsum obtinere seu adipisci nisi per viam suae largitionis. Ad largitionem autem ipsius non est via nisi per voluntatem ejus et beneplacitum. Quare tota vita nostra voluntate ejus et beneplacito moderanda et dirigenda est; tota igitur debet esse sua.

Item si ipse finis est totius vitae nostrae, quod utique esse jam non dubitatur sicut et initium esse non dubitatur, tota igitur vita nostra debet esse ad ipsum seu in ipsum; haec<sup>39</sup> enim, ut diximus, rectitudo ejus est. Non autem est in ipsum nisi et ipsa sit, cum enim tota ipsi debeatur, nisi tota ei reddatur, hoc est, si quid ei de vita nostra auferatur, injuriosa est et vitiosa et obliqua. Per injustitiam autem et vitium et obliquitatem non est ascensus ad eum ullo modo, quoniam omni injustitia tenditur in deorsum aut latus aut sistitur omnino a processu.

Item per injustitiam receditur a justitia, non solum quae via est, sed etiam a perfectissima. Quare nisi tota vita nostra ipsi vivatur, ad ipsum non tenditur tota vita, sed magis receditur ab ipso.

Jam igitur manifestum est non aliam viam veniendi humanae naturae ad finem suum ultimum et gloriam atque perfectionem suam ultimam nisi per

<sup>37</sup> Bis B.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Apocalypse* I, 8.

<sup>39</sup> hoc B.

oboedientiam, qualem quidem determinavimus. Hoc autem est qua Deo vivitur, qua ipsa tota vita alieno magisterio et voluntati tota traditur (23<sup>r</sup>), hoc est dominio, magisterio et voluntati, hoc est qua nihil contra Dei magisterium sentire, nihil contra dominationem seu voluntatem ejus facere velle, sed illaesum per omnia magisterium suum et dominationem ei relinquere. Haec enim duo sibi vendicat in *Joan. XIII.*<sup>40</sup> dicens: *Vos vocatis me magister et domine et bene dicitis, sum etenim.* Ejus igitur magisterio erudiendus, ejus ducatu dirigendus est intellectus noster; ejus coercione et moderatione regendus erit affectus noster. Quod autem indecentius intellectui nostro quam usurpare sibi sui ipsius magisterium et ducatum! Quod facit cum seipsum vult habere ducem, seipsum sequi. Quid injuriosius est quam Deum magistrum veritatis lucem et ducem veritatis abicere seque praeferre? Numquid non hoc est rectitudinem vitae incurvare et ordinem justissimum pervertere? An non est justum Deum in omnibus primatum et principatum tenere, an non est praeferenda Dei sapientia nostrae et Dei voluntas nostrae, ubi totum Dei esse non dubitatur, an dubitari potest quicquam contra Dei sapientiam fit stulte fieri, et quicquid contra voluntatem ejus fit injuste fieri, cum nec sapientiam ejus errare vel in modico nec voluntatem ejus non justam esse posse manifestum sit? Dic quae convenientior excogitari potest regula ad corrigendos errores intellectus quam Dei magisterium, quae ad corrigendas pravitates affectus nostri quam Dei voluntas! Quod si dixeris intellectum nostrum sufficere sibi nec egere Dei magisterio, dico quod etiam si hoc esset, necesse tamen habet ei vivere intellectus, cui se totamque vitam suam se debere non dubitat, et hoc idem de affectu nostro verum esse necesse est.

Item si seipsum habuerit ducem intellectus, Deo injuriosus est, qui totus ex Dei pondere dependet arbitrio. Non enim licet ei sui ipsius usurpare sibi ducatum aut magisterium, sicut vero affectui nostro sui ipsius usurpare dominationem.

Jam autem patefecimus in praedictis quod intellectus se duce non tendit nisi in tenebras; ubi tamen rectissime sibi in eodem videtur, hoc est per viam demonstrationis. Quoniam autem intellectus non credens Deo, eo ipso quod ei fidem non exhibet, cui absque ulla haesitatione fidem debet, a Deo per hanc ipsam injuriam recedit. Inde autem maxime injuriosus et<sup>41</sup> erroneus est quod de Deo non Deo soli credit quem sibi ipsi maxime notum esse necesse est, non attendens quod creator intellectus intellectum limitavit et finivit, terminos cognitionis ei ponens pro beneplacito suo, scribens in eo digito suo primas impressiones, et seminantibus cognitionum seminans illis utique, quibus voluit et quot et quantis et qualiter, et quod ex illis seminibus non potest altioris atque sublimioris scientiae seges excrescere, immo minor et ignobilior est scientia omnis, quae ex his colligitur, et inferior. Ipse autem intellectus necessario habet elevari supra semina illa primarum impressionum, si debet elevari<sup>42</sup> ad altum perfectionis suae et gloriae ultimae. Quare omnis cognitio qua elevatur, necessarior, nobilior et sublimior est ipsa cognitione primarum impressionum. A se autem nullam habere potest, quae non sit ignobilior et inferior, quoniam naturalium cognitionum et per inquisitionem acquisitarum nobilissima est illa seminalis et radicalis principiorum. Ex illis autem non potest supra illa; hoc certum habet. Ipse igitur cognitio qua proficit directe in altum suae perfectionis, et qua proximior fit suae luci datum est descendens a patre luminum. Et ad hunc modum est ostendere de his omnibus quibus proficit per se vis nostra motiva. (213<sup>r</sup>)

<sup>40</sup> *John* xiii, 13.

<sup>41</sup> *Om. B.*

<sup>42</sup> *Om. B.*



Similiter quippe illa seminata est suis seminibus quae sunt innatae nobis affectiones et principia ceterorum; de quibus aliquid suo loco dicimus.<sup>43</sup> Quare necessario sublimiores sunt affectiones, quibus ascendit super se et fit altior atque sublimior et melior virtus nostra motiva. Cum igitur omnis illustratio ejus donum perfectum descendens a patre luminum, quoniam ex causis, quae apud ipsam sunt majus ipsis causis esse non potest aliquid. Majus<sup>44</sup> autem oportet esse quanto maximo suo viciniis est idem est suae perfectior maximae. Nulla quippe causa potest per se in majus<sup>45</sup> se; secundum efficientiam dicitur, non secundum receptibilitatem veritatis.

Ex his igitur, etsi nulla alia essent a nobis super hoc dicta, palam est principia recte vivendi data optima et dona perfecta esse descendencia<sup>46</sup> a patre luminum.<sup>47</sup> Palam etiam est totius vitae nostrae decorem rectitudinem esse et hanc oboedientiam atque justitiam supra crebro nominavimus. Justitia quippe subditorum in praesidentes oboedientia est. Quanta autem turpitudine sit ibi esse magisterium, ubi disciplinatum solum esse congruebat, aut ibi esse dominationem, ubi subjectionem seu oboedientiam solam esse oportebat visus noster interior et aspectus lucidissime vident. Haec enim indecentia proprie est ordinatio<sup>48</sup> incongrua et incompetens, licet pulchrum sicut supra scripsimus.

Vides igitur turpitudinem intellectus proprie esse secundum duos modos,<sup>49</sup> aut carentiam et defectum ejus quod decebat ipsum habere, et hanc turpitudinem vocamus in eo tenebras ignorantiae, aut defectum certitudinis, ubi pro certitudine habet ignorantiam aut dubitationem aut opinionem.

Secunda turpitudine ejus est id quod habere non decet ipsum, quale vocavimus magisterium sui ipsius, quod utique turpissimum est, cum ejus contrarium discipulatum scilicet ipsum deceat habere. Sed et haec turpitudine est habere inferiorem cognitionem et ignobilem, ubi debebat haberi coelestis superior et nobilior. Per viam istam intelliguntur turpitudines virtutis nostrae motivae. Ex his autem facile erit ostendere quae sint et quot et quales perfectiones istae seu pulchritudines virtutis nostrae apprehensivae.

## XV

Sed resumamus sermonem iterum ordinantes ab altiori et dicamus quia postquam anima humana in medio duorum saeculorum ordinata est ordine suo naturali et creata est possibilis et in sursum et exaltari et proficere in gloriam perfectionis angelicae, sed hoc largitione et gratia creatoris sui, et iterum possibilis creata est trahi deorsum in saeculum sensibile, et hoc quidem totum in arbitrium ejus positum est hoc modo, ut praesto sit ei creator suus <ad> adjuvandum et largiendum perfectiones suas, quibus proficere possit in altum et quaesitum ei velut quaedam principia movendi<sup>1</sup> sursum motu spirituali, qui est approximatio ad perfectionem suam certissimam; et iterum praesto est ei saeculum inferius ut ei perfectiones ignobiles et indecentes infundat quae sunt ei velut quaedam principia movendi in deorsum et vocamus eas vitia, non autem quod ad hoc mundus iste inferior sit ut sit in laqueum et in ruinam et muscipulam animarum, sed ipsa convertit ipsum sibi in odium et tentationem et muscipulam sicut dicitur *Sap. IIII*.<sup>2</sup> Non enim in admirationem sui nos trahere intendunt (24') creaturae sua mirificentia<sup>3</sup> et decore, sed ad laudem et admirationem creatoris nos invitant quantum in eis est et ad amorem et reverentiam creatoris dum velut odorem pertenuem et vestigium divinae suavitatis<sup>4</sup> et

<sup>43</sup> Cf. pp. 290 ff.<sup>44</sup> inanis B.<sup>45</sup> descendena A.<sup>46</sup> Cf. *James* i, 17.<sup>47</sup> inordinatio B.<sup>48</sup> Cf. p. 262.<sup>1</sup> movenda B.<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Wisdom* xiv, 11.<sup>3</sup> mirificetia B.<sup>4</sup> summitatis B.

altitudinis in eis sentimus. Nos autem in eis sistimus constituentes eas terminos inquisitionum nostrarum et admirationum.

Similiter amorum et timorum cum deberent nobis esse viae; haec ergo principia motuum nostrorum spiritualium virtutes et vitia nominamus.<sup>5</sup> Quoniam autem non dubitatur nomen virtutis primum fuisse nomen fortitudinis, eo quod virtus audacia dicta sit;<sup>6</sup> deinde ampliant ad alias ex ea consideratione quod unaquaeque quaedam fortitudo sit. Ostendendum erit nobis qualiter unaquaeque fortitudo quaedam sit et contrarium ejus infirmitas.

Primum igitur attendamus illud quod stare in rectitudine sua fortiter et firmiter virtutis et fortitudinis est resistere impellentibus et casum intentantibus. Similiter iterum<sup>7</sup> sursum moveri et ascendere contra retinentes et in deorsum trahentes ampliusque in altum proficere, cum majores et plures et fortiores sicut retinentes et retrahentes majoris est fortitudinis. Si igitur in unaquaque virtute ad hunc modum se habet merito virtutis nomen unicuique congruere manifestum erit. Quia omnis virtus, omnis potentia invalescit exercitio sui debito, dico ubi autem majora et fortiora et plura sunt adversantia, ibi majus et melius et congruentius et magis debitum exercitium virtutis. Manifestum est quod diximus unamquamque scilicet virtutem fortitudinem tantam esse quae omni impugnatione sua et resistentia et adversatione crescit et proficit et invalescit. Et hujusmodi exemplum est in fortitudine bellica, quae tunc primum valet et invalescit cum adversantes et oppugnantes habet. Unde ut bene tu pugnes, bene pugnans efficit hostis. Hic igitur una causa est hujus nominationis qua virtus fortitudo quae omnis virtus nominatur. Alia vero causa est quod omnis virtus principium est per se dimicationis et belligerationis, id est defensionis et oppugnationis; unaquaeque namque hostes habet contra quos exercitum suum et aciem dirigit; quod suo loco explicabimus per singulas.<sup>8</sup> Hostes autem vocamus quicquid (214') virtutibus obsistit, quicquid profectum earum impugnare videtur, quicquid animas nostras praecipitare, in<sup>9</sup> inferiora autem illaqueare et<sup>10</sup> captivare in his potest. Hostes etiam vocamus daemonum catervas, quae nos undique velut obsident. Merito igitur fortitudo et virtus dicitur quicquid est nostrae defensionis principium et hostium nostrorum impugnationis atque subactionis aut mortificationis; quidam enim hostes occidendi sunt.

Quoniam autem jam palam est eum habitum virtutem esse qui est recte vivendi principium; recte namque vivere est<sup>11</sup> in perfectionis finem tendere sive proficere. Quia igitur finis nostrae perfectionis altissimus est, necesse est rectam vitam ascensionem esse et perfectionem in sursum. Quare manifestum est virtutes principia esse quaedam nostrae ascensionis ad gloriam nostram et finem nostrae perfectionis altissimum.

Ex his etiam manifestum est animas nostras sive nosipsos viatores institutos divina ordinatione et iter nostrae perfectionis aggressos aliquo modo per naturam ipsam et institutionem nostram primitivam, verumtamen nec passu uno proficere in altum posse, (24') nisi ex datis optimis et donis perfectis descenditibus a patre luminum, gradi quidem secundum rectum planum primitiva institutione nostra nati sumus et descendere et cadere, sed secundum rectum altum moveri, hoc est in sursum, non nisi per modum possibilitatis receptibilis; non enim principia movendi sursum nobis indita aut insita per naturam nostram etiam primitivam sunt. Et hoc ex sensu sumimus. Nota quippe sunt nobis principia et velut semina cognitionum nostrarum et impressiones primae, et quod ex illis possumus, sicut enim ex primis impressionibus nihil possumus magis

<sup>5</sup> Om. haec—nominamus B.

<sup>6</sup> Thus many classical authors; cf. *Theophrastus Linguae Latinae*.

<sup>7</sup> igitur B.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. pp. 294 ff.

<sup>9</sup> ad B.

<sup>10</sup> aut B.

<sup>11</sup> et B.

noscere<sup>12</sup> quam nosipsos aut contra nosipsos. Hoc autem inde manifestum quoniam omnis natura intendit quicquid intendit propter proprium subjectum. Ponderositas quippe nihil intendit acquirere nisi proprio subjecto; et ad hunc modum se habet de aliis. Quod si dixerit quod nonnumquam mater pro filio seipsam negligit et in hominibus et in animalibus, cum affectio amoris, quae hoc imperat naturalis tantum sit, attendit quod naturalis amor, qui movet matrem, ipsum filium suum reputat, sciat etiam quod amor iste amor multiplicationis ipsius subjecti sive speciei suae, et propter hoc non est intentio ista praeter intentionem acquirendi aliquid proprio subjecto.

Ostendamus autem quoniam virtutes quas nonnulli ex philosophantibus et acquisierunt et tractatibus disseruerunt, non fuerunt veri nominis virtutes nec recte veri vivendi principia, sed quemadmodum alba dicuntur quaedam, quoniam nihil [de] habere videntur ad comparisonem scilicet vitiorum et pravitarum et tortitudinum, quae apud nos abundant, et virtutes dixerunt eas comparatione infirmitatum nostrarum. Hoc enim habebant ipsa experientia vitia esse turpitudines, servitutes, aegritudines, imbecillitates sive debilitates animarum, quae omnia omnis intellectus refugit et omnis anima multo fortius in se quam proportionalia eorum in corporibus. Similiter et horum contraria necesse est amari quotiescumque agnita fuerint. Si enim proportionalia istorum amat humana<sup>13</sup> anima in corpore suo, multo fortius haec in se; hic est enim ordo naturalis dilectionis. Hujus autem signum est certissimum quod, qui interiora vident, exteriora aut parum aut nihil curant; qui enim virtutum decorem intueri sufficiunt, ista non mirantur; qui autem sola exteriora videre sufficiunt, sola exteriora mirantur. Hoc autem et ipsi dixerunt et scripserunt philosophi gentiles. Sumus enim, inquit, natura avidissimi appetentissimique honestatis.<sup>14</sup> Qualiter enim honestatem exteriorum, ut ita dixerim, amare et appetere nati sumus et non magis interiorum! Si enim amatur pulchritudo vestis quanto magis corporis, et si pulchritudo corporis, quanto magis mentis!

Item si pulchritudo vel aliud quodcumque bonum nostrorum diligimus, quanto magis nostri bonum quodcumque diligemus. Qui igitur hac intentione virtutes exquirebant propter seipsos eas exquirebant quia scilicet bona quaedam ipsorum eas esse videbant. Quare in hoc sibiipsis vivebant et in se excolendis et exornandis vitae suae studium expendebant.<sup>15</sup> Amor igitur sui principium erat apud eos omnia faciendi. Hae igitur sunt virtutes quas natura videtur peperisse; quae autem a natura procederent, in ipsam revertebantur. Vides igitur ex<sup>16</sup> his virtutibus naturam non exaltari supra se nec dilatari ultra (25') se; quare<sup>17</sup> nihil magnificari simpliciter. Vides etiam Deo auferri quod suum erat aut saltem non reddi, dum sibiipsis vitam propriam usurpabant, et eam suae exornationi impendebant. Sed quid etiam rectitudinis habere poterat, quae tota in se incurvabatur? Circulus enim et curvitas redditus est a se in se et ab eodem in idem; sed et hi seipsos vitae suae duces habuere; quod est alia vitae turpitudine ut jam patefecimus. Erant necessario descendentes in minus et minus cum profectu suo sive veritatem inquirentes per viam inquisitionis sive virtutem exquirentes per viam assuefactionis; minus enim necessario est habitus quam potentia qua acquiritur; sed revera consideratione turpitudinis contrariae pulchritudo videtur, cum tamen pulchritudo non sit absolute. Isti ergo sui cultores non Dei et sui exornatores intelligendi sunt. Et si quis perscrutativus attendat, nec laudem aliquam habet vita eorum nisi quis cultores corporum

<sup>12</sup> nosce AB.

<sup>13</sup> Add. in B.

<sup>14</sup> I have been unable to find such a quotation; cf. however Avicenna, *Meta.* VIII, 6,

fol. 100a, where the same idea can be found.

<sup>15</sup> expandebant B.

<sup>16</sup> Om. A.

<sup>17</sup> Om. B.

suorum laude dignos existimet etsi majori<sup>18</sup> laude quam hujusmodi cultores animarum (214<sup>7</sup>). Cultus quippe et exornatio et custodia debentur corporibus, sicut suos animarum cultus atque custodia debetur animabus.

Qui autem ex hujusmodi philosophantibus intellexerunt virtutes viam quandam esse ad beatitudinem et propter ipsum finem beatitudinis eas exquirendas esse putaverunt et exquisierunt? Siquidem hac sola de causa ea<sup>19</sup> exquesierunt ut majora virtutibus merito virtutum ipsarum reciperent,<sup>20</sup> sibi totam vitam tribuentes et in propria commoda intorquentes, Deo injuriosi fuisse videntur, dum velut negotiatores obsequia sua Deo vendere intendebant, non attendentes quia haec ipsa quae vendere intendebat non sua erant, sed Deo penitus debebantur. Quare Deo quae Dei jure plenissimo erant vendere conabantur et quae gratis impendere<sup>21</sup> tenebantur, venaliter impendere studebant quasi non esset Deo gratis obsequendum, serviendum, oboediendum, immo nullatenus nisi ipse servitores conduceret, sed isti ex avaritia et cupiditate sola Deo serviebant, immo sibiipsis, nec amabant nisi se. Si<sup>22</sup> igitur diligenter consideremus primi naturae terminos et limites non extendebant, isti vero, etsi excedere viderentur, ipsam tamen cedebant, nec ultra se amorem suum vel desiderium et intentionem extendebant, sed in seipsos curvabantur.

Sed et illud praetermittendum non est quoniam non congruit quemquam magistrum sui ipsius aut dominum esse nec in eodem magisterium esse et discipulatum aut servitutem et dominium ejusdem. Quod si intellectum humanum edoceri oportuit, quod ei melius et tutius magisterium quam divinum?<sup>23</sup> Si alieno dominio et ducatu regendus et moderandus fuit humanus effectus, quid vel dominio vel ducatu rectius quam divino? Quis enim melior eruditor intellectus humani quam Deus? Quis ei melior dux aut dominus excogitari potuit? Quod si Deum aut non curare, quod nefarium est cogitare, aut per se nolle hoc facere dixeris, jam patefecimus in praedictis quod omnes apprehensiones sive cognitiones, quae secundum se sunt via, et quibus inaltatur anima humana supra statum naturae suae, ut proximior per se sit suae perfectioni ultimae quibus, inquam, ut ipsis non secundum accidens, data optima esse descendencia a patre luminum. Sive autem immediate, sive per medium descendencia sunt non discutimus modo. Sed hoc solum sufficere manifestum est nobis in hoc quod ipsa nec sunt naturae magisterio acquisita, sed data datoris<sup>24</sup> universalis largitate.

Has igitur cognitiones tanto lucidiores et perfectiores esse necesse est inferioribus quae a parte rerum creaturarum acquiruntur animabus nostris, quanto lux prima purissima—(25<sup>7</sup>) quae<sup>25</sup> velut radii quidam sunt, ipse purior<sup>26</sup> lucidiorque est rebus, a quibus inferiores cognitiones velut umbrae quaedam intelligentiae nostrae speculum jaciuntur.

Item propinquiores ultimae cognitioni quae est gloria et beatitudo intellectus nostri, necessario<sup>27</sup> lucidiores et certiores; certissimo quippe et lucidissimo propinquius, certius lucidiusque esse necesse est. Hoc idem ex similitudine majori monstrabitur. Non enim desinunt paulatim assimilari hujusmodi cognitiones, proficientes per augmenta, donec fuerit quodammodo in perfectionem illuminationis nostrae ultimae sicut legitur *Prov. IV.*<sup>28</sup> *Semita justorum quasi lux splendens procedit et crescit usque ad perfectum diem.*

Item omnium duorum luminum illud est magis indubitanter, quod absorbet et<sup>29</sup> obfuscatur alterum. Cognitiones vero quae desursum sunt absorbent aut

<sup>18</sup> major AB.

<sup>19</sup> *Corr. from eas A.*

<sup>20</sup> receperent A.

<sup>21</sup> vendere B.

<sup>22</sup> Om. B.

<sup>23</sup> dominium B.

<sup>24</sup> datore B.

<sup>25</sup> quae AB.

<sup>26</sup> purior B.

<sup>27</sup> Om. B.

<sup>28</sup> *Proverbs* iv, 18.

<sup>29</sup> aut B.

obfuscant inferiores. *Unde absorti sunt juncti petrae iudices eorum.*<sup>30</sup> Omnes etiam cognitiones lucere desinunt ubi illae illuxerunt, quemadmodum luna et sidera omnia aut lucernae aut verius putredines lignorum et squamae piscium, ubi solaris fulgor<sup>31</sup> illuxerit, ubi lux illa prima velut radios cognitionum suarum sparserit, etiam quales recipimus eos modo per interpositionem<sup>32</sup> corporis et densissimam caliginem phantasiarum quibus involvimur et oculos nostros ad conspectionem verae lucis aperire<sup>33</sup> prohibemur. *Quod enim stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus* ut legitur *ad Cor. I.*<sup>34</sup> Hoc autem alibi latius ostendemus.<sup>35</sup>

Quoniam enim gratia media est inter gloriam et naturam, necessario<sup>36</sup> altior et melior modis omnibus est quam natura, alioquin non meliorem faceret naturam, nec inaltaret eam participatione sua. Quare sive cognitiones sive motiones spirituales sint, quae sunt gratiae, altiores et ultimae perfectioni, quae est gloriae, viciniore sunt quam ea quae sunt nunc<sup>37</sup> in nobis. Quare lucidius et certius videmus cognitionibus quae desursum sunt indubitanter quam eis, quae deorsum a parte rerum creatarum. Quanto quippe altior est cognitio, tanto certior atque lucidior. Et haec est causa quare cognitio principiorum lucidior et certior sit cognitione conclusionum. Hac igitur de causa cognitio omnis, quae superior est cognitione principiorum, lucidior et certior erit cognitione conclusionum! Hoc etiam vidit Aristoteles<sup>38</sup> qui dixit quoniam virtus omni arte certior et melior est. Et hoc utique etiam in illis virtutibus quas philosophi gentium videre et cognoscere potuerunt indubitanter verum est. Nos autem in virtutibus nostris faciemus hoc sciri.

Quod autem virtutibus eguerit intellectus noster, et quod natus est admirari virtutibus, ad hoc ut proveniat ad suam perfectionem<sup>39</sup> ultimam (215'), inde manifestum est quod bellum ei quemadmodum virtuti nostrae motivae; primum quidem contra seipsum; necesse quippe habebat Deo seipsum ex toto subigere, et quae sibi quodammodo innata erant exuere, alienum magisterium induere.

Secundum bellum imminabat ei contra errores qui rationibus humanis et sapientia mundi armati contra ipsum ex adverso stabant et ei mortem et obtenebrationem intentabant aut servitutem; qua subacta non posset credere nisi quae illi<sup>40</sup> imperassent. Obmitto ambiguitates, difficultates (26') inveniendi quod verum est, obscuritates undique quodammodo obsidentes et impugnantes<sup>41</sup> eam,<sup>42</sup> bella ista solus quem experientia docuit intellectus agnoscit. Familiiores autem sunt nobis concupiscentiarum et passionum virtutum motivarum molestiae in quibus, quae bella, quae certamina sint edoceri non indigemus.

Nunc ergo<sup>43</sup> si tibi videtur minus difficile intellectui humano<sup>44</sup> innatam credulitatem exuere quam affectui innatam voluntatem errare, te agnoscito. Multos quippe videmus propriam voluntatem exuisse, sed proprium sensum et credulitatem qui exuerint paucissimos experieris. An putas naturalia et innata aut quae usu et consuetudine invaluerint, facile evacuari aut vinci posse? Prima igitur difficultas quae vincenda proponitur intellectui nostro, innata credulitas aut assueta. Primum belli discrimen imminet ei contra seipsum ut seipsum quodammodo deponat et Deo subigat, seipsum velut pelle vetustae credulitatis exuat et novam quam Deus iusserit induat et seipsum in captivitatem redigat et in obsequium Christo Domino, cui totum debet. Quod est de hoc bello legis *ad Cor. II:*<sup>45</sup> *Nam arma militiae nostrae non sunt carnalia, sed potentia a Deo ad*

<sup>30</sup> Psalm cxi, 6.

<sup>31</sup> fulgur B.

<sup>32</sup> interpositum B.

<sup>33</sup> Om. B.

<sup>34</sup> I Cor. i, 25.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *De Universo Iallae*, 41; *De Anima* V,

11.

<sup>36</sup> necessior A.

<sup>37</sup> nec AB.

<sup>38</sup> 1106 b 14-5.

<sup>39</sup> perfectionem suam B.

<sup>40</sup> ille A.

<sup>41</sup> oppugnantes B.

<sup>42</sup> Refers to *intellectus*, probably understanding *anima* as the antecedent.

<sup>43</sup> igitur B.

<sup>44</sup> humano intellectui B.

<sup>45</sup> II Cor. x, 4.

*destructionem munitiorum, consilia destruentes, et omnem altitudinem extol-  
lentem se adversus scientiam Dei, et in captivitatem redigentes omnem intel-  
lectum in obsequium Christo. Omnia<sup>46</sup> ista quatuor debellanda se opponunt  
intellectui humano in Lucae II, IX.<sup>47</sup>*

Viam<sup>48</sup> ad nostram perfectionem ultimam ipse magis veritatis aperit paucis  
et bellum quod vianibus imminet aperte demonstrat. *Si quis, inquit, vult venire  
post me, qui utique rectissime ambulabit,<sup>49</sup> abneget semetipsum, tollat crucem  
suam cotidie et sequatur me.*

Quia igitur unaquaeque trium virtutum nostrarum naturalium necesse habet  
venire post ipsum, quoniam ad eum finem ad quem per se ibat, ut necessario  
unaquaeque negare habet semetipsam, unaquaeque cotidie tollere crucem suam,  
unaquaeque sequi ipsam. Qui autem negat se utique recedit a se et gerit  
seipsum liberum a seipso, in nullo<sup>50</sup> subditum sibiipsi. Hoc enim vulgariter  
negare aliquem dominum suum dicimus recedere, scilicet ab eo et liberum ab  
ejusdem dictione et dominatione se gerere, et in nullo sibi debitorem se gerere,  
hoc est primum intellectui nostro a seipso recedere in nullo sibi, hoc est nativae  
credulitati seu consuetudini subesse, sed omnino a seipso seipsum eximere et  
libertatem contra seipsum sibi vindicare, quasi in nullo debitor existat sibi ipsi,  
in nullo credere teneatur.

*Tollat cotidie crucem suam*, id est virtutem qua rebellantes sensus et rationes  
et cogitationes mortificet et omnia quae ipsum in sui ipsius dictionem et  
servitutem ipsum redigere moliantur. Semper quippe nova bella ab ipso contra  
seipsum ei recidunt, semper novi latrunculi velut a prudentia carnis missi  
jugi incursatione libertatem istam impugnant et servitutem intentant. Contra  
eos igitur armatum esse intellectum humanum necesse est et erectum<sup>51</sup> quodam-  
modo apud ipsum patibulum in quo configantur et mortificentur. Quod vero dicit  
postea: *et sequatur me*, hoc est, credat mihi. Illos enim sequimur quos credimus  
quasi me ducem suae viationis habeat, non<sup>52</sup> se. Hoc igitur totum est ut intellectus  
humanus seipsum abiciat ut incursantes et inquietantes latrunculos carnalium  
sensuum jugiter crucifigat. Non solum autem se, quem imitetur et (26°)  
circumdat, cui credat, habeat. In aliis autem viribus haec omnia palam sunt.

Jam igitur claruit intellectui humano ad altum suae perfectionis ultimae  
conanti bella multa et difficultates ex adverso consurgere. Quare necessario  
armandum ipsum fuisse virtute et roborandum manifestum<sup>53</sup> est. Quanta autem<sup>54</sup>  
fortitudinis sit seipsum expugnare et seipsum exuere, innata deponere et  
consuetudine rediviva naturalia aut consuetudine bello inexorabili persequi et omnino  
sibi ipsi bellum indicere adversus seipsum armari, seipsum persequi quis non  
videat? Quae igitur sit virtutum militia et quae bella et contra quos hostes  
jam clarum est, ✠ quoniam qua nos ipsos, quales nos sumus, ex qua corrupta, qua  
naturalia nostra et consuetudine, quibus nec nostrae corruptionis secuti sumus.<sup>54</sup>  
Intellectus igitur contra errores falsitatis et contra ignorantiae tenebras et  
horum suffragantia atque sequelam bellum in ipsa sua ad Deum conversione  
suscepit vis concupiscibilis contra noxias delectationes et harum concupiscentias  
et desideria necnon et sequelam et suffragia earum. Vis vero irascibilis contra  
passiones et perturbationes et omnino contra omnem indebitam dilatationem aut  
magnificationem sui ipsius et sequelam et suffragantia earum.

Vitia autem vel a vincendo quoniam nonnisi eorum, qui turpitudinibus victi  
sunt, assignantur, aut ab eo quod est *vis* et<sup>55</sup> *cario* sive *cupio* dicta merito quis

<sup>46</sup> Om. B.

<sup>47</sup> Luke ii, 34; ix, 23.

<sup>48</sup> nam B.

<sup>49</sup> ambulabat A.

<sup>50</sup> neque ullo B; corr. from neque ullo A.

<sup>51</sup> Om. B.

<sup>52</sup> Add. autem B.

<sup>53</sup> Om. B.

<sup>54</sup> Corrupt passage; no plausible emenda-  
tion seems evident.

<sup>55</sup> Om. B.

arbitretur, sed et aegritudines pro eo quod naturam (215') humanam laedunt et debilitant et operationes ejus perturbant et servitutes quae vires naturales tributarias sibi faciunt et consuetudinibus durissimis premunt et ad alta suarum perfectionum ascendere et volare non sinunt.

Vim autem apprehensivam nostram quinque virtutibus armari oportere inde manifestum erit, quoniam<sup>56</sup> quinque ei bella ex adverso<sup>57</sup> consurgunt. Primum bellum est circa exteriora nostra quae sunt sermones et opera et temporalium administratio quaecumque. In his igitur vim nostram impugnant exterior pulchritudo et turpitudine quas solas carnales considerant et laudant aut vituperant. Haec igitur honestas exterior<sup>58</sup> et turpitudine, quas exterioribus his dediti solas judicant et mirantur, et bonitatem et malitiam vocant, vim nostram apprehensivam seducere consueverunt et ad sui approbationem abstrahere vel reprobationem.

Contra hujusmodi igitur fallacias muniri oportuit vim nostram apprehensivam et contra earum impugnationes lumine<sup>59</sup> verae cognitionis ut interiora intuitu penetraret,<sup>60</sup> et robore protectionis ut his insultibus resisteret. Hanc autem virtutem prudentiam vocamus, quae et contra fallacias hujusmodi mentem illuminat et contra suasiones et opiniones roborat, ne facile aut omni spiritui credat et omni vento doctrinae circumferri eam permittat.<sup>61</sup> Hac igitur nihil esse pulchrum dinoscimus nisi quod Deo placere, nihil turpe nisi quod Deo displicere novimus, nihil prudenter fieri nisi cujus effectiorem regit et moderatur Dei sapientia, quae sacris eloquiis omnes vere prudentes erudit.

Est igitur prudentia haec scientia moderandi exteriora sua secundum Deum; hoc est visus judicativus et discretivus verae pulchritudinis et verae turpitudinis eorum quae ex nostra voluntate sunt, quoniam sola pulchritudo interna delectat, sola turpitudine interna offendit, et directio opposita prudentiae carnis, quam sola honestas et turpitudine exterior aut delectat aut offendit. Haec autem oppositio in affectionibus spiritualibus et carnalibus manifestior est. Inde amorem carnalem, quae carnis sunt amat amico suo, et quae spiritualia bona sunt amico (27') non considerat ullo modo. Amor vero spiritualis, quae spiritualia bona sunt,<sup>62</sup> optat et quaerit amico. Quae carnalia sunt omnino non curat nisi forte, si adjuventur eis spiritualia, aut<sup>63</sup> defectu eorum laedantur et impediuntur.

Ad hunc modum se habent prudentia carnis et spiritus prudentia. Altera quippe<sup>64</sup> solam pulchritudinem spiritualem internam aut turpitudinem considerat; altera vero solam carnalem exteriorem quam caeci extimatores soli mirantur. Quod exemplo uno manifestum fiet. O quam pulchrum est monstrari digito et dici: Hic est haec prudentia! exterior dicit prudentia, non vero interior. O quam pulchrum est audire, adeo *vox tua, vox dulcis et facies tua decora!*<sup>65</sup> *Ostende mihi faciem tuam.*<sup>66</sup> O quam turpe est derideri ab hominibus dicit prudentia carnis! O quam turpe est derideri a daemonibus dicit prudentia spiritus! O quam pulchrum est placere hominibus dicit prudentia carnis! *Confusi sunt qui hominibus placent quoniam Deus sprexit*<sup>67</sup> eos, et ego si hominibus placerem, Christi servus non essem.<sup>68</sup> Ambo ex prudentia spiritus locuti sunt.

Vide igitur quomodo prudentia carnis mors est virtutis nostrae apprehensivae quantum ad haec. Nonne si visus noster exterior non posset videre nisi nigra, quoad<sup>69</sup> alba<sup>70</sup> mortuus esset? Esset igitur semimortuus. Sic igitur vis nostra apprehensiva mortua est quoad interiora, cum illa apprehendere non valeat, sed

<sup>56</sup> quod B.

<sup>57</sup> Add. ei B.

<sup>58</sup> Om. B.

<sup>59</sup> lumen B.

<sup>60</sup> penetra et B.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* I, 43, 153; I John iv, 1.

<sup>62</sup> Add. sive interna sunt A.

<sup>63</sup> autem A.

<sup>64</sup> quippe altera B.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *Canticle of Canticles* ii, 14.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Exodus* lxxiii, 13.

<sup>67</sup> *Psalms* lii, 6.

<sup>68</sup> *Galatians* i, 10.

<sup>69</sup> Om. B.

sola exteriora videt; quod si<sup>70</sup> nec exteriora ut sunt et vere, plus est quam semimortua.

Apostolus<sup>71</sup> autem ubi vitam nominat aut<sup>72</sup> mortem, vitam aeternam aut spirituales et mortem aeternam vel spirituales plerumque vult intelligi, quoniam de eis maxime est ei sermo, quoniam ad congruentiam suae intentionis ea vocabula intorquet, quemadmodum et omnes disciplinarum doctores ad commodum suum adoptant vocabula; hic autem inde mortem innatae aut consuetae nobis aestimationis sive credulitatis de superveniente vivifica prudentia et quasi tenebras diffugas infusa luce prudentiae. Lucebant quippe nobis quaedam et lucem ac pulchritudinem affectabant, et hoc dum nox esset apud nos aut tenebrae caecae extimatores extimationis nostrae; sed ortu verae et internae lucis quam prudentiam<sup>73</sup> dicimus, cum ipsa nocte et tenebris extimationis nostrae dilucescente die prudentiae, qualia essent, illuxit nobis, verbi gratia florere in mundo, placere hominibus et gratiosum esse inter homines pulchrum iudicabat nostra credulitas, et seipsam lucem aestimabat ipsa credulitas nostra. Sed dilucescente nobis luce prudentiae, quae desursum est, omnia haec quibus lucem quodammodo et pulchritudinem praebebant nostrae tenebrae, instar putridorum lignorum quibus ut luceant praebent noctis tenebrae, qualia essent secundum veritatem nobis claruit, et quod ipsa credulitas nostra, qua prius ut luce utebamur, sequentes eam tenebra esset et non lux, ubi adjuvamus etiam exemplo avium noctis, quibus lux videtur tenebra et e converso, et nox dies et e converso.

Est igitur nostra credulitas ante illuminationem prudentiae ut visus noctuarum perversus et secus; post illuminationem vero prudentiae velut visus est avium diei aut humanus. Quaecumque quippe in mundo lucent nobis, ex nostris tenebris nobis lucent, quod visus sanus et dies clarior, ut diximus, ostendunt. Largitas quippe humana exterius consideratur (216<sup>r</sup>) rantibus et largitas videtur et pulchritudo; interius vero considerantibus in die et luce prudentiae aut negatio est dum per eam vanae laudis acquisitio intenditur, aut rapacitas,<sup>74</sup> dum aliis debita aliis largiuntur. Hujusmodi igitur largum pulchrum iudicat (27<sup>r</sup>) prudentia carnis et laudabilem. Hoc autem totum, ut diximus, ex tenebris interius<sup>75</sup> est quas prudentia carnis patitur. Ad hunc igitur modum de pulchritudine seu honestate exteriorum operum nostrorum non externe, sed interne prudentia dijudicat. Est igitur lumen ejus circa tenebras interiores, quas diximus, et acies aspectus ejus ad interna semper directa.

Fortitudo vero illius est contra innatae aut assuetae nobis credulitatis susurria, contra<sup>76</sup> vaniloquiorum<sup>77</sup> opiniones et verba et suasiones et omnia, quae pulchritudinem exteriorem suadere nituntur et omnia, quae pulchritudinem exteriorem suadere nituntur et credulitatem nostram in exterioribus, qualia diximus, hoc est, qualia amatores exteriorum considerant, figere et detinere nata sunt.

Jam igitur ex his clarum est prudentiam esse fortem et luminosum habitum exteriora nostra, hoc est sermones et opera, interne dijudicans, exteriores suasiones refellens atque debellans. Exteriores autem suasiones voco eas quae internam dijudicationem prohibent et interiorem pulchritudinem, aut turpitudinem suadent. Vide autem et hoc qualiter ratio nostra et intellectus practicus noster seipsum merget et lucem internam sequatur et qualiter crucem atque patibulum erectum apud se habeat ubi latrocinantem credulitatem, quae veritatem ei furari molitur fallacibus suggestionibus suis, jugiter affigit atque mortificet. Ideo autem primam ponimus hanc prudentiam quoniam primum nati sumus

<sup>70</sup> Om. B.

<sup>71</sup> *Romans* viii, 6.

<sup>72</sup> non B.

<sup>73</sup> prudenam A.

<sup>74</sup> capacitas B.

<sup>75</sup> exterius B.

<sup>76</sup> et B.

<sup>77</sup> vaniloquorum B.



videre et dijudicare exteriora nostra, scilicet sermones<sup>78</sup> et opera, et primum nata est seducere nos exterior pulchritudo, sed et opiniones et suasiones humanae circumferre nos et dimovere.

Est autem prudentia quasi prodentia dicta ab eo quod est *prodere* sive *manifestare*; quae enim latet turpitudine sub exteriori pulchritudine prudentia manifestatur et proditur, et vice versa pulchritudo, quae sub exteriori plerumque latet turpitudine, prudentia proditur et palam fit. Quod autem haec sit prudentia quam sacra creberrime loquuntur et laudant eloquia ipsis sacrorum eloquiorum testimoniis clarum erit.<sup>79</sup> Qualiter enim verum est quod scientia sanctorum prudentia est ubique revera sancti interna vident, ut diximus, et norunt! Et hoc est proprie scientia sanctorum internae scilicet pulchritudinis seu honestatis, quae sola veri nominis honestas cognitio. Malorum vero scientia quid est nisi error, quoniam de exteriorum consideratione concipiunt? Nos autem illud datum optimum, quod ipsum nomen etymologia sua et vi exprimit, prudentiam vocandum merito arbitramur, ceterarum cardinalium lucem et ducem.

Error quippe circa exteriora dux est vitiorum omnium et quodammodo lux. Haec igitur prudentia longe est a prudentia, quae vulgo dicitur peritia, de experientia longa et multa casualium atque fortuitorum et de his, quae frequentius ab hominibus et inter homines fieri frequentius solent. Plurimum enim experti prudentes nonnumquam dicuntur,<sup>80</sup> sed hoc quasi prudentes. Ex his enim quae experti sunt provident, id est procul vident et praevident quae evenire aut consueverint aut possint. Sed hoc quidem etsi adjuvare<sup>81</sup> possit honestatem, nec tamen honestas est nec pars honestatis ullo modo.

De ea vero quam diximus quin et lumen sit et virtus apprehensivae virtutis nostrae dubitationem habere non debet, quemadmodum si quis quaerat utrum prudentiam affectionem dicamus aut apprehensionem, dicimus quia prudentia et apprehensio et affectio est simul et in una vi rationabili, alioquin non esset in ea aut desiderium aut (28<sup>o</sup>) delectatio. Delectationem<sup>82</sup> autem in unaquaque vi fieri et esse ipsa definitio delectationis clarum facit.

Est enim delectatio conjunctio convenientis cum conveniente sive perceptio rei quae naturalis est virtuti apprehendenti. Certum autem est<sup>83</sup> quia et veritas et pulchritudo intelligitur . . . sive interna naturales sunt visui interiori, quae est vis rationabilis nostra sive intellectus. Quare conjunctio ejus in his est necessario delectatio, nisi aut infectio aut tale aliquid delectationem prohibuerit, sicut in febricitantibus infectio salivae prohibet delectationem gustus a cibo.

Item sicut delectatio ex aspectu pulchritudinis visibilis sit in visu exteriori et ex conjunctione eorum invicem, necesse et interiori visu similiter se habere ut pulchritudo intelligibilis delectet, quidem sanatus fuerit, alioquin scimus hoc esse non posse sicut et in exteriori visu se habet.

Item si nihil est natum conjungi pulchritudini nisi visus, per modum, dico, quo est pulchritudo visibilis, nihil est per eundem modum delectabile pulchritudine nisi visus exterior. Ad hunc modum se habet de interno visu et interna pulchritudine. Quod si quis dicat quia non possunt unum esse numero affectio et apprehensio sive motus et apprehensio, nihil tamen prohibet ex uno habitu utrumque esse sicut et e converso se habet, quod una est bonitas in bono quocumque a qua et est lumen apprehensionis et delectatio affectionis, sic ex uno habitu virtutis est et lumen cognitionis et sapor affectionis. Quod in sapientia et sapore manifestum est, et in gustu et habitu. Quis enim dubitet in

<sup>78</sup> sermones scilicet B.

<sup>79</sup> Prudentia occurs about 70 times in Sacred Scripture with approximately the meaning given it by William of Auvergne.

<sup>80</sup> dicimur B.

<sup>81</sup> adunare B.

<sup>82</sup> delectatio B.

<sup>83</sup> Om. B.

gustu aut ex gustu esse simul et saporis cognitionem et ex eodem delectationem. Quod si hoc in habitibus naturae non miramur, nihil in hujusmodi habitibus, qui sublimiores et potentiores sunt debet videri mirabile. Si quis autem in amore aut alia affectione inseparabilem apprehensionem quae ibi est, et affectionem, unum et idem esse, cognoscere sufficiat, non dubitabit<sup>84</sup> hic; nulli enim dubium est amantem omnem in affectu<sup>85</sup> apprehendere aliquo modo amatum, sed revera non alio quam amore ipso, quoniam solo amore movetur. Quiescentibus apprehensivis omnibus et generaliter omni (216<sup>v</sup>) affectione necesse est apprehendi ipsum in quo<sup>86</sup> est affectio. Quid enim dixisset Aristoteles,<sup>87</sup> ubi dixit omni arte certiolem et meliorem virtutem, nisi virtus ex seipsa certitudinem haberet? Si igitur omni affectione necesse est apprehendi id ipsum in quod est motus affectionis, nec est opus affectionem alia apprehensione, tunc dico, cum est motus ejus, alioquin quomodo in rem aliquam esset affectionis motus nisi, ut ita dicam, luminosa aut lucida esset cognitione aliqua ipsius rei in quam est motus ejus. Sed et ideo quoniam affectiones intimiores, ut ita quis autem dubitet aliquem posse esurire et de cibo aliquo non cogitet, cogitatione, dico, apprehensiva nuda? Sed revera cogitat de cibo non alia cogitatione quam sit esuries nec alio lumine videt cibum, magis tamen certius videt esurie cibum ipsa, quam visu, et intimius bonitatem ejus sentit. Quod si ita liquido est in affectionibus ut ipsae apprehensiones quaedam quodammodo affectiones, et in his quidem<sup>88</sup> non amplius immorabimur.

Sed hoc non dubitetur ipsam prudentiam habitum esse, et velut visum interna (28<sup>v</sup>) pulchritudine delectabilem tantum instar exterioris visus, et ipsum ad delectandum non alia vi vel habitu egere sicut nec exterior visus alio habitu aut viget ad hoc, ut pulchritudine<sup>89</sup> exteriori delectetur. Nec ibi aliud est delectatio subjecto et essentia quam visio ipsa, sicut neque exterius quoniam unus est visus in quo fit operatio visionis, et ab uno pulchro scilicet, et per unam pulchritudinem videlicet, et ideo unum necesse est esse quod recipitur in uno et ab uno et per unum. In visu igitur sano impossibile est apprehensionem pulchritudinis aut honestatis tantum apprehensionem esse. Et in contrario similiter se habet. Sed necessario erit delectabilis aut offendens aspectum sive interiorem sive exteriorem. Nomen vero affectionum sibi vendicaverunt et nomen motus vires motivae quia hoc est in eis principale et primum moveri et acquirere id, in quod est motus, et est<sup>90</sup> etiam pluribus; nihilominus tamen apprehensivae motivae sunt ad ea ad quae nata sunt movere et moveri. Unde enim est<sup>91</sup> illud desiderium, quo omnes homines natura scire desiderant?<sup>92</sup> Nonne cujus est motus et quies et acquisitio finis necessario? Quia igitur finis motus et quies hujus motus, hoc est scire, apprehensivae virtutis nostrae est, necessario et motus ille desiderium cujus est finis ipsum scire. Deinde si moveri non potest in finem illum vis apprehensiva nostra, quomodo in illum perveniet?

Item motus et quies ejusdem sunt necessario, quies autem desiderii delectatio est. Delectabitur igitur vis apprehensiva nostra in scientia et erit scientia delectabilis<sup>93</sup> et concupiscibilis. Quare erit ei conjungibilis et acquiribilis et nata fieri in ipsa. Quod si scientia delectari non potest eam vim cui sola nata est conjungi et quae nata est in ea fieri, multo minus igitur aliam relinquitur ergo illud desiderium scientiae esse in vi apprehensiva nostra. Et hoc est quod quaerebamus.

Omnes igitur et apprehensivas vires nostras quodammodo motivas esse, et

<sup>84</sup> dubitat B.

<sup>85</sup> effectu A.

<sup>86</sup> quod A.

<sup>87</sup> 1106 b 14.

<sup>88</sup> quidam AB.

<sup>89</sup> pulchritudini B.

<sup>90</sup> Om. B.

<sup>91</sup> est enim B.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Aristotle 980 a 21.

<sup>93</sup> delectabile AB.

hoc motu spirituali, palam debet esse ex his, et omnes motivas apprehensivas<sup>94</sup> quodammodo esse, id est cognoscitivas et luminosas. Sed apprehensivae quasi radiis veritatis illuminantur quos deferunt rationes et argumenta causae et signa consequentia et comitantia. Motivae vero ipso rerum sapore qui dividitur in bonitatem et malitiam et indifferentiam, ut diximus, verum motivae, non lumen, quaerunt a rebus, in quantum motivae sunt, neque in illuminatione quiescunt, in quantum est illuminatio, sed bonitas, in quantum bonitas est. Quae quidem non quaeritur ab eis ut agnoscatur, sed ut habeatur per modum quo haberi eam congruit. Haec igitur sunt quibus differunt apprehensivae absolute et motivae vires nostrae et apprehensiones et affectiones, et his modis est prudentia et lumen circa tenebras errorum et exteriora obnubentia internam pulchritudinem exterioris conversationis nostrae. Cujus venatrix est prudentia et virtus et principium et ars belligerandi circa impugnationes nativae nostrae credulitatis et suasiones caecorum<sup>95</sup> mundialium. Ex uno igitur habitu sunt hujusmodi illuminatio et hujusmodi<sup>96</sup> belligeratio, ut diximus. Et hoc non est inconveniens ab uno igne esse simul calorem et lumen, et quanto quaelibet vis sublimior est, tanto operationibus affluentior et innumeriosior.

<sup>94</sup> *Om. B.*<sup>95</sup> *ceterorum B.*<sup>96</sup> *Om. B.*

## Mediaevalia

### I. Andreas Capellanus: Discovered or Re-Discovered?

PREFACED to the list of the two hundred and nineteen propositions condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, on the seventh of March 1277, is a specific condemnation levelled against an anonymous book entitled "*De Amore*" sive "*De Deo Amoris*".<sup>1</sup> In a fairly recent article, Msgr. Martin Grabmann definitely linked this apparently hitherto anonymous work to Andreas Capellanus.<sup>2</sup> To his knowledge, it had never been previously identified.<sup>3</sup> A colleague, Professor Paul Lehmann, had drawn his attention to the already edited *De Amore libri tres* of Andreas and a comparison of its *incipit* and *explicit* with those of the condemned book proved their identity. Just the previous year, Msgr. Grabmann had had occasion to refer to this condemned treatise in the course of a study devoted to a group of unpublished thirteenth century ethical commentaries that betrayed Averroistic teachings.<sup>4</sup> He had noted there that the author was unidentified and, as he confessed later, he had failed to identify Andreas as its author because he thought that the work was contemporary with the condemnation and because Andreas' *De Amore* was usually assigned to the twelfth century.<sup>5</sup> M. Gorce, too, had failed to identify the author of the condemned treatise. He had suggested that the specific condemnation of those propositions dealing with sexual morality was designedly against the latter half of the *Roman de la Rose* by Jean de Meun. It seemed to him, then, that the "*De Amore*" sive "*De Deo Amoris*" of the condemnation was in reality the *Roman de la Rose*.<sup>6</sup>

The name of Andreas had long been associated with the condemned book. When Msgr. Grabmann's article first appeared, some forty years had passed since the decree of condemnation had been edited by Denifle and Chatelain. In their edition, at the very point where the words *Librum etiam "De Amore" sive "De Deo Amoris"* occurred, the editors had entered the following note:

Iste liber exstat in Bibl. Amplon. Fol. n° 50, fol. 123-160. Bibl. nat. Paris ms. lat. 8758, fol. 1; Bibl. de la faculté de médecine de Montpellier, n° 217, fol. 1. Quantum ad edd. aliaque cf. *Hist. litt. de la France*, XXI, 320 sqq. Brunet, *Manuel du libraire*, 5 ed., I, 267. Auctor libri nominabatur magister Andreas, et verisimiliter tempore Stephani episcopi Parisiensis vivebat.<sup>7</sup>

It was likely the latter part of the editors' note that misled Msgr. Grabmann into thinking that the author of the condemned book was contemporary with the decree of condemnation. However, they did supply in the first part of their

<sup>1</sup> Edited Denifle and Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I* (Paris, 1889), p. 543 and P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle II* (Louvain, 1908), p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Das Werk *de Amore* des Andreas Capellanus und das Verurteilungsdekret des Bischofs Stephan Tempier von Paris vom 7. März 1277, *Speculum VII* (1932), 75-79.

<sup>3</sup> Weder H. Denifle noch P. Mandonnet, welche das Verurteilungsdekret des Bischofs Stephan Tempier ediert haben, haben über dieses Werk sich geäußert. Dasselbe ist meines Wissens bisher nicht identifiziert worden. *Art. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Der lateinische Averroismus des 13.

Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung, *Sitzungsberichte der Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., phil.-hist. Abteilung*, (München, 1931), 75-76.

<sup>5</sup> *Speculum VII* (1932), p. 77. Msgr. Grabmann had suggested that the anonymous treatise was written in French rather than in Latin. *Ibid.*, p. 76 and 'Der lateinische Averroismus', p. 75, note 3.

<sup>6</sup> La lutte *Contra Gentiles* à Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, *Mélanges Mandonnet I* (Paris, 1930), 241-245; *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie ecclésiastique, art. Averroïsme V* (Paris, 1931), col. 1069.

<sup>7</sup> *Ed. cit.*, p. 557, note 8. The note does not appear in Mandonnet's edition.

note references that might have led to the identification of this Master Andreas as the Andreas Capellanus, author of the *De Amore libri tres*, and to the identification of the anonymous work with this treatise. One of the manuscripts referred to in their note identifies Andreas as Andreas Capellanus, chaplain to the royal court of France:

Liber de arte honeste amandi, editus et compillatus a magistro Andrea, Francorum aulae regiae Capellano; ad Galterium amicum suum cupientem in exercitu amoris militare; in quo quidem libro cuiuscumque gradus et ordinis mulier ab homine cuiuscumque conditionis et status ad amorem sapientissime invitatur, et ultimo, in fine ipsius libri, de amoris reprobatione subjungitur.<sup>8</sup>

Another manuscript lacks the name of the author entirely but adds the useful information that the book is divided into a threefold division: *Liber de honeste amandi trium generum scilicet plebeiorum, nobilium, nobiliorum.*<sup>9</sup>

Now if we turn to the article referred to by the editors in their note, we find that Claude Charles Fauriel had qualified Andreas as chaplain to some pope, king or queen from the information furnished by the manuscript he used in preparing his article: *Bibl. nat. Ms. lat. 8758*.<sup>10</sup> He had contented himself with assigning Andreas, chaplain to the royal court of France, to the end of the twelfth or to the beginning of the thirteenth century.<sup>11</sup> Before giving an analysis of Andreas' text, Fauriel had indicated another view held by Du Cange<sup>12</sup> and Fabricius,<sup>13</sup> arrived at by internal evidence, to the effect that the Andreas in question was chaplain to the royal court of France and had lived about the year 1170. Rayounard, too, had shared in that view.<sup>14</sup>

While Msgr. Grabmann, then, may have been the first to make the identification as explicitly as he does, and while he may have been prevented from making it earlier due to the erroneous information supplied by the editors of the decree of condemnation, in all justice to the same editors, it should be pointed out that they had given in the same note clues which had they been followed, might have led to an earlier identification of the anonymous book with the treatise on love by Andreas Capellanus.

A. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

## II. Ambrose on the *Praecursor Angelicus*

IN an interesting discussion of three famous ivory triptychs, one preserved in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, the second in the Museo Cristiano of the Vatican,

<sup>8</sup> *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae, Pars Tertia, t. IV*, (Paris, 1744), p. 491. The description of the manuscript is reproduced by M. Raynouard, *Choix des poésies originales des troubadours* II (Paris, 1817), pp. lxxxix-lxxxii.

<sup>9</sup> *Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften - Sammlung zu Erfurt* (Berlin, 1887), p. 42, ed. Wilhelm Schum. The explicit of the Amplonian manuscript differs from that of the condemned treatise. It is a fragmentary copy and breaks off at the end of the Eighth Dialogue. Its *explicit* corresponds to the

*detegit impudicam* of the Paguès edition. Cf. *Andreae Capellani De Amore libri tres*, ed. Amadeu Pagès (Castello de la Plana, 1930), p. 127.

<sup>10</sup> 'André le chapelain, auteur d'un traité de l'amour', *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXI (Paris, 1895), p. 320-332.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 321.

<sup>12</sup> *Glossarium ad Scriptores Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis* (Frankfurt a. Mainz, 1681), Index Auctorum, col. 84.

<sup>13</sup> *Bibliotheca Latina Mediae et Infimae Aetatis I* (Florence, 1858), p. 86.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. lxxxix.

and the third in the Louvre, E. Kantorowicz<sup>1</sup> compares the place of St. John the Baptist in these triptychs with his position in the Gallo-Frankish *laudes*. The three ivories display a so-called *deisis*, that is the intercessory supplication offered up before Christ by the Virgin and John the Baptist. Explaining the role of the Virgin and St. John as intercessors nearest to the Lord, the author states:

Mary and John the Baptist had one feature in common in the Greek and Oriental rites; they were the only human beings believed to dwell in the angelic world. To be correct, the Virgin ranked higher than the angels, as she is praised time and again, in the Eastern Mass "more honorable than the Cherubim, and beyond compare more glorious than the Seraphim." St. John however is glorified because "he alone appeared on earth as an angel incarnate." He "participates in the ethereal dignity," for when he baptized the Lord angels assisted him as celestial acolytes, and he performed the services in an angelic way though still within his human life.<sup>2</sup>

E. Kantorowicz refers here to Sophronius, *Encomium in St. Joannem Baptistam*, c. 19 (PG 37; 51-52BC) and to Cyril of Alexandria I, 6, (PG 73; 105-106C). "It is inferred" he says, "by the polemic of Paschasius Radbertus that this conception of the Precursor as an angel was known also in the West and probably at the Frankish court as well."<sup>3</sup>

As a matter of fact this conception was known in the West as early as the fourth century, in other words long before Sophronius and even before Cyril of Alexandria. The series of mystagogical catecheses which is known under the title of *De sacramentis*, contains the following passage:

Ubi corpus Christi, ibi et aquilae volare consuerunt, ut terrena fugiant, caelestia petant. Quare hoc dico? Quia et homines angeli, quicumque adnuntiant Christum, et in angelorum adscisci videntur locum. Quomodo? Accipe Baptistae rationem. Iohannes natus erat ex viro et muliere; attamen audi, quia angelus est et ipse; Ecce mitto angelum meum ante faciem tuam et praeparabit viam tuam ante te. (Matt. xi, 10)<sup>4</sup>

Since *De sacramentis* is now regarded to be an authentic book of St. Ambrose,<sup>5</sup> he can be credited with having the same conception of St. John the Baptist as Cyril of Alexandria and Sophronius had in the East. Paschasius Radbertus made ample use of *De sacramentis* in the Eucharistic controversies in which he became involved and therefore knew these words of St. Ambrose very well.

JOHANNES QUASTEN,

Catholic University of America.

<sup>1</sup>E. Kantorowicz, 'Ivories and Litanies', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 5 (1942), 56-81.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 72.

<sup>4</sup>*De sacramentis* 1, 2, 7 (p. 140 ed. Quasten).

<sup>5</sup>Cf. G. Morin, 'Pour l'authenticité du *De sacramentis* et de l'Explanatio symboli de S. Ambroise', *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft* 8 (1928), 86-106. O. Faller, 'Was sagen

die Handschriften zur Echtheit der sechs Predigten S. Ambrosii de *Sacramentis*?' *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), 11-65. The same, *Ambrosius, der Verfasser von De Sacramentis. Die inneren Echtheitsgründe* (Innsbruck, 1940). R. H. Connolly, 'The *De sacramentis* a work of St. Ambrose', *The Downside Review* 177 (1941), 1-13. J. H. Srawley, 'The *De Sacramentis* a work of St. Ambrose', *Journal of Theological Studies* 44 (1943), 199-200.

## III. How Judicare Came in the Creed

THE Middle English *Choristers' Lament*<sup>1</sup> offers us a humorous and touching account of the woes of embryo singers. In the course of the poem one of the young monks, Walter, seeks out his friend William, tells him his own difficulties, and bids him "wel to spede." William answers:

"God it wot . . . þer-of haddi nede  
Now wot i qwou Judicare . was set in þe crede,"

and proceeds to outline his own sorrows as a chorister.

The meaning of this reference to Judicare in the Creed is obscure, and it appears that any attempt to ferret it out might depend on a collection of such occurrences as one can muster. Those which have come to my attention follow, arranged in such chronological order as our knowledge can approximate.

(1) About 1350-80? The *Choristers' Lament* as cited.

(2) About 1401. *The Reply of Friar Daw Topias* [to Jacke Upland]. The friar hurls the common charge of being friend to Antichrist back at his Lollard antagonist:

Jak, of perfite pacience holilich  
holy chirche thou me prechist,  
to kep it if I will sitte  
on Cristis owne side,  
but, good Jak, herdist thou evere  
how judicare cam into crede?  
no more skil thou canst of paciens, Jak,  
so God me spede,  
ffor thi schreude herte and he  
ben as afere asundir  
as Lucifer is from heven  
and Gabriel from helle.<sup>2</sup>

(3) First quarter of fifteenth-century (Manuscript of about 1450-1500). In the *Flagelacio* or "Scourging", play XXII of the Towneley mystery cycle, a typically mediaeval Pilate says to the soldiers who are holding Jesus:

"Syr, looke ye take good hede  
his cloyse ye spoyll hym fro,  
ye gar his body blede  
and bett hym blak and bloo."

"Secundus tortor" answers with a significant piece of anachronism and distorted theology:

<sup>1</sup> Carleton Brown and Rossell Hope Robbins, *The Index of Middle English Verse* (New York, 1943), no. 3819; see the edition by F. L. Utley, *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 194-202.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Wright, ed., *Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, Composed during the Period from the Accession of Edw. III. to that of Ric. III* (London [Rolls Series], 1861), II, 58. The three "poems" which compose this controversy are not listed by Brown and Robbins, since

they are unrimed, unmetrical, and can only by a very elastic imagination be termed alliterative. *Jack Upland's Rejoinder*, printed by Wright below the *Reply*, contains what may be an allusion to the passage quoted:

"Whe have leve of scripture  
to deme after mennes werkes,  
but for to deme as thou dost,  
is to robbe God of his power;  
ffor the apostil saith,  
Noli ante tempus judicare, quoadusque  
veniat Domini."

"This man, as myght I spede  
that has wrought vs this wo,  
how 'Iudicare' comys in crede  
shall we teche, or we go,  
All soyne."<sup>3</sup>

(4) Late fifteenth-century Manuscript. In the carol, *A Hen-pecked Husband's Complaint*, the husband's helpmate eats and drinks all he earns, beats him, and allows him no protest:

Yf ony man haue svch a wyfe to lede,  
He schal know how 'iudicare' cam in the Cred;  
Of hys penans God do hym med!  
Carfull ys my hart therefor.<sup>4</sup>

(5) Late fifteenth-century Manuscript. The following headless poem, printed in full, uses the phrase as a refrain:

For þi self, man, þou may see,  
How iudicare come in crede.

And þou prowde man in þi pres,  
Ful mody & of ful mykyl myght,  
With dereward dayntes dere on dese  
þou sett not by no symple wyght.  
Yytt shal þou com to reknyng ryght,  
þof þou be neuer so sterne on stede.  
þer-for be-thynk þe both day & nyght,  
How iudicare com in crede.

And þou combred man in Couetys,  
Thys worldys welth þou wold fayn hafe wynne:  
Thynk on Jhesu, þat hy justice;  
He syttys & sees al owre synne.  
Yf we haf oght þat wrong is,  
In byttur bayles it wyl vs brede;  
We shal a-counte for more & mynn,  
Syn iudicare come in crede.

And þou lecherus, þat is so leve  
In luste for to lede þi lyfe,  
Hyt shal þe turn to grete greve;  
þe dome shal com, þou shal down dryfe.  
þou shall a-counte for maydyn & wyf,  
Yf þou hafe spylt þam of þare spede:  
And þere-fore thynk, man, if þou wyl thryfe,  
How iudicare comes in crede.

And þou gloton, þat neuer is glad,  
To þou be ouer-ful [of fode],

<sup>3</sup>George England and Alfred W. Pollard, ed., *The Towneley Plays* (London [EETS 71], 1897), p. 247. I owe this and the Gascoigne reference to Professor Bartlett J. Whiting. The phrase does not appear in the corresponding portion of York or the other cycles, and it is just such a colloquial touch as might have been added by the "Wake-

field Master", whose work is commonly assigned to a period roughly between 1400 and 1425.

<sup>4</sup>Richard L. Greene, *The Early English Carols* (Oxford, 1935), p. 272; Brown and Robbins, no. 210; to their references may be added F. L. Utley, *The Crooked Rib* (Ohio State University Press, 1944), no. 20.



Hyt shal þe rekken of þi rede,  
And turn hyt shal þen þi mode.  
þi sawle þou does ful lytyl gode;  
In byttur bayles þou can hyt bryng:  
þat shal þou sore rew by þe rode,  
When iudicare comes in crede.

For-thy my menyngys to yow I make  
Of al þat euer bare blode or bone.  
Ylk man for hys synns sake  
Shal com to þat dome by on & by one.  
Cryste vs bryng to hys wone,  
Os he on rode for vs wolde blede.  
Thus herd I a clerke þe soth expone,  
How iudicare com in crede.<sup>5</sup>

(6) Among John Heywood's *Proverbs* (1562 or earlier; first edition of 1546 not consulted), in a marital context resembling somewhat that of *A Hen-pecked Husband's Complaint*, appears the following couplet:

I am taught to know, in more haste than good speed,  
How Iudicare came into the Creede.<sup>6</sup>

(7) In George Gascoigne's "Epistle to the Yong Gentleman," which was printed in his *Posies* (1575), the poet answers certain of his critics: "The faults they finde are, *Iudicare* in the Creede: Chalke for Cheese: and the cōmon infection of Love. . . . [These carpers] when they can indeede finde none other fault, will yet thinke *Iudicare* verie untowardlye placed in the Creede."

With such a variety of citations at our disposal, we might expect to squeeze a good deal of blood out of this particular turnip. Yet no very clear pattern of meaning emerges at a glance, and all we may venture in view of contexts which fail to provide a clear denotation is to assemble certain agreements in connotation which seem to strike our eye.

Several of the passages suggest that the phrase bears some relation to the virtue of patience. The hen-pecked husband obviously needs patience, Jack Upland is charged with the lack of it, and the chorister William seems to have learned monastic patience to his sorrow. The speaker of Heywood's proverb has done something in an impatient and hasty manner, and his resultant bad luck is equivalent to learning how Iudicare came into the Creed. A conjectural restoration of the moral poem which uses the phrase as a refrain will confirm this interpretation. The poem is organized around the Seven Deadly Sins, three of which are missing. Perhaps we may assume that three stanzas comprised the lost beginning, devoted to Wrath, Envy, and Sloth. Wrath with its corrective virtue Patience<sup>8</sup> may well have been the subject of the first stanza, which would have ended with an appropriate reference to Iudicare. Significant in this connection is the very early Christian statement

<sup>5</sup>Karl Bülbring, "Über die Handschrift Nr. 491 der Lambeth-Bibliothek," *Archiv. . . . der Neueren Sprachen*, LXXXVI (1891), 387-88; Brown and Robbins, *Acéphalous Poems* no. 30.

<sup>6</sup>*The Proverbs, Epigrams, and Miscellanies of John Heywood*, ed. J. S. Farmer (London, 1906), p. 20. The "good speede" of this proverbial example may well be an integral part of the idea, for it is the turning point of the *non sequitur* jest in the

*Choristers' Lament* and may also be echoed in the Towneley passage. It may, however, be merely a product of the exigencies of rime.

<sup>7</sup>*The Complete Works of George Gascoigne*, ed. John W. Cunliffe, (Cambridge, 1907), I, 10.

<sup>8</sup>See Walter W. Skeat, ed., *The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman II* (Oxford University Press, 1924), 72.

by Tertullian that impatience, father of all sins, cannot be indulged in after the Incarnation *sine iudicii periculo*.<sup>9</sup> It looks as though our late fifteenth-century poet set out to moralize a colloquial phrase which usually had a worldly and humorous significance, and that his view of a contribution to the subject was to apply the phrase to each of the other sins, as well as to the appropriate one, Wrath.

One question demands study: was the phrase customarily used in the past or in the present? If present, as in the refrain poem, it might mean simply "how the section *inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos* appears in its proper sequence in the Apostles' Creed." To say that a man knows how *Judicare* comes in the Creed would mean in general that he *knows* his Creed, that he rightly performs his religious duties and realizes their significance, that he knows "how to die" and how to be prepared for the day when Christ will come to judge the quick and the dead. As President Greene, the one person to my knowledge who has commented on the expression, says, this is probably the "serious and proper sense" of the phrase,<sup>10</sup> though it is not necessarily the original meaning. This serious sense is related to the common notion that *inde venturus est iudicare* was "put in the creed to remind men daily of their accountability for all their acts." Greene refers to an important passage in the *Commentarius in Symbolum Apostolorum* of Rufinus Aquilensis (ca. 345-410), the famous friend and enemy of St. Jerome. The passage deserves quotation:

Quod autem veniat iudicaturus vivos et mortuos, multis quidem divinarum Scripturarum testimoniis edocemur. Sed prius quam propheticiis haec eloquiis praedicta doceamus illud necessarie arbitror admonendum, quod ista fidei traditio quotidie nos vult de adventu iudicis esse sollicitos, ut actus nostros ita praeparemus, tanquam reddituri imminenti iudici rationem.<sup>11</sup>

Rufinus continues with the explanation that both soul and body will be judged on Doomsday.

This early patristic view helps to tell us why a man must learn how *Judicare comes* in the Creed. But four out of our seven citations allude to how *Judicare came* or "was set" in the Creed. Considering the rather facetious nature of these four examples, we presumably cannot interpret the phrase as a sober historical allusion to the composition of the Apostles' Creed.<sup>12</sup> It seems likely rather that there was once a story which gave weight and piquancy to the expression. Such a conjectural story might well have posited as its central character some impatient or otherwise sinning mortal who, in the midst of his daily vice, learned from a saintly, angelic, or divine visitation the true meaning of *inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos*. Such a story is exactly what we might expect in a Preachers' Manual or a Book of Sermons. If the story is extant I can only say that I have not located it. It is also possible that we are dealing with a truncated Wellerism which might go this way: "I learned in haste how *Judicare* came into the Creed, as the profane monk said when the convent roof fell on his head." I haven't located the Wellerism either.

<sup>9</sup> *De Patientia* v-vi; PL 1, 1369-71. Friar Daw Topias's allusion to impatience dividing the hosts of heaven and hell recalls Tertullian's "Igitur natales impatentiae in ipso diabolo deprehendo, jam tunc cum Dominum Deum universa opera quae fecisset, imagini suae, id est homini, subiecisse impatenter tulit" (*ibid.* 1367).

<sup>10</sup> *Early English Carols*, p. 433.

<sup>11</sup> PL 21, 368-69.

<sup>12</sup> Towneley may be an exception to the

use of the past for dramatic reasons. The anachronism is bold enough as it stands, but it would be worse if a past temporal relation were expressed. The whole problem of just what sort of dramatic irony was intended in the play is difficult for a modern reader to solve. Gascoigne's clipped phrase tells us nothing about tense, and the refrain-poem, as we have seen, may be a departure from the basic sense.

But the proverbial type known by this name is much older than the *Pickwick Papers*; Archer Taylor has allowed us a taste of several from ancient and mediaeval sources.<sup>13</sup> The story, exemplum or Wellerism is of course a mere guess on my part; further search may, however, confirm the guess, and help to clear up the meaning of the puzzling past tense.

Professor Bartlett J. Whiting has offered me his own impression that "to learn how Judicare came in the Creed" means to receive sudden and unexpected instruction in the obvious. Pursuing this interpretation, we may cite a simpler phrase to which the Judicare element may well have been a fourteenth-century addition. A hasty search has provided me with five examples of the simpler phrase. The first three of them are from Laurence Minot (1300?-1352?), a belligerent poet who followed the fortunes of Edward III.

(1) *The Siege of Calays* (written after September 2, 1347):

Calays men, now mai ye care,  
And murning mun ye haue to mede;  
Mirth on mold get ye no mare;  
Sir Edward sall ken ye yowre crede.

(2) *The Battle of Neville's Cross* (after October 17, 1347):

When sir Daudid þe Bruse . satt on his stede,  
He said of all Ingland . haued he no drede;  
Bot hinde Iohn of Coupland . a wight man in wede,  
Talked to Daudid . and kend him his crede.

(3) *The Taking of the Castle of Gynes* (after January, 1352):

Gentill Iohn of Doncaster . did a full balde dede,  
When he come toward Gines . to ken þam þaire crede.<sup>14</sup>

(4) Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde* (1380-86). Troilus has taken leave of his beloved, and turned homewards on his horse without the courtesy of a goodbye to Diomedes or the other Greeks. For a man of such gentility this impoliteness betrays the passion which a courtly lover should hide,

Of which the sone of Tideus took hede,  
As he that koude more than the Crede  
In swich a craft.<sup>15</sup>

(5) Towneley *Processus Crucis*, where the Third Torturer says of Jesus:

"And so shall I with all my myght,  
Abate his pride this ylk nyght,  
And rekyn hym a crede."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *The Proverb* (Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 200-220. The phrase we are studying does not appear in a number of continental collections which I have consulted, and it is notably absent from the recent valuable treatise of Samuel Singer, *Sprichwörter des Mittelalters* (Bern: Herbert Lang et Cie, 1944-46), of which two volumes have appeared and a third is promised. Singer covers the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; our examples suggest a fourteenth-century origin for the phrase. Professor Hans Sperber tells me of a current Viennese proverb: "Er ist hineingekommen wie [Pontius]

Pilatus in's Credo [variant in der Glauben]", which might be freely translated "He's been sticking his nose in where it doesn't belong."

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Hall, ed., *The Poems of Laurence Minot* (3rd ed., Oxford, 1914), pp. 27, 32, 35. See Hall's note, page 91.

<sup>15</sup> Robert K. Root, ed., *The Book of Troilus and Criseyde* (Princeton University Press, 1926), p. 321 (v. 85-91). Root comments (p. 532): "Creed, Pater Noster, and Hail Mary are the first rudiments of an education. Diomedes is no schoolboy."

<sup>16</sup> England and Pollard, pp. 259-60.

This simpler expression, *to teach one his creed*, appears to have lived on in Scottish dialect, where the word *creed* means "A severe rebuke, a 'lecture'."<sup>17</sup> The phrase is clearly a memory of the mediaeval boys' school; teaching one his creed means teaching one the most elementary of all lessons, obedience. Joseph Hall cites a French analogue, examples of which could no doubt be multiplied: *Bien vous aprent vo patenostre*.<sup>18</sup> The version quoted from Chaucer has a special ironic flavor; Diomedes's creed is akin to "the olde daunce" which the Wife of Bath knew so well. But Chaucer's ironic leap depends upon the more common meaning.

Sudden instruction in the obvious was certainly not absent from the fourteenth-century grammar school, and that such instruction was normally of a sharply physical nature goes without saying. However the word *Judicare* may have intruded into the simpler proverb, it is likely that it always retained a suggestion of physical punishment. Of some interest in this connection is a story from the *Chronicon* of St. Antonino of Florence (1389-1459). A certain Dominican novice of Spoleto marvels that God is said to be of such great stature that He could hold the world in His hand, and prays to know the truth of this matter. He is granted a vision of Christ as Judge:

[The Lord] bade read the evil deeds [of the world]; and these were so many that He loathed to hear them all; but, falling into a sudden fury, He seized the world as though it were a tennis-ball, and cast it violently down, saying: 'When it is judged, let it be condemned and cast away!'

The Blessed Virgin intervenes, and says

'O Son, suffer this world which Thou hast redeemed with Thine own blood to be judged once again [*judicare* for *judicari*]; for now I have set forth my [Friars] Preachers to recall the world to Thee.' Marvellous and most stupendous to relate! for, even as that novice cried aloud, there followed an earthquake throughout the city and the whole country round about, so that many towers and buildings were thrown to the ground, and men and women fled forth that night from the city.<sup>19</sup>

This anecdote offers evidence that the words *judicare* and *justice* manifest in this period little of the temperate spirit that they have acquired in a Pelagian and humanitarian modern world. Justice usually meant punishment, clear and simple, because that was the kind of "justice" that man merited. In Godefroy, for instance, the first two meanings of *justise* are "punition" and "exécution"; only with "droit de justice", "jurisdiction", "juge" "vertu morale" and "tribunal" do we approach something like the modern abstraction.<sup>20</sup>

The familiar allegory of the Four Daughters of God (Justice, Peace, Truth and Mercy)<sup>21</sup> is only one of the many literary and artistic occasions on which Justice is opposed to Mercy as it is in the anecdote from St. Antonino. That the opposition is early is shown by the bald words of the Peterborough continuation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, where under the year 1137 the chronicler says

<sup>17</sup> Four examples in Joseph Wright, *The English Dialect Dictionary* (6 vols., London, 1896-1905), I, 784. Wright suggests connection with *screed* (Old English *scréade*, which is also the ancestor of the more southerly *shred*). Unless we assume some later contamination between phonetically similar forms, this would conflict with my derivation from Latin *credo*, Old English *créda*.  
<sup>18</sup> *Poems of Laurence Minot*, p. 91 (from the thirteenth-century *Wistasse le Moine*).

<sup>19</sup> I have been unable to consult the original. The translation is from G. G. Coulton, *Life in the Middle Ages*, IV, (4 vols. in one, New York, 1925), 216-217.

<sup>20</sup> Frédéric Godefroy, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancienne Langue Française*, IV, 678; X, 55-56 (10 vols., Paris, 1880-1902).

<sup>21</sup> See Hope Traver, *The Four Daughters of God* (Philadelphia [Bryn Mawr College Monographs VII, 1907]).

of Stephen the Usurper: "þa the suikes undergaeton ðat he milde man was . and softe . and god . and na iustise ne dide, þa diden hi alle wunder."<sup>22</sup> A similar emphasis upon the inevitable execution of justice, as contrasted to the balanced process of judgement, is apparent in canon law. A gloss to Gratian reads: *judicare potest maritus uxorem corrigendo eam . . . sed non verberando eam.*<sup>23</sup> Perhaps the most striking example of this older meaning which I have encountered is from Froissart's *Chronicle*: *Avant ot il fait moult de grans mauls et de crueuses justices des nobles de son roiaulme.*<sup>24</sup> That some of these old meanings still cling to the root-words may be seen in our word "prejudice", in our common phrase "rough justice", in the Spanish *juzgado* (dialectal American "hoosegow"), and in what is at any rate the common proverbial interpretation of "Judge not, that ye be not judged".

We must reckon, then, with a meaning of the phrase "to learn how Judicare came in the Creed" which recalls the atmosphere of the mediaeval boys' school, with its swift visitations of justice in the form of scolding and flogging. Such a meaning best fits our five facetious quotations: it is the presumable implication of the Heywood proverb; it explains the remark of the schoolboy and chorister William; it shows how our hen-pecked husband finds every day a time of Judgement;<sup>25</sup> it sheds light on the threat of Friar Daw Topias that the impatient Lollard Jack Upland will too soon find what Judgement can mean, while Topias himself is sitting comfortably at Christ's own side and laughing at Jack's plight; finally it adds to the dramatic complexity of Towneley's Second Torturer, whose abysmal ignorance contrasts with the faith of the audience, which knows well now, as the suffering Christ did then, how Judicare comes in the Creed. I regard this facetious explanation as the basic one: our feeling for wit and the agreement of five out of seven examples, three of them at least earlier in time, constrain us to assume that the late fifteenth-century refrain poem is a kind of distorted pious parody of the original humorous phrase. This last explanation does not rule out the others. To receive a sudden instruction in the obvious is bound to increase our store of patience as it did that of the mediaeval schoolboy, and it is bound to make us careful of our daily acts in anticipation of the Coming of the Lord.

FRANCIS LEE UTLEY,

Ohio State University.

<sup>22</sup> Benjamin Thorpe, ed., *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle I* (2 vols., London [Rolls Series], 1861), 382. The late Professor Kenneth G. T. Webster once commented on this passage by saying that justice in Scotland meant "hanging".

<sup>23</sup> *Decretum of Gratian*, C. 7, q. 1, c. 39, *judicari*. Father T. P. McLaughlin of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies has drawn to my attention a well known text transmitted through all the canonical collections since the fifth century which shows clearly the dual meaning of the word *judicare*, process of judgment and punishment. It is from the Prophet Nahum, i, 12. The Septuagint version is rendered thus: *non judicabit Deus bis in idipsum*, whereas the Vulgate has: *Afflizi te et non affligante ultra*. The verb used in the Hebrew signifies in fact both *judicare* and *vindicare*. A Syrian collection of Canons of the Apostles about the year 400, translated by Dionysius

Exiguus about 500, contains the text in this form: *Non vindicabit Dominus bis in idipsum*. The text is found at least four times in the *Corpus Juris Canonici* (*Decretum of Gratian*, C. 13, q. 2, c. 30; D. 81, c. 12; D. 3, *de poenitentia*, dicta following c. 39 and 42). The edition of Friedberg shows that the manuscripts vary in the use of either *judicare* or *vindicare*. The text became famous through St. Thomas Becket's use of it to support his contention that a cleric should not be tried again by the lay courts after having been tried and degraded by the ecclesiastical court.

<sup>24</sup> Quoted by Godefroy, IV, 678. I have been unable to consult an edition which corresponds to his reference.

<sup>25</sup> As President Greene saw (*Early English Carols*, p. 433). Probably this is a variant of the conventional remark that marriage is a hell on earth, or at least purgatory (see Utley, *The Crooked Rib*, p. 269).

#### IV. An Ingot in Foreign Exchange

MOST lexicographers are in agreement that the French word *lingot* is derived from the English *ingot*, but their arguments are so tenuous that one is inclined to treat that contention as a wide-spread myth. The chronological data in themselves ought to suffice to cast doubt upon the accepted history of this word and of cognate words.

Laborde<sup>1</sup> gave 1467 as the date when *lingot* entered the French language with the date of 1440 for the Latin *lingotus*, although Du Cange himself had made it clear that *lingotus* was merely a servile copy of the French model. The editors of the *Dictionnaire Général*, which takes the date of 1405 from an unpublished manuscript of Delboulle, and Miss Pope<sup>2</sup> put *lingot* in the same phonetic category with *lendemain*, *lendit*, *loriot*, *luette* where the article has attached itself to the substantive. Gamillscheg,<sup>3</sup> who assigns *lingot* to the fifteenth century, and Meyer-Lübke<sup>4</sup> are of the same opinion. Godefroy's *Complément*, vol. X, p. 85a, advances the date to 1392. It was indeed strange for Bloch<sup>5</sup> to announce that the Judaeo-French *langot*<sup>6</sup> existed prior to any other example of *lingot*. Apparently he misjudged the date of the dictionary which bears the siglum G; its composition can not be dated precisely, but surely it was sometime in the fourteenth century. In preparing his *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*, which appeared in 1932, Bloch sought examples of words in early works. One of them was the *Miroir historial*; in it he came across a passage containing *lingot*. Its exact year of composition is also unknown, but it is safe to say that Jean de Vignay wrote it about 1333. Dauzat, in his dictionary which bears the same title as that of Bloch and which appeared in 1938, takes that date from Bloch; he too treats *lingot* as a probable agglutination of *l'ingot*, borrowed from the English *ingot*.

Now these lexicographers have not even considered the possibility that *lingot* might reflect the counterpart of the phenomenon which makes the article agglutinated to certain nouns beginning with a vowel, i.e., apheresis or the fall of the initial *L* by confusion with the article. It is true that such a fall is comparatively rare. The calculation of its frequency made by Cross<sup>7</sup> suffers from haste; to the fifteen words which he put together one can add fifteen others extracted by Thomas<sup>8</sup> from French literary and dialectal sources. Nevertheless the percentages worked out by Cross suffice to show that in the Romance languages the initial consonant falls less often than the initial syllable which, in turn, falls less often than the initial vowel. As for our particular problem, Meyer-Lübke has mentioned elsewhere the Latin *lingua* merely in order to explain that it drops its initial consonant to form *enwa* in the dialect of the valley of Bagnes.<sup>9</sup>

The foisting of French *lingot* as a loan-word from English *ingot* has sometimes led to results inadvertently facetious. By his analysis of *lingot* alone, Génin has justified completely the title of his opus:<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Glos. fran. du moyen âge à l'usage de l'archéologue* (Paris, 1872).

<sup>2</sup> *From Latin to Modern French* (Manchester, 1934), §606.

<sup>3</sup> *Etym. Wörterbuch frz. Sprache* (Heidelberg, 1928).

<sup>4</sup> *Rom. etym. Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1935), art. 4425 *ingot*.

<sup>5</sup> *Bulletin Soc. Ling. Paris* XXXIV (1933), p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> *Recherches lexicographiques sur d'anciens textes français d'origine juive* (Baltimore,

1932), art. 533.

<sup>7</sup> *PMLA* XLIX (1934), p. 998.

<sup>8</sup> *Mélanges d'étym. fran.* (Paris, 1927), p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> *Grammatik rom. Sprachen*, I (Leipzig, 1890), §§428-430. His source is J. Cornu, *Romania* VI (1877), p. 396, who lists *enwa* as one of fifteen cases of the apheresis of initial *L* in this Franco-Provençal dialect.

<sup>10</sup> *Récréations philologiques*, I (Paris, 1858), p. 104.

"Ce mot vient de l'anglais (et d'où pourrait-il mieux venir?); les Anglais disent *ingot*, et depuis longtemps, car dès le douzième siècle Chaucer s'en servait; il est trois fois dans les contes de Canterbury, comme on peut s'en assurer dans le glossaire de Tyrwhitt, qui l'interprète: moule à fondre les lingots. L'étymologie est évidente: *got*, du verbe *to get*, et *in*, couler dans. Nous devrions dire, avec apostrophe, *l'ingot*, *un ingot*; mais continuant un vieux péché d'habitude, nous y avons mis deux articles pour un, nous disons *le lingot*, *un lingot*.

Génin made Chaucer live in the twelfth century; although the exact year in which he composed the Canterbury Tales is not known, it was not before 1386. Charbot (who died in 1722) offered this commentary on *lingot* as used in Dauphiné: *Masse de métal jeté en fonte; ce mot n'est pas ancien dans notre langue, ce qui en rend l'étymologie d'autant plus difficile qu'il n'a aucun rapport avec les autres langues . . . Peut-être de "Berlingottum" par aphérèse.*<sup>11</sup>

Charbot was going far afield to find the source, but his quest remains praiseworthy. In the case of English *ingot*, I also see at work the phenomenon of apheresis in a loan-word taken from French *lingot*. Bloch was very circumspect in his dictionary; he preferred to exercise a scientific control in concluding that the origin of *lingot* is as doubtful as that of *ingot*. In a more independent vein Scheler,<sup>12</sup> while admitting his incompetence for refuting the etymology accepted in his day for *ingot*, treated *lingot* as a

dérivé du latin *lingua*, langue, lequel . . . avait, dans la bonne latinité déjà, dégagé des acceptions diverses se rapprochant de celle de *lingot*<sup>13</sup> . . . En attendant des preuves plus concluantes de l'étymologie prêtée à *ingot*, nous pouvons tout aussi bien prétendre que le mot anglais est le mot français avec retranchement de l'article, d'autant plus qu'on a en anglais le mot *linget*.

As for English *linget*, it is simply one variant among several. The *NED* adopts the French spelling *lingot* in the heading of this term, which is obsolete in English today. Its orthography was *lingatti* in 1488, *linget* in 1605, *lignate* in 1670, *lingat* in 1697, but *lingot* in nine examples between 1540 and 1868. Generally it had the meaning of "lingot" but, in the two examples which the *NED* gives for 1540 and 1686, it denoted "*lingotière*."<sup>14</sup> That takes us back to the idea of "*lingotière*" attributed to *ingot* as used by Chaucer about 1386 and by Randle Holme in 1688. The latter example, taken from *The Academy of Armory*, serves as a bridge, so to speak, between the two articles: "an *ingot* or *lingate*." One should not deduce that these forms competed concurrently for two hundred years: rather one is reminded thereby that, during the fifteenth century, no instance of *ingot* is attested in English at all while *lingot* was being used often in French. Even though the *NED* accepts the date of 1405 attributed to *lingot* by the *Dictionnaire Général*, its phonetic refutation is quite tenable:

<sup>11</sup> Dict. étym. de la langue vulgaire qu'on parle dans le Dauphiné (Grenoble, 1885), pp. xxxviii and 306.

<sup>12</sup> Dict. d'étym. fran. (Bruxelles, 1888).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. A. Ernout-A. Meillet, Dict. étym. de la langue latine (Paris, 1939), s. v. *lingua*: "Désigne tout objet en forme de langue ou en contact avec la langue."

<sup>14</sup> There is a homonym which is defined as "the strap of a shoe" by J. Wright, *The*

*English Dialect Dict.* (London, 1898). In Lancashire it is pronounced *lingot*, whereas the form *langot* heard in Cheshire reminds one of the Judaeo-French gloss cited above. I wonder whether this dialectal term is an echo of Latin; both *lingua* and its derivative *lingula* had as one of their many denotations, "la languette, l'oreille dans un soulier" or "the strap of a shoe".

"French *lingot* is held by some French etymologists to be adopted from English, with coalescence of the article, for *l'ingot*. The origin of a term of alchemy (as this evidently was) in English is not a priori probable . . . Those who assume an English origin suggest a derivation (not unapt as regards the sense) from *in* adverb and *goten*, ancient past participle of Old English *géotan*, Middle English *yheten*, modern dialectal *yett*, to pour, to cast (metal). Here there is the difficulty that the past participle *goten* was conformed to the rest of the verb, as *yhoten*, *yoten* before the 14th century; the hard *g* might perhaps have been retained in an old compound . . . , but even in that case we should have expected an original final vowel, giving Middle English *ingote*. The existing evidence is thus too contradictory for any certain conclusion."

The fact that neither *\*ingote* nor *\*inyot* has ever been discovered has not hindered Skeat<sup>15</sup> and Weekley<sup>16</sup> from accepting the Anglo-Saxon derivation. As far as I know, Noah Webster<sup>17</sup> was the only lexicographer of the English language to seek the origin of *ingot* in *lingot* < *lingua*. That equivalence is very old among French lexicographers. Some two hundred and fifty years ago Ménage proposed the same derivation by metaplasm. The prejudice engendered by his fantastic examples of metaplasm, e.g. *haricot* < *faba*, may account for the reluctance of modern etymologists to heed his advice in this matter. Diez<sup>18</sup> was inclined to adopt the Anglo-Saxon origin, but he realized that that would make the semantic development of *ingot* very illogical: it entered English about 1386 in the sense of *lingotière*, but no example of it in the sense of *lingot* is recorded before 1558. Therefore he suggested the possibility of *ingot* being a loan-word taken from the French *lingot* by apheresis. Instead of stopping there, he went on to reject the opinion of Ménage because the first vowel of *linguet* is not identical with that of *langue* < *lingua*. In other words, he never had the opportunity to consider *langot*—"lingot" which is the precise form of the Judaeo-French gloss already mentioned.

Aside from *lingot*—*langot*, one might think of the doublet *lingueter*—*langueter* used by carpenters to express the action of *pratiquer une languette dans une planche*.<sup>19</sup> Diez did not anticipate that his assumption of *linguet* < *lingua* would ever be challenged later on.<sup>20</sup> It was Gamillscheg who expressed disagreement, because this nautical term did not appear until the seventeenth century;<sup>21</sup> hence he sought its origin in the English "sling" through the intermediary of *élinguet*. He failed to complete his chronological investigation, however, because *élinguet* made its first appearance in 1694 or sixty years after the birth of *linguet*. This nautical term is relevant to our main discussion on the phenomenon of apheresis,

<sup>15</sup> *An Etym. Dict. of the English Language* (Oxford, 1910). Credit must be given to Skeat for pointing out that Low Latin *lingotus* "has been by some fancifully derived from Latin *lingua*, the tongue, owing to a supposed resemblance of a mass of molten metal to the shape of the tongue." Du Cange himself had noticed the resemblance.

<sup>16</sup> *An Etym. Dict. of Modern English* (London, 1921).

<sup>17</sup> *An Amer. Dict. of the English Language* (New York, 1828). This distinctive etymology has disappeared from the 1944 edition of Webster's *New International Dict. of the English Language*.

<sup>18</sup> *Etym. Wörterbuch rom. Sprachen* (Bonn,

1878), p. 627.

<sup>19</sup> E. Littré, *Dict. de la langue fran.* (Paris, 1875). The formation of *lingot* from *ingot* did not convince Littré "de sorte que l'ancienne étymologie, qui tire *lingot* du latin *lingua* à cause de la forme, demeure toujours possible."

<sup>20</sup> Diez is upheld by the *Dictionnaire Général*, s. v.; D. Behrens, *Festgabe W. Foerster: Beiträge rom. engl. Phil.* (Halle, 1902), p. 236; H. Saggau, *Die Benennungen Schiffsteile Schiffsgüter Neufr.* (Kiel, 1905), art. 163; Meyer-Lübke, *Rom. etym. Wörterbuch*, art. 5067; Dauzat, *Dict. étym. langue fran.*, s. v.

<sup>21</sup> *Etym. Wörterbuch frz. Sprache*, s. r.



because the anonymous author of a booklet entitled *Constructions des vaisseaux du Roy* (Havre de Grâce, 1691) uses *inguet*.<sup>22</sup>

Apparently Diez introduced *linguet* into the argument since he could not think of any other word comparable to *lingot* in its ending. That being the case, it is proper to mention Old French *languet*—"langue" used in a religious poem which was inspired by the *Song of Songs*.<sup>23</sup> It is hardly necessary to note the survival of *lingue*—"langue" in many dialects—in picard, normand, poitevin, berrichon, bourbonnais, champenois;<sup>24</sup> it shows that the first vowel in *lingot* need surprise nobody. One can compare the normand *linguer*—"parler, jaser," derived from *lingue*, with the saintongeais *élanguer*, "mourir de soif," derived from *langue*.<sup>25</sup> Finally Diez could have found even *lingot* itself used instead of *langue* in a dialect of Franche-Comté.<sup>26</sup>

Let us now turn our attention to the old words that may be pertinent to our problem. The ingot must have served as currency in primitive Gaul. Blanchet's study of the gold ingots unearthed at Nesmy led him to conclude that *les lingots étaient employés comme monnaies de compte pour la valeur d'autant de statères qu'on y avait fait de coches*.<sup>27</sup> It is definite, thanks to Bloch, that in the fourteenth century *lingot* was used by Jean de Vignay some fifty years before *ingot* was used by Chaucer. The information available anent cognate terms of exchange is vague. Godefroy, IV, p. 791a, is content to define as a *sorte de monnaie* the term *linguat* used in the *Histoire de Metz* for the year 1434. In this *Histoire de Metz* for the years 1306 and 1341, Godefroy, IV, p. 716a, came across *langre* or *lengre*, which he did not attempt to interpret. I wonder whether it might present a vestige of *lingula* which in Latin could apply to "the tongue of a scale-beam" or "the short arm of a lever which is placed under a weight that is to be raised." Since this Latin word was composed out of *lingua*, it may not be amiss to refer to *langue*—"languette, aiguille de balance" in a document of 1321.<sup>28</sup> Godefroy, IV, p. 715c, gave a citation of *langoine* in an archive of 1245. He also repeated the two examples given by Du Cange, V, p. 25b, one of which places *langoine* in apposition with *estevenant*—"une monnaie frappée à l'effigie de saint Etienne." Godefroy's definition *monnaie en usage à Langres* corresponds to Du Cange's scholium, as follows: *.X. livres d'estevenans ou de langoines, id est, Lingonensium ab urbe Lingone seu Langone*. This allusion to the city of Langres may have been prompted by another instance dated 1255 by Du Cange,

<sup>22</sup> This statement, borrowed from Jal's *Glossaire nautique* (Paris, 1848), s.v. *linguet*, helps to contradict the hypothesis of Barbier, *Revue ling. rom.* X (1934), p. 148, that *linguet* evolved out of *le hinguet*. Barbier traces *hinguet*, first used in 1678 by Guillet, back to the Middle Dutch *hengel* "anse, hameçon," while recognizing the shift of the accent from the root to the suffix.

<sup>23</sup> Published by K. Bartsch, *Chrestomathie de l'ancien fran.* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 47; cf. the berrichon *languet* "langue fourrée de boeuf" in H. F. Jaubert, *Glos. du Centre de la France* (Paris, 1864).

<sup>24</sup> J. Corblet, *Glos. étym. et comparatif du patois picard ancien et moderne* (Paris, 1851); L. Du Bois, *Glos. du patois normand* (Caen, 1856); L'abbé Rousseau, *Glos. poitevin* (Niort, 1869); H. F. Jaubert, *Glos. du Centre de la France* (Paris, 1864); P. Duchon, *Gram. et dict. du patois bourbonnais* (Moulins, 1904); E. Guénard, *Le Patois de Courtisols* (Châlons-sur-Marne, 1905). Map 750 of the *Atlas ling. France* transcribed *lingue* for one point at least in each

of the departments of Orne, Deux-Sèvres, Vendée, Charente, Indre, Allier, Haute Marne, Marne, Aisne, Meuse.

<sup>25</sup> Du Bois, *Glos. du patois normand*; G. Musset, *Glos. des patois et des parlers de l'Aunis et de la Saintonge* (La Rochelle, 1931), who refers to A. Thomas, *Romania* XXXIV (1905), p. 459.

<sup>26</sup> J. Tissot, *Le Patois des Fourgs* (Besançon, 1865). Moreover, Map 750 of the *Atlas ling. France* gives the phonetic transcription for *lingo* in the departments of Doubs at point 31, Jura at point 918, Ain at point 917, Rhône at point 818, Loire at point 808.

<sup>27</sup> *Traité des monnaies gauloises*, I (Paris, 1905), p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> J. B. de La Curne de Sainte-Palaye, *Dict. hist. de l'ancien langage fran.*, VII p. 145a. See note 14 *supra*. G. Belz, *Die Münz-bezeichnungen in der altfr. Lit.* (Strassburg, 1914), p. 70, offers the proper references to describe the *langoine* (<*lingonica*) coined by the Bishops of Langres (<*Lingones*).

V, p. 497c: *Il est hon l'Evesque de Leingres pour .12. livres de languines qu'il doit panre en la vente de Leingres chascun an tousjours*, but the affinity is not always as clear as it is in that instance.<sup>29</sup>

That leads us to a consideration of a slang word which has always been a favorite subject with those lexicographers who compose commentaries on colloquial French. In the case of *lingre*, an error has been perpetuated as a kind of tradition.<sup>30</sup> I borrow the chronology of the word, in an abridged form, from Sainéan:<sup>31</sup> *ingre*, *La Vie généreuse des mercelots* 1596;<sup>32</sup> *lingres*, *Le Jargon de l'argot reformé* 1628; *lingre*, Leclair, *Histoire des brigands chauffeurs* 1800; *lingrer*—"frapper à coups de couteau," *lingrerie*—"coutellerie," *lingriot*—"canif, bistouri, petit couteau," Vidocq, *Les Voleurs* 1837, which can be completed with *lingue* "couteau" (1878);<sup>33</sup> *linguer*—"donner des coups de couteau" (1880).<sup>34</sup> It is almost incredible that, in spite of the obvious anachronism, Sainéan also based this family of words on *lingre*—"couteau . . . proprement couteau de Langres, ville célèbre par sa coutellerie." Subsequently Dauzat saw fit to ignore the chronology on four occasions—in 1917, in 1918, in 1929, and again in 1938. In *Les Argots de métiers franco-provençaux*, page 51, he refers to *ingre* pour *lingre* dans la *Vie généreuse*. In *L'Argot de la guerre*, he describes *lingue* in this wise: *couteau* (anciennement *lingre*; à l'origine, *couteau de Langres*). In *Les Argots*, pages 65 and 108, one reads:

"Un terme à succès est *lingre*, couteau (aujourd'hui *lingue*, par effritement de la finale), est le nom de la ville de Langres, à la coutellerie jadis réputée (ellipse de: couteau de Langres); la nasale *in* est conforme à l'ancienne prononciation champenoise . . . L, à l'initiale d'un mot, a pu être pris pour l'article, d'où des formes *ingre*, couteau (*Vie des mercelots*) à côté de *lingre*; *ance*, eau (idem) à côté de *lance*."

He also entered this term of thieves' slang in his *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*:

"*lingue*, couteau, argot, altération de *lingre* (*Jargon*, 1628); variante *ingre* (*Vie généreuse* 1597), proprement couteau de *Langres* (avec l'ancienne prononciation champenoise *Lingre*)."

How can one assign to Champagne the phonetic source of a word which came into existence at the end of the sixteenth century? Even granting Dauzat's assumption,<sup>35</sup> one cannot overlook Guénard's contention that *le courtisien qui dit lingue pour langue et blin pour blanc dit au contraire pan pour pain et gran pour grain*.<sup>36</sup> Another effort to reconcile simultaneously *lingre* > *ingre* by deglutination and *lingre* > *lingue* by analogy with *lingue*—"langue" is as ambiguous as it is far-fetched:

<sup>29</sup> W. H. Trethewey, *La Petite Philosophie* (Oxford, 1939), p. 116, maintains that *Lengres* in verse 1154 "stands for the Latin *Liger*, the Loire; the Roman province of Narbonensis Gallia lay south of the Loire and west of the Rhône."

<sup>30</sup> F. Michel, *Études de philologie comparée sur l'argot* (Paris, 1856); A. Delvau, *Dict. de la langue verte* (Paris, 1867); L. Larchey, *Dict. hist. d'argot* (Paris, 1880); L. Rigaud, *Dict. d'argot moderne* (Paris, 1881); A. Barrère, *Argot and Slang* (London, 1887); C. Villatte, *Parisismen* (Berlin, 1895); H. France, *Dict. de la langue verte* (Paris, 1907); L. E. Kastner—J. Marks, *A Glossary of Colloquial and Popular French* (London,

1929).

<sup>31</sup> *Les Sources de l'argot ancien*, II (Paris, 1912), p. 386.

<sup>32</sup> The author uses the pseudonym Pechon de Ruby; the reading in the 1627 edition is *lingre*.

<sup>33</sup> This date is supplied by E. Chautard, *La Vie étrange de l'argot* (Paris, 1931), p. 596.

<sup>34</sup> This verb is cited in Larchey's dictionary.

<sup>35</sup> See note 24. Balzac, *Oeuvres Complètes*, VI, p. 186, bestowed literary dignity upon *cint*, *ein*, *innocente*, *enfant* as used at Issoudun in *La Rabouilleuse*.

<sup>36</sup> *Le Patois de Courtisols*, p. 27.

"Assimilation à la langue, latin *lingua*, organe qui s'élargit à volonté comme elle, s'effile en dard, au sens propre comme au figuré . . . latin *lancea*, lance, *ligo*, pic, houe, d'où *Ligones*, habitants du plateau de Langres, sont des congénères; . . . *lingre*, *ingre*, L, qui fait partie du corps du mot, ayant été considéré comme l'article."<sup>37</sup>

There Timmermans went off on a tangent needlessly, because in Celtic Gaul the inhabitants of Langres were not called *Ligones* but *Lingones*; *lingre* never underwent aphesis, but it is conceivable that *lingre* modified its ending under the influence of *lingue*—"langue."

If one is guided by the chronology, then the evolution *ingre* > *lingre* > *lingue* appears tenable. It convinced Delesalle some time ago.<sup>38</sup> He put down the three stages in the proper sequence, and thereby he saw a clear case of prosthesis. He argued that *lingre* is derived from *l'ingre*, *mot qui n'a aucun rapport avec Langres, ville où l'on fabrique de la coutellerie*.

In this word-study I have dwelt upon the semantic and etymological relationship between *langue* and *langot*. The latter term has been found only in a Judaeo-French document, which means that the original is in Hebrew. The similarity between the idea of a tongue in the mouth and that of an ingot of gold is even more striking in Hebrew: the lemma *lashon*, which serves as the heading of the gloss in dictionary G, is usually applied to a tongue but sometimes, as in this commentary on *Joshua* vii, 24, it is the equivalent of an ingot of gold.<sup>39</sup>

Before closing, I wish to take up an allegory in *La Vie de Saint Thomas Becket*, which is unknown elsewhere. In it Guernes de Pont-Sainte-Maxence alludes to three monetary personifications, which the editor Walberg identifies in this wise: *Blanchart* stands for "white silver" in line 2284; *Sorel* stands for "red gold" in the same line; *Angot* stands for "gold" in line 2653:

Rome est a Evrewic, Rogier a trop argent;  
Cil ad Angot od lui, dunc ad Rome en present!

Godefroy, I p. 655c, records *blanchart*—"tirant sur le blanc;" then Godefroy, VII p. 481b, lists *sorel*—"fauve," and adds that *Sorel* in *La Vie de Saint Thomas Becket* "désigne l'or par opposition à *Blanchart* qui indique l'argent."<sup>40</sup> Paul Meyer finds an exact parallel to the personification of *Sorel* as *l'or rouge* and of *Blanchart* as *l'argent blanc* in the Latin and French jokes about two martyrs at Rome, Saint Rufin and Saint Albin.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, I know of no discussion whatsoever on *Angot*. Even though Guernes de Pont-Sainte-Maxence completed his hagiographical poem at Canterbury as early as 1174, I venture to inquire whether *angot* might reflect *langot* just as *ingot* reflects *lingot*.<sup>42</sup>

RAPHAEL LEVY

University of Texas.

<sup>37</sup> A. Timmermans, *L'Argot parisien* (Paris, 1922).

<sup>38</sup> *Dict. argot fran.* (Paris, 1896).

<sup>39</sup> M. H. Bresslau, *Hebrew and English Dictionary* (London, 1855), s. v. *lashon*, p. 298: "*lashon*, tongue, . . . is also transferred to inanimate subjects, e.g., golden tongue, i.e., a bar of gold."

<sup>40</sup> The same explanation is offered by A. Tobler, *Vermischte Beiträge zur frz. Gram.*, II (Leipzig, 1906), p. 225.

<sup>41</sup> *L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, III (Paris, 1901), p. 151.

<sup>42</sup> See note 23 for an example of *linguet* in a pious poem composed either in the eleventh century or in the twelfth century.

# V. Old-English Riddle I: "Fire"

THERE has been considerable discussion of Riddle 1<sup>1</sup> of the Exeter Book. It is solved by everyone as "Storm" or "Storm on Land" and held to be closely related to the two riddles immediately following it in the manuscript.<sup>2</sup> Trautmann, ignoring the divisions of the Exeter Book and the closing formulae of the riddles themselves, regards the three riddles as in effect one.<sup>3</sup> Dobbie evades the issue.<sup>4</sup> I feel that the riddle has been almost completely misunderstood, and would solve it as "Fire". This solution is reached by recognizing two clearly defined episodes in the riddle, (1) ll. 2-9, a forest fire, (2) ll. 10-14, a human sacrifice. In both episodes the author seems to have in mind a fiendish power residing in these destructive fires. This solution demands that a period be placed after *fylle* (l. 9) and that the *héanum* (l. 10) of the manuscript be restored. All editors, following Grein, have read *héahum*.

I supply here the revised text, with translation.

Hwylc is haeleþa þæs horsc      ond þæs hygecræftig  
þæt þæt mæge ásecgan,

## I. FOREST FIRE (BRUSH FIRE?)

|                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| þonne ic ástíge strong, | hwá mec on sið wræce, |
| þrymful þunie,          | stundum répe,         |
| fére geond foldan,      | þrágum wráce          |
| ræced reafige?          | folcsalo bærne,       |
| haswe ofer hrófum.      | Récas stigað,         |
| wælcwealm were,         | Hlin bið on eorþan,   |
| bearwas blédhwate,      | þonne ic wudu hrére,  |
|                         | beamas fylle.         |

## II. HUMAN SACRIFICE

|                     |                   |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| Holme gehréfed,     | héanum meahtum    |
| wrecen on wápe,     | wíde sended;      |
| hæbbe me on hrycge, | þæt ær hádas wreh |
| foldbúendra,        | flæsc ond gæstas, |
| somod on sunde.     |                   |

|                   |                     |
|-------------------|---------------------|
|                   | Saga hwá mec þecce, |
| opþe hú ic hátte, | þe þá hlæst bere.   |

"Who is so wise a man, and so intelligent  
That he can tell

<sup>1</sup>For the numbering of the riddles, I am following G. P. Krapp and E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Exeter Book* (N.Y. 1936).

<sup>2</sup>So solved by F. Dietrich, 'Die Rätsel des Exeterbuchs Würdigung, Lösung und Herstellung', *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum*, XI (1859), 448-490; Moritz Trautmann, 'Die Auflösungen der altenglischen Rätsel', *Anglia Beiblatt* V (1894), 46-51; Frederick Tupper, *The Riddles of the Exeter Book* (Boston, 1910); A. J. Wyatt, *Old English*

*Riddles* (Boston 1912); etc.

<sup>3</sup>Moritz Trautmann, *op. cit.*; Edmund Erlemann, 'Zu den ae. Rätseln', *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen*, CXI (1903), 49-63.

<sup>4</sup>*Op. cit.* p. 321. "And, after all, the question whether these riddles are one or three, is similar to the question whether *Christ* is one poem or three, and like that question probably impossible of a definitive answer."

# I. FOREST FIRE (BRUSH FIRE?)

who sustains my motion  
when I flare up strong, or when, raging,  
powerful, I roar; or when with vengeance  
I travel through the land burning the dwellings of men,  
robbing buildings? Grey smoke rises  
over the roof tops. There is a noise on the earth,  
slaughter of men, when I disturb the forest,  
the fruitful groves, when I fell trees.

# II. HUMAN SACRIFICE

Covered with water, sustained by  
base powers, spread abroad,  
I have on my back what once wrapped the persons  
of men, their flesh and souls,  
together in the water.

Say who covers me,  
or how I am called, who bear these burdens."

Anyone who has seen a fire race through a wooded area, destroying homes and felling trees, will find in the first part of this riddle a very effective piece of descriptive writing, and will be disposed to solve it as Fire. There is nothing in this solution to strain the sense of the text. Indeed, *folcsalo bærne* (l. 5) and *récas stigað háswæ ofer hrófum* (ll. 6-7) are more applicable to the Spirit of Fire than to the Spirit of Storm, and the intense action of the lines

Hlin bið on eorþan,  
wælcwealm, werā, þonne ic wudu hrére,  
bearwas bléðhwate, beamas fylle. (ll. 8-10)

is quite as characteristic of the violence of a forest fire as of a thunderstorm. An interesting parallel where a similar description actually refers to a forest fire is provided in Aldhelm's *Scintilla* (Spark) riddle.

Nam saltus nemorum densos pariterque fructea  
Piniferosque simul montes cum mollibus altos  
Truxque rapaxque capaxque feroxque sub aethere spargo.<sup>5</sup>

The further possibility that we have here, and in the succeeding episode, to do with a preternatural fire is perhaps substantiated by the tone of the question with which the riddle opens:

Who is so wise a man, and so intelligent  
that he can tell who sustains my motion  
when I flare up strong?

If indeed this tone is really present, then the description of the fire that follows it is not unlike the strange fire in the land of the Ubii described by Tacitus:

<sup>5</sup> J. H. Pitman, *The Riddles of Aldhelm* (New Haven, 1925), pp. 54-6.  
The translation there provided reads:  
"For woodlands dense, groves, shrubs, and mountains tall,

Pine forests on their flanks, I murderously—  
Savage and greedy, with capacious maw—  
Lay waste, and scatter wide beneath the sky."

A sudden calamity now befell our allies the Ubii. A fire sprang out of the ground which devoured houses, lands, and villages, and swept up to the very walls of the newly founded colony. Nothing availed to quench it: neither rain, nor river-water, nor any other kind of liquid; till at last some of the enraged rustics, finding all other remedies fail, took up stones and cast them at the flames.<sup>6</sup>

The second part of the poem (ll. 10-14) depicts in sinister terms a boiling cauldron containing the flesh of human victims, suspended over a sacrificial fire. That the victims are human is implied by the *flæsc ond gæstas* (l. 13), and the shameful and fiendish nature of the act is to be seen in the expression *héanum meahtrum* (l. 10). It is not unusual for O.E. *héan* to bear a disreputable sense.<sup>7</sup> The whole episode may very well refer to the burning of enemy captives, in which case there is a possible parallel in the other Fire riddle of the Exeter book.

Wiga is on eorþan . . .  
    þonne on teon wigeð  
 feond his feonde.                               (Riddle 50, ll. 1-4)

These lines could refer to fire either as an offensive weapon or as a means of recrimination, but it is well established that Germanic peoples sometimes sacrificed their prisoners-of-war to the victory god. Jan de Vries<sup>8</sup> discusses the nature of these sacrifices and gathers together the recorded instances of such treatment. These include impaling human heads on tree trunks,<sup>9</sup> drowning victims in a river,<sup>10</sup> and cutting the victim's throat and collecting the blood in a brazen kettle.<sup>11</sup> De Vries adds that *andere Methoden sind wahrscheinlich geübt worden, aber wir wissen darüber nichts Sicheres*.<sup>12</sup> It may well be a question of one of these other methods in the riddle under consideration.

This solution of the first riddle has this to be said for it, that it both ascribes a genuine sense of literary form to the author in discerning two cleverly related episodes, and appears to relieve the hitherto almost total obscurity of the last six lines.

LAURENCE K. SHOOK C.S.B.,

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

<sup>6</sup> "Sed civitas Ubiorum socia nobis malo inprovisa adflicta est. Nam ignes terra editi villas arva vicos passim corripiebant ferebanturque in ipsa conditae nuper coloniae moenia. Neque extingui poterant, non si imbres caderent, non fluvialibus aquis aut quo alio humore, donec inopia remediorum et ira cladis agrestes quidam eminus saxa iacere . . ." Tacitus, *Annales*, XIII, 57, 6. Transl. G. G. Ramsey, *The Annals of Tacitus*,

II (London, 1909), 176.

<sup>7</sup> *Beowulf*, 1274, and 2099, *héan* describes Grendel as he leaves Heorot mortally wounded.

<sup>8</sup> *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte*, I (Berlin, 1935), 253.

<sup>9</sup> Tacitus, *Annales*, I, 61.

<sup>10</sup> Procopius, II, 25, 9.

<sup>11</sup> Strabo (ed. S. Kramer, p. 294).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 252.